Vol. 74 March 1980 No. 1

PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE FROM
POLITICAL SCIENCE
LIBRARY

The American Political Science Review

Published Quarterly by
The American Political Science Association

American Government.
What it does. How it works.
Where it stands.

Harper & Row texts help students find the answers.

PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

Third Edition

KENNETH PREWITT & SIDNEY VERBA

Noted for its clarity of writing, broadness of coverage, and interesting analysis, this text is more effective than ever in helping students grasp complex problems through an easy-to-understand approach. The text focuses on the relationship between the economy and the political system and shows how the issue of equality permeates political life by using a combination of institutional and behavioral approaches. Features include a new chapter on the bureaucracy...a combined chapter incorporating the most up-to-date research on parties and elections...and coverage of affirmative action and women's rights. Paper. Instructor's Manual and Test Bank. January 1980. 366 pages. ISBN 0-06-045278-1.

AN INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

Third Edition

Also by PREWITT & VERBA

Revised and updated to successfully meet the needs of courses in the 80's, this popular text employs a thought-provoking intellectual framework to cover all of the traditional aspects of American government. Special emphasis is given to the interrelationship between economics and politics. Highlights of the third edition include a stronger thematic focus on equality; a new chapter on the American bureaucracy; a greatly expanded chapter on the presidency; separate coverage of parties and elections; new and expanded material on the Constitution, affirmative action, the political role of blacks and the unemployed, school segregation, and many other topics. Instructor's Manual and Test Bank. 1979. 657 pages. ISBN 0-06-045279-X.

To request examination copies, write to Suite 5D (809), Harper & Row, 10 East 53d St., New York, N.Y. 10022. Please include course title, enrollment, and present text.

Harper & Row
New York • San Francisco

The American Political Science Review

Vol. 74 March, 1980 No. 1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

What Happened to the British Party Model? .... Leon D. Epstein 9
APSA Presidential Address, 1979

Exploring a New Role in Policy Making: The British House of Commons in the 1970s .... John E. Schwarz 23

Reason, Development, and the Conflicts of Human Ends: Sir Isaiah Berlin's Vision of Politics .... Robert A. Kocis 38

John Locke: From Absolutism to Toleration .... Robert P. Kraynak 53

"Cool Reflexion" and the Criticism of Values: Is, Ought, and Objectivity in Hume's Social Science .... Stephen G. Salkever 70

The Two Faces of Issue Voting .... Edward G. Carmines & James A. Stimson 78

Opinion Representation versus Social Representation; Or, Why Women Can't Run as Women and Win .... Jerry Perkins & Diane L. Fowlkes 92

Deconstructing Methodological Falsificationism in International Relations .... Roger D. Spegele 104

Temporal and Spatial Diffusion in the Comparative Analysis of Social Change .... David Klingman 123

Communications 138

Editorial Note 140

Review Essay–*Being Intelligent about Secret Intelligence Agencies* .... Harry Howe Ransom 141

Book Reviews
- Political Theory and Methodology 149
- American Politics 185
- Comparative Politics 221
- International Politics 284

Office of publication: Curtis Reed Plaza, Menasha, Wisconsin.
Second class postage paid at Washington, D.C., and at additional mailing offices.
Composition by TypoGraphics, Columbia, Maryland
Printed in the United States of America by George Banta Company, Inc., Menasha, Wisconsin.

Copyright 1980, by The American Political Science Association, publisher of *The American Political Science Review* (ISSN–0003–0554).

BOOK REVIEWS

Political Theory and Methodology

Ball, Terence, ed. *Political Theory and Praxis: New Perspectives* . . . . Tracy Strong 149

Bouchier, David. *Idealism and Revolution: New Ideologies of Liberation in Britain and the United States* . . . . Larry D. Spence 151

Brewer, Garry D., and Martin Shubik. *The War Game: A Critique of Military Problem Solving* . . . . Davis B. Bobrow 152

Burns, James MacGregor. *Leadership* . . . . Lester G. Seligman 153

Cohen, G. A. *Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defense* . . . . Alan Gilbert 156

Damico, Alfonso J. *Individuality and Community: The Social and Political Thought of John Dewey* . . . . John D. Lewis 158

Danford, John W. *Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy: A Reexamination of the Foundations of Social Science* . . . . David D. Laitin 159

de Beer, E. S., ed. *The Correspondence of John Locke:* Vol. 3, *Letters Nos. 849–1241;* Vol. 4, *Letters Nos. 1242–1701* . . . . Robert H. Horwitz 160

Dunn, James. *Western Political Theory in the Face of the Future* . . . . Lyman T. Sargent 161

Fralin, Richard. *Rousseau and Representation: A Study of the Development of His Concept of Political Institutions* . . . . Roger D. Masters 161

Gandy, D. Ross. *Marx and History: From Primitive Society to the Communist Future* . . . . Ronald J. Hunt 163

Germani, Gino. *Authoritarianism, Fascism, and National Populism* . . . . A. James Gregor 163

Hayek, F. A. *Law, Legislation, and Liberty,* Vol. 3: *The Political Order of a Free People* . . . . David L. Schaefer 165

Henley, Nancy M. *Body Politics: Power, Sex, and Nonverbal Communication* . . . . Bernard Grofman 165

Hoole, Francis W. *Evaluation Research and Development Activities* . . . . David Nachmias 168

Hutter, Horst. *Politics as Friendship: The Origins of Classical Notions of Politics in the Theory and Practice of Friendship* . . . . James M. Rhodes 169

Knei-Paz, Baruch. *The Social and Political Thought of Leon Trotsky* . . . . Ladis K. D. Kristof 170

Kreml, William P. *The Anti-Authoritarian Personality* . . . . C. Anthony Broh 171

McGrath, Michael J. G., ed. *Liberalism and the Modern Polity: Essays in Contemporary Political Theory* . . . . Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr. 172

Nichols, Ray. *Treason, Tradition, and the Intellectual: Julien Benda and Political Discourse* . . . . Robert J. Pranger 173

Said, Edward W. *Orientalism* . . . . Charles E. Butterworth 174

Schaefer, David L. *Justice or Tyranny: A Critique of John Rawls's "A Theory of Justice"* . . . . James Fishkin 176

Schramm, Sarah S. *Plow Women Rather Than Reapers: An Intellectual History of Feminism in the United States* . . . . Nannerl O. Keohane 177

Schuman, David. *The Ideology of Form: The Influence of Organizations in America* . . . . Vincent Ostrom 178

Simonds, A. P. *Karl Mannheim's Sociology of Knowledge* . . . . Arthur L. Kalleberg 179

Turner, Bryan S. *Marx and the End of Orientalism* . . . . Charles E. Butterworth 174

Ward, Michael Don. *The Political Economy of Distribution: Equality versus Inequality* . . . . Robert W. Jackman 181

Wolfe, Alan. *The Limits of Legitimacy: Political Contradictions of Contemporary Capitalism* . . . . Edward J. Harpham 182

Wood, Ellen M., and Neal Wood. *Class Ideology and Ancient Political Theory: Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle in Social Context* . . . . Mary P. Nichols 183

American Politics

Andersen, Kristi. *The Creation of a Democratic Majority, 1928–1936* . . . . Paul A. Beck 185

Benokraitis, Nijole V., and Joe R. Feagin. *Affirmative Action and Equal Opportunity: Action, Inaction, Reaction* . . . . Allan P. Sindler 186

Berk, Richard A., et al. *A Measure of Justice: An Empirical Study of Changes in the California Penal Code, 1955–1971* . . . . Larry L. Berg 187

Blair, John M. *The Control of Oil* . . . . Charles F. Doran 188

Boles, Janet K. *The Politics of the Equal Rights Amendment: Conflict and the Decision Process* . . . . Irene Diamond 190

Connery, Robert H., and Gerald Benjamin. *Rockefeller of New York: Executive Power in the Statehouse* . . . . Sarah M. Morehouse 191

Engler, Robert. *The Brotherhood of Oil: Energy Policy and the Public Interest* .... Charles F. Doran 188
Etheredge, Lloyd S. *A World of Men: The Private Sources of American Foreign Policy* .... David Garnham 192
Freedman, James O. *Crisis and Legitimacy: The Administrative Process and American Government* .... Paul P. Van Riper 193
Gans, Herbert J. *Deciding What's News: A Study of CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, Newsweek, and Time* .... Michael J. Robinson 194
Goldman, Ralph M. *Search for Consensus: The Story of the Democratic Party* .... M. Margaret Conway 195
Greenberg, Edward S. *Understanding Modern Government: The Rise and Decline of the American Political Economy* .... Benjamin Ginsberg 196
Greer, Scott, et al., eds. *Accountability in Urban Society: Public Agencies Under Fire* .... Robert T. Golembiewski 197
Grøndbjerg, Kirsten, et al. *Poverty and Social Change* .... Edgar Litt 198
Harder, Marvin A., and Raymond G. Davis. *The Legislature as an Organization: A Study of the Kansas Legislature* .... John G. Grumm 199
Higginbotham, A. Leon, Jr. *In the Matter of Color: Race and the American Legal Process, The Colonial Period* .... A. E. Keir Nash 200
Kanter, Arnold. *Defense Politics: A Budgetary Perspective* .... Aaron Wildavsky 202
Kinnard, Douglas. *President Eisenhower and Strategic Management: A Study in Defense Politics* .... Paul Y. Hammond 203
Larkey, Patrick D. *Evaluating Public Programs: The Impact of General Revenue Sharing on Municipal Government* .... Richard L. Cole 204
Lipset, Seymour M., ed. *Emerging Coalitions in American Politics* .... Richard F. Schier 205
Lowi, Theodore J. *The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States* .... Norman C. Thomas 206
Lupo, Alan. *Liberty's Chosen Home: The Politics of Violence in Boston* .... John F. Stack, Jr. 207
Margiotta, Franklin D., ed. *The Changing World of the American Military* .... Lawrence J. Korb 209
Mazmanian, Daniel A., and Jeanne Nienaber. *Can Organizations Change? Environmental Protection, Citizen Participation, and the Corps of Engineers* .... Walter A. Rosenbaum 210
Orfield, Gary. *Must We Bus? Segregated Schools and National Policy* .... Willis D. Hawley 211
Page, Benjamin I. *Choices and Echoes in Presidential Elections: Rational Man and Electoral Democracy* .... John H. Aldrich 212
Platt, Alan. *The U.S. Senate and Strategic Arms Policy 1969–1977* .... Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. 213
Platt, Alan, and Lawrence D. Weiler. *Congress and Arms Control* .... Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. 213
Schneider, Jerrold E. *Ideological Coalitions in Congress* .... Aage R. Clausen 215
Sibley, Joel H., et al., eds. *The History of American Electoral Behavior* .... Everett C. Ladd, Jr. 216
Spaeth, Harold J. *Supreme Court Policy Making: Explanation and Prediction* .... John R. Schmidhauser 217
Theberge, Leonard J., ed. *The Judiciary in a Democratic Society* .... Philip L. Dubois 218
Van Gerpen, Maurice. *Privileged Communication and the Press: The Citizen's Right to Know versus the Law's Right to Confidential News Source Evidence* .... Martin Shapiro 219
Yates, Douglas. *The Ungovernable City* .... Martin Shefter 219

Comparative Politics

Alba, Víctor; trans. by Barbara Lotito. *Transition in Spain: From Franco to Democracy* .... Goldie Shabad 221
Alexander, Robert J. *Juan Domingo Perón: A History* .... George I. Blanksten 222
Allworth, Edward, ed. *Nationality Group Survival in Multi-Ethnic States: Shifting Support Patterns in the Soviet Baltic Region* .... Ihor Kamenetsky 222
Baker, Raymond W. *Egypt's Uncertain Revolution Under Nasser and Sadat* .... Louis J. Cantori 224
Bennett, Gordon, et al. *Huadong: The Story of a Chinese People's Commune* .... David M. Lampton 224
Blasier, Cole, and Carmelo Mesa-Lago, eds. *Cuba in the World* .... Andres Suarez 225

Brand, Jack. *The National Movement in Scotland* .... Charles L. Taylor 226
Bromke, Adam, and Derry Novak, eds. *The Communist States in the Era of Detente, 1971–1977* .... Donald R. Kelley 227
Butler, David, and Austin Ranney, eds. *Referendums: A Comparative Study of Practice and Theory* .... Hugh A. Bone 228
Destler, I. M., et al. *The Textile Wrangle: Conflict in Japanese-American Relations, 1969–1971* .... Charles Lipson 229
de Weydenthal, Jan B. *The Communists of Poland: An Historical Outline* .... Andrzej Korbonski 231
Dunn, John, ed. *West African States: Failure and Promise, A Study in Comparative Politics* .... Richard L. Sklar 232
Eldersveld, Samuel J., and Bashiruddin Ahmed. *Citizens and Politics: Mass Political Behavior in India* .... Aruna N. Michie 233
Evans, Peter. *Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State, and Local Capital in Brazil* .... Peter McDonough 234
Freeman, Gary P. *Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict in Industrial Societies: The French and British Experience, 1945–1975* .... Donley T. Studlar 235
Galnoor, Itzhak, ed. *Government Secrecy in Democracies* .... Leon V. Sigal 236
Gleijeses, Piero. *The Dominican Crisis: The 1965 Constitutionalist Revolt and American Intervention* .... Jerome Slater 238
Godson, Roy, and Stephen Haseler. *"Eurocommunism": Implications for East and West* .... R. Neal Tannehill 240
Gyorgy, Andrew, and James A. Kuhlman, eds. *Innovation in Communist Systems* .... Roy F. Grow 241
Haungs, Peter, ed. *Res Publica: Studien zum Verfassungswesen* .... Donald P. Kommers 242
Hicks, Ursula K. *Federalism: Failure and Success. A Comparative Study* .... Richard H. Leach 243
Hodnett, Grey. *Leadership in the Soviet National Republics: A Quantitative Study of Recruitment Policy* .... Valerie Bunce 245
Hutchinson, Martha C. *Revolutionary Terrorism: The FLN in Algeria, 1954–1962* .... Peter R. Knauss 246
Jancar, Barbara W. *Women under Communism* .... Ellen Mickiewicz 247
Kamenetsky, Ihor, ed. *Nationalism and Human Rights: Processes of Modernization in the USSR* .... Steven L. Burg 248
Kedward, H. R. *Resistance in Vichy France: A Study of Ideas and Motivation in the Southern Zone 1940–1942* .... John F. Sweets 249
Lerman, Arthur J. *Taiwan's Politics: The Provincial Assemblymen's World* .... Sheldon Appleton 250
MacKenzie, Norman, ed. *The Letters of Sidney and Beatrice Webb:* Vol. 1, *Apprenticeships, 1873–1892;* Vol. 2, *Partnership, 1892–1912;* Vol. 3, *Pilgrimage, 1912–1947* .... George Feaver 251
Marr, David G., ed.; trans. by Christopher Jenkins et al. *Reflections from Captivity: Phan Boi Chau's "Prison Notes" and Ho Chi Minh's "Prison Diary"* .... Benedict J. Kerkvliet 253
McInnes, Simon, et al., eds. *The Soviet Union and East Europe Into the 1980's: Multidisciplinary Perspectives* .... Richard C. Gripp 254
Mellors, Colin. *The British MP: A Socio-Economic Study of the House of Commons* .... Harold D. Clarke 255
Mesa-Lago, Carmelo. *Social Security in Latin America: Pressure Groups, Stratification, and Inequality* .... Henry Dietz 256
Miller, William L. *Electoral Dynamics in Britain since 1918* .... W. Phillips Shively 257
Mlynář, Zdeněk. *Nachtfrost: Erfahrungun auf dem Weg vom realem zum menschlichen Sozialismus* .... Jiri Valenta 258
Nachmias, David, and David H. Rosenbloom. *Bureaucratic Culture: Citizens and Administrators in Israel* .... Dennis L. Dresang 260
Nelkin, Dorothy, ed. *Controversy: The Politics of Technical Decisions* .... Irvin C. Bupp 261
Odetola, Theophilus O. *Military Politics in Nigeria: Economic Development and Political Stability* .... Sam C. Sarkesian 262
Overholt, William H., ed. *The Future of Brazil* .... Ronald M. Schneider 263
Paul, David W. *The Cultural Limits of Revolutionary Politics: Change and Continuity in Socialist Czechoslovakia* .... Otto Ulč 264
Pempel, T. J. *Patterns of Japanese Policymaking:*

Experiences from Higher Education ...... Haruhiro Fukui 265
Poggi, Gianfranco. *The Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction* ...... Charles Tilly 266
Rakowska-Harmstone, Teresa, ed. *Perspectives for Change in Communist Societies* ...... Roger E. Kanet 267
Rokkan, Stein, ed. *Scandinavian Political Studies,* Vol. 12/66 ...... Eric S. Einhorn 268
Rosenthal, Uriel. *Political Order: Rewards, Punishments and Political Stability* ...... Leon Hurwitz 269
Smith, Peter H. *Labyrinths of Power: Political Recruitment in Twentieth-Century Mexico* ...... Harold Sims 270
Smith, Tony. *The French Stake in Algeria, 1945–1962* ...... John Waterbury 272
Stacey, Frank. *Ombudsmen Compared* ...... John E. Moore 272
Stegmann, Dirk, et al., eds. *Industrielle Gesellschaft und politisches System: Beiträge zur politischen Sozialgeschichte* ...... Gordon R. Mork 273
Stiefbold, Annette E. *The French Communist Party in Transition: PCF-CPSU Relations and the Challenge to Soviet Authority* ...... Roy C. Macridis 274
Suleiman, Ezra N. *Elites in French Society: The Politics of Survival* ...... Bernard E. Brown 276
Vanneman, Peter. *The Supreme Soviet: Politics and the Legislative Process in the Soviet Political System* ...... Richard C. Gripp 277
Verba, Sidney, et al. *Participation and Political Equality: A Seven-Nation Comparison* ...... Jack Citrin 278
Vogel, Ezra F. *Japan as Number One: Lessons for America* ...... Nobutaka Ike 280
Wesson, Robert G. *Lenin's Legacy: The Story of the CPSU* ...... Peter H. Juviler 281
Wynia, Gary W. *Argentina in the Postwar Era: Politics and Economic Policy Making in a Divided Society* ...... Lars Schoultz 282

International Politics

Aronson, Jonathan D. *Money and Power: Banks and the World Monetary System* ...... Robert W. Russell 284
Aronson, Shlomo. *Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East: An Israeli Perspective* ...... Alan Dowty 285
Bergsten, C. Fred, et al. *American Multinationals and American Interests* ...... Michael Doyle 286
Catudal, Honoré M., Jr. *A Balance Sheet of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin: Evaluation and Documentation* ...... Gerard Braunthal 288
Cranston, Maurice. *What Are Human Rights?* ...... Richard P. Claude 289
Goodman, Allan E. *The Lost Peace: America's Search for a Negotiated Settlement of the Vietnam War* ...... MacAlister Brown 290
Haas, Ernest B., et al. *Scientists and World Order: The Uses of Technical Knowledge in International Organizations* ...... Victor Ferkiss 291
Jahn, Egbert, ed. *Soviet Foreign Policy: Its Social and Economic Conditions* ...... Joseph L. Nogee 292
Jönsson, Christer. *Soviet Bargaining Behavior: The Nuclear Test Ban Case* ...... Herbert S. Dinerstein 293
Joynt, Carey B., and Percy E. Corbett. *Theory and Reality in World Politics* ...... Kenneth W. Thompson 294
Kaiser, Karl, and Hans-Peter Schwarz, eds. *America and Western Europe: Problems and Prospects* ...... David P. Calleo 295
Krasner, Stephen D. *Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy* ...... John G. Ruggie 296
Lockhart, Charles. *Bargaining in International Conflicts* ...... Charles S. Gochman 299
O'Leary, James P. *Systems Theory and Regional Integration: The "Market Model" of International Politics* ...... Werner J. Feld 300
Quester, George H. *Offense and Defense in the International System* ...... Manus I. Midlarsky 301
Richardson, Neil R. *Foreign Policy and Economic Dependence* ...... James A. Caporaso 302
Simon, Sheldon W., ed. *The Military and Security in*

the Third World: Domestic and International Impacts .... Ellen Stern and Miles D. Wolpin 303
Swearingen, Rodger. *The Soviet Union and Postwar Japan: Escalating Challenge and Response* .... Young C. Kim 305
Wallerstein, Immanual. *The Capitalist World-Economy: Essays by Immanual Wallerstein* .... Peter Cocks 306
Waterbury, John, and Ragaei E. Mallakh. *The Middle East in the Coming Decade: From Wellhead to Well-Being?* .... Frederic S. Pearson 307
Yarrow, C. H. Mike. *Quaker Experiences in International Conciliation* .... Darril Hudson 308

The American Political Science Association

1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

PRESIDENT: Warren E. Miller, *University of Michigan;* PRESIDENT-ELECT: Charles E. Lindblom, *Yale University;* VICE-PRESIDENTS: Lucius J. Barker, *Washington University;* Sidney Verba, *Harvard University;* Dina A. Zinnes, *Indiana University;* SECRETARY: Roberta Sigel, *Rutgers University;* TREASURER: James L. Sundquist, *The Brookings Institution;* PROGRAM CHAIRPERSON: Jack Dennis, *University of Wisconsin, Madison;* EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: Evron M. Kirkpatrick; MANAGING EDITOR, APSR: Charles O. Jones, *University of Pittsburgh.*

COUNCIL: (Above-named Officers *ex officiis*), 1979–1981: William C. Havard, *Vanderbilt University;* Chalmers Johnson, *University of California, Berkeley;* Anthony King, *University of Essex;* Ruth Morgenthau, *Brandeis University;* Richard Rosecrance, *Cornell University;* Allen Schick, *The Urban Institute;* Philip Siegelman, *San Francisco State University;* Ann R. Willner, *University of Kansas;* 1980–1982: Nazli Choucri, *Massachusetts Institute of Technology;* Milton C. Cummings, Jr., *Johns Hopkins University;* John Ferejohn, *California Institute of Technology;* Francine R. Frankel, *University of Pennsylvania;* Robert Jervis, *University of California, Los Angeles;* Malcolm E. Jewell, *University of Kentucky;* Abraham F. Lowenthal, *Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars;* Raymond Tanter, *University of Michigan.*

FORMER PRESIDENTS: Frank J. Goodnow, Albert Shaw, Frederic N. Judson, James Bryce, A. Lawrence Lowell, Woodrow Wilson, Simeon E. Baldwin, Albert Bushnell Hart, W. W. Willoughby, John Bassett Moore, Ernst Freund, Jesse Macy, Munroe Smith, Henry Jones Ford, Paul S. Reinsch, Leo S. Rowe, William A. Dunning, Harry A. Garfield, James W. Garner, Charles E. Merriam, Charles A. Beard, William B. Munro, Jesse S. Reeves, John A. Fairlie, Benjamin F. Shambaugh, Edward S. Corwin, William F. Willoughby, Isidor Loeb, Walter J. Shepard, Francis W. Coker, Arthur N. Holcombe, Thomas Reed Powell, Clarence A. Dykstra, Charles Grove Haines, Robert C. Brooks, Frederic A. Ogg, William Anderson, Robert E. Cushman, Leonard D. White, John M. Gaus, Walter F. Dodd, Arthur W. Macmahon, Henry R. Spencer, Quincy Wright, James K. Pollock, Peter H. Odegard, Luther H. Gulick, Pendleton Herring, Ralph J. Bunche, Charles McKinley, Harold D. Lasswell, E. E. Schattschneider, V. O. Key, Jr., R. Taylor Cole, Carl B. Swisher, Emmette S. Redford, Charles S. Hyneman, Carl J. Friedrich, C. Herman Pritchett, David B. Truman, Gabriel A. Almond, Robert A. Dahl, Merle Fainsod, David Easton, Karl W. Deutsch, Robert E. Lane, Heinz Eulau, Robert E. Ward, Avery Leiserson, Austin Ranney, James MacGregor Burns, Samuel H. Beer, John C. Wahlke, Leon D. Epstein.

MEMBERSHIP INFORMATION: *The American Political Science Review,* published quarterly during the months of March, June, September, and December, is supplied to all APSA members. Membership dues are charged according to the following schedule:

Membership Category		*Dues*
Regular		
Annual Income:	Under $12,000	$ 25
	$12,000–14,999	$ 30
	$15,000–19,999	$ 35
	$20,000–24,999	$ 40
	$25,000–29,999	$ 45
	$30,000 and over	$ 50
Student and Retired		$ 12
Family		$ 5
Life		$1000
Institutional (includes *APSR* and *PS*)		$ 50 domestic

Student memberships are limited to five years per person. Foreign currency at the official exchange rate will be accepted for foreign subscriptions and foreign membership fees. The equivalent of $4 per year for additional postage should be added for foreign subscriptions.

Current issues are priced at $10.50 per copy; for back issues prior to 1970 address Walter J. Johnson, Inc., 355 Chestnut St., Norwood, New Jersey 07648; for issues 1970 and later send request directly to the American Political Science Association.

Applications for membership, orders for the *Review,* and remittances should be addressed to the Executive Director, The American Political Science Association, 1527 New Hampshire Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. Notices of change of address should be received in the Washington office by the 25th day of the months before publication.

INDEXING: Articles and notes appearing in the *Review* before the June 1953 issues were indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature.* Current issues are indexed by *The International Political Science Abstracts,* the *United States Political Science Documents,* and the *Social Sciences and Humanities Index.* Microfilm of the *Review,* beginning with Volume 1, may be obtained from University Microfilms, 313 North First Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106. A *Cumulative Index of the Review,* Volumes 1–62; 1906–1968, may also be obtained from University Microfilms. Articles appearing in the *Review* are listed regularly in *ABC Pol Sci* and *Current Contents: Behavioral, Social & Management Sciences.* Book reviews are indexed in *Book Review Index.*

The American Political Science Review
Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15260

EDITORIAL BOARD: Charles O. Jones, *Managing Editor, University of Pittsburgh;* Robert M. Axelrod, *University of Michigan;* Steven J. Brams, *New York University;* Richard A. Brody, *Stanford University;* William J. Daniels, *Union College;* Jorge I. Dominguez, *Harvard University;* Ada W. Finifter, *Michigan State University;* Dante Germino, *University of Virginia;* J. Woodford Howard, *Johns Hopkins University;* George A. Kateb, *Amherst College;* Henry C. Kenski, *University of Arizona;* Nannerl O. Keohane, *Stanford University;* Anthony King, *University of Essex;* Gerald H. Kramer, *Yale University;* Arend Lijphart, *University of California, San Diego;* Jesse M. McCorry, *Department of Health, Education and Welfare;* Joseph L. Nogee, *U.S. Army War College;* Elinor Ostrom, *Indiana University;* Samuel C. Patterson, *University of Iowa;* Nelson W. Polsby, *University of California, Berkeley;* Kenneth Prewitt, *Social Science Research Council;* Jorgen S. Rasmussen, *Iowa State University;* Donald D. Searing, *University of North Carolina;* James L. Sundquist, *The Brookings Institution;* Henry Teune, *University of Pennsylvania;* Edward R. Tufte, *Yale University;* Susan Welch, *University of Nebraska;* Dina A. Zinnes, *Indiana University.* EDITORIAL ASSISTANT: Kendall S. Stanley.

BOOK REVIEW EDITORIAL BOARD: Holbert N. Carroll, *Book Review Editor, University of Pittsburgh;* Paul Allen Beck, *Florida State University;* James R. Kurth, *Swarthmore College;* Richard L. Park, *University of Michigan;* Mary L. Shanley, *Vassar College.* EDITORIAL ASSISTANT: Nancy Majeski.

MANUSCRIPT EDITOR: Jane Flanders.

EDITORIAL INTERNS: Sharon K. Fitzgerald, Kevin Neary, Lewis M. Stern.

INSTRUCTIONS TO CONTRIBUTORS

Address correspondence about contributions to the *Review* to Charles O. Jones, *American Political Science Review,* Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15260. Please submit *four* copies of a manuscript to be considered for publication. *Unfortunately, due to increased postage costs, we can no longer return manuscripts to the author.* Manuscripts must be typed and mimeographed or photocopied, with all written material *double-spaced* (including quotations and footnotes). Use standard typewriter paper—avoid colored and light-weight stock. The typewritten lines should not exceed 5½ or 6 inches in length. Please do not send the original typescript. Since manuscripts are sent out anonymously for evaluation, the author's name and affiliation should appear only on a separate covering sheet. An abstract of *less than 150 words* should accompany the manuscript.

The reference form is that used by most scientific journals (for illustration, see any issue of the *Review,* June 1978, and after); brief parenthetical references are included in the text and all sources are listed alphabetically at the end of the article. The work of classical authors such as Aristotle or Plato may be cited by the standardized code familiar to scholars in the field and passing allusions to such authors do not require mention in the list of references. Conventional foot-of-column notes are used only for explanatory comments or in unusual cases to avoid lengthy in-text references.

All manuscripts will be examined carefully for length. Referees will be asked to recommend where cuts might be made, without affecting the principal contribution. Manuscripts over 30 pages will be reviewed with particular care to determine if such length is warranted. Except in extraordinary circumstances, manuscripts over 50 pages will be returned to the author. Resubmission may follow compliance with the page limit. Manuscripts must be prepared as noted above, double-spaced throughout, with standard margins. Tables, charts, footnotes, and references will be included in the page count.

Communications must follow the form of regular manuscripts (including reference listings where appropriate). They must not exceed five double-spaced pages, including references, footnotes, and tables. All but the briefest letters will be refereed.

Figures should be professionally presented: use high-quality white paper and India ink for maximum sharpness and clarity of line. Copies only should accompany the submitted manuscript, original art work being retained until requested by the editorial office. Tables should be typed on separate pages, with guides, e.g., "Table 1 about here" at the appropriate places in the manuscript.

Books intended for review and all book review correspondence should be sent to Holbert N. Carroll, Book Review Editor, *American Political Science Review,* Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15260. Authors are urged to call their books to the attention of the Book Review Editor to insure that the books will be considered for review.

Information, including News and Notes, for the Association's news-journal, *PS,* should be sent to 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. Advertising,l reprint and circulation correspondence should be sent to the Executive Director at the Washington office. Domestic claims for non-receipt of issues must be made within four months of the month of publication; overseas claims, eight months. Advertising information and rates are available from Eloise French, Advertising Manager, APSA, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

What Happened to the British Party Model?

LEON D. EPSTEIN
University of Wisconsin, Madison

Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 1979

Admired during much of this century, the British party model became especially attractive to American political scientists seeking responsible-party government in the early postwar years. After the mid-1960s, the model's appeal declined as did Britain's national status and the hopes for the democratic socialism often associated with the model. In the 1970s, the model itself seems to have worked in a way unlike that of prior decades. From this intellectual case history, a few broad inferences are drawn about the changing perspectives of political scientists.

My discussion of our profession's changing views of the British party model is not a way to develop generalizations of the kind that distinguished earlier presidential addresses on the nature and responsibility of political science. I find it difficult to offer general advice now that political scientists identify with increasingly specialized subjects and employ more disparate methods. Hence, I present an intellectual case history from which, at the end, I seek to draw only a few broad inferences about how transient circumstances and ideological concerns influence our political perceptions, and how the diminished appeal of a particular model may illustrate a wider skepticism about political systems.

The British party model is familiar from the works of several generations of scholars. Its essence is a sufficiently, but not an absolutely, cohesive parliamentary majority in support of executive office-holding leaders and so of policies accepted by those leaders as well as by the bulk of their partisan followers. Often associated with the model is a mass membership organized in constituency units and represented in national committees and conferences. Their policy-making role is disputed, in fact and in principle, but the model is that of "responsible-party government" whether the crucial parliamentary majority regards itself as mandated by its organized followers, its largely unorganized voters, or its own judgments. In one way or another, that party majority has been the centerpiece of modern British parliamentary government and of the "Westminster model" of strong cabinet leadership adapted and developed by certain Commonwealth nations. While not forgetting the vital linkage of a cohesive governing party with British-style parliamentary institutions, I concentrate here on the party model because of its salience in American political science. Given an almost chronic dissatisfaction with the relative weakness of American parties, our descriptions of British parties have often suggested a special admiration. Moreover, the admiration has occasionally been strong enough to imply that American adaptations were possible even without the transplantation of the parliamentary system in which Britain's strong parties had thrived. The disjunction is observable despite the historical tendency of many American intellectuals, if not the larger American public, to admire British government more generally rather than just for its party model. That tendency among political scientists is excellently and comprehensively reviewed by Dennis Kavanagh (1974).

In addition to exploring the reasons for the British party model's attractiveness in the past, I shall try to explain its apparently diminished appeal during the 1970s although we have been more troubled than ever about the increasingly porous qualities of American parties. My concern here is mainly with changes in the model's appeal to liberal reformers prominent in American political science and in the search for strong party government. A different intellectual possibility would arise insofar as American conservatives were now to look to Prime Minister Thatcher's new parliamentary party majority for the doctrinal policy accomplishments to which her leadership is committed. But whether they or anyone else will be attracted to the model may also depend on the substantial changes in its operation during the 1970s. I describe these changes after discussing the use and disuse of the conventional model.

When and How the Model Was Used

Thanks to Ranney's analysis (1962), many of us realize that the British party model attracted the attention of American political scientists by the turn of the century. Both Wilson (1885) and Lowell (1902, 1908) appreciated that a parliamentary party majority supported an executive leadership's policies to an extent that an American congressional party majority did not. One of the first scholarly students of American parties, Henry Jones Ford (1898), cited the British model, apart from the direct influence of Woodrow Wilson. These founders of American political science, however, were not single-minded advocates of the transfer of British institutions to the United States, and Lowell explicitly recognized that British responsible-party government was incompatible with an American constitutional order designed to protect minority rights against a legislative majority (1889, pp. 78–96). Ours is not the first generation to understand the difficulty of transplanting institutions, and British institutions in particular (Lowell, 1910, p. 3).

However sophisticated the early American exposition of the British party model, it usually reflected admiration—explicitly in Wilson's presentation and implicitly in Lowell's despite its non-imitative character. But old British hands, sorry now to realize the diminished importance of our subject, should not exaggerate the place that British politics once occupied in the profession. To be sure, academic courses on Britain were fairly common before the study of comparative politics included many other nations, and Lowell's early text (1908) was followed by others, notably Ogg's standard treatment (1929). Judging, however, from old volumes of the *American Political Science Review*, one finds little evidence that any large number of scholars ever focused heavily on British affairs.[1] Although in the past American political scientists would have been likely to know much more about Britain than about any other foreign nation, their dominant empirical interest then as later was in the American field.

Despite ordinarily limited attention from most American political scientists, the British political system provided our most convenient comparative benchmark. During the first half of this century, Britain's cultural prestige, imperial power, stable governmental institutions, and linguistic accessibility combined to make its political experience more familiar than that of other foreign nations. In addition, the programmatic and policy-oriented discussion of British politics appealed particularly to academics who esteemed such discussion and found it lacking in the United States. Insofar as British parties were based on ideas, even on ideologies, they had room for intellectual activity that seemed less welcome in Republican or Democratic politics. Admiration on this score dates back to Wilson's reading of Bagehot (1877) and it may be found among conservative as well as liberal writers. Certainly it was implicit and occasionally explicit in the American academic approach to the Labour party; a fairly early case in point is Dean McHenry's *Labour Party in Transition* (1940).

Not all earlier American academic writing about British parties or the rest of the British system was favorable. Being a familiar benchmark for comparison meant that the British model could also be cited invidiously. So it was in well-known works by Pendleton Herring (1940, pp. 129–30, 142) and by Don K. Price (1943). Each thought that Britain's disciplined party leadership had produced bad policy results during the 1930s, at the very time that American presidential leadership appeared to have been relatively successful. Probably the period about which Herring and Price wrote was exceptional in the first half of this century, but their penetrating rejection of the model tells us something about its presence in American political science. As Herring and Price realized, the British model had American champions even in the wake of its failures in the 1930s.

---

[1] By my count, the proportion of *APSR* articles on all British subjects (not just parties) was not above 8 percent even in the early decades of this century. Most of the articles that I counted as on British subjects dealt only or almost wholly with Britain, but I also included those that studied Britain along with one or two other nations. I did not include the articles, increasingly numerous in the last decade, that simply recorded British data along with data from many other nations. I tried to identify all of the articles that could reasonably be regarded as heavily British in their subject matter, but I ordinarily judged only from titles. I had more difficulty counting the total number of articles on all subjects because several volumes contained reports, reviews of events, and research notes that were not always classifiable as articles in the usual sense. In dealing with these contributions, I tried to establish uniform rules of classification. Not everyone would use the same rules. According to my calculations, the number of all articles in a decade ranged from 167 to 466 and the number on British subjects from 7 to 26. In the 1970s, I counted only for the first nine years.

American championship of the British model, it should be stressed, was more widespread not just when the model looked better than it did in the 1930s but also when there was greater dissatisfaction with our own political system and particularly with the role of parties in that system. Fading during the early years of the presidencies of Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt, as partisan congressional majorities enacted innovative policies, dissatisfaction rose in the years between World War II and the early 1960s. No consistently effective party majority functioned to enact the kind of domestic program that liberal intellectuals wanted, and political frustration tended to focus around the inadequacy of party when (in 1949–53, for example) Democrats nominally held both houses of Congress and the presidency. We remember this period in political science for the flourishing of responsible-party advocacy.

If any time were opportune to cite the British model, as it had been cited 50 years before, it was in the first 15 or 20 years after World War II. The American desire for a democratic alternative was strong, and, particularly from 1945 to 1951, the British model was widely thought to have worked effectively to achieve moderate socialist policies. Even in the decade or so after 1951, when Labour left office, British responsible-party government retained its aura of success partly because the Conservative majorities accepted most of Labour's legislation and partly because of Labour's expected, though delayed, return to power. Furthermore, the British political system generally was again held in great esteem. It had survived World War II, as had no other major Western European regime, and its interwar failures looked less important than its maintenance through such bad times and its rapid peaceful adaptation to social-democratic purposes after the 1945 general election. Newly self-governing nations, especially those in the Commonwealth, sought to adapt British political institutions, not without encouragement from Britons confident of the virtues of their own system.

A few of us can remember that glad confident postwar British morning in which democratic hopes rested heavily on parliamentary government and its responsible-party mainspring. The interest of American political scientists in Britain was as always much less than pervasive, but there was an increased awareness of British political institutions. Books by British scholars like Ivor Jennings (1936, 1939) provided full accounts of how these institutions worked, often stressing the importance of parties. Others like Herman Finer (1949) presented British parties and other political institutions in a favorable comparative context. Interest was even reflected in a small increase in the number of articles on British subjects that the *American Political Science Review* published in the early 1950s. The British party model became a standard reference point in the comparative politics courses that developed in American universities after World War II, and new textbooks treated it as working successfully in contrast to the experience with multiparty arrangements in most continental European nations. In the teaching of American government, the capacity of a British party to enact a program was contrasted to the description of brokered politics in the American system.

At the same time, most political scientists understood the difficulties that would impede American adoption of the British party model, or even of significant portions of it. However much the American responsible-party school now admired the model, it could not readily suggest explicit emulation without also recommending apparently utopian constitutional changes that it sought ordinarily and realistically to avoid. I have in mind the famous advocates of responsible American parties, E. E. Schattschneider and the APSA's own Committee on Political Parties. Although a member of the committee, Schattschneider most clearly and fully stated his case in *Party Government* (1942), a widely used book in the immediate postwar years, and *The Struggle for Party Government* (1948), an influential series of short essays. After searching in these two works for references to British experience, I am struck with their approving character, even in 1942 before the advent of the postwar Labour government, but also with their small number, brevity, and limited applicability to the author's main argument. Schattschneider approvingly contrasted British cabinet government, under the effective control of the leaders of a majority parliamentary party, with the American situation in which the Constitution makes such a government impossible (1942, pp. 123–27). Because he proposed no constitutional change, the contrast served only to help explain the nature of the American problem of securing responsible parties. Elsewhere, Schattschneider only implied possible American emulation of British practices by emphasizing the virtues of a less locally oriented parliamentary candidate-selection process (1942, pp. 99–100), the more limited role of pressure groups in the House of Commons (1942, p. 107), and the British acceptance of *party* politics as respectable activity (1948, p. 8).

The APSA's controversial committee report, "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System" (1950), said even less about the British model. The cabinet system was mentioned only to be quickly put aside (p. 35), and there was a brief though admiring description of the substantial permanent central staffing of British parties (p. 49). Limited though these references surely were, we have the written evidence of one who served on the committee, E. M. Kirkpatrick, that "the British model was significant for a number of its members" (1971, p. 974). Furthermore, Kirkpatrick devoted two pages of his devastatingly critical analysis of the report to the proposition that the committee had seriously misunderstood the actual operation of British parties and had, consequently, advocated changes in accord with a partly fictitious model (pp. 974–76). I might temper that criticism, but I can hardly challenge Kirkpatrick's recollection of the significance that the British model had for committee members. It should be emphasized, however, that even Kirkpatrick's account did not assert that the committee thought that the United States could or should adopt the full British party model. At most, the committee wanted American parties to follow certain British practices despite the constraints of the American constitutional setting.

In stressing that the much-abused APSA committee report was innocent of wholesale imitation of the British model, I am trying to sustain my view that American political scientists who used the model did not often let their admiration, when it existed, lead them to think that we could or should fully copy it in the United States. Not only were most Americanists among us wary of wholesale imitation of the British model but so also were most comparativists. Samuel Beer, the leading postwar American scholar of British parties, is illustrative. Admiring generally though not wholly the British party model that he explicated so well, and often seeming to want more effective and coherent American policy making, Beer nevertheless remained dubious about the importation of British-inspired reforms (1962, pp. 55, 76). Writing when British governmental prestige was still high, he did no more than favorably contrast "the concentration of power in the British system" with the American system's "dispersion of power" that creates tendencies toward "incoherence and immobilism" (p. 78).

Understanding the Model

Particularly during the postwar years, several specialized American and British scholars sought to rectify suspected misconceptions and misinformation about how parties worked in Britain. Rectification of this kind became a thriving, though small, academic industry, and I confess to a part in it. Little of the criticism, however, sought to refute the view that party government existed in Britain in a form or to an extent unknown in the United States. The essence of the model, as we had known it since Wilson and Lowell, remained securely in place. Most critics argued that American party reformers in the postwar years had tended, on the basis of limited acquaintance, to exaggerate the admittedly high degree of parliamentary party cohesion, and, more significantly, to attribute it to greater ideological commitment, stronger central party control, fuller mass-membership participation in policy making, and more clear-cut electoral mandates than actually existed in Britain. Although in retrospect I am inclined to stress the limitations of the criticism, much of it was certainly substantial and useful. One of the earliest and best corrective pieces was by David Butler; he contended that "British parties are in fact much less differentiated and much less democratic than is often supposed, and that it is a good thing that this should be so" (1955, p. 47). He thought that their differences, ideologically and programmatically, were not nearly so great in the postwar years as they had seemed to be in the 1930s. Butler also believed that parliamentary leaders, not rank-and-file party members, were predominant as policy makers even in the Labour party. Here Butler's theme resembled that of McKenzie's major party organizational study (1955). Their stress on the leadership's policy-making power, it should be noted, would not have troubled all American responsible-party advocates; Schattschneider, for example, did not rest his case on intra-party democracy.

In any event, there is a respectable argument to be made for important occasional influence flowing from organized British party members (Minkin, 1978). It cannot be so confidently dismissed as wrong even by those of us who have accepted most of McKenzie's analysis and preferences. From time to time, a party conference representing a dues-paying membership, or an executive committee acting in its behalf, affected the policies of an election manifesto. So it seemed in one important particular of Labour's 1945 election program (Beer, 1965, pp. 174–78), notable also for the fact that so much of the program was subsequently enacted. No doubt, the salience of this experience in the immediate postwar years led too readily to generalizations not just about intra-party democracy but also about clear-cut electoral mandates and government policy accomplishments that could not be supported by experience in other periods. Such mistaken generalizations, however, strike me as exaggerations, often temporary, of certain characteristics of the model, rather than as basic misunderstandings.

American party reformers might have had reasons of their own for highlighting whatever role the mass membership played in party affairs. Without the benefit of a parliamentary system that could itself produce the legislative cohesion necessary for an effective programmatic governing party, it was natural to look to whatever else seemed to encourage party loyalty among British MPs. The ideological and programmatic commitments of their organized followers were plausible encouragements especially insofar as these commitments were enforced in one way or another—that is, if MPs were threatened with loss of place for significantly deviating from the wishes of their party's dues-paying members. On this score, one did not have to believe that the organized external membership made or even heavily influenced policies imposed on the parliamentary party. No more had to be assumed than that the organized membership shared the commitments (often more zealously) of its parliamentary leaders and was willing to select as candidates those who would act in accord with those commitments. With rare exceptions, British party members fulfilled those conditions, and, without the hurdle of a direct primary, their bestowal of the party label on candidates remained definitive. If at first in the postwar years the candidate-selection process was incorrectly perceived as highly centralized, the picture of committed party persons in control of the process was not critically changed by learning that constituency-party activists were effectively the selectors (Ranney, 1965). These activists, while choosing candidates in constituency organizations, remained national rather than local in their policy orientations. American responsible-party advocates could still envy the programmatic enforcement that the system thus allowed, and they might even hope in the United States to mobilize similar programmatic followers capable of selecting loyal candidates and of helping them to win direct primaries.

The postwar American party reformers ordinarily realized that those who cared about national party policies would have to control or exert great influence in the congressional nominating process if they were to have a responsible-party system. Moreover, in the 1950s new ideological or programmatic American party organizations, called amateur, non-patronage, and voluntary, developed in several states mainly for this purpose. The fact that they could not regularly fulfill the purpose, in the British manner, tells us what even many responsible-party advocates have always known: the American political structure imposes formidable obstacles to the development of programmatically cohesive parties on a national scale. The experience does not tell us that there was an ill-informed effort to imitate British practices. Not only were the new American programmatic activists probably unaware of any British model, but also their intellectual supporters among political scientists, while more likely to have the model in mind, may not have misunderstood it in thinking that Americans should try to emulate its organizational and candidate-selection features. At most, it seems to me, they might have overestimated the degree to which extra-parliamentary organizations, in contrast to the pressures of the parliamentary system itself, were responsible for British party cohesion.

Turning from party reformers, what can be said about the way in which comparative politics specialists understood the British party model during the first two postwar decades? We can fairly assume that they, whether American or British, would have been a principal source of knowledge for the rest of the profession. Their emphases vary, of course, and it is risky to generalize. Textbook chapters, I believe, properly stressed the parliamentary discipline that characterized the two major parties in the 1950s and early 1960s although the qualifications might not always have been as fully spelled out as we should now prefer. Among specialized works, Beer's influential *British Politics in the Collectivist Age* (1965) devoted more attention to the ideological character of both major parties than did several other close observers, but Beer's description of British party government was representative in depicting its relative strength and cohesion, and carefully tempered by an appreciation of the importance of interest groups in the system. To be sure, this appreciation was mainly reserved for the way in which interest groups were accommodated within or through the major parties and the ministries, in contrast to the more direct legislative influence of interest groups in the United States.

Here, in relation to interest groups, we should note a more basic problem concerning the American understanding of the British party. Customarily it was perceived as majoritarian in the sense of being much more capable than an American party of enacting a program or set of policies in behalf of a majority of citizens. Beer's description was not at odds with this perception; it filled it out, sensibly, by showing how a British party aggregated diverse interests compatibly with the maintenance of its legislative cohesion. Did that aggregating function make it possible for American pluralists to admire the British party model? I raise the query because without an affirmative answer to it we might conclude that American pluralists should have rejected the British party model. No doubt, many did reject it even during its heyday. Admiration would always have been easier for an unabashed majoritarian like Schattschneider.

Declining Attractiveness

The decline in the model's attractiveness is, I believe, readily apparent. Along with Britain's political institutions generally, its parties have suffered new blows from American and British critics during the last 10 or 15 years. Effective and coherent policy making is no longer perceived as the predominant result of the British system. Party government is blamed for many of Britain's new failures. Kavanagh captured the spirit as well as the substance of the recent American criticism in his broader review article (1974, pp. 263–65). He cited several important works rejecting the once-supposed superiority of the British model. Among them is Kenneth Waltz's major assault (1967) on Britain's political leadership in foreign policy since 1945. While critical of the whole British political system, Waltz regarded the prime minister's concern for party unity as a principal cause for neglect of a broader public interest (p. 62). Moreover, he contrasted this feature of the British party model unfavorably with the American arrangement that allows for a less party-oriented foreign policy leadership (p. 307). If few other political scientists went so far as Waltz, there were widespread doubts about the British system after the mid-1960s. As Kavanagh notes, they appear in Beer's epilogue chapter (1969), written for the paperback edition of his 1965 book, and the doubts refer particularly to the efficacy of British party government.

Certain American criticism probably originated in this country, perhaps as reaction against a perceived anglophile tradition, but American political scientists were hardly unaware that British writers had begun to express a new dissatisfaction with their own political institutions and with parties in particular. Bernard Crick's proposals for parliamentary reform (1964), strengthening MPs and the Commons as a whole in relation to the party-based executive leadership, were well known in this country, and so, a little later, were the critical opinions of John Mackintosh on the way in which party cohesiveness actually functioned (1976). Indeed, it would have been hard for any American student of British politics in the 1970s to escape what had become a prevailing current of adverse commentary on party government by British political scientists and related intellectual publicists. The commentary could be said to have culminated in *The Economist*'s well-publicized five-page editorial leader marking Guy Fawkes Day (1977); the leader recommended the figurative blowing up of the system of government that allows "two alternating party political tyrannies" (p. 11). *The Economist* would free Britain from these tyrannies—that is, from the likelihood of responsible party government—by a form of proportional representation that would preclude a majority party without a majority of popular votes, by a constitutional bill of rights limiting the scope of governmental action, and by a parliament whose members, committees, and resources would more nearly resemble those of the U.S. Congress than those of the much less powerful House of Commons. To be sure, these recommendations were not out of line with *The Economist*'s nineteenth-century liberal tradition, but the ground had now been well prepared by numerous academic critics of the system.

We should not, therefore, expect many favorable references to British party performance in the most recent proposals for the reform of American political parties. Certain proposals did not even use the old "responsible party" theme that might have drawn, implicitly or explicitly, on the British model. Saloma and Sontag, for example, avoided the language of the responsible-party school. They sought to distinguish themselves from its principal advocates (1972, p. 10) although they did recommend several features of responsible parties—for example, more policy-coherent congressional parties and more issue-oriented citizen participation in electoral party organizations. On the other hand, the actual post-1968 Democratic party reforms moved, in vital respects, away from responsible-party goals. Whatever its model, the McGovern-Fraser Commission, seeking more open and wider participation in party affairs, helped to demolish what there was of regularized control of nomination processes. The shift was in the progressive anti-organizational direction. If the Democratic reformers wanted to build a new, stronger, and more ideological organization after destroying old and inappropriate structures, their intentions were seldom explicit enough to cite a responsible-party model, British or any other (Crotty, 1977).

Yet many American students of parties continued to prefer responsible parties in the 1970s although some avoided, as did Saloma and Sontag, an identification with the responsible-party school. Others, like W. D. Burnham (1970), were less optimistic about the possibilities than were political scientists of an earlier generation. Now and then the responsible-party school itself received a favorable reexamination. Pomper (1971) argued that the APSA committee of 1950 had often been correct in its projections of the consequences of continuing to function without responsible parties, and that certain conditions required for such parties were more fully met in the 1970s than in the 1950s. While thus being relatively optimistic, Pomper did not cite the British model. Of course, that is not evidence that he rejected it—any more than a similar absence of the British model from J. M. Burns' earlier popular book advocating responsible American parties (1963) indicates such rejection. The model, along with Britain generally, may just command less attention when the old favorable image dims. So it is possible to account for the absence of British experience in Broder's well-known book (1972) and in his very recent writing (1979). In urging that we develop much stronger parties, Broder (1972, pp. 182, 244–46) drew heavily from the APSA's report of 1950, as well as from other political scientists, but he did not specify anything about the British model that might have been in the minds of certain earlier writers. Insofar as Broder had a working model, it was of a responsible-party government that he believed once existed in more substantial degree in the United States (1972, p. 170).

Lest we conclude that all American reformers abandoned discussion of the British party model, we should note Charles Hardin's case for a new American constitution (1974) redesigned on principles so close to those of British parliamentary government that it would produce the kind of strong party that has existed in modern Britain. Not only did Hardin insist with good reason, if with unrealistic hope, that parliamentary-type institutions must be adopted in order to produce British-type parties; but also, in so arguing, he responded to a large portion of the recently adverse criticism of the performance of British party government (pp. 131–41). Significantly, Hardin liked the British party model not merely because party government promises coherent policy making but especially because such policy making is collective rather than individual in the manner of the American presidency. Writing when the presidency had been darkened by Nixon and by failures in Vietnam, Hardin wanted a chief executive who would, like a British prime minister, be a party leader subject to control by his or her legislative followers. Executive authority could thus be strong and yet effectively limited (pp. 2–5).

Other Americans, less interested than Hardin in strengthening parties, similarly discovered in British experience a means for restraining American executive authority in the 1970s. It is hard to say that they found the British party model attractive as had the older responsible-party school or even Hardin. For example, Groth (1970) concentrated on the restraints imposed on British prime ministers because they shared decision-making power with the cabinet and had to answer for it in the Commons. Groth's admiration is primarily for the traditional parliamentary institutions that limited the executive and not for the strong party support that others had supposed those institutions to have helped produce. Later post-Watergate critics occasionally looked enviously to Britain's conventional vote of no-confidence as a way to limit chief executives. These ideas, critically reviewed by Livingston (1976), are tangential to my analysis but interesting because they indicate that in the early and mid-1970s Americans could be attracted to British practices that are distinguishable from those usually associated with the party model itself.

The period for that kind of attraction may already have ended when the Watergate scandal receded and Americans began again to search for a strong president who would lead Congress rather than being limited by it. Probably, too, not very many political scientists even in the early and mid-1970s looked to the restraining festures of British institutions. Instead, the relatively strong and cohesive parliamentary parties remained familiar benchmarks for elucidating, by comparison, the increasingly great independence-from-party of American congressional representatives. Thus Mayhew explained the American situation by a highly sophisticated reference to the British (1974, pp. 19–27). Although at least implicitly critical of a good deal of American congressional behavior, Mayhew stressed the way in which such behavior is a consequence of a system basically different from Britain's. So neutrally objective an account of the British party model, without the old admiration and certainly without recommendations for emulation, strikes me as typical, despite the exceptions cited, of those American political scientists who used the British comparison at all in the 1970s and even the late 1960s. I admit, however, that I do not find numerous contemporary discussions of British experience in the kind of American context that Mayhew provides.

My impression is that American academic interest in many aspects of British politics declined in the last two decades, or, more precisely, that it declined relative to other interests. There is no disconfirmation of that impression in the rough counting that I described in my earlier footnote; rather, the proportion of *APSR* articles on all British subjects dropped to two percent in the 1960s and 1970s from six percent in the 1950s and four to eight percent in preceding decades. Counting only *APSR* articles may underestimate the recent British interest on the part of American political scientists because they could now be contributing works on Britain to several new specialized journals. Hence the general significance of the reported small decline is uncertain. For the professional journal serving the largest political science readership, strictly scholarly developments, like the growth of research on many other nations and on new topics unconnected with any particular nations, could help explain any lessened relative interest in British subjects. But there is also the plain fact that Britain as a nation has become much less powerful and important in the world during the last few decades. We have less cause to look at Britain's foreign policy making, either for its successes or failures, when it no longer plays a major role in international affairs. Moreover, Britain's economy has grown less rapidly than the economies of most continental nations and has now fallen below several of them in an absolute sense. Whether or not national failures are blamed on party government or any other political institution, Britain is a struggling medium-sized industrial country much less likely than in its great-power days to provide models for us.

A probable ideological cause for turning away from the British party model also appears in the late 1960s and the 1970s. These were years of disappointment for democratic socialism. Unlike the period immediately following 1945, the American Left—socialist, crypto-socialist, or just welfare-statist—could now see little in Britain by way of major change or promise of major change. Thus the British party model lacked much of the allure of preceding decades. I do not suggest that conservative Americans have never been attracted to the party model, as they were to other British political institutions, but I believe that the particular model had appealed especially to left-of-center reformers who sought a means effectively to mobilize a majority to support domestic economic and social legislation. I tried to make the point in discussing the use of the model in the late 1940s and the 1950s, and I believe that it can also be made about Woodrow Wilson's admiration for British party government as he himself became a reformer. Like Wilson, relatively few Americans who, after 1945, looked hopefully to British Labour were socialists, even in the loose British sense. But in the postwar years they saw Labour using its parliamentary party majority to enact large-scale economic and social changes within a stable democratic society. Without that use, the British party model lost a substantial portion of its old American constituency.

The loss—that is, the diminished ideological appeal—is explicable from several standpoints. British socialism and the Labour party were themselves often associated with Britain's decline and failures—being largely blamed for *The Future That Doesn't Work* (Tyrrell, 1977). So perhaps fewer observers now favored British socialism and the political means for its accomplishment. Thus the American Left might itself have diminished or have become a still less explicitly socialist Left. But even among those seeking socialist solutions—including many seeking these solutions for the first time—the British parliamentary means for achieving socialism had come to look even more pragmatic and so less "socialist" than earlier; furthermore, Labour party leadership had become more prominently middle-class. Harold Wilson's 13 years (1963–1976) as Labour leader, eight of them as prime minister, were uninspiring for socialists.

Likelier than earlier, socialists could find credible, or at least plausible, the far-Left's persistent rejection of the established parliamentary means for the political advancement of working-class objectives. Leninists were not alone among socialists rejecting British Labour's credentials and methods. More popular among intellectuals in Britain and the United States during the late 1960s and the 1970s were those who used Marxist arguments against parliamentary socialism without adopting the explicitly Leninist alternative of revolutionary action to create a dictatorship of the proletariat. Well known among these critics of the Labour party is Ralph Miliband. His books (1961, 1973, and 1977), widely circulated in both Britain and the

United States, argued that the failures of Labour governments to be more socialist lay in the party's too-exclusive reliance on conventional parliamentary means. Miliband did not want to abandon those means, or the political liberties associated with them, but he did want the mobilization of working-class participants in a network of organizations supplementing state power (1977, pp. 188–89). Still more sharply, another British leftist critic, David Coates, following Miliband's earlier writing, contended that Labour's faith in the reforming potential of a parliamentary majority is misplaced and that now, as in the past, Labour's failures illustrate "the impossibility of the Parliamentary road to socialism" (1975, pp. 144, 229).

No doubt, few American political scientists would have turned away from the British party model because of Marxist-influenced criticism of Labour's use of that model. Nevertheless, I cite these critics to indicate the breadth of disillusionment with the conventional hopes for the model. The point can also be illustrated by turning to a more moderate critic of Labour's inability to achieve working-class objectives. Andrew Martin, an American political scientist asking only whether democratic control—defined as organized labor's control—of capitalist economies is possible (1975), argued that Swedish Social Democrats may have succeeded in a way that British Labour had not. His case, ingeniously made, rests on the possibly crucial usefulness of continuous long-term power for the party representing organized labor. Thus the Swedish Social Democrats, dominating governments for over four decades, could accomplish objectives impossible for British Labour because of its enforced alternation in office. In other words, the very election system that provided the Labour party with a parliamentary majority also deprived it of a sufficiently long-run opportunity to carry out its program successfully. Britain's kind of two-party competition, resting on single-member plurality elections and ordinarily perceived as advantageous for enactment of a socialist program, is in Martin's view less useful than Sweden's multipartyism, associated with proportional representation, which allowed Social Democrats to control governmental policies as the largest single party, although not often with a majority of parliamentary seats. Hence, in a special way Martin saw defects in the British party model.

Regardless of the election system and the number of effectively competing parties, it may have become harder for a labor or social democratic party in any highly developed society to mobilize an electoral majority for strictly working-class objectives. The industrial working class no longer appears large enough in any homogeneous sense to provide such a majority. As Inglehart declared, "The Left *must* go beyond a working-class base if it hopes to win elections" (1977, p. 215). As white-collar workers are beginning to outnumber blue-collar workers, he believed that a party of the Left would have little chance if it depended on class-based voting. Its hopes, he argued, lie in attracting votes from "a relatively large Post-Materialist section of the middle class" (p. 215). Such hopes may well be realizable in Britain or elsewhere, but it is not clear that their realization in an electoral sense would mean realization in the old working-class socialist sense. A majority now would be more diverse in its composition and interests, and perhaps more transient. The party model thus becomes more pluralist in character than it was for those socialists who conceived of a majority party as representative of the working-class majority of the population.

It is true that most advocates of stronger American parties never adopted the class-based majoritarianism found in the European socialist tradition. They tended to be majoritarian only in the sense of believing that a party could mobilize a set of interests constituting an effective majority supporting a given program. Insofar as British Labour might have seemed a class-based party in the European tradition, it could not so readily serve as a model in the United States. But, as I have suggested, the Labour party had impressed American reformers, correctly, I believe, as a less thoroughly majoritarian, even a quasi-pluralist, means for achieving socialist or certain non-socialist purposes.

The point that remains is that American reformers as well as socialists recently became impressed with perceived failures rather than successes of the British Labour party. Hence, an important mid-century reason for the American Left to admire the British party model disappeared, at least temporarily. It is too soon to know whether any comparable admiration will develop on the American right if the British Conservative party's parliamentary majority of 1979 should successfully enact its anti-socialist policies.

Changes in the Model

For those interested in broadly programmatic policies, left or right, the British party model's attractiveness always rested on its actual operations; British responsible-party government was a working model rather than an abstraction. So it still was also for many of its new critics in the late 1960s and the 1970s; for example, the *Economist*'s attack of 1977, previously cited, assumed that party government remained powerful. On the other hand, political scientists, in Britain and the United States, began in the 1970s to observe changes in the characteristics of British parties. In their eyes, the system could no longer be counted on to produce a cohesive party majority as it had during the previous three or four decades of Conservative-Labour competition. Some observers also challenged the earlier description for overlooking or down-playing past deviations from cohesive party government. The emphasis, however, was on changes evident in the 1970s even if they were treated as implicit in earlier experiences (Rasmussen, 1979).

Important changes were found in electoral behavior, parliamentary parties, and extra-parliamentary organizations. All indicated a weakening of the capacity of the two major parties, Conservative and Labour, to dominate British politics and government. Least crucial, in my opinion, was the decline in the direct individual dues-paying membership of the extra-parliamentary party organizations. Having by the 1960s already dropped from peaks achieved in the early 1950s, both the Conservative and Labour parties continued the generally downward trends in such memberships. The Conservative total, however, apparently remained over one million, after having been over two million, and Labour's, while roughly half of what it had been and down to about 300,000, was augmented by over six million indirectly affiliated trade-union memberships (*Economist*, 1975, p. 22). It is not clear that diminished numbers of direct dues-paying members lessened the always-disputed policy-making role of the external organizations. Insofar as the extra-parliamentary party organization might reinforce the parliamentary party loyalty achieved and achievable as a result of other causes, a smaller membership could be just as effective. Where, however, a diminished organization would be less effective is in campaigning. Systematic volunteer canvassing, long so conspicuous an activity of British constituency parties (Turner, 1978), requires a substantial regularized membership. Its decline may thus make it harder for the major parties to mobilize voters although the membership decline itself may also have been caused by a weakening of the parties for other reasons or by the deliberate substitution of mass-media campaigning for individual canvassing. I do not, therefore, treat party membership declines as generally insignificant when I contend that they have not themselves basically altered the British party model.

Much more fundamental was the inability of either major party to win and hold a secure majority of parliamentary seats during about half of the 1970s. From February to October 1974, when Labour governed after winning less than half the seats in the February general election, and also during the next four and one-half years, when Labour had either the barest of majorities or, in the last three years, had none at all except with the help of minor parties, there could simply be no strong party government in the conventional sense. The duration of minority-party government in the 1970s was especially striking. During the preceding decades of two-party dominance, not to mention the 1920s, governments had rested on slim and insecure majorities. They were, however, short-lived and more readily viewed as transitional than the Labour governments of 1974–1979. Admittedly, those governments too may later be regarded as transitional if several years of party majorities now follow the May 1979 election.

Nevertheless, the experience of the 1970s suggests continued departures from the postwar two-party order. It is true that Britain's use of the simple-plurality, single-member election system still helps mightily to produce a majority parliamentary party on a minority of national popular votes for its candidates. But as is shown by long Canadian experience, even more than by Britain's in the 1970s, the election system's magnification, or distortion, of a major party's popular vote has not always been sufficient to provide a secure majority, if any majority at all. In Britain, it was insufficient in the 1974 elections when neither major party received 40 percent of the total popular vote, and it was just sufficient for a safe parliamentary majority in 1979 when the Conservatives received almost 44 percent of the vote. The popular democratic credentials of that parliamentary majority, it should be noted, are suspect in greater degree than they were for earlier party majorities that rested on about 48 percent of the voters (or on an actual voting majority, last achieved in 1935). But in the 1970s it was hard for a major party to come close to winning half of the popular vote. Third-party Liberals, various regional parties, and minor parties together polled between a tenth and a quarter of the votes in the four general elections of the decade, including almost a fifth in the 1979 election that produced the substantial Conservative majority in the House of Commons. The persistence of Liberal electoral strength, still at almost 14 percent in 1979 after its postwar highs of 18 and 19 percent in 1974, is notable. So too, as evidence of the limitations of the major parties, is the increased volatility of support for Labour and the Conservatives (Crewe, 1976). The erosion of electoral commitment to the major parties became most apparent in the 1970s although it may well have begun a decade or more earlier. Voters identified less strongly and less constantly with Conservatives and Labour without always substituting any more durable third-party commitments. Perhaps British two-partyism suffered in the 1970s because the class basis for the earlier mobilization of Conservative and Labour voters had diminished (Butler and Stokes, 1974, p. 208). Whatever the reason, achieving the kind of electoral support requisite for majority-party government was now much more uncertain than it had been in the postwar years.

Still more disruptive of the party model in the 1970s was a decreasing cohesiveness in each parliamentary party even when it had a majority. The way in which the European Economic Community (EEC) issue cut across party lines was only the most highly visible of these signs. The critical parliamentary decisions on EEC in both 1971 and 1975 rested on cross-party majorities, and in 1975 the governing Labour party split sharply and widely when it held a national referendum on Britain's continued membership (King, 1977). Even if the EEC issue had been alone in producing intra-party parliamentary divisions, it could not readily be treated as of little general relevance. Deciding whether the nation should belong to the EEC was the most significant British policy making of the decade and perhaps of the last 40 years. Probably, however, less conspicuous divisions than those on the EEC issue are more persuasive with respect to decreased parliamentary-party cohesion.

The increasing frequency of intra-party dissent in parliamentary voting has been carefully tabulated and analyzed by Philip Norton of the University of Hull. His recording of all cross-voting from 1945 to 1974, shows a sharp rise in both the number and proportion of divisions involving dissenting votes from the earlier parliaments (especially those of the 1950s) to the parliament of 1970–74. Norton finds the Conservative government of 1970–74 to have been actually defeated on five occasions as a result of dissenting votes, including abstentions, and to have suffered on one occasion from the adverse votes of two-thirds of its party's MPs on a whipped division (Norton, 1975, pp. 609–10). These examples are especially telling because the Conservative government of 1970–74 did have a parliamentary majority at just the level of modesty once thought most likely to ensure solidarity and so its policy-making effectiveness. The rising intra-party dissension of the early 1970s makes it unlikely that the better-known dissension during the Labour governments of 1974–79 could be characteristic only of circumstances in which there was either the barest party majority or none. Instead, Norton's later analyses (1976, 1977, and 1978) display the post-1974 intra-party voting dissension as a continuation of tendencies previously established. Between 1974 and 1979, several Labour MPs helped, crucially on occasion, to defeat their government's parliamentary policies on expenditures, taxes, Scottish devolution, and wage restraint. They rallied back to the flag only on votes of confidence, thus helping to keep their party leaders in office.

Of course, from 1976 to 1979, their party's lack of a parliamentary majority meant that Labour MPs needed the support or least the abstention of certain minor-party MPs in order to win confidence votes. Accordingly, when almost all the minor-party MPs voted with the Conservative opposition on the April 1979 confidence motion, Labour's solidarity, though complete, was not enough to keep the government in office. Losing a vote of confidence, as Callaghan's government thus did in 1979, was not at odds with any previously expected operation of the system. Although there had been no other such loss for over 50 years, it was well understood that a minority governing party might always be defeated by a combination of opposing parties. During the three preceding years, however, the system had worked differently from the way in which many of us had told our students that it had worked in the postwar decades. Prime Minister Callaghan remained in office, 1976–79, despite unreversed parliamentary defeats of several of his government's important policies. Moreover, they were defeats that he might well have suffered, as had Heath in 1970–74, even if his party had held a majority rather than almost a majority of seats.

It is clear that in the 1970s both Conservative and Labour MPs voted more independently, and more consequently so, than their predecessors of the 1950s.[2] The change need not have been overwhelming in order to be important. We can still appreciate that MPs, while never as regularly docile as the most extreme picture of party discipline might have implied, remained in the 1970s much more regularly loyal to their parties than American congressional representatives ever have been. We can also appreciate that the decline in parliamentary party cohesion might, like that of the electoral capacity of the major parties, be reversible. But, at least for the 1970s, w' must say that the British party model itself substantially changed. A cohesive party as well as a majority party became less certain.

---

[2] In another article in this issue, John E. Schwarz carefully describes and analyzes the significance of the more frequently independent voting behavior of MPs. His article's appearance indicates that American scho-

Concluding Inferences

The *first* of the broad inferences to be drawn from my review of the place of the British party model in political science comes most directly from the last section. It concerns the time-bound nature of our studies, about which I also wrote when reviewing works on American presidential nominations (Epstein, 1978). In that fascinating area, generalizations based on the politics of 1940–1968 were evidently shaken by experiences in 1972 and 1976. Here and elsewhere, political scientists must now be aware of changes in patterns discerned only a decade or so earlier. The awareness is notably acute in recent scholarship in the highly developed study of voting behavior (Nie et al., 1976; Butler and Stokes, 1974). Yet we like to write in the present tense, so describing behavior and the operation of political institutions in terms that allow readers to think that there is and will be a continuity in what we have found to exist over the past decade or two. It is one of the ways in which we distinguish ourselves from most historians. When we desert the present tense, we often still imply that recently observed developments will remain in effect. I may have come close to doing that in describing the weakened grip of British parties during the 1970s, and I am certain that many of us treated the dominant and cohesive Conservative and Labour parties of the first postwar years as though they would remain so into an indefinite future. Now their great power in the years soon after World War II looks to have been something of a period piece, expressing a simpler, more complete two-party division between classes and ideologies than had prevailed during earlier decades, or that would prevail in the 1970s. At least from the standpoint of 1979, the capacity of the British system to mobilize almost all political interests into two major parties, each cohesive in its purposes, seems a transient phenomenon rather than a durable culmination of long-run developments. Although Americans still have good reason to view each major British party as relatively cohesive and capable of responsible government, now as in the rest of the last century, we must qualify the sharper picture that we had a little earlier.

My *second* inference relates to the perspective of time in a different sense. Even if we have accurately described the British party model in reasonably qualified form, as I believe that political scientists have usually done, its attractiveness rose and fell especially with the policy successes and failures that the American Left identified with it. As I have observed, it was on the left, a moderate Left to be sure, that the model usually had its American champions. While embraced by British tories as well as by British socialists (but not always by British liberals), the majoritarian feature of responsible-party government might have had less appeal for American conservatives. So far at least, it is mainly the ideological perspective of the Left that helps to explain the rise and decline of the British party model's attractiveness in the United States.

Third, the diminished attractiveness of the British party model parallels experience with other once-popular working political models. I am thinking especially but not only of socialist models like those provided by the USSR and other nations governed by Communist parties. It seems to me that Western Marxists now seldom regard any of these nations as suitable models for the United States or other advanced industrial societies. The socialist goals that they retain do not appear to be based on working models elsewhere, as they often were, for instance, in the 1930s. We do not live in a time when the desire for a better political world characteristically finds its fulfillment in a happy experience elsewhere. What hopes we still have must evidently depend on using our own political institutions rather than trying to reshape them according to an operating model in another country. Political scientists may have played a part in bringing about this change, specifically in the case of the British party model by explaining how it actually works, but I should think that their part has been modest relative to other changing perspectives that have made the British experience less compelling.

These new perspectives, it should be added, need not mark the end of our discipline's long-standing treatment of British party govern-

---

larly interest in Britain has by no means vanished even if it might have diminished.

ment as a principal comparative benchmark for the exposition of the American political system. The model could thus remain useful analytically even without its old appeal as a superior political instrument.

References

APSA Committee on Political Parties (1950). "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System." *American Political Science Review* 44: Supplement.

Bagehot, Walter (1877). *The English Constitution and Other Political Essays.* New York: Appleton.

Beer, Samuel H. (1962). "New Structures of Democracy." In William N. Chambers and Robert H. Salisbury (eds.), *Democracy Today.* New York: Collier, pp. 45–79.

______ (1965). *British Politics in the Collectivist Age.* New York: Random House.

______ (1969). *British Politics in the Collectivist Age.* New York: Vintage Books, Random House.

Broder, David S. (1972). *The Party's Over.* New York: Harper & Row.

______ (1979). "Parties in Trouble." *Today,* May 11, 1979, pp. 10–11.

Burnham, Walter Dean (1970). *Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics.* New York: Norton.

Burns, James MacGregor (1963). *The Deadlock of Democracy: Four-Party Politics in America.* Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

Butler, David (1955). "American Myths about British Parties." *Virginia Quarterly Review* 31: 46–56.

______, and Donald Stokes (1974). *Political Change in Britain.* London: Macmillan.

Coates, David (1975). *The Labour Party and the Struggle for Socialism.* London: Cambridge University Press.

Crewe, Ivor (1976). "Party Identification Theory and Political Change in Britain." In Ian Budge, Ivor Crewe, and Dennis Fairlie (eds.), *Party Identification and Beyond.* London: Wiley, pp. 31–61.

Crick, Bernard (1964). *The Reform of Parliament.* London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

Crotty, William J. (1977). *Political Reform and the American Experiment.* New York: Crowell.

Economist (1975). Nov. 22, 1975, p. 22.

______ (1977). "Blowing Up a Tyranny." Nov. 5, 1977, pp. 11–16.

Epstein, Leon D. (1978). "Political Science and Presidential Nominations." *Political Science Quarterly* 93: 177–95.

Finer, Herman (1949). *The Theory and Practice of Modern Government.* New York: Henry Holt.

Ford, Henry Jones (1898). *The Rise and Growth of American Politics.* New York: Macmillan.

Groth, Alexander (1970). "Britain and America: Some Requisites of Leadership Compared." *Political Science Quarterly* 85: 217–39.

Hardin, Charles E. (1974). *Presidential Power and Accountability: Toward a New Constitution.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Herring, Pendleton (1940). *Presidential Leadership.* New York: Rinehart.

Inglehart, Ronald (1977). *The Silent Revolution.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Jennings, W. Ivor (1936). *Cabinet Government.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

______ (1939). *Parliament.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kavanagh, Dennis (1974). "An American Science of British Politics." *Political Studies* 22: 251–70.

King, Anthony (1977). *Britain Says Yes.* Washington: American Enterprise Institute.

Kirkpatrick, Evron M. (1971). "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System: Political Science, Policy Science, or Pseudo-Science?" *American Political Science Review* 65: 965–90.

Livingston, William S. (1976). "Britain and America: The Institutionalization of Accountability." *Journal of Politics* 38: 879–94.

Lowell, A. Lawrence (1889). *Essays on Government.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

______ (1902). "The Influence of Party Upon Legislation in England and America." *Annual Report of the American Historical Association.* Washington: Government Printing Office.

______ (1908). *The Government of England.* New York: Macmillan.

______ (1910). "The Physiology of Politics." *American Political Science Review* 4: 1–15.

McHenry, Dean E. (1940). *His Majesty's Opposition.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

McKenzie, Robert (1955). *British Political Parties.* London: William Heinemann.

Mackintosh, John P. (1976). "The Declining Respect for the Law." In Anthony King (ed.), *Why Is Britain Becoming Harder to Govern?* London: British Broadcasting Corporation, pp. 74–95.

Martin, Andrew (1975). "Is Democratic Control of Capitalist Economies Possible?" In Leon N. Lindberg, Robert Alford, Colin Crouch, and Claus Offe (eds.), *Stress and Contradiction in Modern Capitalism.* Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, pp. 13–56.

Mayhew, David (1974). *Congress: The Electoral Connection.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Miliband, Ralph (1961). *Parliamentary Socialism.* London: Allen and Unwin.

______ (1973). *The State in Capitalist Society.* London: Quartet Books.

______ (1977). *Marxism and Politics.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Minkin, Lewis (1978). *The Labour Party Conference.* London: Allen Lane.

Nie, Norman H., Sidney Verba, and John R. Petrocik (1976). *The Changing American Voter.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Norton, Philip (1975). *Dissension in the House of Commons: Intra-Party Dissent in the House of Commons' Division Lobbies 1945–1974.* London: Macmillan.

______ (1976). "The Government Defeat: 10 March 1976." *The Parliamentarian* 57: 174–75.

______ (1977). "Intra-Party Dissent in the House of Commons: The Parliament of 1974." *The Parliamentarian* 58: 240–45.

______ (1978). "Government Defeats in the House of Commons: Three Restraints Overcome." *The Parliamentarian* 59: 231–38.

Ogg, Frederic A. (1929). *English Government and Politics.* New York: Macmillan.

Pomper, Gerald (1971). "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System? What, Again?" *Journal of Politics* 33: 916–40.

Price, Don K. (1943). "The Parliamentary and Presidential Systems." *Public Administration Review* 3: 317–34.

Ranney, Austin (1962). *The Doctrine of Responsible Party Government.* Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

——— (1965). *Pathways to Parliament.* Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Rasmussen, Jorgen S. (1979). "Was Guy Fawkes Right?" In Isaac Kramnick (ed.), *Is Britain Dying?: Perspectives on the Current Crisis.* Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, pp. 97–125.

Saloma, John S., and Frederick H. Sontag (1972). *Parties: The Real Opportunity for Effective Citizen Politics.* New York: Random House.

Schattschneider, E. E. (1942). *Party Government.* New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

——— (1948). *The Struggle for Party Government.* College Park: University of Maryland Press.

Turner, John E. (1978). *Labour's Doorstep Politics in London.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Tyrrell, R. Emmett, ed. (1977). *The Future That Doesn't Work: Social Democracy's Failures in Britain.* Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday.

Waltz, Kenneth (1967). *Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics: The American and British Experience.* Boston: Little Brown.

Wilson, Woodrow (1885). *Congressional Government.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Exploring a New Role in Policy Making: The British House of Commons in the 1970s

JOHN E. SCHWARZ
University of Arizona

The British House of Commons is frequently used in comparative analysis as a model of the kind of legislative institution that ratifies and legitimizes public policy decisions taken by the government. It debates but rarely does it actually legislate. Examination of the House of Commons of the 1970s reveals a very different legislature, one that regularly overturns the government on significant policy matters. Furthermore, backbench members of the government's own parliamentary party frequently join coalitions to defeat the government in standing committee and on the floor. The research describes the development of the House of Commons as a decision-making unit in the 1970s, compares its record during the 1970s to the workings of the Commons over preceding decades, and examines various factors that help explain why the behavior of the House and its members changed so over the recent decade.

Perhaps more than any other legislature, the British House of Commons is cast as a legislature that acquiesces to the government and its policy initiatives rather than making policy. Hanson and Walles made the point well in their recent text (1975, p. 69): "The House of Commons is essentially a body that ratifies decisions taken elsewhere. It legitimizes but does not legislate." Indeed, for many years the Commons has been a leading example of what Nelson Polsby (1975) calls an "arena" or "legitimizing" type of legislature in contrast to a "transformative" or "policy-making" legislature, and is considered so by almost all major scholarly writers and works on the British political system (Mackintosh, 1978, 1970; Wakland, 1977, 1968; *The Economist,* 1977; Miller, 1977; Harvey and Bather, 1977; Hanson and Walles, 1975; Beer, 1974; Punnett, 1973; Richards, 1972; Crick, 1970; Stacey, 1968; Epstein, 1967). At least over the past three decades, a bedrock feature of the British political system has been the almost unfailing willingness of the House of Commons to defer in the end to the will and authority of the government.

During the 1970s, change in British politics was rife. Britain entered the European Community, the referendum entered British politics, class voting declined, nationalist and third parties began greatly to grow in popular strength, and minority government became an element of British political life for the first time since 1931. Yet despite these many areas of change, the widespread view is that the relationship between the House of Commons and the government remained substantially the same. All the accounts of the 1970s cited above share the view that, as before, the House of Commons continued to play the role of a debating and ratifying kind of legislative institution rather than becoming a seat of decision making. So widespread is this view that Harris Miller could conclude, "No one talks about a revitalized Parliament the way some observers comment, for instance, about a Congress newly strengthened in the 1970's" (1977, p. 123; for an exception, see Norton, 1976, 1978). Nor should there be such talk, in his opinion, because very little change had indeed occurred.

Nevertheless, a rather different picture emerges if one examines the record of an active government backbencher, such as that of Labour MP George Cunningham. After Labour regained power in 1974, Cunningham rebelled so as to defeat government in standing committee or on the floor on eight separate occasions. He did so on matters ranging from pension benefits to housing policy and from the creation of a Scottish parliament to criminal law. (See Schwarz, 1979, p. 36 for further description.) Indeed, Cunningham's record seems as akin to what is expected of an American congressman as to the usual notion of the British backbencher unswervingly supporting a government of his own side.

One can say little from the record of a single backbencher, of course, except to note that it stands in some contrast to the conventional wisdom about how members behave in the House of Commons. The research presented below deals in greater detail with the Commons' handling of government policy initiatives. It finds that a change in behavior of substantial proportions occurred in the House

---

I wish to express my very great appreciation to Helmut Norpoth, Thomas Volgy, and Henry Kenski for their helpful advice.

of Commons in the 1970s: the Commons moved discernibly in the direction of a "transformative" legislature and away from the "arena" or "legitimizing" type of institution for which it had long been almost the archetype in political science literature. The findings suggest, too, that the Commons' more assertive role emerged in the wake not solely of a change of "inputs," such as new kinds of members entering the Commons or new kinds of pressures operating on members that were not there earlier; its expanded role also required change of an internal character. This involved modification of a key institutional procedure, one which many observers had previously considered to lie at the very heart of the British parliamentary system.

Phenomena to Be Examined

It is useful at the start to distinguish the "transformative" from the "arena" legislature. The difference between these two types of legislature has to do, at root, with the legislature's degree of independence from other forces in the making of decisions on public policy (Polsby, 1975, p. 277). The more independent the legislature is in making decisions, the more it is a transformative legislature; the more the legislature defers to or is subject to the influence of another body, the more it is an arena type of legislature. At the one end of the continuum, the transformative legislature is primarily a policy-making body. At the other end of the continuum, the arena legislature is principally a debating and ratifying kind of institution.

Unfortunately, commentators have not been very specific as to exactly what conditions need to be fulfilled in order to regard a legislature as having moved toward one end of the continuum and away from the other. We are thus left in something of a vacuum. The analysis here suggests four conditions that seem appropriate to examine.

A first condition is that the legislature has to be a place where actual decision making occurs. This analysis focuses on the behavior of the House of Commons on policies where British constitutional theory expects the government to be at its strongest. This is on the government's own legislative initiatives into the Commons, which constitute about 75 percent of all adopted legislation in the Commons. However, constitutional theory aside, to be seen as moving toward a transformative legislature, obviously it is not enough for the Commons just to ratify policies that are proposed to it by the government. Nor is it sufficient for legislators to exercise some influence on the government if the legislature simply ends in adopting only what the government has accepted as reasonable and rejecting all that the government has deemed to be unreasonable. For decision making in such cases, though there clearly is some legislative influence, still essentially resides in the government. The decision as to what is and what is not acceptable public policy must be made by the legislature. This means that we must focus on the willingness of the House of Commons to act independently of the government. To act independently the Commons must be willing to alter and/or reverse government policies on its own even if there is government objection. This is what is referred to as "defeating the government." This means that the Commons has either altered or reversed the government's policies over the opposition of the government. The government's opposition is evidenced by its stance on voting divisions.

Second, the willingness of the Commons so to act must occur frequently. The term "frequently" is not terribly precise. But at the very least, if the Commons is moving toward a transformative legislature, there should be a decided increase in its willingness to defeat governments and thus to force alterations and reversals of government policies. Such a shift in behavior should be confirmed by usual statistical tests.

Third, acting to impose change on government policies should occur on important issues, not only on matters of detail. By important policy issues, I mean defeats of the government on matters involving large sums of money, large classes of people, established procedures, or the very principles of legislation which the government has deemed to be important.[1] Moreover, the issues upon which important policy reversals and alterations occur should not be confined to a few policy areas, such as moral questions (capital punishment, abortion, etc.) or constitutional issues, but instead must cover a broad range of issues and subjects.

---

[1] "Large amounts of money," refers to $100,000,000 or more annually or at least $500,000,000 overall; "a large class of people," refers to policies that would affect basic political, economic, or social rights or opportunities available to groups of at least one million persons; by "established procedures," I mean policies that would affect political or bureaucratic processes in a way having potentially major implications for how future decisions on economic and social policies will be made; and by legislation that is important to the government, I mean legislation that appeared in the Queen's Speech, or is among the five bills annually to which the government gave most time in the House, or bills which, having failed, were altered by the government and resubmitted during the same session into the Commons.

Fourth, the cause of the reversals and alterations of the government's policies cannot be a single, unchanging coalition of members in the legislature operating to defeat the government. For were this to be so, only a limited section of the legislature would be involved. Instead, such coalitions must emerge from the entire legislature and involve a constantly changing membership. In the end, a true cross-section of the whole legislature must participate. Of greatest importance, we should be able to observe large numbers of members of the government's own parliamentary party joining coalitions that defeat the government, and such rebellion by the government's backbenchers should occur significantly more often than in the past.

Over the 1970s a marked change occurred in the role of the House of Commons and in the behavior of government backbenchers in the Commons in each of these areas. I reach this conclusion, first, by comparing the parliamentary sessions from 1974 to 1978 to a sample of parliamentary sessions covering the 1945–1966 period. The analysis then introduces additional evidence which examines the intervening period from 1966 to 1974. The evidence shows that the 1974–1978 period was not unique, but in fact followed upon changes that had begun to take place during the latter 1960s and early 1970s. The final stage of the analysis investigates the merits of several competing explanations as to why the behavior of the House of Commons underwent such change over the recent decade.

Commons' Behavior on Government Initiatives

To provide a point of comparison to the 1970s, let us look at four reasonably typical sessions during the 1945–1966 period, and examine the fate of the government's proposed policies both in standing committee and on the floor. The four sessions include 1947–48 (when there was a large Labour majority); 1953–54 (moderate Conservative majority with Labour marginally winning the overall popular vote); 1962–63 (large Conservative majority); and 1964–65 (very small Labour majority). The years surveyed incorporate two sessions of Labour and two of Conservative government. The years also include two sessions with large parliamentary majorities and two with moderate or very slim parliamentary majorities. During the four years, over 1300 divisions took place in the standing committees and on the floor. What is especially telling is that whichever party controlled the government and whatever the size of the parliamentary majority, the four sessions exhibited highly similar results.

The findings conform closely to the stereotype of the House of Commons as an institution that rarely imposes change on the government's policies. As Table 1 shows, in only 11 instances during the four sessions under study did the House alter or reverse the government's policies over the objections of the government, whether in standing committee or on the floor. These 11 instances produced an average of one government defeat for about every 7 bills considered both in standing committee and on the floor, leaving a ratio of .16 government defeats per bill considered. This ratio never exceeded .23 in any single year. Since more than one defeat could occur on a bill, the government actually experienced a reversal during the four years on about 7 percent of all bills that received standing committee and floor consideration. This figure never exceeded 12 percent in any year. Over the four separate years, on only about one division in every 100 taken in standing committee and one division in every 200 taken on the floor did the government find itself on the losing side. Whichever figures on Table 1 that one refers to, whether they be absolute numbers, ratios, or percentages, the conclusion remains the same: the House of Commons, in handling the government's proposed policies, was almost entirely deferential to the government. Some influence it may have had on these policies, but the willingness in the end to impose a different view on the government, the willingness to act independently in this sense, the Commons rarely displayed.

Let us, however, turn to the record of the House of Commons over the more recent period, from 1974 to 1978.[2] These five sessions cover four years, a total length of time similar to that just surveyed from the earlier period. As Table 2 indicates, the change from the earlier to more recent years is dramatic. The period from 1974 to 1978 witnessed a substantial increase to 123 defeats of the government in standing committee and on the floor as compared to a total of 11 defeats during the earlier period

---

[2] The period the research covers is inclusive from the February, 1974 election through April 15, 1978.

(Yule's $Q = .68$, $p < .001$). Never did fewer than 24 defeats of the government occur in any single session from 1974 to 1978, whereas not once did *more* than four occur in a session during the sessions surveyed from 1945 to 1966. The ratio of defeats per government bill considered in standing committee and the floor was .96 during 1974–78 as against a ratio of .16 during the preceding period ($t = 2.18$; $p < .05$). This substantial increase in the total numbers and ratios of defeats is matched by from a sixfold to a tenfold increase in the percentages both of divisions and of bills upon which the government suffered defeats in standing committee and on the floor. In fact, from 1974 to 1978 the government experienced one, two, or more defeats on roughly 40 percent of the bills that passed through the standing committees and the floor (50 percent over the last two sessions) as compared to less than 7 percent during the earlier period (Yule's $Q = .73$; $p < .001$). Whereas the government used to lose only about one division in 100 in standing committee, its control slipped so greatly that over the sessions following 1976 it actually faced defeat on about one division in every eight in standing committee (see Table 3).

As called for by the first two conditions outlined earlier, a significant change has taken place in the incidence of government defeats in the Commons in recent years. Indeed, one other point of comparison is worth making. This is to the so-called "golden age" of Commons power during the mid-nineteenth century. The House then had no equivalent to the standing committee procedure of today. Com-

Table 1. Defeats of the Government in the House of Commons in 1947–48, 1953–54, 1962–63, 1964–65

	1947–48	1953–54	1962–63	1964–65
Total defeats	1	3	3	4
Ratio of defeats per bill considered*	0.05	0.23	0.18	0.16
Defeats: standing committee	1	2	3	1
Defeats: floor	0	1	0	3
Defeats as percent of all divisions: standing committee	0.5	0.9	2.1	0.8
Defeats as percent of all whipped divisions: floor	0.0	0.3	0.0	1.1
Bills altered by defeat: total number	1	1	2	1
Percentage bills altered by defeat*	5.3	9.1	11.8	4.0

Sources: House of Commons, *Divisions*, HMSO, for each respective session; House of Commons, *Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Official Report*, for each respective session; House of Commons, *Minutes of Proceedings, Standing Committees*, HMSO, for each respective session; House of Commons, *Parliamentary Debates, Official Report, Standing Committees*, HMSO, for each respective session.

*On the bills receiving standing committee and floor consideration.

Table 2. Defeats of the Government in the House of Commons: 1974–78 Compared to Four Selected Years from 1945–66

	1945–66	1974–78
Total number of defeats	11	123
Ratio of defeats per bill considered*	.16	.99
Defeats: standing committee	7	84
Defeats: floor	4	39
Defeats as percent of all divisions: standing committee	1.1	7.2
Defeats as percent of all whipped divisions: floor	0.4	5.9
Bills altered by defeats: total number	5	45
Percentage of bills altered by defeat*	6.8	40.7
Most defeats in one year	4	32
Least defeats in one year	1	24

Sources: House of Commons, *Divisions*, HMSO, for each session; House of Commons, *Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Official Report*, for each respective session; House of Commons, *Minutes of Proceedings, Standing Committees*, HMSO, for each respective session; House of Commons, *Parliamentary Debates, Official Report, Standing Committees*, HMSO, for each respective session.

*On the bills receiving standing committee and floor consideration.

Table 3. Defeats of the Government in the House of Commons, 1974–78

	1974	1974–75	1975–76	1976–77	1977–78[a]
Total defeats	26	24	32	24	17[a]
Ratio of defeats per bill considered[b]	1.3	.65	.87	1.1	1.5[a]
Defeats: standing committee	10	18	27	20	9[a]
Defeats: floor	16	6	5	4	8[a]
Defeats as percent of all divisions: standing committee	7.5	3.5	5.6	12.7	12.5[a]
Defeats as percent of all whipped divisions: floor	16.7	1.7	1.3	1.9	7.4[a]
Bills altered by defeat: total number	5	8	19	8	5[a]
Percentage of bills altered by defeat[b]	25	22	53	38	45[a]

Sources: House of Commons, *Divisions*, HMSO, for each respective session; House of Commons, *Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Official Report*, for each respective session; House of Commons, *Minutes of Proceedings, Standing Committees*, HMSO, for each respective session; House of Commons, *Parliamentary Debates, Official Report, Standing Committees*, HMSO, for each respective session.

[a] Incomplete year, inclusive to April 15, 1978.

[b] On the bills receiving standing committee and floor consideration.

parison to the "golden age" must therefore restrict itself to the floor. Examining action on the floor, one finds that the defeats the Commons handed the government from 1974 to 1978 approached in absolute terms the situation mid-nineteenth century governments faced in the Commons. Thus, the period 1974–78 witnessed a total of 39 defeats of the government on the floor, just slightly lower than the average of 44 such defeats per four years over the 1851–1867 period.

Nevertheless, figures such as the ones presented could be largely misleading if, according to the third condition, the defeats concerned principally minor matters or if the range of issues involved was relatively narrow and confined. In fact, many of the defeats the government sustained over the 1974–78 period, whether in standing committee or on the floor, were on significant policy matters, and they occurred in virtually every policy area outside foreign policy and defense.

The defeats, for example, include amendments the Commons made to three of the last four finance bills. On the 1978 Finance Bill the Commons defeated the government so as to reduce the basic rates of taxation by the equivalent of almost $1 billion. Still other defeats of the government over finance in 1978–77 reduced taxes by a further $900 million, and stipulated that the amounts of most social tax reliefs henceforth would be tied to inflation. Defeats of this order would have been unimaginable a decade earlier. Witnessing the defeats, the *Times* observed that it was the House of Commons rather than the Chancellor of the Exchequer which had taken control over the initiative about how excess funds in the budget were to be used (*Times*, June 15, 1977). Also involved are defeats on each of the major government bills on constitutional reform, both devolution bills and the European Assembly Bill. As a result of its defeats on the government's devolution bills, for example, the Commons placed what was clearly an impossible condition for the Welsh devolution plan to meet and a considerably more difficult one for the Scottish plan to meet. In the end, the Scottish plan was reversed as a consequence of the Commons' defeats. A flurry of defeats in standing committee and on the floor, too, cost the government the intended purposes of its bills on dock work regulation, public lending right, and redundancy rebate payments. (See Schwarz, 1979, pp. 39–40, for further description of the issues involved and results of the divisions.) It took three sessions for the government's aircraft and ship-building bill finally to pass. And a series of critical amendments were forced on the government's legislative proposals ranging from pension benefits (trebling the pensioner's earnings rule, for instance) to racial discrimination and from industrial strategy to farm prices (Schwarz, 1979, pp. 40–42).

Each of these was a significant defeat according to the criteria established earlier. In all, these reversals incorporated a total of 24 of the 123 defeats the government suffered in the Commons during the 1974–78 period, or about 20 percent of all the defeats. Obviously, too, quite a broad sweep of legislation was involved.

There were, of course, many other defeats the government suffered during the period that might be thought of as somewhat less significant, considering the kinds of reversals just outlined, but which were certainly far from trivial. They are described in some detail elsewhere (Schwarz, 1979, pp. 42–45). To cite just a few, these defeats would include the Commons' imposition of a public inquiry into the Crown Agents affair. They would also include a series of reversals that ended in defeating both the government's Clay Cross and automobile safety belt legislation and that imposed substantial alterations on government legislation concerning linear metrification, employment protection for the newly hired, war widows' pensions, and the rights of criminal suspects, among others. Nor does it mention the times the government gave way with the certain knowledge that it would be defeated in the Commons as it did, to cite three such examples, in dropping its direct labor proposals, in scuttling its plans to reorganize the power industry, and in reducing by 40 percent the increased rates it proposed that industry contribute to national insurance.

It is true that a number of the government's defeats to which we have referred (about three-fifths) came about in the standing committees. It is equally important to add, lest there be some confusion or question, that each of the standing committee defeats cited was in turn accepted (often without a further division) on the floor or accepted in a version closer to the standing committee's viewpoint than that of the government, an indication of the significance that action in the standing committees came to have over the period.

Let us now turn to the fourth condition. This condition is that the increased propensity the House exhibited to defeat the government should arise essentially from the entire legislature, involving a cross section of all legislative members rather than a single and unchanging coalition of members within the legislature. The possibility that a single, unchanging coalition of members could be responsible for the markedly increased numbers of defeats presents itself because at least three of the five sessions from 1974 to 1978 found the government with a slight partisan minority in the House of Commons.

Despite this, as the data on Table 4 make clear, the defeats during the 1974–78 period owed as much to the government's own backbenchers voting against the government as it did to alignments of non-government partisan forces against the government. During the period, a total of 64 of the 123 government defeats, or 52 percent, were accompanied by the government's own backbenchers rebelling to defeat the government. In 57 of these 64 cases, the government's policy *would have been sustained had not its own backbenchers dissented to support the opposition.* Of the defeats caused by backbench rebellion, no less than 20 occurred when Labour held a majority in the

Table 4. Defeats of the Government in the House of Commons: 13 Sessions from 1945–78

	Ratio: Defeats per Bill Considered[a]	Defeats: Standing Committee	Defeats: Floor	Defeats: Total	Defeats with Cross-voting
1947–48	.05	1	0	1	0
1953–54	.23	2	1	3	2
1962–63	.18	3	0	3	0
1964–65	.16	1	3	4	0
1968–69	.36	10	0	10	3
1969–70	.40	10	0	10	1
1971–72	.33	6	2	8	6
1972–73	.45	12	3	15	11
1974	1.32	10	16	26	2
1974–75	.65	18	6	24	20
1975–76	.87	27	5	32	13
1976–77	1.14	20	4	24	14
1977–78[b]	1.54[b]	9[b]	8[b]	17[b]	15[b]

Sources: House of Commons, *Divisions,* HMSO, for each respective session; House of Commons, *Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Official Report,* for each respective session; House of Commons, *Minutes of Proceedings, Standing Committees,* HMSO, for each respective session; House of Commons, *Parliamentary Debates, Official Report, Standing Committees,* HMSO, for each respective session.

[a] On the bills receiving standing committee and floor consideration.

[b] Incomplete year, inclusive to April 15, 1978.

Commons in 1974–75, a majority similar to the one it held from 1964 to 1966.

Large numbers of backbenchers from the government's ranks, and not just few isolated MPs, were involved in bringing about the government's defeats. On the standing committees alone, there were over 60 Labour backbenchers who rebelled to defeat their own government during the 1974–78 period. The number runs to well over 100 Labour backbenchers when divisions on the floor are included. Indeed, from 1974 to 1978, 56 government backbench members rebelled at least twice to defeat the government and almost two score did so on four or more occasions. George Cunningham, to whose record of rebellion we referred at the outset, was certainly not alone.

Nor do we speak only of minor or trivial defeats that were accompanied by rebellion: cross-voting accompanied 11 of the most significant government defeats the analysis alluded to earlier, including finance in 1976–77, devolution, pension reform, racial discrimination, and farm prices.

Table 4 reveals still another finding worthy of notice. This is that the marked increase in the number of defeats that occurred during the sessions from 1974 to 1978 followed a trend of increasing defeats that began even under governments with majorities as far back as the latter 1960s. The table shows that whereas four or fewer defeats were the rule for each session surveyed prior to 1966, by 1968–70 the Labour government, despite having an overwhelming majority of over 80 members in the House, suffered 10 defeats in each of these sessions. In addition, it was forced to lay aside two of its bills, one on industrial relations and the other on reforming the House of Lords. The ratio of defeats per bill considered in standing committee and the floor was .38 in 1968–70, compared to a ratio of .16 for the period prior to 1966.

Nor did these defeats of majority governments end with a Conservative victory over Labour in 1970. Instead, Table 4 shows that the numbers of defeats reached a new zenith under the Conservatives in 1972–73, a total of 15 over the session. This produced a ratio of defeats per bill considered of .45 for that session, including three defeats on the floor, with defeats in standing committee or on the floor occurring on such important policies as immigration, fair trading, and counter-inflation. Moreover, from 1970 to 1974, for the first time, deliberate cross-voting on the floor by the government's backbenchers was responsible for the defeats. Thus, it would appear that the larger number of defeats which came after 1974 was not an entirely new phenomenon, but followed the gradual emergence of increased defeats that had already begun for some years before 1974 under governments which held firm majorities in the Commons.

We have seen that no single coalition was responsible for the upsurge of defeats the government suffered in the House of Commons since 1974. Alongside opposition members who participated in defeating the government, large numbers of Labour backbenchers were also involved. Cross-voting by government backbenchers accompanied more than half the defeats of the government and involved the participation of over 100 government backbenchers. Two additional observations help to confirm this conclusion. First, the government experienced a marked increase in defeats in 1974–75, even though it then enjoyed a majority in the Commons. Second, the increased frequency of government defeats was not a phenomenon associated with the 1974–78 period alone, but followed a trend that appears to have commenced and gradually grown since the latter 1960s.

Factors Promoting Changed Backbench Behavior

The most dramatic precedent set during the 1970s concerned action on the floor. That backbenchers could inflict first one and then an extended series of defeats against their own government on the floor, on policies of national scope that went well beyond matters of conscience, was path-breaking. One floor defeat that was clearly of this order struck the Conservatives in 1972. This concerned the immigration rules. Several other Conservative defeats of lesser importance also occurred on the floor in 1972–73.[3] No defeat at all due to backbench rebellion had taken place on the floor of the House of Commons for at least three decades before the Conservative government first tasted defeat in 1972.

---

[3] There were an additional four floor defeats under the Conservatives during 1970–74. The issues involved in these four defeats were either highly local in character (local refuse disposal, the Maplin plan) or pertained to matters often considered to be ones of conscience (jury duty at age 18, export of live animals for slaughter). Of the four issues the most significant surely was the Maplin plan to build an airport and other facilities southeast of London. For while its effect was principally local, substantial public expenditure was envisioned. Even in this case, however, the government's defeat only established a consultative procedure to be followed when the government determined the plan's future. It neither called for nor imposed any change in the plan itself or the public expenditure called for under the plan.

Under Labour, there was an even higher incidence of floor defeats inspired by backbenchers. In less than two years after Labour regained a majority in the Commons in October, 1974, and until it returned to minority status during 1976, eight defeats of the government at the instance of its own backbenchers occurred on the floor. Each of these defeats concerned an issue of national scope and consequence and each went well beyond what could be considered matters of conscience. This string of backbench defeats reached a zenith in early 1976, in a remarkable defeat of the government's basic economic strategy. From 1976 to 1978, after Labour had returned to minority status, rebellious Labour backbenchers inflicted still another 11 floor defeats on their government. Thus by mid-1978 backbench dissidence had produced over 20 government defeats on the floor, whereas not one such defeat had taken place for more than three decades prior to the 1970s. About 75 percent of these backbench defeats, including all but one of the most important of them, came under Labour after 1974.

Why did a change in legislative behavior of this magnitude occur in an institution whose members had for decades been renowned for acting otherwise? First, I will briefly describe the argument to be made. In attempting an explanation, one must distinguish the sources of backbenchers willing to engage in rebellion from the conditioning factors that lay behind or prompted the rebellions. Backbenchers from a preexisting wing to the ideological extreme of the parliamentary party provided the main source of members first willing to rebel so as to defeat their own government on the floor. This was the case among Conservative as well as Labour MPs. Other more dynamic factors, such as the entry into the House of Commons of a new crop of backbenchers with a more assertive style and attitude (King, 1978; Gould, 1978; Raphael, 1979), were not as important in either case.

But, if preexisting wings of the parliamentary parties initially provided the main source of backbench rebellion, rather than more dynamic factors, other circumstances must have existed that prompted members of these wings to act to defeat governments now whereas before they had not. In Labour's instance the conditioning factors must explain an incidence of floor defeats that resembled the "golden age" of the mid-nineteenth century. The conditioning factor in Labour's case, I will argue, involved change of an institutional or procedural character in the Commons. The effect of this change was to expand the backbenchers' scope of freedom to defeat governments on the floor. I refer here to a relaxing of the parliamentary rule, a rule of fundamental and perhaps even "constitutional" importance in British politics (Morrison, 1959; Moodie, 1964; Epstein, 1964). Briefly to point out the time sequence: the Labour defeats on the floor caused by its own backbenchers did not begin until early 1975. (By 1975, Labour had regained a majority in the Commons resulting from the October, 1974 general election.) Change in the operation of the parliamentary rule so as to provide greater backbench freedom appears to have begun taking shape in 1972, and then to have reached a crest during 1974, from February until October, when Labour occupied office as the first minority government since before the Second World War.

Prior analysis has found very different factors to have been responsible for floor defeat earlier under the Conservatives (Norton, 1978). Conservative defeat was not preceded by an institutional change that worked to enlarge backbenchers' freedom to defeat governments; rather, it was preceded by provocation; that is, by new and unusually divisive pressures on backbenchers that boiled over on occasion to generate a defeat. These pressures prevailed throughout much of the Conservatives' period in office.

None of these pressures played much of a part, certainly not at the start, in bringing about the increased numbers of backbench defeats which emerged under Labour. For once the parliamentary rule had come under severe attack, especially during the minority Labour government in 1974, defeats by Labour backbenchers began both to strike the government in ever-greater numbers and did so largely outside the peculiarly divisive pressures on backbenchers that earlier seemed necessary to produce Conservative floor defeat. That a relaxation of the parliamentary rule could yield such a result brings to the fore the great power of this particular institutional arrangement, which normally lurks beneath the surface as a constant, to shape British parliamentary behavior.

As a first step, let us take up the backbench sources of government defeat on the floor. Considering the long tradition of party loyalty and cohesion in the Commons, rebelling to defeat one's government on the floor was by no means a trivial matter. For many decades, it was thought that such behavior would likely bring on extremely grave consequences (Morrison, 1959; Moodie, 1959; Epstein, 1964 and 1967; Norton, 1976). Thus it is reasonable to hypothesize that the backbench members first willing to rebel to defeat their own government on the floor would be those with an especially intense position on issues, one which prior to 1970 may have led these members frequently to rebel, even if not then to the point of defeating the government.

The Labour experience supports this hypothesis. In the 1960s a majority of Labour backbenchers had rebelled on the floor at least once. But decidedly the most dissident in each session during the 1960s had been the left-wing members of the parliamentary party, known as the Tribune Group (Piper, 1974). The Tribunites had never defeated their government in the 1960s. Yet by the 1970s they made the chief contribution to the backbench defeats inflicted on the government. Table 5 shows just how crucial affiliation with the Tribune Group was to the Labour rebels who effectuated the first series of eight Labour floor defeats brought on by backbenchers from 1974 to 1976 (Yule's $Q = .79; p < .001$). The table also shows how responsible these members were for the single most significant defeat in March, 1976 over the very centerpiece of the government's economic policy (Yule's $Q = .96; p < .001$). Although certain members from outside the Tribune Group made a critical contribution over the period, the overall numbers of their members paled in comparison to the Tribune Group.

A similar point can be made for the Conservatives. During the 1970–74 period, one floor defeat occurred under the Conservatives that was substantially equivalent in policy scope and importance to the Labour defeats after 1974, this with respect to the immigration rules in 1972. Well over half of the Conservative backbenchers had rebelled against their government on the floor at least once from 1970 to 1974, and over 35 percent had rebelled twice or more. Yet who were the rebels willing to reverse the government on its major defeat over the immigration rules? As in Labour's case, path-breaking behavior on the floor arose disproportionately from a wing of the Conservative parliamentary party, the right wing.[4] As shown in Table 6, almost 80 percent of the Conservatives from the right supported this rebellion on the floor compared to only 11 percent of the remainder of the parliamentary party (Yule's $Q = .90; p < .001$).

An alternative hypothesis, however, argues that defeats of the government in the 1970s owe their origin more to a new generation of backbenchers entering Parliament with a new style and attitude than to preexisting factors such as wing cleavages. What seems to characterize the new generation of backbenchers, according to this view, is a more solid preparation, a more professional orientation toward the role and work of the parliamentarian, and a less deferential attitude toward authority and leadership. In the words of Robert Kilroy-Silk,

Table 5. Affiliation with the Tribune Group and Labour Rebellion on the Floor to Defeat the Government, 1974–76

		Behavior on the Floor			
		Rebel	Loyalist	Total	Yule's Q
A. All Defeats, 1974–76					
Affiliation:	Tribune (N=67)	66[a]	34	100	.79
	Other (N=157)	19[b]	81	100	
B. Economic Policy, March, 1976					
Affiliation:	Tribune (N=67)	52	48	100	.96
	Other (N=157)	2	98	100	

Sources: Compiled from data in the House of Commons, *Divisions,* HMSO, for each respective session. Names of backbenchers affiliated with the Tribune Group are found in F. W. S. Craig, *The Political Companion* (Chichester, England: Parliamentary Research Services, 1976).

[a] 43 percent of the Tribune members rebelled twice or more on the eight defeats.

[b] 6 percent of the other members rebelled twice or more on the eight defeats.

---

[4] The right wing of the Conservative party is defined as those members who joined two or more of the floor rebellions on Rhodesia, Common Market entry, northern Ireland (March, 1972), and clause 4 of the Counter-Inflation Bill in 1973, each considered to be a right-wing rebellion. For a similar measure, see Norton, 1978, pp. 250–51.

members who entered Parliament in the 1970s have been "generally better informed, better researched certainly.... They are much less deferential, they're much less respectful of authority, they're much more arrogant if you like, too." Kilroy-Silk goes on to say, "Most of the rebellions have been occasioned and have been supported by what you might call the new generation" (quoted in King, 1978, p. 7). Sharing a similar view of the most recent generation of backbenchers is Labour's Chief Whip throughout most of the 1974–76 period, Robert Mellish (King, 1978, p. 7; see also Gould, 1978; Raphael, 1979).

Although this thesis is attractive at first sight, analysis reveals that it is largely incorrect with respect to the government's defeats on the floor. As Table 7 confirms, in the Conservative case, a new generation of backbenchers had little to do with defeating the Conservative government on the floor. And as Table 8 shows in Labour's case, the new generation was no more than modestly related to Labour's defeats on the floor. Indeed, the effects attributable to being of a new generation of backbenchers become weaker still in the Labour case when Tribune affiliation is allowed to remain constant.

Table 6. Right-wing Affiliation and Conservative Rebellion on the Floor to Defeat the Government: The Immigration Issue, 1972

	Behavior on the Floor			
Wing Affiliation	Rebel	Loyalist	Total	Yule's *Q*
Right Wing (N=31)	77	23	100	.90
Other (N=211)	15	85	100	

Source: Compiled from data found in House of Commons, *Divisions*, HMSO, 1972/73.

Table 7. Recency of Entry into the House of Commons and Conservative Backbench Rebellion to Defeat the Government on the Floor: The Immigration Issue, 1972

	Behavior on the Floor			
Entry into the Commons	Rebel	Loyalist	Total	Yule's *Q*
1970 or later (N=83)	18	82	100	–.28
1969 and earlier (N=159)	28	72	100	

Sources: Compiled from data in House of Commons, *Divisions*, HMSO, for each respective session. Entry into the Commons found in Andrew Roth, *The MP's Chart: Parliamentary Profiles* (London: Parliamentary Profile Services, 1971).

Table 8. Recency of Entry into the House of Commons and Labour Backbench Rebellion on the Floor to Defeat the Government, 1974–76

		Behavior on the Floor			
Wing Affiliation	Entry into the Commons	Rebel	Loyalist	Total	Yule's *Q*
All members	1970 or later (N=90)	45	55	100	.45
	1969 and before (N=134)	24	76	100	
Tribune members	1970 or later (N=41)	68	32	100	.22
	1969 and before (N=26)	58	42	100	
Others	1970 or later (N=49)	27	73	100	.35
	1969 and before (N=108)	15	85	100	

Sources: Compiled from data in House of Commons, *Divisions*, HMSO, for each respective session. Tribunite affiliation found in F. W. S. Craig, *The Political Companion* (Chichester, England: Parliamentary Research Services, 1976). Entry into the Commons found in Andrew Roth, *The MP's Chart, 1976–77* (London: Parliamentary Profiles, 1976).

However, if support for government defeats by backbenchers on the floor seems to have arisen more from preexisting wing cleavages than from a more dynamic type of factor such as the entry of a new kind of backbencher into the Commons,[5] how does one account for backbenchers' willingness in the 1970s to defeat governments, whereas before, though substantially the same cleavages were present, they had not done so? Perhaps in Labour's case we have overlooked a dynamic factor already present in the data discussed. This concerns the swollen numbers of Tribune members recruited into the Commons on the Labour side in 1970 and 1974 (see Table 8). Over 40 percent of these two classes of Labour entrants became affiliated with the Tribune Group. This is perhaps the result of intensified efforts by the Left over the decade to gain control of the Labour party from "underneath," that is, by gaining control of the constituency associations which in turn nominated parliamentary candidates.

It is possible that the entry into the parliamentary party of large numbers of left-wing backbenchers helped to establish an atmosphere conducive to defeating the government, in which case it would certainly be a relevant factor. With or without the new Tribune members, however, the incumbent Tribune affiliates were still at least a modestly large group on their own, constituting 26 backbenchers. Indeed, each of the defeats the Labour government suffered would have taken place, generally by decided margins, had not one of the new Tribunites supported the incumbent members against the government on the floor. Moreover, the entry of large numbers of Tribune members in 1970 and 1974 does not explain why Labour backbenchers failed to defeat their government on the floor even once throughout 1974, such defeats commencing only in 1975. Thus the swollen numbers of Tribune members on the Labour side would seem neither to be critical in accounting for the Labour defeats themselves nor at all helpful in accounting for the fact that they began only a full year after Labour entered power.

Another hypothesis, one which helps us to account for both these points, is founded on the possibility that change of an institutional nature occurred. This concerns change in one of the underlying practices of British politics that began taking shape in 1972 and then crested during 1974 under the minority Labour government.

An element of the British political system traditionally thought to help minimize the possibility that government backbenchers in the Commons would cross-vote to defeat their own government on the floor is referred to sometimes as the parliamentary rule. This is the understanding that, following a defeat of the government on the floor on an important issue, the government may well resign (Morrison, 1959; Moodie, 1964; Epstein, 1964 and 1967; Norton, 1976). As Epstein's research (1964, 1967) documented so well, if nothing else would, the parliamentary possibility that one's government might resign if defeated on the floor, with the result that the opposition party might come to power, was almost sufficient in itself to keep backbench members at bay. "Each parliamentary vote on an important policy," Epstein observed (1964, p. 56), "involves the question of whether the M.P. wants a cabinet of his party or of the opposition. Thus each vote becomes a party vote in a sense politically meaningful to the individual M.P..... No such incentive operates with sufficient force to impel American Congressmen, under the separation of powers, to be so cohesive." Using a similar line of reasoning, Michael Foot, leader of Labour's left-wing Tribune Group, explained why the Labour Left, although rebellious on many occasions, had not once reversed the government on the floor in the 1960s: "None of the rebellions," he said, "has threatened to destroy the government. [The left wing] knows how damaging that could be to the whole future of the Labour Party and the Labour movement" (*Tribune*, February 26, 1965).

However, when Labour's string of floor defeats brought on by backbench dissidence began in early 1975, the notion that a government might resign if defeated on an important issue on the floor of the House had come into question. Partly this was due to Conservative experience. For, provoked by a peculiarly divisive set of pressures, including highly inept leadership and a severely contentious issue within the parliamentary party, Conservative backbenchers had reversed their government on the floor in 1972 on a policy of national scope and consequence, and yet resignation did not follow. On the other hand, no defeat on such an important policy had arisen before or would arise thereafter under the Conservatives.

---

[5] A series of other factors was also considered, none of which was found to be closely associated with the backbench rebels who defeated governments on the floor. For example, members from marginal districts, sometimes considered to be a bastion of the rebels (Norton, 1976), were no more likely to join the defeats than were members from safe seats (for the Conservatives, Gamma = −.06, not significant; for Labour, Gamma = .15, not significant). Nor were members' class or educational backgrounds found to be of importance.

But two years later, in 1974, under a minority Labour government, defeats of the government without resignation arose in a flurry: the Labour government was defeated on the floor no fewer than 16 times in seven months without ever considering resignation. It is noteworthy that Labour backbenchers did not participate in any of these 16 defeats of their government. But when Labour regained a majority in the Commons in October of 1974, a change of undetermined proportions in the parliamentary rule seemed under way. The life of governments, like that of presidents in a separation of powers system, was beginning to develop an independence of parliamentary voting outcomes on the floor. As the experience under the minority Labour government illustrated, governments could be defeated, even frequently (on almost 20 percent of the floor divisions) without resigning. In turn, published statements by MPs reveal that certainly some backbenchers fully recognized the change in the parliamentary rule that had occurred (Norton, 1978), especially under minority government (Gould, 1978; King, 1978), and that they equally understood the implications for their own freedom to rebel, even to the point of defeating a government on the floor (Gould, 1978; King, 1978; Norton, 1978). To the extent that this is so, and considering the deep-seated wing cleavages discussed earlier, it would seem no coincidence that Labour backbenchers, particularly from the Left, not only began to use the new freedom to impose their own floor defeats on the government, but did so only after the Labour minority government had concluded and its frequent defeats on the floor were history.

Thus change in the operation of the parliamentary rule seems likely to have played some part in helping condition the many backbench-inspired floor defeats that occurred after 1974 under the Labour government. That change in the parliamentary rule was likely a decisive factor is in turn suggested if one examines the history of Labour defeats in light of the kinds of pressures that lay behind earlier Conservative defeat on the floor. There had been no successful challenge to the parliamentary rule by 1972, when the first Conservative defeat came. Instead, extraordinary stresses and strains placed on backbenchers, causing deep division among them, were responsible. These factors have been well documented elsewhere. The argument to be made here about the importance of change in the parliamentary rule is that the Labour defeats by backbenchers, which immediately emerged and then greatly increased once the parliamentary rule came under serious question, occurred largely in the absence of the kinds of divisive pressures operating on backbenchers that had appeared necessary to bring about floor defeat under the Conservatives.

Floor defeat under the Conservatives had been brought on by a conjunction of factors. (For a complete description, see Norton, 1978; see also King, 1978; Cosgrave, 1972; Watt, 1972.) These included, first, the introduction of new and highly contentious issues that divided Conservative backbenchers as earlier issues had not; second, highly insensitive leadership; and, third, a government generally unpopular with the public.

None of these factors was particularly relevant in Labour's case. The Labour defeats on the floor following 1974 were not caused, like defeat under the Conservatives, by the entry of a new and highly divisive set of issues into British politics. Fresh issues had indeed arisen in the 1960s and 1970s that greatly divided each of the parliamentary parties. Principal examples are British membership in the Common Market, Rhodesia, immigration, and devolution. And, certainly these new issues underlay the Conservative governments' unprecedented defeat in 1972, which involved the convergence of both the immigration and the Common Market issues (Norton, 1978; King, 1978).

Despite this, from 1974 until 1977 the upsurge of floor defeats under Labour because of backbench dissidence occurred without these new issues acting as much of a factor. With but two possible (wholly indirect) exceptions, each of the first eight Labour government defeats on the floor caused by backbench dissidence during the 1974–76 period was founded on more traditional economic or welfare kinds of issues (pensions, taxes, the government's overall economic strategy, the legal rights of business and unions, and so forth) than on the new generation of issues. New issues, especially involving devolution of power to Wales and Scotland and entry into the European Community, later became important foci of a series of floor defeats later on under Labour in 1977 and 1978. But, neither these nor the other new issues were necessary or even much of a contributing factor to the government's backbench reversals from the time the string of reversals commenced, following minority government in 1974, until at least through 1976.

Another critical factor helping to provoke Conservative defeats on the floor had been a period of exceptionally headstrong leadership under Edward Heath and the resulting tensions that came to overwhelm the Conservative parliamentary party as a result (Norton, 1978; Cosgrave, 1972; Watt, 1972). But this was not likely so in Labour's case. For, Labour's defeats occurred under two quite different leaders, Wilson and Callaghan. Moreover, one of them, Harold Wilson, had previously led Labour governments quite successfully without facing defeat on the floor resulting from backbench dissidence. This was so whether Wilson's party majority in the Commons was nonexistent (as under minority status in 1974) or very slim (as in 1964–66). Again, it was only after, and then *immediately* after, the parliamentary rule had been buffeted by the history of minority government in 1974 that defeats of the Labour government under Wilson began to arise on the floor from backbench dissidence.

Still a third possible force concerns the atmosphere of the times, perhaps unique to the 1970s, resulting from Britain's severe economic problems. Perhaps the public's dissatisfaction with the government that accompanied the soured economy laid the groundwork for the increased numbers of floor defeats in the Commons. In the case of the Conservatives, it is possible that this dissatisfaction provided something of a stimulus. Thus, in mid-1972, when defeat struck the Conservative government on the floor of the House, Labour held fully an eight-percent lead over the government in the polls. Public disapproval of the government's current record certainly was strong (32 percent to 51 percent).[6] This could have diminished confidence on the Conservative backbenches.

But in early 1975, when the Labour government was first defeated by its own backbenchers on the floor, the government enjoyed a substantial 13-percent lead over the Conservatives. Although not clearly approving the Labour government's record, the public also clearly did not disapprove of it, but was evenly divided (37 percent to 38 percent). Indeed, the public's view toward Labour in early 1975 when the first backbench defeat occurred had considerably improved from the previous summer. Then, even though the Labour government was not to suffer any backbench defeat on the floor, opinion disapproved of the government's record by as much as 32 percent to 47 percent. By July and August of 1975, too, when the next several backbench floor defeats arose under Labour, the government was still running neck and neck with the Conservatives, doing at least as well as in the election of the previous October. It was only by early 1976, after the first five defeats by backbenchers, that popular feeling against the Labour government clearly began to sour.

Whereas the floor reversals suffered by Conservatives in the Commons had been accompanied by a combination of stressful circumstances involving insensitive leadership, the introduction of new and highly divisive issues, and a popular mood both dissatisfied with the government's record and favoring the opposition, the Labour defeats following 1974 seemed to arise from nothing so extraordinary. While not entirely absent, the circumstances accompanying Conservative defeat were manifestly less apparent in Labour's case. Nor has this analysis, or that of others, located any other substantially new factor after 1974 that was not also a part of the situation during 1974 when the Labour government escaped entirely without a backbencher defeat. Instead, the only new factor was a relaxation in the system's parliamentary rule that culminated especially under the minority government in 1974. This change served to enlarge backbenchers' freedom and independence to defeat the government on the floor beyond what was known under Labour in 1974, under the Conservatives from 1970–74, or earlier. The effect of this change in institutional arrangements was powerful. Immediately in 1975, for the first time under Labour, important government defeats on the floor inspired by backbenchers began to occur; they then rapidly grew to unprecedented levels, both in frequency and policy significance, compared to any time in recent memory, even while the variety of pressures which had earlier provoked floor defeat were less intense.

With this past history and the role of the parliamentary rule in mind, what can one expect for the future? The Conservatives, who once again hold office, provide a difficult case for prediction precisely because change in the parliamentary rule occurred principally under a Labour government. No Conservative government has yet withstood an extended series of important floor defeats without resigning. One cannot be certain yet whether the starting point for the Conservatives will be their own previous experience in office or that of Labour. Were it to be Labour's, one might expect more Conservative defeats on the floor in comparison to a decade ago, when the Conservatives held a majority approximately the same as that of 1979. In addition, in order to bring about defeats, Conservative backbenchers would likely exhibit less need than in the earlier 1970s for an intense outside stimulus to provoke them. But it remains possible that the point of reference for the Conservatives will be the earlier years of the 1970s. Were this to be so, Conservative backbench behavior would again depend upon pressures from outside the backbench population; and, if such pressures were to occur, an occasional defeat of importance, not an extended series of important defeats, would be the likely result. The record at this writing finds that backbench dissidence pushed the new Conservative government to alter two of its first policy initiatives (on the Vietnam boat people and on members' salaries), and did so on the latter issue because it appeared virtually certain that the government would be defeated on the floor.

---

[6] Configurations of public opinion reported in this and the following paragraph are found in George H. Gallup, *The Gallup International Public Opinion Polls, Great Britain, 1937–75* (New York: Random House, 1976), for August, 1972 (p. 1193); July and August 1974 on the government's record (pp. 1336 and 1344); January, 1975 (p. 1384); and July and August, 1975 (pp. 1422, 1435).

More certain predictions could be made for a Labour government. Under Labour, defeats of the government had become largely divorced from the need for uncommon pressures on backbenchers to provoke rebellious behavior. In a sense, backbench behavior in defeating the government had realized almost a momentum of its own. It seems apparent from the record that had Labour been returned to office, even with a majority of the size the Conservatives now hold, the government would have continued to face a number of important defeats and forced policy reversals on the floor. Even with a majority the size of the Conservative's, the outcome of at least eight of the Labour government's floor defeats from 1975 to 1978 would have remained the same. Indeed, at this juncture it seems likely that should the pattern established in the last Parliament not be replicated under the Conservatives, when a Labour government returns to power some semblance of the behavior found in the Commons following 1974 will once again be in order.

Conclusion

During the 1970s, the House of Commons was a very different place from what it had been. For the first time in decades—generations is perhaps the better term—the Commons began to effectuate policy change by being willing to defeat the government and to compel modification in the government's policy initiatives; the Commons repeatedly so acted, on a great range of policy issues, some of considerable significance; large numbers of backbenchers of the government's own parliamentary party, too, began to join coalitions to defeat the government, and they did so frequently both in the standing committees and on the floor; finally, helping to prepare the way, change took place in an important procedural device in the Commons that some had previously considered to be at the very heart of the British parliamentary way of life. Possibly no other area of British politics witnessed change in the 1970s more so than the House of Commons.

Yet, Harris Miller (1977) is correct when he commented, even in 1977, that very few observers noticed much change. It is curious that this should be so. Perhaps stereotypes long thought to provide a satisfactory description of the Commons' relations with the government had become so accepted that the new developments escaped much notice.

No matter how permanent the changes we have witnessed prove to be, it is time to reassess the House of Commons. It is time to reach beyond viewing it as an institution so steeped in tradition that change is next to impossible. The House of Commons in the 1970s showed itself to be a legislature, quite capable of fooling us, in which not only can substantial changes in members' behavior and in internal procedure occur, but indeed may take only a very short span of time to be realized.

References

Beer, Samuel (1974). *The British Political System.* New York: Random House.

Cosgrave, Patrick (1972). "The Winter of Their Discontent." *Spectator,* Dec. 2, 1972.

Crick, Bernard (1970). *The Reform of Parliament.* London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

The Economist (1977). "Blowing Up Tyranny." Nov. 5, 1977.

Epstein, Leon D. (1967). *Political Parties in Western Democracies.* New York: Praeger.

——— (1964). "A Comparative Study of Canadian Parties." *The American Political Science Review* 58: 46–60.

Gould, Bryan (1978). "Democracy and the Parties." *The Listener,* July 13, 1978.

Hanson, A. H., and Malcolm Walles (1975). *Governing Britain.* Glasgow: Fontana.

Harvey, J., and L. Bather (1977). *The British Constitution.* London: Macmillan.

King, Anthony (1978). "Talking Politics." BBC transmission, Oct. 28, 1978. Mimeographed.

Mackintosh, John P. (1978). "The Need to Put Parliament before Party." *The* [London] *Times,* Jan. 23, 1978.

——— (1970). *The Government and Politics of Britain.* London: Hutchinson.

Miller, Harris N. (1977). "Future Research on Parliament." In Dennis Kavanaugh and Richard Rose (eds.), *New Trends in British Politics: Issues for Research.* London: Sage.

Moodie, Graeme C. (1964). *The Government of Great Britain.* London: Mcthuen.

Morrison, Herbert S. (1959). *Government and Parliament.* London: Oxford University Press.

Norton, Philip (1978). *Conservative Dissidents: Dissent Within the Parliamentary Conservative Party, 1970–74.* London: Temple Smith.

——— (1976). "The Government Defeat: 10 March 1976." *The Parliamentarian.* 57: 174–75.

Piper, J. Richard (1974). "Backbench Rebellion, Party Government, and Consensus Politics, 1966–70." *Parliamentary Affairs* 27: 384–97.

Polsby, Nelson (1975). "Legislatures." In Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby (eds.), *Handbook of Political Science,* Vol. 5. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.

Punnett, R. M. (1973). *British Government and Politics.* New York: Norton.

Raphael, Adam (1979). "Will Cabinet Give Way on MP's Pay?" *The Observer,* June 24, 1979, p. 4.

Richards, Peter G. (1972). *The Backbenchers.* London: Faber and Faber.

Schwarz, John E. (1979). "The Quiet Revolution: The Awakening of the House of Commons in the 1970s." Mimeographed paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C.

Stacey, Frank (1968). *The Government of Modern Britain.* Oxford: The Clarendon Press.

Walkland, S. A. (1977). "Whither the Commons." In S. A. Walkland and Michael Ryle (eds.), *The Commons in the 70's.* London: Fontana.

——— (1968). *The Legislative Process in Great Britain.* New York: Praeger.

Watt, David (1972). "Immigration: The Warning Lights Begin to Flash." *Financial Times,* Nov. 27, 1972.

Reason, Development, and the Conflicts of Human Ends: Sir Isaiah Berlin's Vision of Politics

ROBERT A. KOCIS
Bowling Green State University

At the root of the conflict between Berlin and his critics is a fundamental disagreement over the possibility of certainty and over the relation of human ends to politics. Gerald MacCallum's formalist critique obscures the political question of whose values a free person is at liberty to pursue. Macpherson's attempt to defend positive liberty as not rationalistic is shown to fail because he (a) conflates liberty with its conditions and (b) assumes a rational pattern to human moral development. And Crick charges Berlin with ignoring politics, understood as active participation in the polis. *Finally, Berlin's conception of politics as a form of human interaction aimed at creating the conditions of human dignity in a situation where we sincerely disagree over the ends of life is shown to be an effort to liberate us to live life for our own purposes. Yet Berlin's defense of liberty is problematic because it is too skeptical; to overcome this difficulty, a non-teleological yet developmentalist account of human nature and a weakly hierarchical account of human values is suggested.*

What makes life worth living? To this, the central question of political and all practical philosophy, Sir Isaiah Berlin returns a singularly striking answer: there is no system to the cosmos, no plan to human development, nor any pattern to human values which can provide a reason for living. Only each individual's artistic and creative capacities can provide such a reason. Nothing outside of us, be it God, Reason, History, Spirit, or the Good, provides a purpose for existence which we can discover; we are not only the discoverers, but actually the creators, of meaning and purpose in the universe. Captivated by a vision of humanity as self-creative and developing in unpredictable and conflicting directions and by a vision of the world as not infused by any cosmic pattern or purpose, Berlin denies that any of us can demonstrate that our way of life is morally superior to others; thus, we need to tolerate one another.

Berlin's defense of tolerance and freedom is fairly unique. As he depicts it, our Western tradition has rested on one basic, yet mistaken assumption: that for every real question, there is one true answer (Berlin, 1962). Berlin is convinced that accepting this belief draws a theorist inevitably to its logical implication: that there is only one true way for all people to live, and those who refuse or fail to live by the light of reason must be brought to the truth. Berlin calls this belief "rationalism" and he relentlessly seeks out and exposes it at the base of political theories. By inclination more a physician than a metaphysician, Berlin sees this assumption of a pattern to things which entails one final, right solution to all human problems as both the heart of the metaphysical doctrine of rationalism and as the source of many political difficulties of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Berlin, 1969, p. 167): "One belief, more than any other, is responsible for the slaughter of individuals on the altars of the great historical ideals. . . . This is the belief that somewhere, in the past or in the future, in divine revelation or in the mind of an individual thinker, in the pronouncements of history or science, or in the simple heart of an uncorrupted good man, there is a final solution."

Thus Berlin sees two competing approaches to life on which views of politics and society rest; political theorists face two logical alternatives. Either theorists can make the rationalist assumption of a pattern to things and so of one correct answer to life's questions; or they can reject this assumption and remain devoted to life's diversity and variety. Theorists of the first group are called rationalists, monists, or "hedgehogs"; the second group includes empiricists, romantics, pluralists, and "foxes" (cp. Berlin, 1953). With his commitment to an unpatterned universe, to human creativity and to the plurality of values, Berlin is clearly a member of the second group who is aware of the need to fuse these two traditions (cp. Berlin, 1969, p. 199).

The Problem With Berlin's Account of Moral Pluralism

Berlin's is an almost coherent theory; despite his concern to unveil the rationalist assumption of other thinkers, Berlin himself appears to make (and perhaps must make) this assumption. This difficulty is logical and its source lies in his theory of human nature. Although he is empiricist and romantic enough to recognize that there are a variety of ways of life and to claim further that they are each valid and equally stable, still he insists that there is an eternal truth about human beings: they are capable of living life for their own purposes. This vision of humanity becomes *a prioristic*—any individual said to be totally lacking the basic moral intuitions of normal people would be said to be inhuman. On this view, there are certain things which we *could not do or be and remain human* (Berlin, 1962, pp. 26–27). The resulting emphasis on freedom and choice requires that we all live in such a way as not to deny others the possibility of making their own choices about life. We are agents, creators of ourselves and our world; to violate this truth is to do violence to ourselves and to deny our humanity.

Where Berlin's more empiricist and romantic view of humanity as creative suggests a dramatic vision of people facing moral ultimates among which they can only choose (Berlin, 1971, p. 31), his more universalist view of our purposiveness leads to a claim that some values, like negative liberty, have a more basic validity than other values, in that they protect the human capacity for choice (Berlin, 1955, pp. 287–88). Where Berlin's romantic vision of humanity leads to a meta-ethical claim that our values cannot be rank-ordered (1955, p. 294), his more rationalistic vision of people as choosers implies a substantive ethic which values negative liberty as "a truer and more humane ideal" (Berlin, 1969, p. 171) than positive liberty. It is my contention that this conflict which first surfaces in his account of human nature later tears his theory apart, rendering his meta-ethical doctrine of pluralism incompatible with his substantive ethical endorsement of liberty. For Berlin faces a dilemma: either the rationalists are right that we can discover some order to our values which best guarantees our humanity, or he cannot insist that negative liberty is "a truer and more humane ideal" than any other.

Yet Berlin's liberalism might be rendered internally consistent if we were to treat liberty, not as the highest of values, but rather as a basal or foundation value, as Nicolai Hartmann (1932) and Charles Fried (1970) treated justice and privacy. These "lower" values constitute a base which provides the moral and psychic foundation for achieving the higher reaches of human perfection. Without this foundation, the other things we value—excellence, equality, nobility, fraternity, dignity—become elusive ideals which remain beyond the reach of human beings. In the absence of these values, we devolve into a more bestial existence (Berlin, 1955, pp. 287–88): "Liberty . . . is very hard to attain and preserve, but without it all things wither." Still, Berlin insists, in the presence of these values, we develop "in a variety of conflicting directions" (1969, p. 205). The "deep structure" of Berlin's image of politics, then, involves an image of us as developing in a variety of directions once a certain basal level has been assured by liberty.

In other words, examining Berlin's views unveils a compelling vision of liberal politics. Despite the logical flaws, Berlin's vision is clear—to deny human beings the chance to choose their life-plans for themselves is a violation of their personhood. Thus he fears the rationalists, whose commitment to some higher goal endangers human choice. However, most of Berlin's critics fail to deal with this claim which Berlin recognizes as most basic. Either they concede to him his claim that rationalism leads ineluctably to one picture of how we must live (and so leads to despotism and paternalism); or they fail to come to grips with the propensity of rationalistic views of the universe, of humanity, and of morality to lead to a conclusion that we must be coerced to live according to plan. Yet this conflict is basic to a consideration of the controversy between the proponents of "negative" and "positive" liberty; if Berlin is right that the positive doctrine rests on some patterned vision of what we must be, then it does not accord with a vision of human beings as able to choose their own ends.

My contention is that a consideration of Berlin and his critics will lead us to an insight into the nature of politics. For Berlin's vision of liberty has been attacked both for including too much politics and for excluding politics. On the one hand, Berlin's claim about the essentially political nature of human freedom has been reduced to a question of formal logic by MacCallum; and his claim that liberty rests on rationalistic grounds has been challenged by Macpherson who would like to terminate liberal politics and substitute participation in economic planning. On the other hand, his defense of negative liberty is depicted as apolitical by Crick who, together with Fromm, would use politics to achieve the full life for all. Against all of these, we can see Berlin (1962, p. 8) as maintaining that politics is an interaction between human beings aimed at resolving conflicts engendered by choosing competing ends of life: "If we ask the Kantian question, 'In what kind of world is political philosophy . . . in principle possible?' the answer must be 'Only in a world where ends collide.' " Thus, liberal politics, based on a recognition of the plurality of valid and conflicting ends of life, aims to free people to choose among the ends as they see fit. It does not provide us with the good life, but it makes pursuit of the good life possible.

The Nature and Foundations of Negative and Positive Liberty

But the liberal tradition is not monolithic; one of the many significant controversies within liberalism concerns the very nature of liberty itself. T. H. Green, from within the tradition of British Idealism, first popularized the distinction between "negative" and "positive" liberty by criticizing the legalist tradition of human rights as being too empty and formalistic—too negative—and urging that the state be more positively concerned with the material needs of its citizens. With this, welfare concerns were introduced into the liberal tradition. Berlin (1969, p. 171) fears that this trend will end by elevating material welfare over liberty, so he reminds us that negative liberty is "a truer and more humane ideal" than positive liberty because the positive conception of liberty is rooted in a rationalistic view of the world.

Berlin's point is not that the goals of positive libertarians are evil—rather, they are so compelling that, in pursuing them, we inevitably lose sight of the more basic liberties of the negative kind. Indeed, his point is that in pursuit of other goals we must never sacrifice our basic liberties, since they guarantee our human dignity. Nor does this make of Berlin an opponent of humane policies which aid the less advantaged in our societies; his claim is that it makes a difference how we justify these policies. To initiate a system of transfer payments to funnel government funds to indigent citizens because they are viewed as helpless dependents leads inexorably to paternalism and despotism (even if it is benevolent); to advocate the same policy because a certain minimum of material welfare is necessary for any person to pursue his or her own purposes is to foster human freedom and independence. As Berlin puts it (1969, p. xlvi): "The case for the . . . welfare state and socialism . . . can be constructed with as much validity from considerations of the claims of negative liberty as from its positive brother; and if, historically, it was not made so frequently, that was because the kind of evil against which the concept of negative liberty was directed as a weapon was not laissez-faire, but despotism"

Berlin's insight is that human dignity is to be found in our capacity to make our own choices—the flaw of rationalistic views is that they justify violence to, and denigration of, persons. The always-present desire for some higher good or another readily provides some people with justifications for present indignities by appeal to some future good. Berlin (1956, p. 25) fondly quotes Herzen on the logic of this perversion: "Do you really wish to condemn human beings alive today to the mere sad role of caryatids supporting a floor for others one day to dance upon?" The problem is that the goal of a future life which requires present indignities is self-destructive, leading to an abasement and mockery of human life. As Berlin sees it, any vision of liberty, like positive liberty, which (by virtue of its rationalist foundations) requires the repression of individuals and the imposition of alien purposes upon them is necessarily faulty, a form of deception rooted in a misrepresentation of human nature.

Berlin's distinction between negative and positive liberty rests on a simple and commonsense understanding of freedom, locating within it both positive and negative dimensions. Simply, any agent's desire for freedom derives from the wish that his or her actions be truly his or her own and not anybody else's. In Berlin's words (1969, p. xliii): "I wish to determine myself, and not be directed by others, no matter how wise or benevolent; my conduct derives an irreplaceable value from the sole fact that it is my own, and not imposed upon me." Thus, to be free may take either of two senses: it may mean being free from coercion or it may mean having a positive capacity to govern oneself. The first is the negative sense of liberty, and the latter is its positive counterpart. Negative liberty is concerned with moral and political rights to live for one's own purposes within a certain realm. Positive liberty is geared to providing people with the capacity to become better, more rational beings who live for higher purposes; it aims at creating a new, and better, society.

Berlin distinguishes the two by reference to the types of questions to which they respond. The first, negative sense of liberty addresses questions like "What is the area within which the subject . . . is or should be left to do or be, without interference by other persons?" (Berlin, 1969, pp. 121–22) or "How much am I governed?" (p. xliii) or "Over what area am I master?" (p. xliii). The first definition of liberty is involved in defining an area within which no one has a right to intervene, an area in which agents have a right to make their own decisions. Intrusion into this realm is a violation of the person, denying human purposiveness. This sense of liberty emphasizes protecting individuals in their choices and requires maintaining the inviolability of persons.

By contrast, positive liberty is concerned with questions of who can be a governing agency and of who is to have the power to coerce others to act. Such questions include: "What or who is the source of control or interference that can determine someone to do, or be, this rather than that?" (p. 122) or "By whom am I governed?" (p. xliii) or "Who is master?" (p. 133). It is not concerned with a defensive rampart, but with which agency is to exercise a positive capacity to get things done. It would seem, then, that positive liberty is not a freedom from coercion but the ability to do or become something. It is not protective of the person who is, but creative of new circumstances in which the person changes. A fundamentally different approach to life and politics, positive liberty emphasizes the creation of a capacity for those who are rational to realize a better life, while negative liberty is committed to the importance of restraints on that capacity so that human dignity might be respected.

In his critique of positive liberty, Berlin might be seen to be offering us an insight into political theorizing: any view of the nature of morality and society which assumes that there is one right answer to questions about how people are to live is inevitably drawn to a (perverse) kind of Platonic politics which requires government by the elite of guardians who know the right answer to life's questions. Berlin's fundamental argument is that this rationalistic positing of the existence of *the right answer* to questions of how we are to live inevitably leads proponents of positive liberty down the road to paternalism: if one right answer exists, then those who have discovered it have an obligation to bring this truth to the unenlightened. If there is one truth about how to live, then all people must be made aware of the right answer and must be made to act in accord with it. Berlin fears theorists of positive liberty because they must have some vision of a (possible?) world without scarcity and conflict, or a view of human developmental powers which will carry us into a new age, or a view of some higher good which requires of them a commitment to the expansion of human powers to require action of other people. Possessed of and by a truth of how people are to live, they are logically and reasonably compelled to require all to act in accord with this truth.

If Berlin is right, the problem with positive liberty is that this subsuming of all people under one ideal lays the foundation for violence. Any who fail to see its truth are either ignorant or irrational; pursuit of any other end is subversive of the pursuit of the one right end. Any persons who pursue other ends are classified as perverse, as not knowing what is truly good for them. If they will not choose to do what the enlightened know to be right, they have to be coerced so that the good life will not be denied to the rest of humanity.

Berlin (1969, p. 133) finds this view frightening and dehumanizing:

> Once I take this view, I am in a position to ignore the actual wishes of men or societies, to bully, oppress, torture them in the name, and on behalf, of their "real" selves, in the secure knowledge that whatever is the true goal of man (happiness, performance of duty, wisdom, a just society, self-fulfillment) must be identical with his freedom—the free choice of his "true," albeit often submerged and inarticulate, self.

Berlin locates the psychological basis for this perversion of liberty in the metaphysical division of the self into a bundle of instincts and the latent rational controller. Once this division has been assumed, only the latently rational aspect of a person is seen to have access to the one true way for people to live and those who are not governed by reason are not to be taken seriously, or even as (full) human beings. They must be irrational and reactionary—they do not desire the same things as the enlightened do. Berlin suspects that such a view holds out no hope for the unenlightened; if they do not behave properly, the hopes of all will be dashed, to the detriment of all mankind. They must not be permitted to destroy the great experiment—it is of more importance than their perverse wishes. Coercion is justified.

Berlin (1969, p. 152) notes that what begins as a doctrine of freedom is thus perverted to a doctrine of coercion and repression; step by step it leads "from an ethical doctrine of individual responsibility and individual self-perfection to an authoritarian state obedient to the directives of an *elite* of Platonic guardians." Because he sees the positive doctrine of liberty as rooted in the rationalistic tradition, Berlin senses that it will seek to impose its vision of the good of man upon us all, smothering our capacity for creating that good for ourselves. All of the diversity, color, and variety of politics would be lost, along with our human dignity, if the positive ideal of liberty were pursued too zealously. Pursuit of this, or any, ideal as the true good for all would depoliticize our world, reducing political questions to technical questions (Berlin, 1962, p. 8).

Liberty De-Politicized: A Formal Logical Relationship?

However, it may well be that questions of liberty are not political questions after all; they may be questions of logic and meaning. Gerald MacCallum (1972) has offered a reasoned and closely argued critique of this distinction between two kinds of liberty which Berlin has employed in his arguments. MacCallum questions the need for the distinction, arguing that the two conceptions of liberty are both formally involved in any statement about human freedom. Where Berlin sees two fundamentally different approaches to life and politics, MacCallum sees one logical relationship. Liberty, properly understood, is neither positive nor negative. Rather, liberty is a single, triadic relationship (MacCallum, 1972, p. 175): an agent (*X*) is free from some constraint (*Y*) to do, be, or become something (*Z*). MacCallum identifies three variables which may range over agents (*X*), over preventing conditions like constraints, restrictions, interferences, and barriers (*Y*), and over actions or conditions of character or circumstances (*Z*).

It is not the case, MacCallum continues, that two different conceptions of liberty are at the root of the controversies over negative and positive liberty. Rather, the disputants disagree over the ranges of these variables. MacCallum contends that where the advocates of negative liberty take *X* to extend over common-sense persons, advocates of the positive doctrine may either restrict the range of the agent variable to only those who are rational—"the retreat to the inner citadel" (1972, p. 184; Berlin, 1969, pp. 135–40)—or expand it so that "the institutions and members, the histories and futures of the communities in which the living human body is found are considered to be inextricable parts of the 'person' " (MacCallum, p. 185). Similarly, the negative libertarian's limiting of obstacles to those actions or arrangements of others who might interfere with an agent is rejected by members of the positive tradition, since "it is quite irrelevant whether difficulties in the way of the policies are or are not *due to* arrangements made by human beings. The only question is whether the difficulties can be removed by human arrangements, and at what cost" (MacCallum, p. 186). Finally, disagreement over the range of the last variable centers around a difference between focusing on the conditions of character (by the positive faction) and emphasizing actions (by the negative faction). One may be free to do something—to perform specific actions, as the negative libertarians would have it; or one may be free to be or become something—people are free for the purpose of developing and need more than the absence of constraints, and so they must be provided the positive capacity to actualize certain potentials.

Yet MacCallum's formal logic obscures a deeper conflict about the ends of life: is a person to be freed to pursue some rationally specified purpose or is s/he to be freed to pursue his or her own purposes? In dismissing MacCallum's critique, Berlin hints at this, writing that liberty needs no further or higher purposes: "A man struggling against his chains or a people against enslavement need not consciously aim at any definite further state. A man need not know how he will use his freedom; he just wants to remove the yoke. So do classes and nations" (1969, p. xliii n.). However obliquely, Berlin appears to be contending that if liberty were to be construed as containing its own purposes, it would leave no room for the purposes of those who struggle to achieve it. However, Berlin's footnote does not constitute a refutation of MacCallum: he fails to show that there is anything wrong with MacCallum's triadic relationship as an account of liberty, opting to suggest that it flies in the face of some of our intuitions about why people seek freedom. What is wrong with MacCallum's formal analysis of liberty?

Initially, the problem is that the analysis is formal; its strength is also its weakness. This is not to say that formal logics and grammars are inherently flawed and of no use to political theory; but they are limited. Linguists have become very sensitive to the fact that linguistic forms can obscure a more profound logic; depth grammars have been developed because formalistic grammars cannot account for the underlying differences between sentences like "John is easy to please" and "John is eager to please." Formal grammars face difficulties distinguishing "easy" from "eager"—one (formal) variable could be made to cover both of these "dispositions" with respect to pleasing. However, the underlying logic of the two sentences is fundamentally different: in the one, some agent other than John is aiming to please John and finds this easy, while in the other sentence John is aiming to please someone else and seems willing to go to great lengths to do so. With some difficulty, a formalist could describe these sentences in terms of a single triadic relationship: "*X* (some agent) is *Y* (in some way disposed) to *Z* (to pleasing)." Yet this formal analysis obscures a deeper logical problem concerning which agent is aiming to please; formalist grammars are not always sensitive to the differences of which person is seeking an end.

MacCallum's analysis of sentences expressing relationships of human freedom is similarly flawed by an inability to identify who should be deciding about human ends. Formally, MacCallum's account is flawless–it is possible to formalize all freedoms as "*X* is free from *Y* to do or be *Z*." But the purpose of analysis is to lay bare the underlying logical reality; MacCallum's analysis fails to do so. To clarify the underlying logic, two points about the relationship of freedom to human ends must be made. First, it is true but trivial to claim that all liberties can be expressed formally as a triadic relationship since the sorts of things which follow "*X* is free from *Y* to. . ." are as different as "easy" and "eager" in the earlier example. It is certainly true that liberties, such as freedom of religious belief, can be so expressed: all citizens are free from governmental interference to believe what they will about a deity. But not all freedoms are liberties; some are capacities. One may be free to speak one's own mind or free to become rational or "a new socialist man." The difference between the two is that the first permits a variety of different human purposes, while the second implies that some human purposes are to take precedence over others. One may be free to pursue one's own ends (however foolish) or one may be free to pursue certain ends specified by more rational agents. This difference between freeing someone to become the sort of person he or she wishes to be and freeing a person to fit some mold is obscured by MacCallum's formalist analysis.

Second, this conflict about the ends of life is symptomatic of a larger and deeper philosophical disagreement. One side of this argument holds that freedom is the ability to pursue certain rationally specified ends, while the other concentrates on an individual's space to choose his or her ends. This political dimension of liberty must not be obscured by logical formalism. Negative freedoms, interpreted as liberties and rights, are protective of the agent's right to choose his or her ends without interference and include the freedoms to worship, to speak, to write, and to assemble. Positive freedoms, interpreted as capacities, are expansive of an individual's powers to pursue certain specified ends, including the freedoms to be rational, to be American, to be Soviet, and to be a fully integrated personality. This second group of freedoms involves a series of higher ends and is not directly related to questions of legal/civil liberties and human rights; could anyone have a right to be rational?

However, it is here that the force of Berlin's reply to MacCallum can be fully felt. For freeing human beings need not (and perhaps should not, or even, must not) involve some higher purpose; it is enough to free them to find their own purposes. Unhappily, as Berlin notes, freeing people in the negative sense entails freeing them to do even those things which we might see as mistaken; freeing them to pursue their own purposes may well mean that they will not pursue the ends we prefer. We might well free them to become better human beings, but their ends might lead them to become something totally different from, and even contrary to, our expectations. Criticizing Rousseau and the Jacobins, Berlin (1969, p. 148) writes that for them, "Freedom is not freedom to do what is irrational, or stupid, or wrong. To force empirical selves into the right pattern is not tyranny, but liberation." Positive liberty becomes the freedom to do what is rational, to do what rational agents would want to do. Berlin is right to protest that giving freedom this purpose is a transformation and perversion of liberty, making of it a means to some other end rather than a condition for our decisions about the ends of life. Actual persons are not protected by this freedom; only abstract and more rational persons are worthy of the freedom to decide for themselves. We might conclude then that if we want people to be something in particular, we need to coerce them, not to free them. To speak of freeing them to pursue our ends is a mockery; human beings can only be freed to pursue their own ends.

To ignore who is to make decisions about human ends is to remove all politics from a discussion of liberty. If all people agreed on what is the highest good, there would be no conflict over whether we should be free to pursue our own ends–our ends would all be the same and only the irrational would seek perverse ends. In passages unrelated to his comments on MacCallum, Berlin explores the dimensions of removing politics from a consideration of freedom and making the questions of freedom into questions of formal logic.

We might begin this exploration of the political dimensions of liberty by noting that any effort to include a foreign or higher end in a definition of liberty amounts to an advocacy of a paternalistic approach to liberation and government. If there is some higher end to be achieved in human liberation, then other persons are not to be counted as full moral agents capable of their own purposes but treated like children who must be taught what is best for them. With this higher end and their best interests in mind, leaders are to initiate them into the best life. Rather than agreeing with MacCallum that freedom includes this sense of (higher) purpose, Berlin (1969, p. 136) may be taken to be showing that this vision of purpose is the very root of oppression: "For if the essence of men is that they are autonomous beings—authors of values, of ends in themselves, the ultimate authority of which consists precisely in the fact that they are willed freely—then nothing is worse than to treat them as if they were not autonomous, but natural objects. . . ." To treat human beings as natural objects is to treat them as determined by outside forces and as not capable of their own purposes; the purposes we actually have must not be as good as those brought with the positive sense of liberty. The advocate of positive liberty becomes a kind of despot in Berlin's eyes (1969, p. 137): " 'Nobody can compel me to be happy in his own way,' said Kant. 'Paternalism is the greatest despotism imaginable.' This is so because it is to treat men as if they were not free, but human material for me, the benevolent reformer, to mould in accordance with my own, not their, freely adopted purposes. . . ." But this capacity for ends is what is distinctively human about each person and to deny it is to deny human status to a person (1969, p. 137): "But to manipulate men, to propel them towards goals which you—the social reformer—see, but they may not, is to deny their human essence, to treat them as objects without wills of their own, and therefore to degrade them." Deception is wrong for the same reasons, writes Berlin: to deceive people or to trick them into seeking ends preferred by the deceiver, even though it may later to be to their advantage, is "to treat them as sub-human, to behave as if their ends are less ultimate and sacred than" those of the deceiver (1969, p. 137).

No proper sense of liberty, as Berlin sees it, could be paternalistic; liberty for the sake of being or doing something desired by others is not truly liberty. The political dimensions of negative liberty carry with them the implication that various human values might conflict; but positive liberty assumes that human ends can be rationally specified and ranked. This is the crucial difference between the two which is obscured by MacCallum's formalist analysis: negative liberty would preserve the ground of politics on which conflicting human ends grow, so that our ability to choose is preserved, while positive liberty would harmonize human ends. Hence, we might conclude that it is certainly true that freedoms can be specified formally as a single triadic relationship; but it is more profoundly true that two divergent and opposed approaches to life can both address questions of liberty using that single form. MacCallum's critique fails because it does not get below the surface of the logical form of statements of freedom to the political question of who shall choose the ends of life for each person.

Liberty De-Politicized: Welfare and the Harmony of Human Ends

However, this does not mean that Berlin's account of liberty is not open to criticism from another angle by those who oppose its political dimension: perhaps positive liberty is needed to foster human development. Berlin's refusal to see freedom as a capacity or to see any need for a higher purpose for freedom is what leads C. B. Macpherson (1973) to argue that Berlin's definition of negative liberty accords too little importance to welfare as a condition for human growth. This controversy operates at two levels, beginning with Macpherson's rejection of the distinction between liberty and its conditions and proceeding to an attempt at refuting Berlin's claim that positive liberty is inherently rationalistic.

Berlin insists that providing people with the material conditions necessary for the enjoyment of liberty is not the same thing as freeing them; "Useless freedoms should be made usable, but they are not identical with the conditions indispensable for their utility" (1969, p. liv). Berlin argues that this is "not a merely pedantic distinction" since zealots who free people in the sense of providing them with material goods would downgrade the importance of freedom of choice. "In their zeal to create social and economic conditions in which alone freedom is of genuine value, men tend to forget freedom itself; and if it is remembered, it is liable to be pushed aside to make room for these other values with which the reformers or revolutionaries have become preoccupied" (1969, p. liv).

Macpherson targets this distinction for destruction, contending that it empties liberty of some necessary content. His complaint is that Berlin's negative liberty "does not include access to the means of life and the means of labour, in spite of the fact that that lack of access does diminish negative liberty, that is, does diminish the area in which a man cannot be interfered with." Because Berlin seems to remove access to the means of life and the means of labor from his definition of liberty, Macpherson sees him as removing such "class-imposed denials from the department of liberty into the department of justice or equality." Unfortunately, as Macpherson sees it, this is some sort of a degeneration into reactionary thinking; Berlin's move "seems to me an unfortunate reversion towards the extreme liberalism of Herbert Spencer" (Macpherson, 1973, p. 102). Projecting guilt by (false) association, Macpherson appeals to our intuitions which suggest that depriving people of food seems to make their formal freedoms empty, which is true enough; but that does not establish an identity between these conditions and liberty. All that Macpherson's argument proves is that the conditions are necessary, which Berlin would not deny. Having a paper and pen is a necessary condition for writing an article; however, providing a paper and pen does not make someone a writer. Other conditions must be met for sufficiency. Neither would feeding people be equivalent to freeing them (except from hunger, which is not a form of political liberation but of liberation from natural forces).

Indeed, providing sufficient material security, health, knowledge, and certain minimums of equality, justice, and mutual confidence is necessary for the exercise of liberty. Still, Berlin argues (1969, p. lv) that providing exactly those things, especially in the name of liberty, can result in a dangerous and disastrous travesty:

> To provide for material needs, for education, for equality and security . . . is not to expand liberty. We live in a world characterized by regimes (both right- and left-wing) which have done, or are seeking to do, precisely this; and when they call it freedom, this can be as great a fraud as the freedom of a pauper who has a legal right to purchase luxuries. Indeed, one of the things that Dostoevsky's celebrated fable of the Grand Inquisitor in *The Brothers Karamazov* is designed to show is precisely that paternalism can provide the conditions of liberty, yet withhold freedom itself.

Macpherson's concern for these material conditions of liberty is laudable; but to portray them as necessary conditions for enjoying liberty, as Berlin does, is not to spurn them. Rather, Berlin is fully aware that "freedom for the wolves has often meant death for the sheep. The bloodstained history of economic individualism and unrestrained capitalist competition does not, I should have thought, today need stressing." Indeed, Berlin argues that there is available a stronger argument than the warm-hearted altruism of Macpherson to condemn these deprivations: they have resulted in "brutal violations of 'negative' liberty—of basic human rights" (1969, p. xlv). Decrying this as an "odious mockery," Berlin has no desire to throw people to the mercy of the market without the protection of rights; however, we must be careful of the reasons which move us to protect others from social injustice. It is better, Berlin would say, to provide people with protection and material goods because they are seen as purposive beings who need these things to seek their own purposes than it is to provide them with material goods because they are seen as dependents who must be taken care of and brought to the true way of living. The danger of paternalism which lurks in demands for welfare is perverse indeed: the goal of providing the material conditions of liberty may finally subvert liberty itself. Berlin writes (1969, pp. lviii–lix):

> Those who are obsessed by the truth that negative liberty is worth little without sufficient conditions for its active exercise, or without the satisfaction of other human aspirations, are liable to minimize its importance, to deny it the very title of freedom, to transfer it to something that they regard as more precious, and finally to forget that without it human life, both social and individual, withers away.

The conflict between Macpherson and Berlin, then, centers around the roles that liberty and material welfare are to have in fostering human growth. Macpherson fears that Berlin neglects material welfare and ignores the effects of class divisions; Macpherson would have us pursue the goals of material security and harmony. Berlin may even seem rather hard-hearted alongside Macpherson because he insists that welfare is not the same as liberty and that liberty is a more sacred ideal. But Berlin's ideal is not a state where people are formally free yet starving. Berlin's position might even be more sensitive to human needs and shortcomings in that he would not permit the single-minded pursuit of any one goal, not even Macpherson's collective material welfare, to dictate to people what they ought to do with their lives. Thus Macpherson's first objection to Berlin is not convincing: regarding material welfare as a necessary condition for enjoying liberty is not the same as contending that it should be ignored. It is only a way of reminding us that the concerns of liberty are also important to human potential; perhaps they are more important, not in that they are concerned with a higher good than welfare, but in that they constitute a more basic value.

The second aspect of the disagreement between these two theorists is substantive and concerns the nature of positive liberty: is it inherently rationalistic? Where Berlin contends that positive liberty is rooted in a rationalistic view of the world or of humanity, Macpherson argues that not all forms of positive liberty are rationalistic. Macpherson (1973, p. 105) distinguishes among three senses of positive liberty: PL_1 is the basic sense of positive liberty, involving conscious self-direction; PL_2 is a debased form which imposes rational freedom on those said to be not fully rational; and PL_3 involves the democratic right to participate in the sovereign authority. Macpherson begins his argument by noting that positive liberty is indeed concerned with the individual's ability to develop into a "fully *human* being" (p. 105). But, he wants to argue, this is no concession since the degeneration of doctrines of positive liberty into rationalistic perversions and denials of liberty is "due not to the logic of positive liberty, nor to the assumptions of the idealist and rationalist theorists who have pushed positive liberty, in thought, to positions which have supported such repulsive extremes. I want to argue now that it is due rather to a specific failure of liberal theory..." (p. 107). This failure is the failure to see how class divisions and scarcity give rise to conflict. This liberal error is responsible for the slide from PL_1 to PL_2. Macpherson seems willing to grant Berlin that PL_1 becomes PL_2 if a series of assumptions is made and quotes Berlin's specification of those assumptions:

> first, that all men have one true purpose, and only one, that of rational self-direction; second, that the ends of all rational beings must of necessity fit into a single, universal, harmonious pattern, which some men may be able to discern more clearly than others; third, that all conflict, and consequently all tragedy, is due solely to the clash of reason with the irrational or the insufficiently rational—the immature and underdeveloped elements in life—whether individual or communal, and that such clashes are, in principle, avoidable, and for wholly rational beings impossible; and finally, that when all men have been made rational, they will obey the rational laws of their own natures, which are one and the same in them all, and so be at once wholly law-abiding, and wholly free (Macpherson, 1973, p. 111; Berlin, 1969, p. 154).

But, contends Macpherson (1973, p. 111), not all versions of positive liberty need make all these assumptions: "My point is that the last three assumptions are not needed in any concept of positive liberty, and are indeed inconsistent with PL_1." There is a difference, Macpherson writes, between believing (1) that there is some pattern to human development and (2) that "if the chief impediments to men's developmental powers were removed ... there would emerge not a pattern but a proliferation of many ways and styles of life, which could not be prescribed and which would not necessarily conflict" (pp. 111–12).

But Berlin would not be so critical if positive liberty assured that people could develop in a variety of ways; indeed, some de-patterned version of human change and growth seems close to his heart. For instance, he begins his essay on J. S. Mill (p. 173) with a quotation from Mill suggesting the "importance, to man and society, ... of giving full freedom to human nature to expand itself in innumerable and conflicting directions." If this were what positive liberty meant, then Macpherson is right that Berlin would have no reason to oppose it. But the controversy over the nature of positive liberty is real and involves the possibility that, as we develop in diverse directions, conflict might cease. Berlin, following Mill, believes that we will grow in various and conflicting directions; Macpherson feels that these directions will not conflict. The error in liberal theory to which Macpherson refers centers around the unwillingness to see that conflict begins with scarcity and class divisions. Where Berlin sees the conflict between values to be a necessary truth about the human situation, Macpherson sees this conflict as contingent upon scarcity and the divisions between people based on exploitation.

Macpherson (p. 113) seems ready to concede that the conflicts between values which we experience are real, that opposite views can be "maintained by men (and groups) of equally good will. That is what makes their perpetual presence plausible." But this concession is nothing more than a claim that such conflicts are born in class-divided societies based on a postulate of infinite desirousness (p. 113). "But how many of those conflicts would remain endemic in a society without class conflict and without scarcity?" Pessimistic liberals like Berlin err; Macpherson writes (p. 113), "We do not have to go to the opposite extreme of a brainwashed utopia to envisage a society where diverse, genuinely human (not artificially contrived) desires can be simultaneously fulfilled." We must conclude, then, that their disagreement is about human nature, especially about what we can be: Macpherson feels that our ultimate values can be rationally harmonized as we develop, while Berlin is convinced that human dignity would have to be sacrificed to overcome the diversity of human ends. Given his assumption of the feasibility of a harmonious society based on people made rational, Macpherson contends that the conflicts of values need not be perpetual; if the conflict of values is not perpetual, then repressive monism is not necessary to achieve positive liberty—we need only be freed to develop. This leads Macpherson to conclude (p. 113) that "the monism which is the essence of PL_2 [the rationalist perversion] is not entailed by PL_1 [rational self-direction]." In other words, in a world where values do not conflict, no rationalist monism is needed to endorse positive liberty, and there is no need to worry about the slip from PL_1 to PL_2.

Or is there? The problem with Macpherson's argument is that the rationalist assumption is not needed at this point in the argument because it had been smuggled in earlier; we must back-track a bit to detect the point of entrance. Both theorists seem to agree that ours is not a world in which all values are compatible. Berlin argues that one must make rationalist assumptions about this world or about human development to make an argument for positive liberty. But in speaking of a world or a society in which values do not conflict, Macpherson makes just such an assumption of an order to human development which renders consonant all of the things (fully developed, rational) people desire. One may not have to go to the extreme of a brainwashed utopia to make this assumption, but one does have to cross a threshhold into rationalism.

Logically, the difficulty with Macpherson's critique is that, in his belief in men's developmental powers, Macpherson links together two conjuncts which are contradictory. Clearly, he is right in asserting (pp. 111–12) that there is a difference between believing that there is a pattern into which all rational beings fit and believing that "if the chief impediments to men's developmental powers were removed, if, that is to say, they were allowed equal freedom, there would emerge not a pattern but a proliferation of ways and styles of life which could not be prescribed and which would not necessarily conflict." While this second assumption is more attractive, it is also self-contradictory: the assumption that there would be no pattern to human development so that ways of life could not be prescribed opposes the assumption that the ways of life into which we would develop need not conflict. If we assume (as both Macpherson and Berlin believe) that human values now conflict, then there are only two possibilities for human development: either we will continue to develop in the directions in which our conflicting values pull us, so that we develop in conflicting directions; or we must develop according to some pattern which will harmonize our rational desires so that human ends need not conflict in the future. To assume that the conflicts which are a necessary part of our current existence need not be a part of some more developed existence is to see a pattern at work in human development; to see an end of the conflict between our desires is to see us developing toward some more rational existence in which there could be a rational accommodation of values. Given Macpherson's diagnosis of the problem, the prescription is simple: create a new society without scarcity and class divisions and our rational desires will no longer conflict. The problem, as any opponent of rationalism would see it, is that in this end-state after scarcity and classes, any agent whose desires do conflict with some one else's rational desires cannot be rational, cannot fit the pattern. Such an agent must be less developed, a remnant of the bourgeois period, still under the control of irrational impulses. Since this person does not fit the new pattern in which we have been liberated from scarcity and social divisions, this individual with irrational and conflictual desires is also to be "liberated." The rationalist perversion of liberty remains: in the name of freeing people, we (the benevolent reformers of Macpherson) must coerce them to live as we think fit.

Finally, we must again note that the disagreement separating these theorists is substantive: the question is simply whether or not positive liberty need be rationalistic in depending upon some assumption of a pattern to the cosmos or to human development. Macpherson denies that positive liberty need be rationalistic and advocates a concern for this notion of freedom with a view to eliminating scarcity and class conflict so that we might develop to a stage where all of the various manifestations of human capacities need not conflict with one another. However, we must conclude that Macpherson's conception of positive liberty, despite his efforts to avoid the errors of rationalism, finally rests on the assumption that humanity will develop so that all rational human desires are harmonized.

We might conclude, then, that since Macpherson sees the conflict of values as ephemeral and rooted in scarcity and class divisions while Berlin views this conflict between the things which people desire as a perpetual and necessary condition of human existence, the two would disagree about the nature of politics. Berlin would have to view politics as some form of human interaction based on a recognition that we are capable of unique and conflicting ends which are legitimate. Thus negative liberty acquires its distinctly political value because of the possibility that some people, captured by their vision of the good, would attempt to impose their view of what is good upon other recalcitrant persons, denying the validity of their ends and purposes and so degrading them. Hence the conflict of values, coupled with our metaphysical compulsion to unify our world, yields the need for a liberal society where persons are protected from such impositions by others.

By contrast, from Macpherson's point of view, Berlin's liberal kind of politics exists in this vale of tears where we now live, in the midst of scarcity and divisions; but armed with a vision of human perfectibility, he believes that we will move beyond this pitiful situation, transcending (liberal) politics. While politics is necessary in the present world, ridden as it is with strife, it has meant the creation of institutions which enable some to bend the wills of others (and if not their wills, at least their energies) to their own purposes. Thus, politics is inevitably tied up with the conflict between classes and with scarcity. Macpherson's goal comes to be the removal of the conflict-generating elements in society. Once the conflicts are eliminated, Macpherson's command economy would involve the citizens in a lot of democratic participation in the development of the economic plan; but would this participation be political? Berlin would suggest that decisions to be made about the plan would not be about human ends; all ends would have been harmonized. Rather, the decisions to be made would concern means to rational ends, and so would be technical instead of political: there would be no politics in a world with no scarcity and no divisions. Politics is necessary not because we are weak and irrational; rather, politics is needed because human dignity entails that each person is capable of his or her own ends, which no authority can dictate.

Freedom Hyper-Politicized: Participation as "the Good of Man"

Curiously, where Macpherson sees Berlin as making the liberal error of viewing politics (and the value conflicts on which it is based) as a necessary and eternal part of the human condition when it is contingent upon class divisions and scarcity, Crick criticizes Berlin for not including enough politics in his conception of freedom. In his "Freedom as Politics," Crick (1967, p. 211) argues that politics, seen as the free activity of men in the *polis,* is missing in Berlin's too-negative conception of liberty. "Negative liberty is the wrong end of the right stick: it only defines what we seek to avoid harming in others while we act more positively ourselves." Enamored of the virtues of the ancient republic, Crick rejects the "liberal belief that all power is inherently evil." Returning to an ideal of "freedom as citizenship," Crick is less concerned with the individual and his or her rights against the state, and focuses instead on the need for republican virtues, "on those conditions which were necessary to operate successfully the kind of state characterized as republican" (p. 211).

Crick's critique of Berlin is respectful and friendly. He notes (p. 212) that the gap between Berlin and him is not that great: "Here is my whole difference with Berlin—perhaps in some circumstances a slight one: between being able to choose and actually choosing." He believes that Berlin confines negative liberty too narrowly, and "while he has shown a great skill in defending the nymph of liberty from abuse, he has been unnecessarily modest in denying her exercise and is at fault in letting her languish with so little to do" (p. 195). In Crick's eyes, whatever Berlin's negative liberty is, it is *not political liberty.* Dedicated as he is to the republican ideal, he is not willing to countenance as a political liberty any liberty which does not confer upon a citizen the capacity to participate in the governance of the community. In the ancient *polis,* those who had political liberties were those who had a voice in the government. No others had liberty in the political sense. From Crick's perspective, Berlin seems to separate freedom from any republican notion of virtue: the problem is that Berlin seems to ignore "any possible social or political context" (p. 198).

Crick is worried that Berlin's "freedom" is concerned with the absence of constraint and not with the capacities for self-rule which mark a republic. For him, people must be political actors; it is not enough that they are *free to act; they must act* if they are to be free citizens. Failure to act subverts the goal of republican citizenship. In particular, they must act as responsible citizens of a republic. Crick writes that what "is missing in Berlin's analysis, odd though it may sound to say so, is any analysis of the link between freedom and political action—a typically liberal lack. . ." (p. 199). The problem, as Crick sees it, is that if people are free as Berlin would like them to be, free to choose their own responsibilities and ends, they may even be free from the responsibilities of the *polis:* "Freedom is being left alone from politics," writes Crick of Berlin's liberty, and not accepting this, asks, "Is it?" (p. 199). Because Berlin is concerned with freeing people from constraints and not with integrating them into communities where they could become citizens, Crick (p. 198) finds a negatively free person to be isolated. "I would call such a condition simply 'isolation' or more often 'loneliness'—put more sympathetically, 'splendid isolation' or 'the self-reliant individual'. . . ." Such people need not possess the proper dedication to republican virtues, and Crick sees this as a serious problem. Crick wants to free us for the purpose of becoming good, active citizens.

In his need to free persons to behave responsibly as citizens, Crick worries, as he notes that Erich Fromm and Dostoyevsky had worried, that we might abdicate our responsibilities, turning to some "expert" who assumes those responsibilities for us (p. 196). The responsibility for one's own fate becomes so large a burden that we seem ready to surrender that freedom for some security. Citing the Germans who mistakenly voted Hitler into power, Crick asks if they were still free at the moment of voting. Answering the question as he thinks Berlin must, basing it on his view of liberty as the absence of constraints, Crick depicts them as free at that moment—their votes were not coerced. Here, Crick becomes restive: "Isn't it, in fact, more *informative and explanatory* to say that such people are rejecting freedom—often very consciously—rather than exhibiting it?" (p. 198).

Is Berlin committed to viewing such voters as free? Although Berlin is often less than clear about whether he is talking about an individual's being free for making some one particular decision or about a social arrangement in which all members have the maximum freedom for making such decisions, there can be little doubt that he sees negative liberty as a social virtue and that our obligations with respect to it are to seek social arrangements in which it would be fostered. Negative liberty is the ideal of a liberal tradition which Berlin is defending; noting that democracies can cease to be free in this sense, Berlin asks what would make a society free. He responds (1969, p. 165) that "no society is free unless it is governed by at any rate two interrelated principles; first, that no power, but only rights, can be regarded as absolute, so that all men, whatever power governs them, have an absolute right to refuse to behave inhumanly; and second, that there are frontiers, not artificially drawn, within which men should be inviolable. . . ." Voting one's freedom away, like selling oneself into slavery then, even if not a coerced action, is in no way the free action of a free person in a free society. Freeing people to throw their liberties away is not what liberalism is all about.

Taking both Crick and Fromm together as advocates of the full life, Berlin declares (1969, pp. xlii–xliii) that they simply misunderstand the nature of negative liberty: "The freedom of which I speak is opportunity for action, rather than action itself. If, although I enjoy the right to walk through open doors, I prefer not to do so, but to sit still and vegetate, I am not thereby rendered less free." Freedom is not acting, but being situated where one has the possibility of acting. What separates Berlin from Crick and Fromm is their emphasis on the full life, on the realization of certain potentialities which require self-assertion. Berlin is sympathetic with their ideal, but insists that it is something other than liberty and that liberty is more important. Granting that "apathetic neglect of various avenues to a more vigorous and generous life" may be condemned on other grounds, Berlin has no objection to fostering such a vision of the full life, so long as such apathy is not "considered incompatible with the notion of being free." Berlin's misgiving is that neither Crick nor Fromm would see the issue this way: "But I fear that Dr. Fromm would consider such abdication as a symptom of lack of integration, which for him is indispensable to—perhaps identical with—freedom. . . ." Similarly, Crick, with his dedication to the republican ideal, "would look upon such apathy as too inert and timid to deserve to be called freedom" (1969, p. xliii). Berlin fears that both Crick and Fromm would be willing to coerce us to fit their ideals of assertive activity.

Berlin concludes his response to Crick and Fromm by conceding that he finds "the ideal advocated by these champions of the full life sympathetic; but to identify it with freedom seems to me conflation of two values. To say that freedom is activity as such is to make the term cover too much; it tends to obscure and dilute the central issue—the right and freedom to act—about which men have argued and fought during almost the whole of recorded history" (1969, p. xliii). This vision of the full life is one of many values which Berlin sees as ultimate and in conflict with liberty. While we must take it into account, we must not permit it to overshadow liberty.

Despite the overwhelming dissimilarities between their beliefs, Macpherson and Crick agree in criticizing Berlin for not providing enough participation. Is participation necessary for human freedom? Berlin contends that it is not, although participation is certainly conducive to freedom. From a logical point of view, there is no *necessary* connection between participation in democratic or republican politics and the liberal arrangement of society. Even kings and conquerors can provide people with an area in which they are free to choose for themselves. As a matter of fact, Berlin writes (1969, p. 130), the politics of participation does help to secure the liberty he defends, and that may provide a justification for this sort of political arrangement. However, that such politics would secure liberty is not a logical claim, but an empirical one.

There is a fundamental difference about the nature of politics, then, which leads Crick to regret the absence of (a certain kind of) politics in Berlin's account of freedom. When Crick accuses Berlin of ignoring the political contexts of freedom, of constructing a notion of liberty which lacks a political dimension, his point is that politics of a certain (republican and participatory) kind is not given proper emphasis. Crick (1967, p. 211) is thus advocating a different hierarchy of ideals, in which the participation of the citizen in the *polis* becomes of paramount importance. "I have really returned to a view of 'freedom as citizenship' which was current in the late seventeenth century and throughout the eighteenth, but which hardly survived the mid-nineteenth century.... This viewpoint did not center so much on individual rights against the state, but on those conditions which were necessary to operate successfully the kind of state characterized as republican." For Berlin this would entail coercing people to participate; and while this may be justified on other grounds, it is not political liberation.

A Non-Rationalist Perspective on Freedom and Politics

But in ignoring this republican ideal of political participation, Berlin is not ignoring politics, nor is his free individual in a state of splendid isolation. Rather, Berlin has a different conception of politics which is born of the concern he shares with Oakeshott about rationalism in politics. There is a conception of politics as civil interaction, or civil conversation, common to Oakeshott and Berlin. Both are concerned with politics as public deliberation about arranging society. From their perspective, political activity becomes "a pursuit of intimations" (Oakeshott, 1962, p. 127). Political questions are not simply of the form "how should I vote?" but also of the form "how shall we live?"

On the republican version, politics becomes tied to policy and assumes that the basic structure of the society and the polity are already established and settled. On the second version, the classic liberal view of Oakeshott and Berlin, politics is as much concerned with the conditions under which a republic (or any polity) can pursue certain policies. On the first version, constitutionalism is not a political but a legal topic; on the second version, the issues of constitutionalism are paradigmatically political. It is this conception of politics which leads Berlin to view questions of negative liberty as of paramount importance. It also inspired Oakeshott's expression of the need for civility in those interactions between *cives* which he calls "civic conversation." Thus Oakeshott writes that politics "is concerned with an imagined and wished-for condition of *respublica,* a condition in some respect different from its current condition and alleged to be more desirable. It is deliberation designed to specify and find reasons for, and action designed to promote the change from the one to the other" (1975, p. 168). It is this concern with the conditions of sociality which characterizes the politics of Oakeshott (1975, p. 163): "In considering the engagement to deliberate the conditions prescribed in *respublica* in terms, not of their authority but of their desirability, to imagine them different from what they are and to undertake or to resist their alteration, we are concerned with politics properly speaking."

Common to both theorists is not only a conception of the sorts of questions which are political but also an opposition to conceiving of political questions as automatically answerable by reference to a rationalist structure of the cosmos and to some transcendent purpose deriving from that view of the universe; in short, both oppose rationalism as it may corrupt politics, conceived as deliberations about the structure of society. For Oakeshott, politics (as the pursuit of intimations in a tradition) is neither so emotive as to be based on an irrational cohesion of persons (irrationalism) nor is it the drawing of implications from axiomatic assumptions (rationalism)—it is tied neither to reason nor to its negation. Both could be dangerous; but the greater danger is posed by those who see politics as the technical exploration of the implications of some master plan because they misunderstand the nature of human existence and of politics: politics is not an endeavor infused with some set and agreed-upon *telos,* but is interaction among people with conflicting purposes. Hence, the state is not a telic or purposive entity (Oakeshott, 1975). Efforts to transform the state into an enterprise association, aimed at achieving some greater good for us, is predicated upon an assumption about politics which is contrary to fact. It should not surprise us, then, if the results are a travesty of our ideals.

Politics needs no other purpose than the protection and maintenance of civility among people.

Actually, although Berlin would agree that an implication of this is that political liberty needs no other purpose than the protection of human dignity in choices, he would not go quite so far as Oakeshott on this issue. For Berlin, a government may legitimately pursue other goals, and may even have some goal like fostering the welfare of its members. But these goals are not the same as liberty and no increment in these other values offsets the loss of fundamental liberties. But the effect of both theories is the same: the pursuit of goals by any government is viewed with suspicion, since these other ends may conflict with the basic liberties necessary for free and independent persons. Both Berlin and Oakeshott oppose teleological approaches to politics because of their opposition to the paternalist implications and the rationalist foundations of such politics.

Conclusion: Political Obligation and the Conflicting Ends of Life

All of Berlin's critics considered here would de-politicize the issue of human liberty, choosing to ignore the questions of who is to decide on the ends for which we are to live. If asked the question of what makes life worth living, they would all entertain the possibility that there might be one substantive answer which is rationally and logically sound. MacCallum treats the issue as logical and not political, assuming that logic requires that all forms of freedom involve some vision of a higher good. Macpherson advocates the goal of harmony of ends, to be achieved by creating a society without scarcity and class divisions. And Crick would use participation to bring all people closer to his ideal of full human development. By contrast, Berlin would respond that each person must answer this question for him/herself. Yet even Berlin confuses the issue by treating negative liberty as one among many equally ultimate goods; if liberty is simply one among many ends, how can one argue that it is a truer and more humane ideal than any other?

We must conclude then that Berlin's opposition to rationalism makes him too skeptical. His contribution to a discussion of the political dimensions of liberty is that we must not give in to the metaphysical impulse to try to impose our visions of the highest good upon others. But his view is limited in that it cannot provide the grounds for an obligation to tolerate others; if there are no grounds for ranking liberty as either a higher or a more basic good than any other, then we would have no obligation to meet its requirements if we were to become obsessed with some other value. If all of the ends are equally ultimate, then why not commit ourselves to some one or another even if it should require a sacrifice of some liberty? Skepticism results in too weak a defense of liberty.

The ethical and psychological foundations of liberalism are more rationalistic than Berlin would permit, and must be so. The tradition of Natural Rights is not totally mistaken in its defense of liberty; our human nature requires that we recognize certain rights. If we are to defend liberty as a true and humane ideal, there must be truths about humanity and our values which require that liberty. It is not really the case that Berlin would see all ways of life as equally stable and viable; a liberal society would better suit his vision of human purposiveness than would a slave society. Berlin correctly directs our attention away from architectonic visions of politics. The timber of human nature is crooked since we are metaphysically compulsive creatures, driven by a need to detect a pattern to things. Once possessed of this pattern, we seek to impose it upon other people. Hence, negative liberty is a necessity if human dignity, rooted in the capacity to choose one's goals for oneself, is to be protected. Paradoxically, the very plurality of competing and equally ultimate values seems to entail that one of these values (negative liberty) is in some way more important than some others. It seems that Berlin has captured the truth of two conflicting intuitions about human moral experience: we live for a variety of conflicting purposes, yet we must structure our societies so that we are protected in the choices of these purposes. These ethical intuitions can only be rendered consonant by viewing negative liberty as a basal value.

Despite his opposition to transformational psychologies, then, Berlin's vision of human moral psychology must be developmental: people must secure the base of liberty which guarantees that their actions are truly their own before moving on to the heights. Without the security of this base, the other things we value—excellence, equality, nobility, fraternity—become elusive ideals which remain beyond the reach of human beings. These higher ideals may well be conflicting; all that is needed for social life is agreement upon the requirements of civility which constitute the base. Of course, this is not to say that it is logically impossible for human beings to develop higher values in the absence of lower values; the difficulty confronted in such an effort is not logical but psychological in nature. In other words, it certainly is possible for a given society to proceed as though it were not the case that human beings develop in a secure context, but such a society (even though it may achieve some things of value) would not remain stable because human needs would not be met. In fact, Berlin seems to recognize and concede the logical force of this claim when he writes that liberty is not simply license nor is it easily achieved, "but without it all things wither" (1955, pp. 287–88). Or somewhat differently, as J. Roland Pennock put it (1979, p. 137), this view of human nature as developing once certain basal conditions have been met, while not universally accepted, at the very least "suggests in a general way how liberty can be of primary importance, a primary value, and yet not be a major concern of men under all conditions." Certainly liberty is of special importance, yet we cannot say that it is the highest or the most important of the values. Liberty, then, is a true and humane ideal because it provides people with the psychic security that their actions are their own, and the assurance that no one else will be able to dictate their goals to them. This is the foundation upon which we erect the structure of our moral obligations, the basis on which we require things of one another.

Thus, despite Berlin's compelling vision of the dangers of rationalism, we must recognize that both the rationalists and their opponents are right in that they each detect one dimension of politics. Clearly, there are some eternal truths (say, about human purposiveness) which require that we respect other persons as beings with their own lives to live. Equally clearly, the recognition of such political and moral obligations does not necessarily entail that all people have an obligation to seek some one, rationally specified, goal. Rather, what is distinctly human about us is that we are each uniquely capable of living for our own purposes. There is no one goal towards which all people should be moving; our political obligations are not defined by our commitment to the highest good, to be discovered by all rational agents. Rather, we require of each other a certain basic minimum of humanity and civility; beyond that base, we should be moving in a variety of directions, since to do otherwise is to deny our humanity.

References

Berlin, Sir Isaiah (1953). *The Hedgehog and the Fox.* New York: Simon & Schuster.

——— (1955). "Montesquieu." *Proceedings of the British Academy* 41: 267–96.

——— (1956). "A Marvellous Decade IV: Herzen and the Grand Inquisitors." *Encounter* 6, No. 5: 20–34.

——— (1962). "Does Political Theory Still Exist?" In Peter Laslett and W. G. Runciman (eds.), *Philosophy, Politics, and Society,* 2nd Ser., Oxford: Blackwell.

——— (1971). "The Question of Machiavelli." *New York Review of Books,* 4 November 1971, pp. 20–32.

Crick, Bernard (1967). "Freedom as Politics." In Peter Laslett and W. G. Runciman (eds.), *Philosophy, Politics, and Society,* 3rd Ser. New York: Barnes and Noble.

Fried, Charles (1970). *The Anatomy of Values: Problems of Personal and Social Choice.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Hartmann, Nicolai (1932). *Ethics.* Translated by Stanton Coit. New York: Macmillan.

MacCallum, Gerald (1972). "Negative and Positive Freedom." In Peter Laslett and W. G. Runciman (eds.), *Philosophy, Politics, and Society,* 4th Ser. Oxford: Blackwell.

Macpherson, C. B. (1973). *Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Oakeshott, Michael (1962). *Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays.* New York: Basic Books.

——— (1975). *On Human Conduct.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Pennock, J. Roland (1979). *Democratic Political Theory.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

John Locke: From Absolutism to Toleration

ROBERT P. KRAYNAK
Colgate University

Many of Locke's early writings have been discovered and published in the last 30 years. Among them are two short tracts in which Locke argues that the power of the civil magistrate should be absolute. Because these early tracts are very different from Locke's later teachings, they have been misunderstood by contemporary scholars who do not see any connection between absolutism and liberal toleration. I explain the connection by reconstructing Locke's critique of religious politics, which reveals that absolutism and toleration are the same in principle despite their great difference in practice. I then use this demonstration to explain Locke's development and to illuminate the foundations of contemporary liberalism.

Locke's earliest writings on civil government remained undiscovered for 300 years. They were found a short time ago in a collection of Locke manuscripts and were published recently as the *Two Tracts on Government.*[1] Judging from Locke's reputation as a founder of liberalism, one might expect the early writings to be imperfect versions of his familiar teachings on religious toleration and limited government. But this is not the case. The *Tracts* are more "authoritarian" than "liberal." As Locke says, they were written to prove that "the supreme magistrate . . . must necessarily have an absolute and arbitrary power over all indifferent actions of his people" and that even "sincere and tender-hearted Christians" must be denied "a toleration . . . as their right" (*Tracts*, pp. 123, 160). Surprisingly, the early writings reveal the young Locke as a defender of absolutism and an opponent of toleration.

This discovery raises important questions about Locke's development and his understanding of liberalism. How could one of the great founders of liberalism have advocated absolutism in his early years? Why did he change his mind and become a defender of toleration? Contemporary scholars have not faced these questions squarely because they are perplexed and even embarrassed by the *Tracts.* They react to the discovery of absolutism in Locke's early writings either by denying that Locke's position is absolutist or by denying that it has any connection with his later views. Thus, some scholars describe the *Tracts* as a more traditional kind of "constitutionalism" or as "late medieval," and then propose reasons for Locke's change which are merely circumstantial or are simply invented. Other scholars admit that the *Tracts* are absolutist, even "Hobbesian," but then are unable to explain their connection to Locke's later defense of toleration. In all cases, contemporary scholars have failed to understand Locke's early writings for the same reason: they have not considered the possibility that absolutism is the original form of liberalism.

The purpose of this article is to explain Locke's development by showing that absolutism and toleration are the same in principle despite their great differences in practice. This interpretation of Locke's career will be presented in three parts. The first part explains Locke's view that religious sectarian warfare is the fundamental problem of politics and can be controlled by either absolutism or toleration. The second part uses this analysis of the problem and its solutions to explain Locke's development as a change in political strategy for managing religion. The conclusion shows that contemporary scholars have failed to understand Locke's development because they do not see why absolutism necessarily lies at the origins of liberalism.

Sectarian Warfare and the Political Management of Religion

Locke's writings on politics and religion are based on a specific analysis of religious conflict. In the early defense of absolutism, Locke states that his goal is to find a political solution to "all those tragical revolutions which have exercised Christiandom these many years." And in a later argument for toleration, he rests his case on an explanation of what "has produced all the bustles and wars that have been in the Christian world on account of religion." In the course of his career, Locke recommended different political policies for dealing with the revolutions and wars of religion. Though composed at different times, the policies are based on a specific critique of Christianity which never changed. This critique is presented in a general way in each of the political writings; it is specifically elaborated, however, only in Locke's private notebooks. Before turning to the political writings, therefore, we must examine Locke's analysis of Christian politics as it is presented in three short essays—namely, "Sacerdos," on the priesthood, "Error," on the idea of orthodoxy, and "A Defense of Nonconformity," on church history.[2] Taken as a whole, these essays constitute a classic version of the enlightenment critique of Christianity: they explain in entirely secular terms (political and psychological rather than providential) how Christianity conquered the Western world and then unraveled itself in the Reformation and its sectarian wars.

---

[1] They are mentioned by Locke's nineteenth-century biographers, H. R. Fox Bourne (1876, Vol. 1, p. 154) and Lord Peter King (1972, p. 7). But the manuscripts were not discovered until 1947 when the Lovelace Collection of Locke papers was acquired by Oxford's Bodleian Library. They did not appear in an English edition until 1967 when Phillip Abrams published them as *John Locke: Two Tracts on Government.* All references to the *Tracts* are to Abrams' edition.

Locke's enlightenment account of Christianity focuses on the development of the priesthood and the idea of orthodoxy. In its original and primitive form under Jesus, Christianity was little more than a teaching about a moral life and pure heart, with almost no concern for speculative opinions, forms of worship, or church organization. But this ethical religion of Jesus was soon transformed into a priestly religion of authoritative dogma and worship. Ambitious clerics introduced doctrines and creeds, and prescribed forms of worship in order to make salvation dependent upon belief in abstruse dogma and performance of elaborate ceremonies; and they established church government to enforce their prescriptions against those who dissented. In other words, a priestly class made itself indispensable to the people by arrogating to itself exclusive powers from God,

> the chief whereof are, 1st, To teach opinions concerning God, a future state, and ways of worship. 2nd, To do and perform themselves certain rites exclusive of others. 3rd, To punish dissenters from their doctrines and rules [by excommunication] (quoted in King, 1972, p. 289).

The creation of a priesthood by self-appointment and the focus on dogma as the test of salvation or damnation enabled the clergy to control the superstitious people merely by controlling opinions. Their ambition to achieve dominion without using arms determined the essential character of Christianity: its concern with orthodox and heretical opinion. Hence, Locke says, "The great division among Christians is about opinions; every sect has its set of them, and that is called orthodoxy" (quoted in King, 1972, p. 282). In this analysis, Locke reveals that the institutions of priesthood and orthodoxy are nothing more than political artifices for achieving earthly empire.

This critique is developed by Locke's account of the origins of the historical Church. The first churches were planted in the world by the traveling Apostles who left behind local leaders, originally called "bishops" or "presbyters," in the cities they had converted to Christianity. Each great town had its own church which was of limited size and governed independently. Not long after their establishment, however, these independent congregations were consolidated "upon pretense of preventing schism and heresy, and preserving the peace and unity of the church." The churches became "subjects of power and matters of ambition," giving rise to "metropolitans and archbishops" and not stopping until one universal Church was created (quoted in King, 1972, p. 258). In short, the historical Church developed by consolidating and expanding orthodoxy, using the technique of excommunicating and punishing heretical opinion.

Moreover, from the earliest days, the Church used the defense of orthodoxy as a pretext for controlling the state and civil magistrate. Though claiming to be above politics and foreswearing all use of arms, the Church nevertheless controlled the state and its subjects by pressing "as a duty on the magistrate to punish and persecute those whom they disliked and declared against; and so when they excommunicated, their under-officer, the magistrate, was to execute." The magistrate, on his part, was "persuaded it was his duty to punish those the clergy calls heretics, schismatics, or fanatics . . . [and thought] it is his interest to suppress them." And the people, on their part, were divided between rival priests competing for the support of the prince or between priest and prince. Sectarian warfare occurred when the priests and popular following of one sect fought against others for the right to have their opinions established as orthodoxy by the state. And sectarian rebellion occurred when those sects which were not established rejected the established orthodoxy as heresy. This rivalry for establishment, Locke says, has been the cause "of those calamities which have so long disturbed and wasted Christiandom" (quoted in King, 1972, p. 290).

---

[2] Quoted in King (1972, pp. 286–91, 282–85, 346–58). The first two essays are entries in Locke's Common Place Book, dated about 1661 by King. The last is an unpublished essay, dated about 1682–83. See also Worcester (1889, esp. pp. 63–78).

The Roman Church and clergy were historically the first to gain recognition for the title of orthodoxy; they sought to have it imposed by the Holy Roman Emperor and by Christian princes in their nations. When the Reformed sects eventually challenged the orthodoxy of Rome, they arrogated to themselves a new orthodoxy and fought for its establishment. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the clash of orthodoxies threw the whole Christian world into sectarian warfare.

The Reformation, however, challenged not only the Roman orthodoxy, but also the very idea of orthodoxy. From its beginning, the principal goal was to transform Christianity from a religion of *priestly orthodoxy* to one of *freedom of conscience*. Hence, there arose the Protestant idea of "Christian liberty," which maintained the paradoxical idea that the only Christian orthodoxy is freedom from orthodoxy or the freedom to follow one's own conscience. Locke confronted this idea in its most extreme form as it was developed in turn by Lutherans, Calvinists, and Puritans (or radical nonconformists). In the early *Two Tracts* (1660), he wrote primarily against the radical nonconformists because they threatened civil peace not only by rejecting the establishment of Catholic or Anglican doctrines, but also by rejecting the very idea of establishing orthodoxy. In sum, Locke traces the cause of religious conflict to the transformation of Christianity into a religion of priestly orthodoxy and to its later reformation into a religion of individual conscience.

This analysis of Christian sectarianism underlies Locke's thinking about the role of the state in regulating religion. It causes him to reject the view of classical and Christian political philosophy that the state should legislate orthodoxy in religion and morality in order to promote the salvation and moral perfection of its citizens. Locke's analysis demonstrates that this principle is responsible for all the hypocrisy and cruelty of past and contemporary politics. Whenever the state is obligated to uphold the true religion and promote moral virtue, politics becomes dominated by ambitious clerics and embroiled in sectarian controversy. Therefore, Locke seeks an alternative to the classical and Christian view in the idea of *the limited state:* instead of caring for the souls of its citizens, the state should be limited to maintaining civil peace; and instead of caring about the *truth* of opinions, the state should be concerned only with their social utility.

But this new political principle can assume two very different forms in practice. One form is *secular absolutism*, in which the state establishes a religion but makes no claim that it is the true religion; it merely imposes an arbitrary uniformity on warring sectarians for the sake of civil peace. In this case, orthodoxy is replaced by a "positive" religion, and the priesthood is clearly subordinated to the prince. The second form of the limited state is *liberal toleration*, in which the state disestablishes religion altogether and confines itself to protecting civil interests. In this case, priests are not directly suppressed but are indirectly subordinated to the state because the disestablishment of religion deprives them of all pretexts for interfering in politics. Thus, despite the fact that the absolute state imposes a "positive" religion, while the liberal state allows liberty of conscience, the two policies are the same in purpose and principle. Both are opposed to establishing the true religion and to suppressing false religion, and both limit the state to civil concerns. They differ, according to Locke, only as strategies in the political management of religion.

Locke's career, therefore, exhibits continuity in principle but change in practical strategy. In 1660, he wrote the *Two Tracts* and defended absolutist imposition as the best means for achieving civil peace. In 1667, he wrote an *Essay on Toleration* in which he raised the question "whether imposition or toleration be the readiest way to secure the safety and peace . . . of this kingdom"; he answered the question by recommending toleration on prudential grounds. Finally, in 1689, Locke composed *A Letter Concerning Toleration* in which he defended toleration as the right principle as well as the better policy. We shall now turn to these writings to see the reasons for Locke's evolution from absolutism to toleration.

Absolutism in the *Two Tracts*

Locke's earliest writings on civil government consist of two disputations on the power of the magistrate in regulating religion. One is written polemically in English and apparently addresses a Puritan audience. For it is a point-by-point refutation of a pamphlet published in 1660 by the Puritan divine Edward Bagshaw entitled, *The Great Question Concerning Things Indifferent in Religious Worship*. The other tract is written in Latin and makes no reference to Bagshaw's text. It apparently addresses an academic audience sympathetic to Anglican divines like Hooker. For unlike the first tract, which denies acquaintance with Hooker's work beyond his preface, the second one appeals to his definition of law and presents a general theory of law, obligation, and civil authority. The disputed question in both tracts is whether the "indifferent things" in religious worship may be imposed by the civil magistrate or should be left to the individual conscience. Both Bagshaw and Locke agree that the forms of worship, such as the time, place, posture, and clothes, are "indifferent"—that is, not "necessary" for salvation or moral perfection because they are not specifically determined by divine or natural law. Bagshaw rejects any regulation of indifferent things, however, because the idea of "Christian liberty" as revealed in Scripture requires liberty of conscience in things indifferent. Locke, on the other hand, upholds the right of the magistrate to impose an arbitrary uniformity in all indifferent matters for the sake of civil peace. Locke's argument is peculiar because he takes a definite practical position in favor of absolutist imposition, but intentionally avoids a decision about its theoretical foundations.

Despite his evasiveness about the foundations of absolute government, Locke gives clear reasons, both political and psychological, for its practical necessity. He declares that his immediate cause for writing is to defend the Restoration of Charles II, ending the English Civil War. The recently established settlement needs to be defended against the doctrine of liberty of conscience; for this doctrine would "turn us loose to the tyranny of a religious rage" unless it is unmasked as a "liberty for contention, censure, and persecution" (*Tracts*, p. 120). Locke unmasks its pretensions by exposing its origins in the ambition of priests and scholars. As sectarian leaders, they create disputes about the correct orthodoxy in dogma and worship and then incite "the ignorant and passionate multitude" in the name of conscience to destroy their sectarian rivals or reform the state religion. Sectarian warfare ensues "as often as the teachers should alarm the consciences of their zealous votaries and direct them against the adverse party." And rebellion occurs whenever sectarians use "the specious name of reformation, . . . [to] correct the errors of [the state] religion." In this candid exposé, Locke lays bare the causes of "all those tragical revolutions which have exercised Christiandom these many years" (*Tracts*, pp. 158, 121, 160).

Locke then develops the political analysis of sectarianism more fully by describing its psychological origins. Sectarianism arises from the relation between passion and opinion in human nature: all people have a "partial humour" which makes them partial to their own opinions. They receive their opinions partly by chance and partly by choosing those which serve their interests; then, out of pride, they assert them blindly and zealously against those who disagree (*Tracts*, p. 118). As a result "men [will not] suffer one another to go to heaven every one his own way, . . . [but] out of a fond conceit of themselves, pretend to greater knowledge and care of another's soul . . . than he himself" (*Tracts*, p. 161). In this way, "partiality" inevitably produces a variety of conflicting opinions to which men respond by persecuting and imposing on others.[3]

This political and psychological critique of sectarianism is the central argument which Locke uses against Bagshaw's plea for toleration or liberty of conscience; it underlies both his prudential and theological rejection of Bagshaw's claims. Regarding the prudential question "whether toleration might promote a quiet in the world," Locke shows that claims of conscience and liberty of conscience are simply pretexts for domination and persecution. Regarding the theological right of conscience based on Christian liberty, Locke argues, first of all, that Bagshaw's textual evidence does not prove that the Bible prohibits the political determination of indifferent things. Locke points out that Bagshaw's texts from St. Paul's Epistles show that Christian liberty refers to freedom from Pharisaical doctrines and the ceremonial law of the Jews rather than from the magistrate's laws (*Tracts*, pp. 134–36, 142, 149, 233). But Locke also responds to Bagshaw's claims for the right of conscience by asserting that "conscience [is] nothing but an opinion of the truth" or a "private judgment" (*Tracts*, pp. 138, 238). This definition derives from Locke's psychological insight that conscience is merely a partial opinion. From these prudential, textual, and psychological arguments, Locke concludes that the magistrate's imposition is justified because it alone can preserve civil peace.

Locke regards imposition as an adequate policy for settling controversies about indifferent things in religious as well as civil matters. For both he and Bagshaw admit that such things are undetermined by divine and natural law (*Tracts*, pp. 126–27). Moreover, Locke makes it clear that the magistrate legislates these indifferent things as indifferent. That is, the magistrate settles matters according to his arbitrary will, or according to what is expedient and conducive to agreement (*Tracts*, p. 164). As a result, his laws cannot be challenged as false religion or as impositions on the conscience. For imposing on the conscience occurs, Locke says, only when the magistrate "presses doctrines or laws upon the belief or practice of men as of divine original, as necessary to salvation, and obliging the conscience, when they are no other but the ordinances of men." And since the magistrate's determinations claim to be expedient rather than true, they require only outward conformity or verbal profession without inner belief. In fact, Locke says, this is all the magistrate can expect to achieve because penalties and force cannot produce belief; but the "rigor which cannot work an internal persuasion may notwithstanding [work] an outward conformity" (*Tracts*, pp. 139, 128). In short, the imposed uniformity under secular absolutism makes no claim to being necessary, true, or orthodox and leaves the conscience alone as much as possible. The state religion is merely a "positive" religion; and the magistrate assumes his awesome arbitrary powers only by relinquishing claims over his subjects' inner beliefs.

---

[3] As Abrams points out (1967, p. 95 ff.), "partiality" was a life-long concern of Locke. See Locke, *Of the Conduct of the Understanding*, Sec. 34, 35.

This solution may be conducive to settlement in things admittedly indifferent; but it is not clear if it can work for the necessary things of religion, morality, and politics. Should necessary things be imposed as well? Here, Locke's task becomes difficult because "necessary" as opposed to "indifferent" things are the essential dogma and moral duties of religion. They are prescribed by divine and natural law as necessary for salvation and moral perfection, and are binding on the consciences of magistrates and subjects prior to human legislation (*Tracts*, pp. 124, 226). Thus, when imposing necessary things, the positive laws must conform to the divine and natural laws instead of to the magistrate's arbitrary will; the laws must claim to establish the essential doctrine and moral duties of the true religion and must have them recognized as such in conscience. But the determination of necessary things is precisely what is at issue between warring sectarians. For this determination is made by interpreting Scripture or by consulting natural reason; and partiality causes each sect to have a different opinion about what is necessary or orthodox. To legislate such matters raises the spectre of sectarian warfare and sectarian rebellion.

Thus, there is a fundamental difference between legislating indifferent and legislating necessary things. Though they appear to be the same because both result in an imposed uniformity, the two are imposed in radically different ways. They correspond, in fact, to two theories of state which appear to be similar but are radically different—namely, Hobbes' Secular Absolutism and Hooker's Christian Commonwealth. In many practical respects, the two views are similar: both seek to unify the church and the state under the state, and to impose uniformity on warring sectarians, especially on Puritan conscientious objectors. For Hobbes, this uniformity is imposed as indifferent, upon individuals who acknowledge that all religious and civil things are indifferent. That is, Hobbes' sovereign imposes an arbitrary, "positive" religion which is legitimized by the consent of individuals who have acknowledged that everything is indifferent or morally neutral in the state of nature. Those who have consented owe an absolute conformity in outward actions, except when their preservation is endangered; but they are allowed freedom of inner belief.[4] For Hooker, however, the state is required to impose necessary things as necessary; the Christian Commonwealth is responsible for establishing the true religion and caring for the souls of men. Despite this difference in principle, Hooker's Christian Commonwealth resembles Hobbes' absolute state in practice. For, in most practical instances, the state religion of Anglican Christianity operates like a merely "positive" religion. That is, the state tempers its concern for establishing the true religion with a concern for peace and order; it sometimes allows false doctrines to go unpunished to avoid constant persecution of heretics, and it also maintains the immunity of the state from the censure of clergymen (Hooker, 1843, "Preface," VIII, 9). This flexibility or prudence is possible, however, only because a large part of the true religion, Christianity, is indifferent. According to Hooker, matters such as the form of worship, church government, and the political regime are indifferent. They cannot be settled precisely by consulting Scripture, nor should they be left to the free exercise of conscience, as Puritans think. Instead, they should be settled by *ancient custom*, which is a mixture of reason and arbitrariness, reflecting a longstanding consensus about what is "naturally fit and decent" (I, 8–9; V, 6–8, 12). Regarding the necessary parts of religion, they should be administered by the Visible Church which requires only external conformity and leaves along the Invisible Church of inner belief (V, 4.3; VIII, 4). Hooker's polity resembles that of Hobbes because it is so "judicious"–for it combines the requirements of the true religion and civil peace, is founded on divine right and consent, requires an *almost* absolute obedience, and grants a maximum of room for custom and the prudence of rulers to achieve stability within a Christian polity.

---

[4] Abrams totally misunderstands Hobbes on this crucial point by claiming that "Hobbes eliminates the freedom of conscience" (1967, p. 77). But Hobbes says: "Laws over conscience: . . . another error in their [Schoolmen] civil philosophy . . . [is] to extend the power of the laws, which is a rule of actions only, to the very thoughts and consciences of men, . . . notwithstanding the conformity of their speech and actions." Hobbes (1962, p. 491).

Because of the practical similarity between the two positions, Locke is able to pursue a "persistent strategy," as the editor Abrams suggests, of appealing to Hooker on the surface while "insinuating [the] radical positions" of Hobbes into his arguments.[5] This strategy consists of five elements which effectively free the magistrate from the obligations of divine and natural law to impose the necessary things of religion and morality. First, Locke reduces the necessary part of religion to the most "latitudinarian" or minimalist version of Christianity by asserting that "Scripture is very silent in particular questions . . . seldom going beyond the general doctrines of the Messiah and the duties of the moral law" (*Tracts*, pp. 172, 151). And the duties of the moral law which Locke mentions in the *Tracts* are only the prohibitions against theft and adultery (which protect the civil institutions of property and family). The necessary things are thus reduced to a bare minimum of belief and conduct, leaving the rest of dogma, worship, morals, and church government to arbitrary imposition or local custom. Second, Locke suggests that the magistrate should *not* impose necessary things at all. For either this is impossible to do, because belief in their necessity is controlled by God and cannot be forced; or it is superfluous, because necessary beliefs "oblige the conscience of subjects even if [the magistrate] is silent" (*Tracts*, pp. 128, 167–68, 223, 239). Here Locke enunciates the principle, which is so important for his later writings on toleration, that force cannot change belief if something is believed to be necessary. He uses it to free the state from the obligation to establish even a minimum of the true religion and moral virtue. Third, Locke protects the magistrate from his own errors or abuses of power by asserting that the magistrate alone is the judge of what is indifferent or necessary, and that even if he legislates indifferent things as necessary, he sins before God but still must be obeyed by men (*Tracts*, pp. 150–51, 239). This power allows him to incorporate everything into the realm of indifferency and renders him immune to the censures of priests and private conscience. Fourth, the magistrate is given power over all indifferent things in civil matters, which includes taxes, property ownership, manners, and even the form of government. Civil or political life is indifferent because "Scripture speaks very little of politics" and because the difference between regimes is negligible (monarchy and republics enjoying the same amount of liberty) (*Tracts*, pp. 171–72, 125). Finally, Locke's teaching on the obligation of subjects requires active obedience to laws for the public good and passive obedience to all laws in things indifferent. But whether the laws are just or unjust, for public or private benefit, they are beyond criticism and must be obeyed (*Tracts*, pp. 120–21). These five arguments in Locke's "persistent strategy" remove the surface appeal to Hooker's teaching which limits the realm of indifferent things and requires the magistrate to impose those which are necessary. As a result, the magistrate may impose all things according to his arbitrary will with immunity from conscientious objections in the name of "higher" laws.

It is not surprising, then, that the theoretical arguments which Locke uses to justify the magistrate's powers are the Hobbesian ones for absolutism. Above all, Locke employs the premise that there is a state of nature or "natural liberty" in which all things are left "perfectly indifferent and as to them man is naturally free, but yet so much master of his own liberty, that he may by compact convey it to another." This is also the condition where "private men's judgments" and "private opinions" make it impossible "to settle peace and society amongst men [so] that they mutually agree to give up the exercise of their native liberty" (*Tracts*, pp. 124, 137–38). Such a condition makes men realize that

> the disadvantages of government . . . [are] far less than are to be found in its absence, as no peace, no security, no enjoyments, enmity with all men and safe possession of nothing, and those stinging swarms of miseries that attend anarchy and rebellion (*Tracts*, p. 156).[6]

---

[5] (1967, pp. 67–79). Because he misunderstands Hobbes (see n. 4), Abrams argues that the more radical positions could not be those of Hobbes, but must be those of Sanderson, a "liberal" Anglican.

[6] See also Locke's admission, which echoes Hobbes', that he was born with fear: "I no sooner

Locke uses such arguments throughout the text, he says, because the defense of absolute obedience is most *rhetorically* effective when deduced from natural liberty (*Tracts*, p. 134).

Despite his evident rhetorical use of such Hobbesian arguments, Locke consciously avoids affirming their truth. The reason for his evasiveness may be inferred from his discussion of the four possible foundations of absolute government. One common foundation is divine right patriarchalism, which derives the obedience to government from the natural servitude of children to parents. But this is defective, Locke says, because the legislative power over subjects really cannot be derived from the father's power over his children. Another common foundation is popular consent, which apparently is Hobbes' theory, though Locke does not mention him. Locke simply says that it is defective because the obligation to obey from consent does not confer a right of life and death over subjects. In other words, consent is merely a utilitarian theory of obligation because it is done for preservation and can be withdrawn when preservation is endangered.[7] Locke then suggests a third basis which combines divine right and popular consent; it overcomes their separate defects by granting to government adequate legislative powers and adequate sanctions. But this apparently is also unsatisfactory; for Locke adds a fourth foundation of his own contrivance. It consists of a vague imperative that God wishes "order, society, and government" among men, and that every government must have a supreme power or "legislature" which has power over all indifferent things not restricted by "the pretext of a Christian law." The question, of course, is, why does Locke ignore the first three alternatives and construct a fourth? The advantage of the fourth is that it asserts in one imperative, the end of government (order), the legislative power over indifferent things, and a divine obligation to obey (which is the only real source of political obligation) (*Tracts*, pp. 232, 226). Yet it does so without using any theories of natural servitude or liberty, or of divine and natural law. Locke's intention seems to be to use Hobbes' state of nature teaching as a rhetorical and political argument, but to eliminate his natural law teaching as the theoretical foundation of absolute government. This perfects Hobbes' theory by making preservation the end of government, while creating an obligation to obey beyond self-preservation; and it removes the natural right to self-preservation as a pretext for disobedience. Such a foundation is the culmination of Locke's "persistent strategy" to remove all appeals to divine or natural law—in the name of the true religion, moral virtue, or self-preservation—above the arbitrary will of the magistrate.

But Locke's more consistent version of Hobbesian absolutism is nevertheless open to a fundamental objection. Is the idea of imposing an arbitrary uniformity or "positive" religion really practicable? Locke's success stands or falls by his ability to convince both the magistrate and subjects (especially Puritans) that a large part of religion, morality, and politics can be imposed as indifferent without violating their Christian consciences. This task seems simple because nearly everyone seems to admit that worship and most civil matters are indifferent, or should be treated as such in politics for the sake of agreement and peace.

But this admission is more apparent than real. Locke soon realized that his effort to gain admission of indifferency and acceptance of uniformity would be difficult or impossible. Evidence from his Common Place Book suggests that within a year after writing the *Tracts*, Locke began to modify his views. In the essay "Sacerdos," dated around 1661 by King, Locke alters his position in two ways. First, Locke restricts the magistrate to imposing within his own church, rather than for all churches. This restriction is based on Locke's recognition that the magistrate will impose uniformity as his true beliefs rather than as indifferent, reflecting his prejudices instead of his enlightened policy. Hence he ought to be confined to his own church.[8] Second, Locke makes a subtle alteration in the status of worship which appears to be a concession to the Puritan view of worship. As Locke says in the *Tracts*, the problem with the Puritans is that their behavior is paradoxical; they engage in "an overzealous contention about things which they themselves confess to be little and at most are but indifferent"

---

perceived myself in the world, but I found myself in a storm. . ." (Tracts, p. 119).

[7] *Tracts*, p. 231. These are the same objections which Locke later makes to Filmer's divine right theory in the *First Treatise*, Sec. 64, and to Hobbes' theory of obligation in *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, I, 2.5.

[8] Quoted in King (1972, pp. 287–88). Locke's shift also may have been a response to the Clarendon Code of 1661 which reestablished the Church of England. Locke's objection, however, would not be to establishment per se, but to the claim of orthodoxy instead of enlightened policy.

(pp. 120, 156). This behavior results from their paradoxical view of conscience: Christian liberty demands that the individual be allowed to believe what he thinks is necessary, but only in things admittedly indifferent. Hence, Puritans are filled with enthusiasm for beliefs which they know cannot be true, and they impose on others to free them from orthodoxy or to convert them to nonconformity. In the *Tracts*, Locke thinks he can make the paradox of Puritan conscience collapse by gaining full admission of indifferency. But in "Sacerdos," he acknowledges the failure of this attempt and affirms the paradoxes of Puritan worship:

> worship being that homage which every man pays to his God, he cannot do any other way, nor use any other rites, ceremonies, and forms, *even of things indifferent,* than he himself is persuaded are acceptable to the God he worships (quoted in King, 1972, p. 288, emphasis added).

Locke's new attitude toward worship indicates that the need to believe that one's persuasion is necessary must be accommodated, despite the theological fact that worship is indifferent. Thus, absolutism seems impracticable because the need to believe that one's worship is necessary triumphs over the need for enlightened policy and the facts of theology.

The *Tracts* are defective, Locke realized, because secular absolutism depends on a kind of enlightened cynicism. Before people will accept arbitrary imposition, they must be liberated from belief. This change will occur if they are sufficiently impressed by the state of nature teaching; for it reveals that belief in necessary things is impossible because everything is indifferent, or that belief in necessary things is *imprudent* because civil peace requires obedience regardless of beliefs. But admitting this truth requires a level of enlightenment or cynicism which few can sustain. The need to believe eventually overwhelms the glimpses into moral neutrality and the chaos of opinions. As a result, people cannot live with a *positive law,* handed down by the arbitrary will of a human legislator for the sake of peace. It soon comes to be regarded as *a custom,* a mixture of reason and arbitrariness, a sense of what is fitting, handed down from time immemorial. And after a time, even customs come to be regarded as necessary or *as orthodoxy,* handed down by God. But, as Locke acknowledged, things which are believed necessary cannot be changed by force. This realization about the limits of force, combined with the new insight about the limits of enlightenment, lead Locke from absolutism to a consideration of toleration.

Prudential Toleration in an *Essay on Toleration*

Not long after writing the *Tracts* in 1660, Locke began to qualify his argument for absolutism by limiting the magistrate's power over worship and by altering the status of worship. By 1667, he had made a definite choice in favor of toleration and recorded it in an *Essay on Toleration.*[9] This essay precedes the famous *Letter Concerning Toleration* by more than 20 years, and is important for understanding Locke's development for three reasons. First, it states explicitly the psychological cause of sectarian warfare and the psychological needs of conscience which make absolutism impossible and the policy of toleration inevitable. Second, it reveals that Locke alters the status of worship from indifferent to necessary for psychological rather than theological reasons. Finally, it develops a strategy for regulating the various kinds of opinions and the various Christian sects solely in terms of their effect on civil peace. This strategy clearly demonstrates that Locke's initial defense of toleration was not derived from a right of conscience but was conceived simply as a means for managing religion.

Like the *Tracts,* the *Essay on Toleration* is based on a certain understanding of the causes of religious conflict. Unfortunately, these causes are not presented in a political analysis but are reduced to a few psychological principles. The absence of a political analysis, however, is acknowledged by Locke at the end of the *Essay on Toleration.* He states that his argument is incomplete because he has not explained "how it came to pass that [the] Christian religion hath made more factions, wars, and disturbances in civil societies than any other." Nevertheless, Locke's psychological explanation is virtually a political one, because his psychology is not simply a study of the passions but of the relation between passion and opinions. Hence, when Locke blames "ambitious human nature" for causing "ambition, pride, revenge, faction" in religion, he is referring to the

> pride or overweeningness of my own opinion and the secret conceit of my own infallibility, taking to myself something of a godlike power [to] force others to be of my mind; or [to censure or malign them if they be not (quoted in Viano, p. 85).

---

[9] This essay is published in Viano (1961, pp. 81–107) and in Bourne (1876, Vol. 1, pp. 174–95); the Viano edition is more careful and includes Locke's revisions from three or four drafts.

This is a more forceful and subtle description of the psychology of "partiality" which Locke denounced in the *Tracts*. Pride in one's opinions causes religious conflict because it is a secret belief in the infallible orthodoxy of one's opinions and leads to imposing them on others.

Though pride in one's opinions causes imposition, it also makes others resist the violent or angry imposition of opinions. From this resistance to imposition, Locke infers in the *Essay on Toleration* that

> human nature ... preserve[s] the liberty of *that part wherein lies the dignity of man,* which could it be imposed on, would make him but a little different from a beast (quoted in Viano, p. 98, emphasis added).

From his observations about the relation of passion and opinion, Locke boldly formulates the basic fact of human nature as man's sense of dignity as a rational animal. Man senses that his reason or understanding distinguishes him from the brutes. He is proud of this distinction and wishes to preserve it at all costs. Hence, he resists the attempts of forceful imposition to change his beliefs. Locke's characterization is a kind of middle ground between Aristotle's view of man as the rational animal because he has *logos* or the capacity for reasoned speech, and Hobbes' view of man as utterly vain because his reason and speech are arbitrarily used as pretexts for domination. For Aristotle, the deliberation about the just, the good, and the beneficial in politics or the exchange of opinions in dialectics reflects a genuine but indefinite desire for the truth—to know the "essences" of things divined by the ordinary speech about things. For Hobbes, political deliberation or philosophical conversation reflects nothing more than a desire for domination and freedom from domination, which men will admit if they are properly enlightened about the arbitrary and human origins of speech. Locke infers from observation, however, that men are not so interested in the truth to be called *rational,* nor so indifferent to be called *vain;* they are merely *partial.* In avoiding Aristotle's idealism and Hobbes' cynicism, Locke is led to a new interpretation of human partiality as man's pride in his reason or his sense of dignity as a rational animal.[10]

This new psychological insight presented in the *Essay on Toleration* explains the impossibility of absolutism and the need for toleration. For if it is inevitable that people will believe that their opinions are necessary, and if it is impossible to change necessary beliefs by force, then liberty of conscience must be allowed. But this admission raises a new problem. Liberty of conscience may be psychologically inevitable; but its inevitability is no guarantee that it will produce civil peace. Locke faces the dilemma that absolutism is unworkable because it requires too much cynicism; yet toleration based on liberty of conscience is likely to degenerate into sectarian war. Thus, Locke must devise a policy which respects human pride but prevents it from becoming overbearing.

Now, Locke is aware that the strength of pride or of the passion for domination is determined by one's "conscience"—that is, by the belief in the necessity, orthodoxy, or truth of one's opinions. Thus, traditional Christian understandings of the conscience—belief in a law which is objectively necessary[11]—always lead to dogmatic imposition in the name of orthodoxy, and to the control of consciences by priests seeking establishment for their opinions. And the Puritan version of conscience—belief in the necessity of something which is admittedly indifferent—creates a disruptive combination of enthusiasm and doubt, imposition and nonconformity. If liberty of conscience is to be compatible with civil peace, Locke must develop a new understanding of conscience which avoids the dogmatism and clerical control of the nonreformed view of conscience, as well as the paradoxes of the reformed view. His novel alternative is to promote a traditional rather than Puritan view of conscience which, however, is unconcerned with political establishment because it is purely personal. This new alternative, presented somewhat awkwardly in the *Essay on Toleration* but more satisfactorily in the *Letter,* is the liberal conscience.

Locke's attempt to develop a new attitude toward conscience is reflected in his treatment of worship in the *Essay on Toleration.* He asserts that

> in religious worship *nothing is indifferent,* for it being the using of those habits, gestures, etc. and no other, which I think acceptable to God in my worshipping of him, however they may be *in their own nature perfectly indifferent,* yet when I am worshipping my God in a way I

---

[10] I am indebted to Nathan Tarcov (1975) for demonstrating the importance of this "proto-Kantian" view of human nature for Locke's development, especially for his educational writings.

[11] See, for example, Aquinas (1947, Vol. 1, p. 1008): "Synderesis [conscience] is ... the law of our mind, because it is a habit containing the precepts of the natural law. . . ."

> think he has prescribed and will approve of, I cannot alter, omit, or add any circumstance in that which *I think the true way of worship* (quoted in Viano, p. 86, emphasis added).

In this passage, Locke alters the status of worship without presenting any scriptural or theological arguments; he does it solely for psychological reasons. In fact, the conflict between psychology and theology is responsible for the deliberate inconsistency of the passage. At first, Locke says that worship is something necessary; then, he admits that, theologically, worship is indifferent; finally, he simply asserts that worship is necessary because people *believe* it is necessary. Locke clearly has decided that when people believe their opinions are necessary, they cannot be persuaded of their indifferency. But since this belief is precisely the reason why people impose on each other, he tempers it in two ways. First, he asserts that worship is a "voluntary and *secret choice* of the mind" and that it is "an action or commerce passing *only between God and myself* [and] hath in its own nature no reference at all to my governor or my neighbor, and so necessarily produces no action which disturbs the community" (quoted in Viano, pp. 84–85, emphasis added). Second, he tempers the strength of belief by pointing out that worship is really indifferent; only the subjective belief in its necessity makes it objectively necessary. But Locke's position is unsatisfactory because there is no real guarantee that worship will remain personal and private, and because the contradiction between psychological need and theological fact is too blatant. As we shall see, both of these defects are corrected in the *Letter Concerning Toleration.*

In addition to altering the status of worship, Locke designs a social policy for treating the various kinds of opinions and actions. In each case, the appropriate degree of toleration or regulation is determined solely by its effects on civil peace. According to this policy, speculative opinions and worship are entitled to an unlimited toleration. Though the former are involuntary like sensations and the latter is freely chosen, both should be free from interference because they are irrelevant to social behavior and peace. Practical opinions about civil matters of family and property should be tolerated, in principle, because they are indifferent; but since they often have consequences for society, they frequently need regulation. In these regulations, however, the magistrate should distinguish carefully between his own beliefs in conscience and his enlightened prudence in policy; and subjects should not expect the right of conscientious disobedience (which they are permitted in worship). Finally, practical opinions about actions which are morally necessary—namely, Christian and pagan moral virtues—should not be enforced by law but should become "a private and superpolitical concernment between God and a man's soul." Though moral virtue is admittedly "a prop to the state," it should be removed from politics and relegated to conscience (quoted in Viano, pp. 83–90). In presenting this policy, Locke merely asserts without proving the way he thinks religion and morality ought to be understood and regulated. But these assertions are not arbitrary; they subtly articulate the *psychological* conditions of toleration. The underlying pattern reflects Locke's insight that toleration requires a sense of indifference to speculative truth, combined with a sense of personal dignity in the free choice of practical opinions and worship.

In his social policy, Locke also indicates which Christian sects should be tolerated or regulated. Catholics should be suppressed because their worship is inseparable from a foreign allegiance which makes them politically unreliable. Moreover, a policy of suppression will work because Catholics are too intolerant to be pitied as victims; and it will enhance the stature of the "King of England, as head of the Protestants." The radical protestant sects, however, should be tolerated. For they are a majority when united by persecution and by the label "fanatics." But they are easily splintered by toleration along their many divergences of opinion (quoted in Viano, pp. 92–101). Locke concludes his policy statement with the remark that toleration conduces to the settlement of a government only "as it makes the majority *of one mind* . . . by executing strict laws concerning virtue, . . . but making the terms of church communion as large as possible . . . which is latitudinism" (quoted in Viano, p. 113, emphasis added). By this remark, Locke reveals that even a tolerant society requires uniformity of opinion at some level. Hence, he is willing to retract the suggestion that moral virtue should not be legislated, and thinks that religious uniformity should be unofficially promoted. The complete strategy of toleration thus consists of a carefully laid plan to suppress the Catholics, tolerate the Puritans, and support unofficially the Church of England while moving it in a latitudinarian direction. The intent of such a policy is clearly repressive; for it shows no concern for diversity or for freedom of the mind beyond the political and psychological requirements of civil peace.

Personal Religion in *A Letter Concerning Toleration*

Though the *Essay on Toleration* constitutes an improvement over the *Tracts* for respecting the psychological needs of pride, its argument is, paradoxically, too prudential to be practicable. Magistrates are instructed that worship and morality are private and transpolitical, but then are encouraged to intervene in many ways to ensure social harmony. Subjects are allowed the freedom to believe whatever they think is necessary, but then are reminded that worship is indifferent in order to temper their belief. Both of these defects are remedied in the *Letter*. By presenting the disestablishment of religion and the right of conscience as principles, Locke minimizes the possibilities for political intervention. At the same time, Locke perfects the understanding of personal religion by allowing consistency in belief, while tempering it with skepticism and anticlericalism. Locke's hope is that these two improvements will virtually eliminate the role of the magistrate, while encouraging the citizens to leave each other alone.

The first step of Locke's argument in the *Letter* is the disestablishment of religion or the separation of church and state. In the earlier *Essay on Toleration*, this fundamental principle of toleration was carefully qualified by enumerating the various types of opinions and Christian sects, and by granting to each a different degree of toleration. The *Letter* improves this approach by stating disestablishment in an unqualified way. Yet the argument which Locke uses to defend this principle is not the right of conscience to be free from regulation, on grounds either of Christian liberty or natural right. Instead, the justification is prudential or political:

> [in order that] none may impose ... upon others by pretense of loyalty ... to the prince, or of tenderness ... in the worship of God, I esteem it above all things necessary to distinguish the business of civil government from that of religion (*Letter*, pp. 16–17).

Religion is disestablished and government is limited to civil concerns in order to remove the establishment of orthodoxy as a pretext for domination; the separation of spheres eliminates the basic source of controversy between priests and princes and between rival sectarians. According to Locke's most general formulation in the *Letter*, disestablishment is based on the fundamental principle of all limited government: "The business of the laws is not to provide for the truth of opinions, but for the safety and security of the commonwealth. . ." (p. 45). This statement reveals that liberal toleration, which disestablishes all opinions, and secular absolutism, which establishes opinions arbitrarily, are ultimately based on the same principle. In both cases, the state is discouraged from caring about the truth of opinions and the souls of its citizens for the sake of civil peace.

Moreover, in the *Letter*, Locke uses a political analysis of religion to show why the disestablishment of opinions is necessary for civil peace. He explains the cause of "all the bustles and wars that have been in the Christian world on account of religion" as follows:

> The heads and leaders of the church, moved by avarice and insatiable desire of dominion, making use of the immoderate ambition of magistrates and the credulous superstition of the giddy multitude, have incensed and animated them against those that dissent from themselves, by preaching ... that schismatics and heretics are to be ... destroyed (*Letter*, p. 57).

This is Locke's familiar argument that the priests, and their ambition to establish orthodoxy and suppress heresy, are the chief cause of sectarian conflict. In the *Letter*, it supports his view that only complete disestablishment can remove the cause of civil discord.

Yet, Locke is aware that merely asserting the principle cannot guarantee its realization. Ultimately, it is the people's understanding of their consciences—of their pride and opinions—which determines if disestablishment and toleration will be upheld. For, on the one hand, if the people have a "dogmatic" understanding of conscience, they will attempt to establish a Christian Commonwealth; their certainty that orthodoxy exists and can be known infallibly encourages them to follow their priests in imposing and establishing the true religion. On the other hand, a "cynical" understanding of conscience is the basis of the absolute state; for if the people believe that everything is "free and indifferent," they can be led by fear and indifference to opinions to accept an arbitrary uniformity. Neither of these alternatives is practicable, Locke concluded, because they offend man's pride in his reason: the Christian Commonwealth ultimately relies on force to produce belief,[12] and the absolute state relies on enlightenment to eliminate belief. Therefore, Locke wishes to avoid both dogmatism and cynicism in his understanding of conscience. His goal in the *Letter* is to find a middle ground of "moderate skepticism" which serves as the basis for a liberal conscience and complete disestablishment.

---

[12] This alternative is also rejected in principle: for "there is absolutely no such thing under the Gospel as a Christian Commonwealth" (*Letter*, p. 43).

Moderate skepticism is the belief that orthodoxy exists and can be discovered, but is difficult to possess with certainty because reason is fallible and authorities are untrustworthy. In order to create such skepticism, Locke first must confute the cynics by showing that orthodoxy exists. Hence, he must prove or assert that worship is *not* indifferent. Locke does this by presenting a new definition of worship which deliberately obscures its indifferency and creates the impression that it is something necessary. He begins by asserting that worship has two parts: an essential part which is necessary because it is believed to be so, and the mere circumstances which are "perfectly indifferent." He then adds, however, that some of the circumstances, such as the day of worship, may be "under the Gospel . . . a real part of worship which can neither be changed nor neglected" (*Letter*, p. 39). Like the *Essay on Toleration*, the *Letter* presents worship as generally necessary because it is believed necessary. But unlike the *Essay* which tempers this belief by also stating that worship is indifferent, the *Letter* actually strengthens belief by dividing worship into two parts. Belief in the essential or real part is *not* weakened by a reminder that it is indifferent. And belief in the circumstances may be possible if their indifferency can be overcome by finding an objective rule of worship. Without proving that an objective orthodoxy exists, Locke creates the impression that believing in one or discovering one is possible.

Not only does Locke create the impression that orthodoxy exists and can be known, he also maintains that one view is right and all the rest are wrong. He says, for instance, that "there being *one truth, one way to heaven*, what hope is there that more men would be led unto it if they had no rule but the religion of the court?" (*Letter*, p. 19, emphasis added). While asserting that there can be only one orthodoxy or true church, however, Locke never says which one it is or how to go about discovering it. In fact, precisely in those contexts where he mentions that people are "so solicitous about the true church" or about the authority of the priesthood, Locke, with full awareness of his evasiveness, says: "But this [is] not the proper place to inquire into the marks of the true church. . ."; or, "It is not my business to inquire into the original and power or dignity of the clergy" (*Letter*, pp. 22, 27). Locke's strategy is to assert that there is one true church, while avoiding inquiry into the true church. His goal is to preserve the possibility of orthodoxy, while creating doubt but not total cynicism about discovering it. Therefore, Locke tells the reader that

> there is *only one* of these which is the true way to eternal happiness: But in this *great variety of ways* that men follow, it is still doubted which is the right one (*Letter*, p. 31, emphasis added).

Locke's statement allows readers to believe they are orthodox, but tempers the strength of that belief by pointing, not to the indifference of worship, but to the variety of opinions. This reminds them of human fallibility; it suggests that the truth coexists with many errors and is difficult to possess with certainty.

In addition to fostering intellectual skepticism, Locke wishes to create *moral* skepticism about the motives of those who claim to know orthodoxy. Derived from his enlightenment critique of Christianity, Locke's arguments reveal how the claim of orthodoxy has been used by priests as a pretext for domination and persecution. In the opening lines of the *Letter*, Locke declares that all churches advertise themselves, especially by proclaiming their orthodoxy, and that these are signs of "striving for power and empire." Later, he challenges the reader by asking, "Who sees not how frequently the name of church, which was venerable in the time of the apostles, has been made use of to throw dust in the people's eyes, in the following ages?" He then exposes in detail the doctrines by which the orthodox deceitfully arrogate to themselves political rule and property—such as the doctrine that no obedience is due to excommunicated kings, and the teaching that there is no duty to keep promises with heretics. And at the end of the *Letter*, Locke attaches an appendix on the notion of heresy which shows that it is about trivial things not found in Scripture; the implication is that heretical opinion hardly deserves notice, let alone punishment (*Letter*, pp. 13, 32, 50–51, 59–62). Locke's exposé culminates in the flat assertion that the claim of "the orthodox church [to have] the right of authority over the erroneous or heretical . . . is, in great and specious words, to say nothing at all" (*Letter*, p. 25). Locke brings this skeptical critique to the forefront of the *Letter* as part of a rhetorical strategy to create distrust of religious authorities and to force men to think for themselves. He wants the reader to say to himself,

> I am doubtful concerning the doctrine of the Socinians, I am suspicious of . . . the Papists or Lutherans; will it ever be a jot safer for me to

> join either ... of those churches, upon the magistrate's command, and ... the counsel of the doctors of that church? (*Letter*, p. 3).

While never denying that orthodoxy exists, Locke teaches the people to distrust sectarian leaders and to trust only their own judgment. For anticlericalism and individual self-reliance diminish sectarian zeal by transforming the "giddy multitude" into reluctant followers.

These intellectual and moral critiques produce moderate skepticism about orthodoxy: dogmatism is prevented by emphasizing the variety of opinions and the ambition of religious authorities, but cynicism is avoided by never proving that worship is indifferent. Yet, if people are aware that orthodoxy exists but is nearly impossible to possess, how will they ever decide which doctrines to believe? Locke's hope is that they will not take their opinions from the established authorities or sectarian leaders, nor be plunged into an abyss of confusion. Rather, the proper amount of skepticism will encourage them to be satisfied with *sincerity* as the criterion of orthodoxy. This new attitude toward belief is revealed in the two decisive passages of the *Letter*, the one against establishment and the other in favor of personal worship.

In the passage which Locke describes as "the principal consideration ... which absolutely decides the controversy" against establishing religion, he tells the reader (or allows him to say for himself) that even if the magistrate's opinion be "sound and ... truly evangelical,"

> if I be not thoroughly persuaded thereof in my own mind, there will be no safety for me in following it.... It is in vain for an unbeliever to take up the outward show of another man's profession. Faith only and *inward sincerity* are the things which procure acceptance with God.... In a word, whatsoever else may be doubtful in religion, yet this at least is certain, that no religion which *I believe not to be true can be either true or profitable unto me (Letter*, p. 34, emphasis added).

This passage is intended to persuade the reader that there is never an advantage in establishing a doctrine. For even if it is "sound and truly evangelical," it cannot be useful for salvation and cannot even be true if the reader does not believe it is so. Locke's argument makes a subtle transition from an honest critique of hypocrisy–that even the truth cannot save without sincere belief–to an assertion of "subjectivism"–that the truth cannot be true if it is not sincerely believed to be true. This seems to make sincere belief the cause of a doctrine's truth.

Similarly, in the decisive passage about personal worship, Locke makes a claim for the sufficiency of sincere belief. After dividing worship into "what is a part of the worship itself and what is but a circumstance," he asserts: "That is a part of worship which is believed to be appointed by God and to be well-pleasing to him, and *therefore that is necessary" (Letter*, p. 38, emphasis added). Once again, Locke is saying that subjective belief makes a doctrine objectively true or false. As a result, sincere belief becomes the sufficient test of a doctrine's truth and sincerity in one's own beliefs is sufficient for salvation. Locke has achieved the remarkable feat of making "inward sincerity" the criterion of orthodoxy.

Yet, this is a questionable or false teaching; for sincere error is frequently possible. How, then, can Locke expect to persuade people that sincerity makes one orthodox and is sufficient for salvation? His hope is that moderate skepticism has created sufficient doubts to leave sincerity as the only remaining criterion for determining what is true. As we have seen, this effect is caused, first of all, by intellectual doubt from awareness of variety. But doubts from variety always can be dissipated by artful preachers and charismatic prophets proclaiming "the true way." Therefore, moral doubts about authorities are also needed; anyone proclaiming the "true way" must be suspected of ambition or ridiculed as an imposter. People are generally more impressed by human baseness than by variety of opinion in doubting orthodoxy. For the conflicts between doctrines are not felt as forcefully as the resentment at being exploited or fear of being persecuted. The behavior which Locke hopes to produce is described by de Tocqueville as the characteristic behavior of citizens in the democratic age of "general skepticism." In a period when "the disposition to trust the authority of any man" is destroyed, each person "appeals only to the individual effort of his own understanding," as the equal of anyone else's. Yet instead of calling forth intellectual exertion or changes of opinion, this skepticism causes everyone to "cling to his old persuasion" and to be satisfied with his honest beliefs.[13]

When orthodoxy is subordinated to sincerity and the priesthood is replaced by individual self-reliance, the climate of opinion has been created for a tolerant personal religion. Only such conditions could sustain the delicate inconsistency that *one* orthodoxy exists, but everyone is orthodox who sincerely believes he is so; or that anyone can be saved by a personal religion which he sincerely believes to be true for himself. For people must believe that contradictory views can be right at the same time; they must accept the idea that

---

[13] Tocqueville (1945, Vol. 2, p. 4; Vol. 1, p. 197).

> every church is *orthodox unto itself;* to others, erroneous or heretical. For whatsoever any church believes, *it believes to be true;* ... So that the controversy between the churches about the truth of their doctrines and the purity of their worships is on *both sides equal* (*Letter*, p. 25, emphasis added).

According to Locke's argument, a Catholic may think that Lutheranism is wrong for himslef, and if pressed, he may say that Luther's doctrine is wrong objectively. But at the same time, he will say that for a Lutheran, it is right, that "everyone is orthodox to himslef," that it works for him and he will be saved; above all, he will hold that no one can say what is right for another because all truths are equal. In short, Locke has created subjective orthodoxy as the basis of a new kind of conscience, the liberal conscience, which judges and acts according to what is subjectively held as an objective rule, and allows the same right to others.[14]

Locke's new understanding of conscience is intended to produce two profound psychological changes in human relations. First, the open contempt as well as the "secret hatred and rancor" which accompanies the inevitable difference of opinion can be replaced by *respect* for differences. For the tacit premise of a personal religion is that sincerity is sufficient to make one orthodox and worthy of salvation. Therefore, someone can respect the sincerity of another even if the two disagree and hold contradictory views. Second, instead of imposing on others from partiality in order to correct or suppress their errors, people will become *indifferent* to each others' opinions. Though Locke's liberal conscience bears a certain resemblance to the Puritan conscience in rejecting establishment of opinions and supporting the right of personal belief, the two are fundamentally different. The Puritan is incited by a paradoxical belief in Christian liberty to impose on others to free them from orthodoxy and to demonstrate nonconformity. The citizen of the liberal state, by contrast, will be more consistent but more complacent in his beliefs. For he will be perfectly satisfied that his own sincere beliefs are orthodox, but will leave others alone. Instead of reacting to disagreement with contempt and self-righteousness, the person of liberal conscience will treat the beliefs of others with respect and indifference. In other words, he will tolerate them.[15]

The distinctiveness of Locke's *Letter* is the assertion of liberty of conscience as a right, and the absence of an argument from principle for this right. Thus, as is well known, Locke denies the right for prudential reasons to Catholics, atheists, and those maintaining seditious doctrines. And instead of arguing from principle, Locke rejects establishment on the basis of a political critique of Christian sectarianism, and defends the free exercise of conscience with the psychological observation that force cannot produce the sincere belief required for salvation. Locke's argument, therefore, is actually a prudential accommodation to the political and psychological consequences of man's pride in his reason. Yet, Locke realized that prudence itself counsels against a merely prudential argument for toleration. Hence, in the *Letter*, solely for the sake of civil peace, he presents liberty of conscience as a right; and solely for the sake of psychological stability, he presents a consistent view of conscience. But both assertions of principle then are qualified—the first by denying toleration to the intolerant, the second by encouraging sincerity over orthodoxy. Locke thereby achieves the height of prudence, not by open expediency, but by asserting a general principle with pointed reminders of its limits.

Conclusion: Absolutism and Liberalism

We have seen that Locke's development can be explained once the relation between absolutism and toleration is correctly understood. Contemporary scholars have failed to grasp this connection, however, and are genuinely perplexed by Locke's early writings. As a result, they react to the *Tracts* either by denying that Locke's position is absolutist, or by claiming that Locke underwent a radical change before arriving at his mature liberalism.

---

[14] See *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1959, Vol. I, p. 71). Here Locke defines conscience as "nothing else but our own opinion ... of the moral rectitude ... of our actions." Fraser then adds Locke's explication that "conscience ... is not an arbitrary difference of good and evil ... [and] Conscience is not the law of nature, but judging by that which is taken to be the law." Locke explains that conscience is something in between an arbitrary preference and an objective law—namely, judging by that which is subjectively held to be an objective law.

[15] The novel qualities of the "liberal conscience" as developed by Locke distinguish it from the Puritan individualism or genuine Christian faith which scholars such as Dunn (1969) or Ashcraft (1969) point to as the root of Locke's thought.

The first kind of reaction is motivated by a desire to maintain Locke's reputation as an original defender of "constitutional" or limited monarchy. It consists in treating Locke's career as an evolution from a less to a more complete defense of "constitutionalism" for reasons which are merely circumstantial. The most forceful presentation of this view is made by Laslett. He asserts that the young Locke defended "legal, not arbitrary authority," revealing him as a "constitutionalist." By diluting the absolutism of the *Tracts,* Laslett then is able to attribute Locke's change merely to his personal association with the more liberal Shaftesbury in the mid-1660s. But Laslett also contradicts his initial view of the *Tracts* by admitting that the argument "from consent to absolute authority" has "a flavor of Hobbes." Yet he warns against inferring from this likeness that Locke had a direct acquaintance with Hobbes; for such an inference involves "submit[ting] uncritically to the strong tradition which dictates that Locke should always be considered alongside of Hobbes" (Laslett, 1960, pp. 33–41). Laslett, then, is not sure how to characterize Locke's early writings and appears to be misled, not only by a concern for constitutionalism, but by a desire to be iconoclastic.

Gough seems to have a genuine interest in maintaining the reputation of Locke for his "support of constitutional government and opposition to absolute monarchy." It is therefore astonishing to discover that Gough is wholly unperturbed by the *Tracts* and hardly regards them as a challenge to his thesis. He admits without hesitating that Locke regarded the question of toleration as "a political one . . . not a question of freedom of conscience in the abstract." And he supports this view by citing the fact that Locke always excluded Catholics and atheists from toleration, and always gave the magistrate the right to intervene in religion for public order. When discussing Locke's development, however, Gough does not feel obliged to offer an explanation. He simply records that "as [Locke] grew older he undoubtedly came to lay less emphasis on the justification for interference and more on the need for freedom" and that Locke "significantly modified his early doctrine about indifferency. . . ." Gough apparently thinks that the early and later positions are similar enough that no explanation for the change is necessary, or that Locke's views evolved naturally, like growing older.[16] But such complacency about Locke's change from allowing political regulation to defending freedom is inexcusable from someone who maintains that Locke's distinction is his principled opposition to absolute power.

In contrast to those who describe the *Tracts* as early constitutionalist, Abrams characterizes them as late medieval. This "last statement of an old world-view" still rested on "the axiom of knowledge"—that is, on a superior claim to knowledge of divine and natural law by the magistrate which justifies the imposition of his opinions. Following a suggestion by Von Leyden about Locke's inquiry into natural law, Abrams argues that Locke underwent a radical epistemological change in the mid-1660s and had to modify his political theory. Locke came to the conclusion that the magistrate is fallible in his knowledge of natural law, which implied that imposition of his opinions is unjustified and that toleration of subjective views must be permitted.[17] While Abrams' interpretation is distinguished by a subtle sense of all the elements involved in Locke's evolution, it is wrong on the most important point. Absolutism does not require, as Abrams says it does, that the magistrate claim "the axiom of knowledge" or "impose the true religion"; nor does Locke "in 1660 virtually den[y] the objective indifference of all forms of worship." Abrams has made the mistake of confusing the Christian Commonwealth of Hooker, which does have scholastic foundations and does impose the true religion, with the secular absolutism of Hobbes and the young Locke, based on objective indifferency and a positive religion.[18]

Of all Locke scholars, Cranston comes closest to the correct explanation of Locke's development. For he does not deny the obvious; he calls the *Tracts* "Hobbesian" because Locke's description of the state of nature and his argument from consent to absolute government are virtually cribbed from Hobbes. Cranston's problem, however, is that after characterizing the young Locke as "a man of the Right, an extreme authoritarian," he is at a loss to explain why Locke's views "radically changed." He suggests that Locke altered his views after a visit to Holland in 1665 when he saw that toleration could be practicable. A letter by Locke praising the practice of the Dutch is evidence, Cranston says, that "Locke was already moving away from the Hobbesian views of 1661."[19] But this suggestion is not a proof; and it betrays Cranston's uncertainty as to whether Locke's change was radical or prudential.

---

[16] Gough (1973, pp. vi, 197–215). Mabbott (1973, pp. 174–75) criticizes Gough for downplaying the differences, but offers only a loose collection of personal, historical, and epistemological reasons which does not constitute an interpretation. Dunn (1969, pp. 29–30) simply admits that "we have no adequate and established explanation" of "why the older Locke adopted his 'liberal' incoherence in place of his earlier 'conservative' incoherence."

[17] Abrams (1967, pp. 92, 94, 25–26, 80, 99). Von Leyden (1954, p. 29).

[18] Abrams (1967, pp. 94–95, 100). Moreover, both he and Von Leyden are wrong to claim that Locke sought a more adequate theory of natural law to strengthen his case for imposition in the *Tracts.* Rather, as argued above (p. 58), Locke tried to eliminate natural law as a basis for absolute government, because it always provides a pretext for disobedience in the name of "higher" law.

In all cases, contemporary scholars have been unable to provide a satisfactory account of Locke's development because they deny that there is a connection between absolutism and toleration. Now, this denial is not simply an accident of scholarship. It occurs, first of all, because Locke defends liberty of conscience as a right in the *Letter;* and this work, rather than the absolutist *Tracts* or the prudential *Essay,* was published by Locke and established his reputation. Hence, it is presumed that Locke's "first principle" is Liberty rather than Security, and that absolutism and toleration are opposites in principle because of their opposing attitudes toward liberty of conscience.

But this impression could not withstand a careful analysis of Locke's *Letter,* if it were not strengthened by the contemporary understanding of liberalism. Few people today use the Lockean arguments that liberty of conscience must be allowed in order to prevent priestly domination and must be limited by the requirements of security. Instead, liberty of conscience is justified by arguments from Kant, Mill, Dewey, and certain existentialists. They require liberty for ends such as the development of an autonomous moral personality, or the progress of culture and science, or the authenticity of self-expression. As an end-in-itself or as a means to ends higher than civil peace, liberty of conscience appears to have no affinity whatsoever with absolutism.

Yet this affinity remains, and can be seen in the practice of all tolerant societies. For even when liberty serves higher ends, the ends are limited by the requirements of civil peace. Hence, tolerant societies discourage actions which disturb others out of moral zeal, such as public preaching and public-spiritedness. And they encourage behavior which is private and retiring, whether devoted to lower ends such as commerce and hedonism, or to higher ends such as autonomy, culture, science, and authenticity. In addition, the diversity of opinions is limited by an underlying uniformity; for toleration is sustained only by a general distrust of religious and moral authorities. Hence, tolerant societies require official and unofficial enlightenment which promotes intellectual and psychological skepticism. These conditions are the foundations of all tolerant societies, indicating that toleration always is based on an exclusive moral choice and an ultimate uniformity of opinion. Therefore, despite its advances in the uses of liberty and in fostering diversity, contemporary liberalism retains its Lockean basis as well as its affinity with secular absolutism.

---

[19] Cranston (1957, pp. 61–67, 82). It is disappointing to find no analysis of the *Tracts* by Seliger (1968, pp. 24, 41, 209n.), whose work is devoted to showing the "authoritarian" elements–in leadership and extralegal action–of Lockean liberalism.

References

Abrams, Phillip (1967). Introduction to John Locke, *Two Tracts on Government.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Aquinas, Saint Thomas (1947). *Summa Theologica,* 3 vols. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. New York: Benziger Brothers.

Ashcraft, Richard (1969). "Faith and Knowledge in Locke's Philosophy." In John W. Yolton (ed.), *John Locke: Problems and Perspectives.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bourne, H. R. Fox (1876). *The Life of John Locke,* 2 vols. London: Henry S. King.

Cranston, Maurice (1957). *John Locke: A Biography.* New York: Macmillan.

Dunn, John M. (1969). *The Political Thought of John Locke.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gough, John W. (1973). *John Locke's Political Philosophy.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Hobbes, Thomas (1962). *Leviathan.* Edited by Michael Oakeshott. New York: Collier.

Hooker, Richard (1843). *The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity.* Edited by Isaac Walton. Oxford: T. Tegg.

King, Lord Peter (1972; first published 1830). *The Life and Letters of John Locke, with Extracts from his Journals, Correspondence, and the Common Place Books.* New York: Burt Franklin.

Laslett, Peter (1960). Introduction to John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government.* London: Cambridge University Press.

Locke, John (1959). *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.* Edited by Alexander Fraser. New York: Dover Publications.

——— (1954). *Essays on the Law of Nature.* Edited with an introduction by W. Von Leyden. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

——— (1950). *A Letter Concerning Toleration.* Edited by Patrick Romanell. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.

——— (1966). *Of the Conduct of the Understanding.* Edited by Francis Garforth. New York: Teachers College Press.

——— (1967). *Two Tracts on Government.* Edited with an introduction by Phillip Abrams. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

——— (1960). *Two Treatises of Government.* Edited with an introduction by Peter Laslett. London: Cambridge University Press.

Mabott, John D. (1973). *John Locke.* London: Macmillan.

Seliger, M. (1968). *The Liberal Politics of John Locke.* London: Allen and Unwin.

Tarcov, Nathan (1975). *Locke's Thoughts Concerning Education, The Family, and Politics.* Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University.

Tocqueville, Alexis de (1945). *Democracy in America,* 2 vols. Edited by Phillip Bradley. New York: Vintage, Random House.

Viano, C. A. (1961). *John Locke: Scritti Editi e Inediti sulla Toleranza.* Turin: Einaudi.

Von Leyden, W. (1954). Introduction to John Locke, *Essays on the Law of Nature.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Worcester, Elwood (1889). *The Religious Opinions of John Locke.* Geneva, N.Y.: W.H. Humphrey.

"Cool Reflexion" and the Criticism of Values: Is, Ought, and Objectivity in Hume's Social Science

STEPHEN G. SALKEVER
Bryn Mawr College

Is the fact/value distinction incompatible with the possibility of a social science which is both objective and evaluative (or normative)? Does support of the latter require rejection of the former and vice versa? This article presents an indirect argument against the incompatibility of the fact/value distinction and an objectively evaluative social science. My procedure is to show that David Hume, whose is/ought distinction is the locus classicus *of the fact/value distinction, is committed both to the view that values cannot be derived from facts* and *to the view that social science is not (and should not be) value-neutral. Furthermore, Hume's position is free from any logical flaws. My conclusion is that it is false to say that the fact/value distinction entails a value-neutral social science, and that it is therefore utterly unnecessary for critics of such a science to waste their time attempting to "bridge the gap" between facts and values.*

Perhaps the most powerful, and surely the most famous, argument for the exclusion of moral predicates from social scientific discussion is contained in David Hume's is/ought distinction, which occurs in *A Treatise of Human Nature* (pp. 469–70). In this much-disputed passage, Hume appears to claim that *ought* propositions cannot be deduced from *is* propositions, and that it is therefore a logical error to claim that moral distinctions or judgments can be derived from reason. The question is this: does Hume's "celebrated observation" (Hare, 1964, p. 29) that *ought* cannot be deduced from *is* require the conclusion that *ought* propositions are not subject to criticism and revision on rational grounds (in the way that descriptive or explanatory propositions may be criticized) and so must be excluded from any objective and rigorous social science? My argument will be that Hume does not draw this conclusion, and that his rejection of value-neutrality as a goal of social science is not inconsistent with his rejection on logical grounds of the deduction of *ought* from *is*, of value from fact.

One further preliminary distinction is required here: in speaking of Hume's implicit criticism of value-neutrality I am not claiming, for Hume or in general, that objectivity is enhanced insofar as the social scientist holds certain values at the outset of his or her inquiry (Miller, 1979). Rather, my contention is that the *conclusion* of such inquiry will be the evaluation or criticism of values, rather than the description or explanation of moral and cultural judgments in value-neutral terms (see Gibson, 1977).

The is/ought passage itself has been, in the last 20 years, the object of as much close analysis as the most obscure classical text.[1] Although on first inspection "Hume's "Guillotine" seems to bring about a clean separation between facts and values, a closer look reveals ambiguities. The interpretive difficulties arise when Hume says that it *"seems altogether inconceivable,* how this new relation [the *ought* proposition] can be a *deduction* from others [*is* propositions] which are entirely different from it" (Black, 1969, p. 100, emphasis added). When Hume says that such a deduction "seems altogether inconceivable," is he ironically expressing the view that it really is inconceivable, or only stating a difficult problem to be solved by the rest of book 3 of the *Treatise?* And when he says "deduction," does he mean strict logical entailment (in which case some other form of inference from fact to value might be possible) or any inference whatsoever (in which case the gap between fact and value would be absolutely unbridgeable)? Furthermore, how radical is the break with earlier moral and political philosophy proposed by the is/ought distinction? In the same paragraph, Hume says that he is both exposing a defect in "every system of morality" and that his distinction "wou'd subvert all the vulgar systems of morality"; that these expressions are not synonymous is suggested by Hume's frequent separation of learned and vulgar judgments.[2]

---

[1] The first important demonstration of the difficulties that emerge from a careful reading of the passage was that of McIntyre (1969), to whom my own discussion of Hume owes a great deal.

[2] One possible resolution of this difficulty would be to suggest that Hume was opposed to *all* "systems" in science, on the grounds that they distorted our view of

The meaning of the is/ought passage is of more than simply exegetical concern insofar as it squarely raises the issue of whether Hume's distinction can be used as a warrant for claiming that values or moral propositions (unlike factual beliefs) are not subject to rational defense or criticism. If so, then such propositions should be excluded from that "science of man" (*Treatise*, p. xxii) whose foundation on an objective basis forms the goal of the *Treatise* as a whole. Since the disputed passage is not self-explanatory, any attempt to deal with this question must look beyond it to Hume's own practice of social science in book 3.

Hume's Practice of Social Science

Many of Hume's most famous logical and psychological doctrines and aphorisms suggest the conclusion that moral judgments are not susceptible of rational evaluation. Moral judgments are constituted by a feeling or sentiment, and are not conclusions of reason (*Treatise*, pp. 471, 457). Reasoning is always subsequent to a determination of the passions, and so can never judge them: "Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions" (*Treatise*, p. 415). Actions, which are to be construed as reflections of moral principles, can be called laudable or blameworthy, "but they cannot be reasonable or unreasonable" (*Treatise*, pp. 477, 458). Passionate preferences appear to be similarly closed to rational critique: " 'Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger" (*Treatise*, p. 416). All this suggests that it would be plausible to attribute to Hume a sort of pre-Stevensonian emotivism,[3] and to conclude that while social science may indeed explain and classify moral judgments it should avoid the inappropriate evaluation of such judgments in terms of their rationality.

Nevertheless, the bulk of Hume's social science in book 3 of the *Treatise* is as much concerned with justification and evaluation as it is with the explanation of moral phenomena. Hume does of course spend a good deal of time explaining how human beings come to have those peculiar sensations which we call praise and blame; this explanation revolves around his account of the process of communicated affections which he calls sympathy (*Treatise*, p. 576). But he also wants to answer the substantive moral question of what virtue (and particularly, justice) is, as well as the psychological question of how we come to call certain phenomena (or characters) virtuous or vicious.

Justice, according to Hume, is defined by the three fundamental laws of stability of possession, translation by consent, and the performance of promises (*Treatise*, p. 541). His argument that this conception of justice can be justified by reference to a particular conception of the facts which constitute the human condition and general human interest is too well known to require extensive summary here (see McIntyre, 1969, pp. 39–42). The basic fact or major premise of the argument is that human beings, unlike any other animals, are creatures of numberless needs and slender resources, and that it is by the conventions of social organization alone that man is "able to supply his defects" (*Treatise*, pp. 484–85). The gravest of these defects is the instability and uncertainty "of such possessions as we have acquir'd by our industry or good fortune," and it is this particular defect (rather than, say, our capacity for vice, as for Aristotle) which provides the problem to which the conventions of society and justice are the solution (*Treatise*, pp. 487, 491).

Thus far we are dealing only with Hume's conception of the facts, and with the process of reasoning or drawing inferences from one set of facts to another: from the defining characteristics of the human condition to those conventions and rules which are best suited to solving the problems implicit in these characteristics. This inference is sufficient to defend Hume's conception of justice as a more reasonable solution to the human problem than its competitors, such as the Aristotelian notion of justice as fitness in distribution (*Treatise*, p. 502), but it is not sufficient to attach a sense of moral obligation or a sentiment of duty to the rules of Humean justice. One may, without self-contradiction, accept the argument and still not feel any obligation to abstain from the property of others or to keep one's promises: "We have no motive leading us to the perfor-

---

the evidence (*An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, p. 8), a view which was almost a commonplace in eighteenth-century discussions of science. (For a discussion of a similarly critical response to "system" in Rousseau and Buffon, see Salkever, 1978, pp. 216–17.) However, since Hume does refer to his own work as a "system of ethics" (*Treatise*, p. 618), this resolution does not agree precisely with every instance of Hume's use of the term.

[3] This is proposed by Flew (1969, p. 67). Årdal (1966, p. 212) argues that while Hume is not strictly speaking an emotivist (since he was not specifically concerned with the nature of moral utterance), emotivism is "in conformity with other aspects of his philosophy."

mance of promises distinct from a sense of duty" (*Treatise,* p. 518).[4] If I remain unmoved by the prospect of enhancing the general interest of mankind, no amount of careful inductive inference can cause me to feel a duty to enhance that interest. However, once the connection between interest and justice is established, Hume does believe that the natural operations of sympathy, combined with parental instruction and political education, will in most cases add a sense of moral obligation to those rules for which political philosophy and social science (which are one and the same for Hume) provide the justification (*Treatise,* pp. 533–34).[5] But these are two separate processes: social science can show the causal link between a particular conception of justice and human interest, but this demonstration cannot by itself compel *moral* (or action-guiding) assent to its conclusions. I may well agree that promise-keeping is in the interest of mankind and yet feel no moral obligation to keep promises to people I dislike without in any way contradicting myself. My deficiency is in sympathy, not reason. Justice is a means to an end, and will be valued or desired only insofar as the end is valued (*Treatise,* p. 619).

Thus for Hume social science is limited in that it cannot compel moral assent, a limitation which can be established on both logical and psychological grounds. But it is not at all irrelevant to morality, or limited to describing the development of moral sentiments, since its conclusions provide either criticism or justification of those principles or values to which a sense of moral obligation may or may not become attached. It does this by showing that the rules of justice and society are not arbitrary conventions, unlike the rules of various games (*Treatise,* p. 484; *An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals,* p. 39). Rather, they can be construed and evaluated as proposed solutions or answers to the problems posed by the observable and contingent facts about human needs, interests, and capacities. A good illustration of this procedure is Hume's discussion of various competing principles of political obligation, a problem which is central to all his moral and political writing, in which he criticizes as mistaken the two extreme views of Tory passive obedience and Whig contractarianism and attempts to justify a more reasonable middle ground.[6] His argument is that any acceptable principle of political obligation, the sort of principle which proposes an idea of the extent to which a citizen owes allegiance to government, must maximize the satisfaction of the general interest in peace and liberty and that, in fact, "the obligation to obedience must cease, whenever the interest ceases. . . ," since "these notions of right and obligation are deriv'd from nothing but the *advantage* we reap from government. . ." (*Treatise,* pp. 562, 553, 555, emphasis in original).

The function of social science is thus not simply to describe and explain the views people actually hold concerning the limits of political obligation and the nature of justice, but also to discriminate between adequate and mistaken conceptions relative to the standard provided by the facts about the human condition. Such a science is thus legitimately evaluative as well as explanatory, although it cannot by itself entail a sense of obligation, or somehow demonstrate to those without concern for general human welfare that they ought to have such a concern.

Moral Judgments and Reasons: Hume's Distinctions

Thus far I have argued that Hume's practice of social science rests on the methodological principle that moral and political judgments are criticizable on objective grounds, even though these judgments cannot be derived from, nor be entailed or required by, any facual propositions. Moral sentiments themselves are neither rational nor irrational, but the principles to which they become attached (say, distributive justice or the contract theory of obligation) may indeed be criticized in terms of their rationality as solutions to the problem of human interest or happiness. Assuming this to be a fair statement of Hume's position, the following question remains: does Hume's practice of a critical and evaluative social science contradict the separation of *is* and *ought* asserted in the first two sections of book 3 of the *Treatise*? While recognizing the dangers inherent in what Anthony Flew calls the Infallibility Assumption,[7] I will attempt to show that Hume's argument that moral distinctions are not derived from reason is consistent in general, though not always in detail, with his implicit assumption that such distinctions are criticizable and corrigible on rational and objective grounds.

---

[4] Thus from a Humean point of view, any attempt to argue (as does Searle, 1969) that certain institutional facts, like promising, *entail* obligation, is not only doomed to failure but utterly beside the point.

[5] Hume's position here clearly resembles Aristotle's argument, in the *Nicomachean Ethics,* that a good moral character cannot be produced by reason alone, but can only emerge from a process of habituation. In general, my reading of Hume suggests that his account of the *form* of practical reasoning (though certainly not of its content) is much closer to Aristotle's than most (including Hume) have thought.

[6] Forbes (1975, pp. 193–223) argues persuasively that moderation was the ruling passion of Hume's philosophical criticism of British politics.

Hume offers two major arguments for the conclusion that moral judgments are independent of reason. First, morality results in action while reason does not; second, the terms "reasonable" and "unreasonable" cannot be applied to actions or morals, but only to beliefs.[8] The first argument seems to rest on a descriptive psychological claim, the assertion that as a matter of fact "morals excite passions; . . . reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular" (*Treatise*, p. 457). Hume concludes from this that "the rules of morality . . . are not conclusions of our reason." There is nothing in this argument, however, to deny the view that moral rules, however they are arrived at in the first instance, may be subject to correction and revision in the light of subsequent reflection and experience. It simply says that reason *by itself* cannot constitute moral rules. This point is very similar to Aristotle's claim in book 6 of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (1139a35–b4), in which it is argued that since "thought by itself moves nothing," a person cannot become virtuous simply by engaging in a certain course of reasoning.[9] Reason may be both perfectly incapable of spontaneously generating morals and yet perfectly able to evaluate morals.

Hume's second argument for the categorical separation of reason and morality is much more ambiguous. His basic premise here appears to be the logical or analytic claim that reason is concerned only with the agreement (or disagreement) of a belief to either "*real* relations of ideas, or to *real* existence and matter of fact" (*Treatise*, p. 458, emphasis in original). The next step in the argument, however, is the psychological claim that "passions, volitions, and actions," which are the components and the objects of moral judgments, are "original facts and realities, compleat in themselves," and thus "not susceptible of any such agreement or disagreement" (*Treatise*, p. 458). The inference drawn from these premises is that virtue is neither discovered nor derived by the understanding or by reason (*Treatise*, p. 463). Does this conclusion mean that moral judgments are absolutely incorrigible and independent of reason, as is our preference for one flavor of ice cream rather than another?

Everything here seems to depend on understanding what Hume means by saying that our passions and actions are "original facts and realities, compleat in themselves." It is clear that he does not mean that such phenomena are self-generating: our feelings or impressions of moral good and evil arise as a result of the interaction between the internal actions of our mind and external objects (*Treatise*, pp 464–65). When this interaction results in a feeling of pleasure or pain of a particular sort ("without reference to our particular interest" [*Treatise*, p. 472]), we call the feeling one of virtue or vice. So while it is clearly wrong to say that virtue can be derived from consideration of external objects and their relations only, it is equally misleading to say that virtue is a feeling spontaneously and independently produced by the passions alone.

My pleasure in viewing a charitable or a courageous character derives from the complex interaction of my impressions of that character and its effects on others *and* the sympathetic pleasure which these impressions produce in me. The difficulty that Hume encounters in describing this interaction appears when at the end of section 1 of book 3, just prior to the is/ought passage, he attempts to clarify his conception of our feelings of virtue and vice by saying that they are like secondary qualities in modern (Lockean) philosophy and physics, perceptions in the mind rather than qualities in objects (*Treatise*, p. 469). The problem with this analogy is that Hume has already, in book 1 (*Treatise*, pp. 226–31), presented very strong arguments against the intelligibility of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. This inconsistency suggests a very serious difficulty in Hume's account of the nature of our moral judgments. Is there any Humean way around it?

I believe that there is; it lies in noting that moral judgments are not, for Hume, the only judgments which are internal, not derived from reason, and yet corrigible and subject to criticism by experience and reflection. These characteristics also apply to our judgments of efficient causal necessity, whose critique forms the subject of book 1 of the *Treatise*.[10] This analogy has been traced in detail by Lewis White Beck (1974), who argues that the gap between *is* and *ought* is, for Hume, the same as the gap between *was* and *must be*. Hume's critique of causality consists of showing that all causal judgments arise from two interacting elements: our probabilistic reasoning concerning the connections among events (*Treatise*, pp. 180–81), and the supervenient belief that future events will (or "must be") connected in the same way that similar events have been in our past experience. Much of book 1 is devoted to an account of the conditions under which we come to experience causal judgments (showing that they are derived from custom and habit, rather than reason), just as much of book 3 is devoted to an account of the conditions under which we experience moral judgments[11] (showing that they are derived from sympathy, rather than reason). A good way of summarizing the similarities between causal and moral judgments is to note that, for Hume, both can be understood on the model of aesthetic appreciation, as matters of taste (*Treatise*, pp. 103, 462, 547n., 577, 581–82); *Morals*, p. 6).

---

[7] This is the fallacy of "insisting that where two passages in an author appear to be inconsistent, one of these passages has to be so interpreted that the apparent inconsistency is resolved" (Flew, 1969, p. 65). Of course, one must also be careful to avoid the practice of Hubristic Restraint, which makes one's own good sense the measure of an author's consistency.

[8] What follows is greatly indebted to the presentation of Harrison (1976). Both arguments are developed in concise form on pp. 457–58 of the *Treatise*.

[9] This similarity is noted and exploited to a very different end (that of showing that Aristotle is really a Humean subjectivist *malgré lui*) by Irwin (1975).

But to say that they are matters of taste is not at all to say that they are strictly subjective and incorrigible; there is a real (not only a conventional) difference between good and bad taste (*Treatise*, p. 472), and similarly a difference between good and bad causal judgments, or between good and bad science. Book 1 of the *Treatise* is by no means a blanket indictment of all inductive causal inference as unreasonable. It also contains a lengthy analysis of the ways in which we can correct errors in those probabilistic judgments to which causal beliefs become attached, providing a set of general rules of inductive method (*Treatise*, pp. 173–75) by which we can "learn to distinguish the accidental circumstances from the efficacious causes," and so avoid erroneous judgments like those expressed in the prejudices that "an *Irishman* cannot have wit, and a *Frenchman* cannot have solidity" (*Treatise*, pp. 149, 146, emphasis in original).[12] Although causal judgments are not themselves derived from or by reasoning, accurate and careful reasoning concerning those probabilistic inferences on which causal beliefs depend can improve the quality of those beliefs and enable us to reject mistaken causal systems and claims.

Moral judgments guide conduct and are not derived from abstract reason; moral obligations are not entailed by "the discovery of certain connexions and relations of ideas, which are eternal, immutable, and universally obligatory" (*Treatise*, p. 496). But all moral judgments (whether "artificial" or "natural") contain or are supervenient on causal probabilistic claims that certain dispositions or characters tend to promote the interests of society or mankind, just as causal scientific claims are supervenient on probabilistic judgments that some events regularly precede other events (*Treatise*, p. 579; Beck, 1974, p. 221). Thus it makes perfect Humean sense to say that there can be "fatal errors in our conduct" and in the desires and moral judgments which produce that conduct (*Treatise*, p. 538). Furthermore, while reason alone has no power to direct our action, "reason and judgment may, indeed, be the mediate cause of an action, by prompting, or by directing a passion" (*Treatise*, p. 462).

This position is expressed with even greater clarity in the first section of the second *Inquiry*, where Hume says that even though reason cannot be the proximate cause of any action, and thus cannot take the place of moral sentiments, "in order to pave the way for such a sentiment and give a proper discernment of its object, it is often necessary, we find, that much reasoning should precede, that nice distinctions be made, just conclusions drawn, distant comparisons formed, complicated relations examined, and general facts fixed and ascertained" (*Morals*, p. 6).[13] To say that reason is a mediate cause of conduct is surely to say much more than that reason is simply instrumental, nothing more than a calculation of the best means to an end independently and irrationally established by passion. Reasoning can ascertain general facts concerning human need or interest, and draw inferences concerning the dispositions and customs which tend to promote this interest. Hume's social science is itself a critique of those practical reasonings which are implicit in various customs and moral systems, and not simply an account of the conditions under which such systems arise.

---

[10] Compare the language of the is/ought passage with the following statement on p. 134 of the *Treatise*: "... let men be once fully convinced of these two principles [that 'cause' is not in any object, and that there is no *reason* for inferring causality from constant conjunction], and this will throw them so loose from all common systems, that they will make no difficulty of receiving any, which may appear the most extraordinary."

[11] I think, however, that it is misleading to say, with Årdal (1966, p. 195), that this is Hume's "chief objective" in book 3. Harrison's conclusion that Hume was asking a moral question, rather than a psychological or sociological one (at least, given twentieth-century definitions of these sciences), seems nearer the mark (1976, pp. 122–23).

[12] I am guided here by Cassidy (1977).

[13] See also *Morals*, p. 105: "Reason, when fully assisted and improved, is sufficient to instruct us in the pernicious or useful tendency of qualities and actions, but it is not alone sufficient to produce any

There are two general classes of errors which can result in unsatisfactory moral judgments: errors concerning the basic human needs (which, according to Hume, are the needs for peace and liberty in general, and the stability of possessions in particular), and errors concerning the rules and dispositions which best satisfy those needs. The two great sources of both types of error are a priori moral systems which distort our view of the observable facts concerning human needs (*Morals*, p. 8) and our natural tendency to mistake judgments about our own interests for genuine moral judgments: "There is no quality in human nature, which causes more fatal errors in our conduct, than that which leads us to prefer whatever is present to the distant and remote, and makes us desire objects more according to their situation than their intrinsic value" (*Treatise*, p. 538).

These sources of error are precisely analogous to the two sources of mistakes concerning inductive inferences. The first error can be corrected by insisting on the importance of fact and observation in practical reasoning, as in science. The second involves the question of the proper perspective from which moral judgments can be made, and is the same as the problem relative to "our judgments concerning external bodies" in natural science (*Treatise*, p. 603). Our moral judgments will be free from implicit errors to the extent that they are informed by a process of reflection which enables us to consider the value of characters and dispositions from the perspective of the interests of mankind. A necessary condition for adequate reflection of this kind is the intercourse of sentiments in society, which is made possible by sympathy, and which enables us to say that "X is good" instead of "X pleases me" (*Treatise*, pp. 574–91; Beck, 1974, p. 226). Genuine moral judgments are not produced independently or spontaneously by asocial individuals, but emerge only in the process of expressing and comparing views about how best to solve common human problems, and to satisfy shared human needs (*Morals*, pp. 94–95). This is the function of language and reason, and is not merely instrumental or subsequent to moral judgment, but is in an important sense at least partially constitutive of such judgments.

But sociality is not a sufficient condition for the production of praiseworthy moral sentiments. Hume does not claim that all misplaced moral judgments can be attributed to inadequate socialization. He would not, I think, reject the Aristotelian observation that it is possible to be both a good citizen and a not so good human being, and he is surely neither a conventionalist nor a cultural relativist.[14] The most striking evidence for this is his consistent criticism of the praise generally given to heroism, military glory, and courage in general: "Heroism, or military glory, is much admir'd by the generality of mankind. They consider it as the most sublime kind of merit. Men of cool reflexion are not so sanguine in their praises of it. The infinite confusions and disorder, which it has caus'd in the world, diminish much of its merit in their eyes" (*Treatise*, pp. 600–01). Similarly, those societies and cultures which seem to equate courage and virtue, like the Roman Republic and Homeric Greece (*Morals*, pp. 79–80), are subject to criticism on the grounds that their judgments of value are informed by a mistaken conception of real human needs and interests. At something like the other extreme, the "monkish virtues," such celibacy, self-denial, humility, and solitude, are contrary to reason and will everywhere be rejected by "men of sense" (*Morals*, p. 91). The

---

moral blame or approbation." There are important doubts about the propriety of using the *Inquiries* to solve interpretive difficulties in the *Treatise* (see Årdal, 1966, pp. 2–3), since in many respects the *Inquiries* are intended by Hume to smooth over perplexities that are squarely faced in the *Treatise*. The elimination of the doctrine of sympathy from the second *Inquiry* is but one instance of this. I have tried to deal with these problems by citing the *Inquiries* only when there is, to my mind, clear agreement between them and the *Treatise*.

[14] Nor is he guilty of the ethnocentrist view that all societies are fundamentally like England and France, in spite of some well-known passages such as the following from section 8 of the first *Inquiry (Understanding*, p. 93): "Mankind are so much the same, in all times and places, that history informs us of nothing new or strange in this particular." See also *Morals*, p. 33. The position that Hume was very sensitive to cultural differences as well as uniformities has been effectively set forth by Forbes (1975, pp. 102–21).

language of a culture is a necessary condition for the emergence of impartial moral judgments, but that language may reflect mistaken perceptions of human needs and the qualities which serve them and so issue in defective moral judgments or cultural values.

Nor does Hume hold that moral controversies can be resolved by determining what moral views are held by most humans most of the time. Thus I think Harrison is mistaken in arguing that Hume believed that moral questions can be settled by carefully observing what things people actually approve of (1976, p. 123). Nonetheless, it is true that Hume often suggests that common moral opinion is the authoritative standard for resolving moral and political disputes: "The general opinion of mankind has some authority in all cases; but in this of morals 'tis perfectly infallible" (*Treatise*, p. 552; see also *Treatise*, p. 547n.). Similarly, in "Of The Original Contract" he says that "in all questions with regard to morals . . . there is really no other standard [other than an appeal to general opinion] by which any controversy can ever be decided" (Aiken, 1948, p . 371). At the same time, he states with equal clarity, frequency, and force that the basic standard or fact in terms of which values may be criticized is the substantive one of true human interest, rather than the procedural (and indeterminate) standard of what most people take that interest to be: "In all determinations of morality . . . the question cannot, by any means, be decided with greater certainty than by ascertaining, on any side, the true interests of mankind" (*Morals*, pp. 12–13, see also *Treatise*, p. 562).

As his discussion of courage and glory suggests, Hume is clearly aware that there may be disputes between the generality of mankind on the one hand and persons of sense and cool reflection on the other concerning which qualities should be called virtuous; and Hume leaves no doubt as to whose opinion should be favored in such controversies. His ambivalence about affirming that there is an objective moral standard whose existence does not depend upon consent or convention may well be caused by the fact that the human interest or the human good is a sort of final cause, and Hume's rejection of the intelligibility of teleological analysis is a central tenet of his empiricist epistemology (*Treatise*, p. 171). He sometimes attempts to resolve possible discrepancies between real human interest and opinions concerning that interest by suggesting that the moral judgments of societies have progressively improved from uncultivated times to the present (*Morals*, p. 79; Forbes, 1975, pp. 87–89), and even, perhaps, by hinting that there is a preestablished harmony between our moral judgments and their objects similar to that between our causal judgments and the course of nature (*An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, p. 67; Beck, 1974, p. 225). But whatever the merit of these sketchy attempts at reconciling genuine interest and general opinion,[15] they should not be allowed to obscure the fact that, for Hume, a great part of the task of the social scientist is to criticize ill-founded moral or political judgments and to suggest revisions in them wherever possible.[16]

Conclusion

A genuinely Humean social science would indeed be concerned with the analysis of certain kinds of facts, and not with exhorting its audience to be virtuous after one fashion or another: the social scientist is not a poet or a painter (*Understanding*, p. 15). Nor is it his function to deduce obligatory duties from supposedly eternal factual verities. But it would be a one-sided and thus a misleading account of Hume's social science to say that it simply treats values as phenomena to be described and explained by reference to the conditions which produce them. Rather, the work of the best social science will be to ascertain as clearly as possible those fundamental though contingent facts which define human needs and interests, and to examine, methodically and reflectively, the inferences from these facts which are implicit in judgments of value, and upon which such judgments are superimposed by our passionate and sympathetic concern with the interests of mankind. Hume's social science is thus both factual and critical; its subject matter is composed of facts and inferences, but its conclusions are anything but value-neutral. Thus social science must be objectively critical in a way that is perfectly consistent with the is/ought distinction, and, ironically enough, critical in a way that a rigid and only superficially Humean separation of fact and value would exclude from the practice of social science.

---

[15] They seem to be more aprioristic than the teleology whose rejection occasions them.

[16] A brief set of such criticisms and proposals for revision is presented in *Morals*, pp. 12–14, where Hume argues that from the perspective of the true human interest, alms-giving, tyrannicide, and the liberality of princes are not virtues, and that luxury is no vice.

References

Aiken, Henry D., ed. (1948). *Hume's Moral and Political Philosophy.* New York: Hafner Publishing Co.

Årdal, Påll (1966). *Passion and Value in Hume's Treatise.* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Beck, Lewis White (1974), " 'Was-Must Be' and 'Is-Ought' in Hume." *Philosophical Studies* 26: 219–28.

Black, Max (1969). "The Gap Between 'Is' and 'Should.' " In W. D. Hudson (ed.), *The Is-Ought Question.* New York: St. Martin's Press, pp. 99–113.

Cassidy, John (1977). "The Nature of Hume's Inductive Scepticism." *Ratio* 19: 47–54.

Flew, Anthony (1969). "On the Interpretation of Hume." In W. D. Hudson (ed.), *The Is-Ought Question.* New York: St. Martin's Press, pp. 64–69.

Forbes, Duncan (1975). *Hume's Philosophical Politics.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gibson, Mary (1977). "Rationality." *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 6: 193–225.

Hare, R. M. (1964). *The Language of Morals.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Harrison, Jonathan (1976). *Hume's Moral Epistemology.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Hume, David (1955; first published 1748). *An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding.* Edited by Charles W. Hendel. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.

——— (1957; first published 1751). *An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals.* Edited by Charles W. Hendel. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.

——— (1888; first published 1739). *A Treatise of Human Nature.* Edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Irwin, T. H. (1975). "Aristotle on Reason, Desire, and Virtue." *Journal of Philosophy* 72: 567–78.

McIntyre, A. C. (1969). "Hume on 'Is' and 'Ought.' " In W. D. Hudson (ed.), *The Is-Ought Question.* New York: St. Martin's Press, pp. 35–50.

Miller, Richard W. (1979). "Reason and Commitment in the Social Sciences." *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 8: 240–66.

Salkever, Stephen G. (1978). "Interpreting Rousseau's Paradoxes." *Eighteenth Century Studies* 12: 204–26.

Searle, J. R. (1969). "How to Derive 'Ought' From 'Is.' " In W. D. Hudson (ed.), *The Is-Ought Question.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 120–34.

The Two Faces of Issue Voting

EDWARD G. CARMINES
Indiana University

JAMES A. STIMSON
Florida State University

Both implicit democratic norms and the reconstructions provided by theorists of rational choice suggest that issue voters are more sophisticated—educated, informed, and active in politics—than other voters. But some issues are clearly more difficult than others, and the voters who respond to "hard" and "easy" issues, respectively, are assumed to differ in kind. We propose the hypothesis that "easy-issue" voters are no more sophisticated than non-issue voters, and this is found to be the case. The findings suggest a reevaluation of the import of rising and falling levels of issue voting and suggest a prominent role for "easy" issues in electoral realignments.

"To speak with precision about public opinion," V. O. Key once observed, "is a task not unlike coming to grips with the Holy Ghost" (1961, p. 8). A similar observation could be made about issue voting, because for all of the recent attention devoted to this political phenomenon, its character has remained as elusive as ever. This is not to say that no progress has been made in untangling the web of uncertainty and ignorance that surrounds our understanding of policy-oriented voting. On the contrary, recent research focusing on elections and voting behavior has pointed to various social, political, and psychological conditions that facilitate the translation of policy preferences into votes. Thus, according to some research, issue voting occurs most frequently during periods of social and economic turmoil, when the policy options provided by the political parties tend to be relatively distinct (Nie et al., 1976, pp. 156–93). And certain individual cognitive and psychological characteristics are similarly thought to be necessary for policy-conscious voting decisions (Broh, 1973; Miller et al., 1973).

But our understanding of issue voting is not likely to be clear, precise, or comprehensive until we know much more about the core "issue" in issue voting, the decision calculus used by voters to link their policy concerns to voting choices. As a first step toward that comprehensive understanding, we need to question whether "issue voting" is a single phenomenon. Our argument is that it is not, that there are two theoretically different and empirically identifiable types.

Issue voting of the first type involves conscious calculation of policy benefits for alternative electoral choices. This "hard-issue" voting has its intellectual roots in the Downsian tradition (Downs, 1957). It presumes that issue voting is the final result of a sophisticated decision calculus; that it represents a reasoned and thoughtful attempt by voters to use policy preferences to guide their electoral decision. Citizens, after examining the policy positions represented by candidates in a given election, vote for that candidate who is closest to them in some (probably multiple) issue space (Davis et al., 1970; Brody and Page, 1972; Frohlich et al., 1978). Hard-issue voting should be best exemplified, at least in degree, among those who have the conceptual skills to do it well.

The second type of issue voting (which we shall denote "easy") occurs when a particular issue becomes so ingrained over a long period that it structures voters' "gut responses" to candidates and political parties. Because gut responses require no conceptual sophistication, they should be distributed reasonably evenly in the voting population. It can be argued of course that this second type of issue voting is merely a simplified version of the first. But we shall argue that the distinction between them is

---

Apologies to Bachrach and Baratz for borrowing part of their title. The data used in this article were made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. The data were originally collected by the University of Michigan Center for Political Studies of the Institute for Social Research, under a grant from the National Science Foundation. Neither the original collectors of the data nor the Consortium bear any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations presented here. For helpful commentary along the way we thank Russel Dalton, James Kuklinski, John McIver, Leroy Rieselbach, Ann Shaw, Ronald Weber, and some kind anonymous readers for the *Review*. The authors would like to thank the National Science Foundation for its support of this research under grant SOC–7907543.

fundamental, that they involve different decision processes, different prerequisite conditions, different voters, and different interpretation.

The Noncontroversy About Issue Voting

Before we examine in detail these two kinds of issue voting, it will be helpful to put that discussion into perspective by highlighting an assumption upon which all who study the topic seem to agree, that "issue voting" is not a neutral term. On the contrary, the study of issue voting is infused with normative considerations. The common—indeed, universal—view has been that voting choices based on policy concerns are superior to decisions based on party loyalty or candidate image. Only the former represent clearly sophisticated behavior. Indeed, the policy-oriented vote is a defining characteristic of that mythical specimen, the classic democratic citizen. The spatial modeling approach to voting behavior, moreover, is quite explicit in linking issue voting to rationality, an assumption that leads to the conclusion that voting on the basis of other considerations must be nonrational, or at best, less rational.

While scholars have disagreed vehemently about most aspects of issue voting—how it can be measured, whether it can be distinguished from candidate and party effects and, most recently, whether it has increased in frequency during recent elections—they have never questioned its inherent "goodness." (For a sampling of this literature, see Boyd, 1972; Pomper, 1972; Nie et al., 1976; Repass, 1971; Miller et al., 1976; Margolis, 1977; for a fairly complete bibliography through 1972 see Kessel, 1972.) The issue voter has been universally praised. This assumption has been, in fact, so noncontroversial and such an integral aspect of issue voting that those focusing on the topic have felt no need to justify it. Indeed, it is rarely mentioned at all except for the occasional phrase coupling issue voting with the average citizen having been seen in a more favorable light. Thus, when Key (1966, pp. 7, xiii) announced in the opening chapter of his final, posthumously published work that "the perverse and unorthodox argument of this little book is that voters are not fools," no one should have been surprised that the bulk of the supporting evidence focused on "the parallelism of policy preferences and the direction of the vote." For it is precisely such evidence that would support the notion that "the electorate behaves about as rationally and responsibly as we should expect, given the clarity of the alternatives presented to it and the character of the information available to it" (Key, 1966, p. 7).

This uniformly favorable characterization of the issue voter would be of little consequence except that it has led us to treat all issue-based voting as evidence of voter sophistication. Our inferences about the level of issue voting are not in question here; "easy" issues are still "issues." It is the inferences we draw from the level of issue voting that we are going to call in question.[1]

The idea that all issue voting does not indicate voter sophistication was suggested, perhaps inadvertently, by Survey Research Center (SRC) analysts in their study of the 1968 presidential election (Converse et al., 1969). Stressing the issue distinctiveness of Wallace's supporters, as compared to Humphrey's and Nixon's, they noted that "among the whites who voted for one of the major candidates, only 10% favored continued segregation rather than desegregation or 'something in between'; among Wallace voters, all of whom were white, almost 40% wanted segregation" (Converse et al., 1969, p. 1097). Combining the issue distinctiveness of Wallace voters on a variety of issues with the finding that among the general public favorable and unfavorable evaluations of Wallace had a strong issue coloration led to the conclusion that "the Wallace candidacy was reacted to by the public as an *issue* candidacy" (Converse et al., 1969, p. 1097). While the Wallace voters may have been motivated largely by issue considerations, Converse et al. do not argue (and we have no reason to assume) that they were any more sophisticated—according to any criteria—than Humphrey or Nixon voters. Thus, the SRC analysis of the Wallace candidacy of 1968 represents an initial effort to drive a wedge between issue voting and voter sophistication. But, ultimately, to discover the primary motivation of a candidate's supporters is not likely to reveal much about issue voting for the simple reason that in a strict sense there is no such thing as an "issue candidacy." For any candidate with a modicum of public support will attract voters for all sorts of reasons, many of which have nothing to do with his or her issue positions. Thus, one must agree with Brody and Page (1972, p. 455) that "there is no way to avoid modeling the individual voting decision and still estimate policy voting," a topic to which we shall turn shortly.

---

[1] Our discussion of the distinction between issue voting and voter sophistication parallels the differences between issue voting and rational voting discussed by Converse (1975, pp. 97–100).

The Attributes of Easy Issues

Most of what is written about "issues" is descriptive of what we have called "hard" issues. We focus here, in counterpoint, on the attributes of the easy issue.

If we ask the question, "what makes an issue easy?" we would be asking what makes possible a gut response elicited equally from well-informed and ill-informed, from interested and uninterested, from active and apathetic voters. Three such requisites are these:

1. The easy issue would be symbolic rather than technical.
2. It would more likely deal with policy ends than means.
3. It would be an issue long on the political agenda.

Each of the requisites has a simple rationale. Symbolic conflicts are readily communicated to mass publics. Technical issues are not. As prescriptions for public problems, technical policies require knowledge of important factual assumptions to be appreciated. Symbolic issues may be presented *and understood* simplistically.

Easy issues must almost inevitably concern the ends of public policy rather than the means. In part, this is simply the first requisite restated; the means of public policy are usually more technical than symbolic. In part, it is because preferences about policy ends can arise from the common prejudices of the mass culture. Normative premises are not by definition informed; neither do they need to be articulated.

The easy issue, finally, is likely to be an unresolved conflict long in the public eye. Even if the first requisites were met, a new issue would not be likely to find its way to the "gut" of those paying least attention to politics. Simplicity alone is not enough, but with time and simplicity an issue can permeate the electorate.

A last, more speculative, attribute of the easy issue is not a requisite, but a consequence. The availability of the easy issue for electoral choice we take to be a system-determined attribute. Simply put, sometimes easy issues are offered to the electorate and sometimes they are not. Whether a given easy issue was employed by a given voter in an election depends more crucially upon whether the choice was offered than upon the ability of the voter to make such a choice (Prewitt and Nie, 1971). Hard issues we posit to be always available; the degree to which they are employed is voter-dependent. More interested, more informed, and more involved citizens are more likely to discriminate by hard issues than their less interested, less informed, and less involved counterparts.

This last attribute could form an important link in the solution of the unresolved problem of explaining over time variation in issue voting. But it must remain only an informed speculation here. We turn now to two real-world issues that exemplify the easy/hard distinction.

Desegregation and Vietnam: Easy and Hard. Racial desegregation is a protypically easy issue—in fact, the issue that led us to think about the consequences of easy-issue voting. Although the policy conflicts involved in desegregation can be detailed in great complexity, we think it reasonable to assume that the typical voter sees in it a simple issue. Some support for that assumption can be found in our operational indicator of desegregation attitudes (a factor score derived from a variety of racial materials), which is most clearly defined by items which ask simply for respondent preferences for more or less segregation in American society. Desegregation is symbolic (Sears et al., 1979); there are virtually no technical or pragmatic issues in it. And it has been around a very long time now. The least-informed segments of both black and white communities respond meaningfully to the question of desegregation; it is that easy.

It is an issue, finally, on which parties and candidates have staked out relatively unambiguous positions—most notably in the 1964 presidential election. The clarity of positions on desegregation during that electoral contest can be seen in a simple statistic: the Survey Research Center did not discover a single black Goldwater supporter in its nationwide election survey (cited in Greenstein, 1970, p. 26). The 1964 presidential election, we believe, had a powerful and lasting effect on mass perceptions of the parties' stands on racial desegregation—perceptions that led to a slow but permanent reshaping of underlying party loyalties (Stimson and Carmines, 1977).

The Vietnam War was quite a different issue. The issue was badly muddled in 1968 when the country was deeply divided about the war (Verba and Brody, 1970) but Nixon and Humphrey took similar positions (Page and Brody, 1972). War and peace are simple enough ends, but the candidates did not offer that choice. Instead, the electorate was presented with alternative plans (one of them "secret") to end the war (Page, 1978). The issue had been changed but not particularly clarified by 1972 (Steeper and Teeter, 1976), when one candidate promised to end the war by immediate withdrawal and the other claimed already to have resolved it by his harder-line approach. While antiwar activists may have seen a wide gulf separating the candidates' position, we believe most voters saw the issue in far more narrow terms, focusing mainly on the speed and conditions of withdrawal. The confusion was heightened, finally, by the fact that Democratic presidents had initiated and vigorously prosecuted the war while the Republican incumbent had sharply reduced the number of U.S. troops in Vietnam. With strong sentiment for ending the war running in the electorate, moreover, the alternative candidate scenarios increasingly focused debate on the return of prisoners of war, American postwar prestige, and the like. The relative efficacy of the not terribly different candidate strategies was the issue.

The pace of withdrawal from Vietnam (the "choice" offered in the 1972 presidential election) was clearly a hard issue by our criteria. The issue, as presented, was pragmatic, not symbolic. It dealt with the best means of ending the war, but with nearly universal agreement on the ultimate end. And it was an issue of relatively brief duration, lasting at most the length of American involvement in the war, but probably a good deal less than that, since the nature of the issue changed as the war evolved.

Our classification of desegregation and Vietnam into theoretical categories rests, in the end, on empirical knowledge. Racial desegregation could be complex and Vietnam simple if the issues had evolved that way in the political system *and if voters saw them that way.* All issues have intrinsically simple and complex facets; which particular facets predominate at a given time is an empirical question. We have no doubt that desegregation was (and is) seen as a simple issue. For evidence that Vietnam was not at all simple in 1972, see Steeper and Teeter (1976).

Desegregation and Vietnam in the 1972 Election

The 1972 presidential election proves to be a useful case study for examining easy- and hard-issue voting. The election is widely described as issue-oriented, perhaps more than any other. It falls in the electoral period of enhanced issue consciousness, a phenomenon yet to be fully explained. And it is particularly convenient for this research because, as we shall soon see, it is dominated by two issues, Vietnam and desegregation, each an exemplification of hard and easy issues, respectively.

Before we can proceed with further analysis, we need (for later purposes) to demonstrate that our two issues had a non-trivial and non-spurious impact on the 1972 contest. This we have accomplished with the multivariate probit analysis of voting choice of Table 1.[2] Along with party identification, it includes as

Table 1. 1972 Vote, Party, and Issues

	Standardized Maximum Likelihood Estimate	*Z*
Party identification	−1.733	−15.9
Vietnam withdrawal	− .932	− 9.5
Desegregation	.616	6.3
Guarantee of jobs	− .544	− 5.7
Attitude toward black activists	.410	4.2
Legalization of marijuana	− .218	− 2.2
Rights of accused	− .177	− 1.8
Women's role	.113	1.2
Tax reform	− .045	− .5
Control of inflation	.003	.0

Source: Computed from data collected in the 1972 Center for Political Studies election study, University of Michigan.

−2(Log Likelihood Ratio) 832.0
Significance: P < .001

---

[2] Our choice of the probit model over regression is based most crucially on our assumption that the S-shaped cumulative propensity function assumed by probit is a more accurate representation of the impact of issues on vote choice than the alternative linear regression model. It is also important for our yet to be discussed classification procedure that all individual vote choice predictions be bounded by the (0,1) limits

independent variables all the (non-racial) CPS seven-point scales administered to both Form 1 and Form 2 respondents and the two racial-attitude factors.

Table 1 presents standardized maximum-likelihood estimates (MLEs, analogous to the standardized slope coefficients of regression) along with "z" tests for the null hypotheses that the true MLEs are zero, all for the full sample of issues. Vote choice is dichotomous, the seven-point issue scales are the familiar respondent self-placements (not proximity measures) and the two racial scales are factor scores derived from a variety of racial attitude materials (see Appendix A). The first taps attitudes toward desegregation, both in general and in the traditional battlegrounds of schools, jobs, housing, and so forth. The second racial factor, more diffuse and affective, taps attitûdes oriented more toward racial protest (and protesters) than the substance of racial policy.

The evidence of Table 1 is clear. Both the Vietnam War and desegregation are shown to have influenced the 1972 vote in the face of controls for party identification and a reasonable sample of other possible issues. What is intriguing about Table 1 is that racial desegregation emerges as the second best "issue" predictor of voting choice in 1972. For unlike Vietnam, which was a dominant theme in the campaign, racial desegregation was hardly mentioned by either candidate. That it was not emphasized in party platforms and not salient in the campaign but still exerted a substantial influence on the election outcome suggests something about the unusual properties of desegregation as a political issue.

We have talked of issue voting and the distinction between hard and easy issues in largely intuitive and indirect terms, to this point. A more systematic approach is now in order.

Classifying Issue Difficulty

We conceive of issue voting as a two-part multiplicative process requiring at minimum that each voter (1) assess his or her own issue preference and (2) calculate relative positioning of parties and candidates. The second dimension, the spatial mapping process, we believe, distinguishes hard from easy issues. Hard issues are more accurately mapped by the well-informed. Easy issues are accurately mapped by all.

How can we tell empirically whether a particular issue is easy or hard? Our theory suggests simply enough that the relationship between *hard* issues and vote should be *conditional* on level of political information possessed by voters. Issue position should exert a considerably stronger causal influence on the votes of the well-informed because they, more than the ill-informed, accurately map party and candidate issue stances. The ill-informed should show a tendency to mix "correct" responses with "incorrect" ones in the aggregate, and therefore display an apparently weaker[3] relationship between issue and vote. No such distinction should hold if the issue is easy. That the ill-informed can respond appropriately is a defining characteristic of the easy issue.

Figures 1 and 2 array vote by issue position on Vietnam withdrawal and desegregation, respectively, with voters classified by political information level.[4] Figure 1 shows the Vietnam withdrawal scale as a prototypical hard issue. Well-informed voters as a group appear extremely sensitive to the issue; the pro-withdrawal segment is sharply pro-McGovern, the "military victory" group almost unanimous in support of Nixon. Those with medium information levels show a still strong but flatter response in their votes; they are less inclined to vote for McGovern if they favor withdrawal, less inclined to vote for Nixon if they advocate

---

of probability. That is the case for probit and is not for linear regression. On these points see Aldrich and Cnudde (1975) and McKelvey and Zavonia (1975). For a very brief discussion of the probit model see Rosenstone and Wolfinger (1978).

[3] We use the vague strong/weak terminology here because we expect the relationships between issue position and vote to be cumulative propensity functions–S shapes. If linear regression were appropriate, the argument would be simpler: hard issues would show steeper slopes for the well informed, an interaction effect. Employing a method discussed by Wright (1976), we made such a test, which supports the interpretation presented here. The Vietnam/Vote relationship has a statistically significant information interaction; the Desegregation/Vote relationship does not.

[4] Our classification is based upon the number of right answers to a series of six objective questions about American politics administered to the Form 1 subsample. The series includes some questions which are current and relevant to electoral decision making (e.g., which party controls Congress?) and some which tap background information (e.g., the number of years in a senatorial term). The requirement of objectively correct answers limits the possibility of measuring more directly relevant information. Scores of 0, 1, and 2 are classified "low," 3 and 4 "medium" and 5 and 6 "high."

the military solution. The least-informed complete the pattern; similar to the medium information group if they favor withdrawal, they are considerably more likely to report a McGovern vote if they take the hard-line position other voters associate with Nixon. The Eta-squared statistic from analysis of variance is a rough summary of the (nonlinear) relationship between issue and vote. For low, medium, and high information groups, respectively, it progresses from .15 to .22 to .46. Voter information makes a difference.

Figure 2 demonstrates that the issue/information interaction does not apply to all issues. At the pro-desegregation end of the scale, voters are undifferentiated by information level. Differentiation increases with segregationist sentiment, but it is mixed and intransitive, with the best-informed between the low and medium categories in voting response to pro-segregation attitudes. The Eta squared is similarly intransitive, rising from .06 for the least-informed to .17 for the medium group, and then falling off to .11 for the best-informed. This unpredictability is what we expect of the easy issue; information doesn't structure the relationship between issue preference and vote.

The statistical evidence thus indicates that Vietnam was a hard issue and desegregation an easy one. It may seem paradoxical that the issue which dominated campaign rhetoric was hard and the one undiscussed easy. But we think that is probably normally the case. Easy issues do not require discussion, whereas complicated policy disputes (i.e., hard issues) are not likely to be reflected in electoral response at all unless they are extensively discussed.



Source: Computed from data collected in the 1972 Center for Political Studies election study, University of Michigan.

Figure 1. Vote and Vietnam Withdrawal by Political Information Level

Measuring Policy Voting

Although the literature on voting behavior is richly suggestive of where we should look for issue voting—to the well-educated, well-informed, concerned and active segment of the electorate—it has little to offer as a guide to measuring it directly. The presumed causes of issue voting (education, access to information, etc.) are particularly ill-suited as surrogate indicators of it in this research, where it is hypothesized that they are not common to all types of policy voting. This research requires a pure measure of the phenomenon, a yardstick that will allow the categorization of individuals without reference to the presumed antecedents of issue-voting behavior.

To separate issue voting from its antecedents and consequences in order that both may be open to empirical investigation, we define it as voting which is predictable from knowledge about individual policy preferences. That simple definition skirts some theoretical difficulties and is far from easy to render operational, but it does allow for classification at the individual level.

The principal theoretical problem with our simple definition is specifying the proper role of partisanship. Party identification may be conceived as policy-irrelevant loyalty, as a cue to issue preferences, or as an amalgam of the two. It no doubt serves all of those purposes for different subsets of the electorate. It may even of course be the causal result of policy preferences. In the analysis to follow we treat party identification as antecedent to both policy preferences and voting choice. For each individual policy, party identification is used as a predictive baseline against which the presumed influence of issues is judged. Each voter is judged an issue voter if knowledge of the individual's issue position improves our ability



Source: Computed from data collected in the 1972 Center for Political Studies election study, University of Michigan.

Figure 2. Vote and Desegregation by Political Information Level

to predict his or her vote beyond the level of predictability already achieved by party identification.

The procedure for classifying individuals into issue-voter categories is a good deal less simple than our simple definition; measuring predictability is not as easy as talking about it. The procedure outlined here (and in more detail in Appendix B) is as follows:

1. The best-fitting probit function relating party identification and Vietnam and desegregation attitudes to vote is derived for all voters collectively.
2. Three separate probit predictions are then generated for each of the 1,515 voters. One drops out the two policy attitude variables (by setting them to their mean values for everybody), leaving party identification as the only predictor variable. One drops out desegregation and predicts from party and Vietnam. And one drops out Vietnam and predicts from party and desegregation.
3. Each of the three predictions is transformed into probability of voting for McGovern.
4. The three probability calculations are compared with reported vote to classify each individual voter into one of four mutually exclusive categories:
    - A. Non-issue Voters: Neither "party + Vietnam" nor "party + desegregation" models have smaller predictive error than "party only," 15 percent of all voters.
    - B. Easy-Issue Voters: "Party + desegregation" is a better predictor than "party only," but "party + Vietnam" is not, 19 percent of all voters.
    - C. Hard-Issue Voters: "Party + Vietnam" is a better predictor than "party only," but "party + desegregation" is not, 24 percent of all voters.
    - D. Constrained[5]-Issue Voters: Both "party + desegregation" and "party + Vietnam" improve upon the "party only" prediction, 42 percent of all voters.

Our typology is a means to an end; it allows examination of our basic hypothesis, that easy- and hard-issue voting are fundamentally different.

The Attributes of Issue Voters

We have argued thus far that easy issues are different in kind from hard issues. Although we have already presented some evidence for the argument, the most important evidence is to be found in the argument's implication that easy-issue voters are also different from hard-issue voters. We hypothesize that they are. The hypothesis, more specifically, is that hard-issue voters have the characteristics universally attributed in the literature to "issue voters" and that easy-issue voters are no more informed, educated, or active in politics than those who are not influenced by issue considerations at all. The easy-issue voters are genuinely issue voters, but we hypothesize that they share none of the personal attributes traditionally associated with issue voting.

The distinguishing characteristic of the easy issue is that it requires almost nothing of the voter. Those who employ only easy issues would not therefore be expected to be more sophisticated—by any number of criteria—than voters who use such easy alternatives as party loyalty or candidate affect. Similarly, those who employ both hard and easy issues would not be expected to be more sophisticated than those who use hard issues only; the only critical distinction is between using and not using hard issues.

We have chosen three indicators of voter sophistication, "education," "political information," and "political activity," because they are commonly believed to differentiate the issue voter from the non-issue voter. They are central to Berelson's "democratic citizen" (1954, pp. 305–23) and, unlike such other alleged issue-voter attributes as rationality, they can be measured in an unambiguous manner. We take them up one at a time.

Education. The democratic citizen/issue voter is usually considered to be well informed about political choices. We can reasonably assume that formal education contributes to that state of affairs. Table 2 displays the levels of education of our four voter types. Of particular note is that the easy-issue voters are far and away the least-educated segment of the voting sample—being even less educated than the non-issue voters, with about 10 percent more who have not completed high school and 15 percent fewer who have attended college.

The constrained-issue voters, also in line with their predicted position, are slightly less

---

[5] Use of the term "constrained" has the limited connotation that voters seem to use both issues in their voting decision and that both run in the same direction. No other term is a suitable expression of that notion. Whether these voters are "constrained" by other criteria is a question beyond the scope of this effort; we do not wish to imply that they are.

Table 2. Education and Issue Voting (Percent)

Education	Non-Issue Voters	Easy-Issue Voters	Hard-Issue Voters	Constrained-Issue Voters
Less than high school	32.1	41.4	22.6	29.0
High school or equivalent	28.5	34.4	38.0	31.2
Some college or more	39.4	24.2	39.4	39.7
	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.9
N =	(221)	(285)	(371)	(637)

Source: Computed from data collected in the 1972 Center for Political Studies election study, University of Michigan.

well educated than the hard-issue voters (indeed, barely different from non-issue voters), with about 6 percent more reporting less than a high school education. We have predicted that easy voters are *not more* sophisticated than non-issue voters (and constrained-issue voters *not more* sophisticated than hard-issue voters). The outcome with respect to education is stronger than the prediction: those who use race, our easy issue, to aid their decision making appear *less* sophisticated than their counterparts who do not, although the magnitude of difference is small.

Political Information. Knowing "facts" about politics is a second requirement for being well informed. Such factual knowledge can be measured with the political information scale we have already employed. Levels of such political information for our four voter groups are shown in Table 3. Easy-issue voters are slightly (but not significantly) better informed by this criterion than non-issue voters, although interpretation is clouded by the presence of fewer easy-issue voters in both lowest and highest information groups. Both easy-issue and non-issue voters are less well informed than voters in the other two groups, which are in turn similar to one another.

Political Activism. Political activism is not so much a measure of sophistication as a presumed cause of it. Those who take an active role in politics should develop a more sophisticated understanding of the choices they confront than those whose involvement in politics extends only to the voting booth. To the degree that activism is not a correlate of education, it may well be a substitute for it, an alternative way to learn about the political world.

We measure activism for this analysis with a summary count of respondent reports of engaging in influencing others' votes, attending political meetings, working for a party or candidate, wearing a campaign button or displaying a sticker, giving money, writing to a public official, or writing a letter to a newspaper about politics.

The activism/issue voting relationship is as predicted, as seen in Table 4. Non-issue and easy-issue voters look substantially the same on this scale, as do hard-issue and constrained-issue voters. Easy-issue voters, on the other hand, are substantially less active than hard-issue voters, with almost half of them reporting no participation beyond voting; this is the case among less than a third of the hard-issue voters. In sum, all differences are in the predicted direction.

Our analysis to this point has shown but one

Table 3. Political Information and Issue Voting (Percent)

Political Information	Non-Issue Voters	Easy-Issue Voters	Hard-Issue Voters	Constrained-Issue Voters
Low	41.7	31.7	21.1	23.5
Medium	40.9	54.2	44.3	47.4
High	17.4	14.1	34.6	29.1
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N =	(115)	(142)	(185)	(344)

Source: Computed from data collected in the 1972 Center for Political Studies election study, University of Michigan.

Table 4. Political Activity and Issue Voting (Percent)

Number of Participatory Acts	Non-Issue Voters	Easy-Issue Voters	Hard-Issue Voters	Constrained-Issue Voters
0	46.1	47.9	31.3	32.9
1	23.3	26.2	27.2	27.6
2	17.8	14.7	20.8	18.6
3 or more	12.8	11.2	20.8	20.9
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N =	(219)	(286)	(371)	(633)

Source: Computed from data collected in the 1972 Center for Political Studies election study, University of Michigan.

deviation from the predicted pattern, and that one was statistically insignificant. We turn now to a slight reconceptualization for a summary look at our findings.

The fourfold typology of issue voting can be easily broken down into the two dichotomous variables from which it was created.[6] We decompose it here for a summary analysis of the correlates of using easy issues (variable name "easy"), hard issues ("hard") or both. We do this to present the separable effects individually and to take advantage of the interval scales of two of the criterion variables. The third criterion, education, is recoded to the dichotomy, "high school or less" and "some college or more."

The quality of measurement shows its effect in the low correlations of Table 5, but the individual coefficients still tell a clear story. The correlations of variable "easy" with the three criteria are in all cases trivial, and in two cases go in a negative direction. Whether or not voters are predictable from a hard-issue position, on the other hand, is positively related to our sophistication criteria. To be predictable from a hard issue is to be somewhat better educated, better informed, and more active in politics than the average voter.

Partial correlations are displayed on the right side of Table 5. They speak to the question of which type of issue voting is associated with sophistication criteria for that large number of voters who are predictable from both hard and easy issues. The first-order partials are virtually identical to the zero-order correlations, an outcome that could have been predicted from the near-zero correlations of the "easy" dichotomy with the criterion variables.

In sum, not all "issue voting" indicates sophistication by these criteria; hard-issue voting does, easy-issue voting does not.

---

[6] Two separate tests are involved in the classification procedures (see Appendix B): (1) whether or not our easy issue contributed to prediction and (2) whether or not the hard issue contributed.

Table 5. Some Correlates of Easy- and Hard-Issue Voting

	Zero-Order Correlations Voter Dichotomies		Partial Correlations	
	"Easy"	"Hard"	"Easy" Controlling for "Hard"	"Hard" Controlling for "Easy"
Education (attended college)	–.045	.086*	–.051	.089*
Information (number of correct responses)	–.013	.207**	–.028	.209**
Activism (number of participatory acts)	.010	.153**	.000	.153**

Source: Computed from data collected in the 1972 Center for Political Studies election study, University of Michigan.

*$p < .01$
**$p < .001$

Political Inferences and the Easy-Issue Voter

Political analysts observe issue voting and infer sophistication. That inference is clearly problematic in view of our finding that there is a second type of issue voting that is not sophisticated at all. Indeed, as we have seen, easy-issue voting is found most frequently in the least-sophisticated portion of the electorate. Thus it is clear that issue voting, as it has been traditionally conceptualized and measured, overestimates the amount of sophisticated policy calculation going on in the electorate. This is the most direct implication of our findings. But the question of "how much" issue voting is only part of a larger theoretical quandary that begins with the questions "who?" "where?" and "when?" and ends with "what does it all mean?"

We have seen that some traditionally postulated correlates of issue voting are uncorrelated with easy-issue voting. When the easy-issue voters are included as issue voters, these relationships are weaker than they would be if only hard-issue voters were counted. This suggests that these indicators predict not issue voting per se, but sophisticated calculation (i.e., hard-issue voting). Other theoretically crucial correlates of issue voting would be expected to behave the same way.

Some of the meaning of issue voting can be found from studying *where* it occurs. A regional analysis of several recent elections would, for example, point to the South as the homeland of issue voting, an anomaly for current conceptions. The South, with its prevailing low educational levels and politics of one-party factionalism, is hardly the place to search for unusual sophistication in voting behavior. And indeed the South is not unusually sophisticated, because while it contains disproportionate numbers of issue voters, it has disproportionately few hard-issue voters. The difference, of course, lies in the large number of voters—at both ends of the spectrum—who respond only to our easy issue, race.

These findings also shed some light on the debate over whether the lack of issue voting observed in some times and places derives from inherent limitations of the citizen/voter or from inadequacies of choice offered by the political system. It may well be that the two conflicting theories each account for a different kind of issue voting. Sophisticated calculation requires both cognitive ability and attention to political life, neither of which is likely to vary much from year to year. We would expect a gently upward trend in sophisticated calculation over time from the upward trend in mean education level of the electorate. Easy-issue voting, on the other hand, requires neither cognitive ability nor attention to politics, and is free to vary with the availability of easy issues. When easy issues are present, as seems certainly to have been the case for the New Deal era and to a lesser extent, the post-1960 period, increases in issue voting are observed. When easy issues are absent, as in the 1950s, issue voting is considerably more modest because it is concentrated among hard issues.

This suggests that easy-issue voting may occur in waves or surges, as a response to the relatively rare occasions when parties engage in the hazardous behavior of staking out opposing positions on a deeply felt issue. The surge of easy-issue voting is not an encouraging phenomenon for those who would hinge the viability of democracy on the ability of citizens to choose rationally between alternative issue positions of parties and candidates. The surge in issue voting seems likely to occur on a large scale only when choices are simplistic. In light of this account, one should not be surprised that the authors of *The American Voter* (Campbell et al., 1960) did not discover high levels of issue voting for the 1952 and 1956 presidential elections. By that time the easy issues associated with the New Deal had declined in salience but had not yet been replaced by the emerging issue of race.[7] Nor are we surprised by the higher levels of issue voting that researchers have discovered in the post-1960 presidential elections. But the lion's share of this increase, we believe, is owing to the easy issue of race, not to hard issues. Increased issue voting therefore says little about the political sophistication of the American electorate.

Isolating the easy issue and the unsophisticated easy-issue voter is useful, finally, as a bridge between historical accounts of electoral realignment and the modern voting studies. The historical accounts specify a prominent role for the lowest common denominator of the mass electorate in the issue-based overthrow of old party systems. But association of issue voting with voter sophistication in the voting studies would predict that the unsophisticated would be the last to adjust their electoral behavior to an issue cleavage cutting across the party system. The emergence of the easy issue is a plausible resolution of this apparent dilemma. The crystallizing factor that precipitates realignments must, we believe, revolve around easy—not hard—issues. For only easy issues are salient enough over a long enough period to encourage parties to provide relatively clear and simple choices. And these are the only kinds of choices that provide parties the opportunity to change their minority or majority status, to become beneficiaries (or victims) of the unfolding realignment process. Hard issues, on the other hand, are too complicated and too subtle to provide a basis for a *major* reshuffling of party supporters. While their effects on the party system may be dramatic in the short term—as Vietnam was in 1972—their long-term impact is likely to be inconsequential.

---

[7] That all the early voting researchers had been exposed to the easy-issue politics of the New Deal period may well account for their shock at discovering such a limited role for issues in the post-New Deal period.

Appendix A. The Dimensions of Racial Attitudes: A Principal Factor Analysis (with Varimax Rotation)*

	Factor 1: Segregation/ Integration	Factor 2: Attitude toward Black Activists
Equal employment for blacks	.480	–.244
School integration	.535	–.268
Public accommodations	.577	–.137
Neighborhood integration	–.594	.037
School busing	.385	–.344
Aid for minorities	.459	–.391
Civil rights too fast	–.504	.335
Violence of blacks	–.478	.167
Blacks helped/hurt cause	.461	–.228
Preference for (de)segregation	.615	–.141
Preference for (de)segregated neighborhood	.460	–.211
Equivalence of intelligence	.399	–.098
Feeling thermometers		
Black militants	–.151	.791
Urban rioters	–.120	.776
Civil rights leaders	–.490	.528
Eigenvalue	5.16	1.42
(Percent explained variance)	(34.4)	(9.5)

Source: Computed from data collected in the 1972 Center for Political Studies election study, University of Michigan.

*The sample consists of 2191 respondents who were interviewed in both pre- and post-election waves.

Appendix B. The Issue-Voter Classification Procedure

The PROBIT function derived for all voters—the unstandardized equivalent of Table 1, but with "other" issues excluded, is:

$$Z_i = -.44752 - .41236P_i - .28587V_i + .03949R_i$$

where Z_i is the voting prediction for respondent i in standard form,
P_i is party identification,
V_i is Vietnam withdrawal attitude, and
R_i is racial desegregation attitude.

Three alternative predictions are then generated for each respondent by setting combinations of variable values to sample means to eliminate their contributions to prediction:

1. "Party Only" $Z_i = -.44752 - .41236P_i - .28587\bar{V} + .03949\bar{R}$.
2. "Party + Vietnam" $Z_i = -.44752 - .41236P_i - .28587V_i + .03949\bar{R}$.
3. "Party + Desegregation" $Z_i = -.44752 - .41236P_i - .28587\bar{V} + .03949R_i$.

The three predictions for each respondent are transformed into predictions of "probability of voting for McGovern" by a sub-routine that functions in a fashion analogous to examining "area to the left of z" in a table of areas under the normal curve. The resulting probabilities lie in the interval (0, 1) and, when aggregated, take on the characteristic "S" shape of cumulative probability density functions, but with an asymmetry that reflects the electorate's modal preference for Nixon.

Defining error as the absolute value of each of the three probabilities minus actual vote, we can then classify by whether or not specific issues contribute to error reduction. Error based on each of the three models can be represented as follows:

e_p is error from the "Party Only" model,
e_v is error from the "Party + Vietnam" model, and
e_r is error from the "Party + Desegregation" model.

The sequence of steps used to classify respondents into the four issue-voter types can then be depicted by the following flowchart:


Is e_r less than e_p?
No
Is e_v less than e_p?
No
Yes
Yes
Respondent is non-issue voter
Is e_v less than e_p?
No
Yes
Respondent is hard-issue voter
Respondent is constrained-issue voter
Respondent is easy-issue voter

References

Aldrich, John, and Charles Cnudde (1975). "Probing the Bounds of Conventional Wisdom: A Comparison of Regression, Probit, and Discriminant Analysis." *American Journal of Political Science* 19: 571–608.

Berelson, Bernard R., Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee (1954). *Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Election.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Boyd, Richard W. (1972). "Popular Control of Public Policy: A Normal Vote Analysis of the 1968 Election." *American Political Science Review* 66: 429–49.

Brody, Richard A., and Benjamin I. Page (1972). "Comment: The Assessment of Policy Voting." *American Political Science Review* 66: 450–58.

Broh, C. Anthony (1973). *Toward a Theory of Issue Voting.* Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage.

Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes (1960). *The American Voter.* New York: Wiley.

Converse, Philip E. (1975). "Public Opinion and Voting Behavior." In Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (eds.), *Handbook of Political Science,* Vol. 4. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.

———, Warren E. Miller, Jerrold G. Rusk, and Arthur G. Wolfe (1969). "Continuity and Change in American Politics: Parties and Issues in the 1968 Election." *American Political Science Review* 63: 1083–1105.

Davis, Otto A., Melvin J. Hinich and Peter Ordeshook (1970). "An Expository Development of a Mathematical Model of the Electoral Process." *American Political Science Review* 64: 426–48.

Downs, Anthony (1957). *An Economic Theory of Democracy.* New York: Harper and Row.

Frohlich, Norman, Joe A. Oppenheimer, Jeffrey Smith and Oran R. Young (1978). "A Test of Downsian Voter Rationality: 1964 Presidential Voting." *American Political Science Review* 72: 178–97.

Greenstein, Fred I. (1970). *The American Party System and the American People,* 2nd ed. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

Kessel, John H. (1972). "Comment: The Issues in

Issue Voting." *American Political Science Review* 66: 459–65.

Key, V. O., Jr. (1961). *Public Opinion and American Democracy*. New York: Knopf.

——— (1966). *The Responsible Electorate: Rationality in Presidential Voting, 1936–1960.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Margolis, Michael (1977). "From Confusion to Confusion: Issues and the American Voter (1956–1972)." *American Political Science Review* 71: 31–43.

McKelvey, Richard D., and William Zavoina (1975). "A Statistical Model for the Analysis of Ordinal Dependent Variables." *Journal of Mathematical Sociology* 4: 103–20.

Miller, Arthur H., Warren E. Miller, Alden S. Raine, and Thad H. Brown (1973). "A Majority Party in Disarray: Policy Polarization in the 1972 Election." Presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans.

——— (1976). "A Majority Party in Disarray: Policy Polarization in the 1972 Election." *American Political Science Review* 70: 753–78.

Nie, Norman, Sidney Verba, and John R. Petrocik (1976). *The Changing American Voter.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Page, Benjamin I. (1978). *Choices and Echoes in Presidential Elections: Rational Man and Electoral Democracy.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

———, and Richard A. Brody (1972). "Policy Voting and the Electoral Process: The Vietnam Issue." *American Political Science Review* 66: 979–88.

Pomper, Gerald (1972). "From Confusion to Clarity: Issues and American Voters, 1956–1968." *American Political Science Review* 66: 415–28.

Prewitt, Kenneth, and Norman H. Nie (1971). "Election Studies of the Survey Research Center." *British Journal of Political Science* 1: 479–502.

Repass, David E. (1971). "Issue Salience and Party Choice." *American Political Science Review* 65: 389–400.

Rosenstone, Steven J., and Raymond Wolfinger (1978). "The Effect of Registration Laws on Voting Turnout." *American Political Science Review* 72: 22–45.

Sears, David O., Carl P. Hensler, and Leslie K. Speer (1979). "Whites' Opposition to 'Busing': Self-Interest or Symbolic Politics?" *American Political Science Review* 73: 369–84.

Steeper, Frederick T., and Robert M. Teeter (1976). "Comment on 'A Majority Party in Disarray.'" *American Political Science Review* 70: 806–13.

Stimson, James A., and Edward G. Carmines (1977). "The Continuing Issue in American Politics." Presented at the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, New Orleans.

Verba, Sidney, and Richard A. Brody (1970). "Participation, Policy Preferences, and the War in Vietnam." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 34: 325–32.

Wright, Gerald C. (1976). "Linear Models for Evaluating Conditional Relationships." *American Journal of Political Science* 20: 349–73.

Opinion Representation versus Social Representation; or, Why Women Can't Run as Women and Win

JERRY PERKINS
Texas Tech

DIANE L. FOWLKES
Georgia State University

This article, by employing voting simulations in a survey of party activists, examines responses to a woman's claim to party office on the basis of her sex. The degree of acceptance of this claim, or the willingness to grant what is called social representation, is contrasted with the respondents' inclinations to select candidates favorable to women's rights, or the willingness to grant what is called opinion representation. Variations in responses to the two simulations are analyzed in terms of attitudes toward gender roles, government intervention and the legitimacy of groups in the political process. Voting in the simulation involving opinion representation can best be understood in terms of the respondent's attitude toward government intervention, while the simulation involving social representation activates the attitude toward groups. Discussion of the findings focuses on the dilemma of group claims for minority representation in a liberal democratic context and the need for better understanding of attitudes toward groups among political elites.

Although classic liberal notions stressing the rights of individuals predominate in American political thought, groups have always been important in American political behavior. Blacks and women, for example, have made demands on their own behalf for government action to right wrongs and inequities from which they suffer because of discrimination on the basis of group characteristics. In their pursuit of social and economic justice, disadvantaged groups have recognized that gaining decision-making roles in the political process itself is one of the payoffs of concerted action. Thus, claims for participatory rights and for the recognition of group characteristics in representative bodies are widely heard. Campaigns to increase the numbers of blacks or women in political office have been mounted. The purposes of these campaigns are twofold. First, there is the argument that only blacks or women can truly represent the opinions of their own groups. While this claim is based on the assumption that group representatives accurately portray the opinions of other group members, evidence from the 1972 national party conventions (Kirkpatrick, 1975) undermines the argument. There is, however, a second dimension of the problem. As Robert Goodin (1977) argues, the representation of groups by their own members has "symbolic" or "image-based" value for the groups in question. Members of minority groups or residents of a geographic community might prefer to have their own kind in representative roles in numbers proportionate to the group's numbers in the population, because such participation not only allows that group's voters to identify with "their" representatives but also holds out the possibility of political careers for some group members. Whatever the motivations of voters, the desire for group representation might exist apart from assumptions about similarity of opinion between group members and their leaders. In effect, there may be *social,* as opposed to *opinion,* bases for representation.[1]

The argument over social representation in

The authors share equal credit and are listed in reverse alphabetical order. We gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Sue Tolleson Rinehart and helpful comments from Kirk Elifson and from anonymous referees for this *Review.* The first-named coauthor also acknowledges the relevance for this research effort of his attendance at the 1976 American Political Science Association seminar on representation. The participants in the seminar—particularly Robert Goodin and the seminar directors, Harvey Mansfield, Jr., and Robert Scigliano—provided a valuable setting for thinking about democratic representation, although they bear no responsibility for any shortcomings in this research. The study was funded by a Georgia State University Urban Life Grant.

[1] On "descriptive" forms of representation see Pitkin (1967, Ch. 4). We have termed two forms of Pitkin's descriptive representation *social* and *opinion,* following the distinctions noted by Greenstone and Peterson (1973, p. 167). For an application of Pitkin's concepts to party reform in the United States, see Ranney (1975, pp. 111–45).

liberal democratic society is very suggestive for the analyst of behavior in political parties. In general, some political party activists may be more receptive than others to the demands for officers who represent certain social groupings. In particular there may exist a "group dimension" in the attitudinal set of party activists that accords legitimacy to an individual's group-based claim for political office. That is, some party activists may believe that any individual member of a group should have the right to participate in the political process for purposes of representing the group solely in terms of group type, other considerations notwithstanding. This article is an exploratory first look at attitudes that encourage or deny the social representation of women. It first identifies three attitudes among party activists that should have relevance for the activists' willingness to elect representatives who stand on a group-based claim. Second, responses of the party members to two fictitious voting situations are presented as evidence on the activists' willingness to provide social and opinion representation for women. Finally, the three attitudes are used as explanatory variables for the simulated voting choices.

Attitudinal Constraints on the Representation of Women

Our primary working hypothesis is that the more willing party activists are to accord legitimacy to groups in the political process, the more likely they will be to vote for a woman who runs for elective office on the issue of increasing the number of women in political positions. This hypothesis is derived from the normative debate over group-based quotas. The argument can be seen in part as one wherein defenders of classic liberal philosophy reject movement away from individualism in the construction of representative rules (Goodin, 1977). Individualism, in terms of representation, is taken here to mean the opposite of preestablished group representation along any lines. One might expect that those party members who adhere to the individualistic ethic will not support appeals by women to elect representatives of their group, i.e., social representatives. While party members who acknowledge the legitimacy of groups would be expected to be receptive to appeals for the social representation of women, actual support for women candidates may be conditioned by the party activists' attitudes toward the specific group in question. Just as attitude toward blacks may affect the election of a member of this minority group quite apart from a black candidate's stand on issues, views on the proper place of women may condition and shape the debate over the election of women. The assumption behind our research is that those holding traditional views of gender roles will be less inclined to support a woman than those believing that there should be no role differences between the sexes.

We also expect that classic liberal attitudes about the legitimacy of group claims by individuals in the political process will be related to other more modern usages of ideological terms. The current usage of ideological terms is complex and such terms may have multiple meanings,[2] but one central component of the liberal-conservative cleavage is closely related to the question of groups in the political process: the use of government to intervene on the behalf of underprivileged groups. Government can directly benefit disadvantaged groups by redistributive policies or regulation of the socioeconomic environment. Modern liberals normally would approve of such intervention, while conservatives normally would not. Modern liberalism, encompassing the idea of redistributive and/or regulatory effects of government policy, can be distinguished from classic liberal assumptions about the rules of the political process that elevate individuals to policy-making positions. While the two dimensions may be related, we proceed on the assumption that they are conceptually different ideas. Thus we assume that one involved in politics might take the modern liberal stance that government should be more active in assisting women (e.g., provision of day-care centers) but might simultaneously reject rules that guarantee representative seats or political careers to women. Conversely, one might be conservative when it comes to policy favoring women yet support the notion that women should be involved in the political process. While these combinations may prove to be atypical, they illustrate the conceptual distinctions undergirding our research.[3]

---

[2] Changing ideological and issue currents are discussed widely, but for a relatively comprehensive overview of ideology since the New Deal as it relates to party coalitions, see Ladd with Hadley (1978); see also the issue and attitude group analysis of Miller and Levitin (1976).

[3] Whereas other researchers have examined how differing expectations for and evaluations of the *sexes* affect voting at the mass level for women running against men (e.g., Adams, 1975; Mend, Bell and Bath, 1976; Gitelson and Gitelson, 1977), we are focusing on another set of expectations applied to candidates

Methodology

Data. It is difficult, if not impossible, to present complex philosophical notions about representation to respondents in survey research and expect them to evaluate these ideas in ways that can be meaningfully quantified. Instead of posing philosophical questions, we approached the problem by placing party activists, our respondents, in a simulated-choice situation, a situation which reflects the practical dilemmas associated with choosing representatives in everyday politics. As part of a larger study of party activists in a southern metropolitan area,[4] the respondents were asked to choose between a man and a woman running for higher party office. As will be noted in the following illustration of the simulation there are no differences between the candidates save sex, and the woman bases her claim to office on the fact of her sex. The situation was presented in these words:

> I have two fictitious situations in which people are contesting for party office. I will give you some information on each and ask you which candidates you would vote for if the situation were a real one. [Let us assume that] a man and a woman are candidates for a high state party position. *They do not differ on any* issues; both are moderate on legislation related to equal rights for women. The only difference is that the female candidate says far more women must be in politics regardless of their political beliefs. She says in this contest there are no differences except for the fact of her sex, and she should be elected because she is a woman. Her male opponent says nothing of his sex. Which would you vote for, Candidate A, the woman who says more women should be in office, or Candidate B, the man who says nothing of his sex?

The question was deliberately presented in a rather bald way. The woman could have run without mentioning gender, but we wanted to raise explicitly the point that she is making a group-based claim, not simply that she is a woman running against a man. We are not contending that the rational woman candidate would in reality make such claims. And as the results will suggest, there may be good reason not to emphasize one's sex.[5]

While the idea of social representation is central to our theoretical concern, we presented another simulation for comparative purposes. This choice controlled for sex and allowed a selection on the basis of the respondent's position on women's equality:

> [Let us assume that] the only known difference between two *male* candidates for a high state party office is that one man is for working to achieve equal rights for women across a wide range of specific areas, while the other man tends to be opposed to most equal rights legislation. Which would you choose, Candidate A, who is for equal rights, or Candidate B, who tends to oppose equal rights legislation?

In this simulation, government policy and hence opinion representation rather than social representation is the crucial issue. In line with what we have said earlier, one might expect that the party activists' ideological attitude about government involvement will be a better predictor of the choice in this simulation than attitude about the legitimacy of groups. The reverse should obtain in the other voting choice. Attitude about gender roles should affect choices in both simulations with those favoring nontraditional roles for women more likely to choose both the candidate supporting equal rights and the woman candidate.

The survey instrument measured the three attitudinal dimensions. The attitude about modern liberalism versus conservatism was measured by asking how respondents identified themselves ideologically and by a series of questions about how far the government should become involved in social and economic problems. The responses came from a group of questions presented as follows:

---

for office, those concerning norms of *representation.* In our research, the concern with how gender role expectations affect voting intersects the concern with how representation norms affect voting in an elite population. In effect, we are not concerned simply with women running against men (Darcy and Schramm, 1977; Karnig and Walter, 1976); our emphasis is on women who run and promote the idea of increased social representation for women.

[4] The data employed here are drawn from interviews with 286 precinct-level officials in Democratic and Republican party organizations in DeKalb and Fulton Counties, Georgia. The research, which was carried out in January through April of 1977, is more fully described in a previous article (Fowlkes, Perkins and Tolleson Rinehart, 1979).

[5] It is true, of course, that in the absence of an alternative form of the simulation where the woman makes no group-based claim, we cannot say with certainty that she loses votes as a result of her claim. It is not the purpose here to test varous simulation question formats, but the differential effect of candidate strategy is an important question for other research.

> As you know, government resources can be spent in several areas. On this card, we have listed several general policy areas. In each instance just tell me whether you think government ought to spend more time and money, less, or continue to spend the same as now: insuring that minority groups get fair and equal treatment,[6] protecting consumer rights, improving the economic position of the poor, making sure that industry doesn't damage the environment, providing health care to those that can't afford it, solving the problems of central cities and making sure corporations don't engage in monopolistic practices.

In order not to confuse this attitude with the attitude toward the legitimacy of groups, both of which have ideological overtones, we will call this set of items *government intervention.*

The attitude about gender roles, termed *gender role attitude* for purposes of discussion, was measured by the following ten items selected from the attitudes-toward-women scale outlined by Janet Spence and Robert Helmreich (1972):

> Women should worry less about their rights and more about becoming good wives and mothers.
>
> Women are all right in politics, but we shouldn't forget that women's most important roles are those of mother and homemaker.
>
> Under modern economic conditions with women being active outside the home, men should share in household tasks such as washing dishes and doing the laundry.
>
> A woman should not expect to go to exactly the same places or to have quite the same freedom of action as a man.
>
> Women with children should confine their political activities to voluntary work at the local level.
>
> There are some professions and types of business that are more suitable for men than women.
>
> A woman shouldn't get seriously involved in a political career until her children are grown.
>
> A wife should make every effort to minimize irritation and inconvenience to the male head of the family.
>
> Office holding among women should be limited to their local communities.
>
> Women with children should not work outside the home if they don't have to financially.

Because the existing literature does not provide scales on elite attitudes about group legitimacy, the construction of our scale on this dimension was of necessity more exploratory than the construction of the other two attitude scales. A set of items we thought suitable for measuring attitudes toward various aspects of group-based political behavior were pre-tested on a small group of respondents.[7] We included in the survey five items that produced the greatest variation in response and the highest inter-item correlations. The items were:

> The political process would be improved if we gave more official recognition to the existence of interested groups.
>
> There's too many people in politics representing this or that group.
>
> Individual characteristics should always—without exception—count more than group membership in politics.
>
> Party conventions should allocate seats proportionate to the various groups that compose the party.
>
> It is irritating to have someone demand attention because they represent a group—no matter how worthy the purpose of a group.

This set of items will be termed *group attitude* for purposes of discussion.

Models of Acceptance. Path analysis (Duncan, 1966; Stokes, 1971) provided the method for assessing the relative effects of the three attitudes on party activists' willingness to accept women candidates as social representatives of women. The models to be tested are displayed in Figure 1; they specify the paths representing the hypothesized effects of the explanatory variables on the dependent variables. The same independent and intervening variables are entered in both models, one of which has as the dependent variable choosing between the woman and the man and the other containing as dependent the choice between two men who differ on the question of equal rights for women.

In model 1A *group attitude* is hypothesized to have a positive effect with those scoring high (pro-group) on the scale more likely to select the woman than those scoring low (anti-group). In 1A the path between *government intervention* and the dependent variable is omitted, designating the hypothesis that attitude toward government intervention is irrelevant in this choice. We expected the opposite effects in model 1B where *group attitude* becomes irrelevant and liberalism is expected to be positively related to selecting the equal rights candidate.

---

[6] A similar item in this series regarding fair and equal treatment for women appeared in the questionnaire but was left out of the scale in order to avoid inflating any relationship between the scale and the vote on the simulations.

[7] We used a group of political scientists and politically aware non-party community activists in the pre-test because our research design called for interviewing the universe of political party officials and we did not want to contaminate our data base.

The third attitude scale, *gender role attitude*, is expected to be related to both dependent variables. Activists scoring high (i.e., rejecting traditional roles) are expected to choose both the equal rights candidate and the woman, an expectation that is based on the assumption that all questions about political women are rooted in part in how the sexes are viewed culturally (cf. Mezey, 1978a; Gitelson and Gitelson, 1977; Mend, Bell and Bath, 1976).

Sex and party are included in both models as background variables, but any relationship between sex and party remains unexamined in the models. The effects of party are expected to be indirect, flowing through the three attitudes so that Democrats more than Republicans should be liberal, feminist and pro-group. The impact of sex is more problematic. Since existing studies have found few differences between the sexes in opinions that could be ordered on the modern liberal-conservative dimension (e.g., Jennings and Thomas, 1968), the path between the sex and *government intervention* variables is omitted in both models. The indirect paths through the two remaining attitudes, however, are included for sex. In the same way that many blacks have achieved group consciousness (e.g., Aberbach and Walker, 1973), women party activists may have begun to be more sensitive to and accepting of the notion of "women as a minority group" (Hacker, 1951). Thus, they may be somewhat more supportive than men of groups in the political process. Additionally, the women activists are expected more than men to approve of nontraditional gender roles.

Findings

Addressing first the results of the voting simulations, we find in Table 1 that in terms of the overall distribution of votes, the two contests produce vastly different results. By an almost two-to-one margin, the male standing for equal rights defeats his male opponent. The opposite results obtain in the case of the "woman running as a woman."

The simulation results displayed in Table 1 are likely the result of the rather direct approach by the woman who wanted more women in the party hierarchy. Such an interpretation is supported by some of the comments of the respondents. One observed, "I could have voted for her, if she had not mentioned sex." Another said that "people shouldn't stand up and talk about what they are—they should talk about the issues." Presumably, the individual making the latter statement does not recognize as an issue the under-representation of women. Comments like these are suggestive of the larger concern of this article. Both of the individuals quoted voted for the more feminist of the two male candidates while casting a vote against the woman on the social representation question. Thus they support the idea of government intervention on behalf of women, but they reject group-based appeals by women who attempt to represent their group in the political process.

Table 1 illustrates that the pattern of the two individuals cited above is in fact the modal response pattern. Those favoring equal rights by means of their vote but opposing the woman constitute 38 percent of the total. The least likely outcome is that a respondent opposes equal rights and favors the woman, a combination representing eight percent of the total. The two votes, while quite obviously representing different dimensions, nonetheless are related slightly (r = .19). There is an overall tendency for those choosing the male candidate who is pro-equal rights to be more supportive of the woman candidate than those choosing the man who says enough has been done for women.

Turning to the question of attitudinal antecedents of the simulation choices, we observe that the three expected attitude clusters emerge from a factor analysis (see Table 2).[8] Gender

---

[8] Principal component factor analysis was employed; one analysis called for varimax rotation while another called for an oblique solution. In each case, whether beginning with the assumption that the three attitude dimensions were orthogonal (independent of one another) or not orthogonal (related to one another), the three attitudes emerged as the first three dimensions in the analysis. The varimax solution is presented in Table 2. One other dimension emerged representing a further combination of a few items. This dimension was not theoretically meaningful and was not considered in subsequent analysis. The computer program employed is described by Kim (1975).

A caution about the possibility of a "methods effect" on the factor analysis should be mentioned. Different types of questionnaire items can produce different factors. In the case at hand, the government intervention items are derived from questions that vary in format from all other questions. Two aspects, however, militate against assuming that the factors are the result of method alone. First, the gender role factor and the group attitude factor are based on the same agree-disagree question format. Second, the respondent's ideological self-identification is derived from a question type (i.e., "do you generally think of yourself as. . . ?") different from the other government intervention items, yet it loads highly with them on the government intervention factor.

A. SOCIAL REPRESENTATION: CHOOSING BETWEEN THE WOMAN AND MAN


Government Intervention
X_3
R_u
Sex
X_1
Gender Roles
X_4
R_v
Social Representation
X_6
R_z
Party
X_2
Group Attitude
X_5
R_w

B. EQUAL RIGHTS: CHOOSING BETWEEN THE TWO MEN


Government Intervention
X_3
R_u
Sex
X_1
Gender Roles
X_4
R_v
Equal Rights
X_6
R_z
Party
X_2
Group Attitude
X_5
R_w

Source: Developed by the authors.

*Single-headed straight arrows (solid lines) represent hypothesized effects; dotted lines represent effects hypothesized to be zero. Double-headed curvilinear arrows represent unhypothesized/unanalyzed relationships.

Figure 1. Hypothesized Models for Simulated Voting Choices: Social Representation of Women and Equal Rights for Women*

role variables combine to form factor 1, which is labeled *gender roles.* Factor 2, labeled *government intervention,* includes the indicators of government intervention in various areas and the respondent's self-identification as liberal or conservative. Four attitudes toward group legitimacy load on a third factor, which is assigned the label *group attitude.* The fifth group attitude item was not significantly related to the factor and subsequently was dropped from the analysis.

It is clear that factor 3, while meeting the minimum criterion for inclusion, is the weakest of the three attitude sets. Both the eigenvalue and percentage of variance are low for *group attitude.* Additionally, the "recognition of groups" item has a loading on factor 2 that is almost as high as its loading on factor 3. Nevertheless, the overall factor pattern is fairly distinct. Factor scores were generated for each of the three attitudinal dimensions,[9] and the resultant scores, along with sex and party, were used in the path analyses of both simulation choices.

The major results in explaining the two voting choices are the minimal effects of *gender role attitude* and the relative influence of *government intervention* and *group attitude* (see Figures 2 and 3). In Figure 2 it can be observed that *group attitude* is more important than *government intervention* in the selection between the woman and the man, although both attitudes have influence. Pro-group sentiment and liberalism are positively related to choosing the woman, while *gender role attitude* has no significant effects. In the other simulation (see Figure 3), in which respondents were asked to choose between two men, *government intervention* emerges as a strong predictor, and *gender role attitude* also has some influence. Liberals and feminists are more likely to select the pro-women's rights candidate. *Group attitude* drops to insignificance in this case, as predicted.

The direct effects of sex and party on both votes are very weak. Figures 2 and 3 show that only indirectly does either have any impact. Women more than men are prone to take a feminist stance, but this path is weak. Party is the one variable with any explanatory power via indirect links with the dependent variables. Party is strongly linked to *government intervention* and less strongly linked to *gender roles* and *group attitude.* In all three cases Democrats more than Republicans are liberal, feminist and pro-group. It is evident that the total indirect effects of party are considerably more substantial in both vote simulations than any direct effects of party membership.

The overall predictive power of the attitudinal variables in the two simulations is to be contrasted. A relatively small amount of the variance (18 percent) is accounted for in the choice between the woman and the man, while a substantially higher amount of variance (41 percent) is explained in the second simulation. The rather substantial contribution of government intervention in the equal rights vote would appear to be the primary source of difference in the two votes. Nevertheless, the fact that the group attitude scale performed as

Table 1. The Relationship between Responses to the Two Voting Simulations, by Total Percentages

	Vote for:		
Vote for:	The Woman	The Man	Row Total
Pro-Equal Rights Candidate	26	38	64%
Anti-Equal Rights Candidate	8	28	36%
Column Total	34%	66%	100%
			(N = 266)
Pearson's $r = .19$			

Source: Computations from survey data in the Fowlkes-Perkins study of Atlanta area party members, January-April, 1977.

---

[9] Separate principal component factor analyses were performed for the sets of items for each attitude. Because only one factor was involved for each analysis, no rotations were required. These factor analyses provided the weights for each standardized item as each set of items was summed for its respective scale. The reliability of each scale in terms of internal consistency is indicated by the emergence of separate dimensions in the factor analysis reported in Table 2 and by the percent of variance in a particular set of items explained by the one dimension in each separate factor analysis. For group attitude, 39 percent of the variance is explained. For attitude toward government involvement, 49 percent of the variance is explained. For attitude toward women, 46 percent of the variance is explained.


Government Intervention
X_3
.80
R_u
Sex
X_1
.601
-.164
.308
Gender Roles
X_4
.94
R_v
Party
X_2
-.235
Group Attitude
X_5
.97
R_w
.203
.280
Social Representation
X_6
.91
R_z

Independent/ Intervening Variables	Direct Effects On				Indirect Effects On Social Representation Through		
	Government Intervention	Gender Roles	Group Attitude	Social Representation	Government Intervention	Gender Roles	Group Attitude
Sex[b]	(-.044)	-.164	(-.019)	(-.086)	-.009	-.010	-.005
Party[c]	.601	.308	.235	(-.027)	.122	.018	.066
Government Intervention	-	-	-	.203	-	-	-
Gender Roles	-	-	-	(.059)	-	-	-
Group Attitude	-	-	-	.280	-	-	-
	R^2=.36	R^2=.12	R^2=.06	R^2=.18			

Source: Computations from survey data in the Fowlkes-Perkins Study of Atlanta Area Party Members, January-April, 1977.

[a] Direct effects are indicated by standardized partial regression (path) coefficients. Only those paths significantly greater than zero at the .01 level are included in the model. The path analysis is based on the following correlation matrix:

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Sex	—					
2. Party	.049	—				
3. Government Intervention	-.014	.599	—			
4. Gender Roles	-.149	.300	.213	—		
5. Group Attitude	-.008	.234	.356	.218	—	
6. Social Representation	-.101	.174	.301	.168	.360	—

[b] Sex is coded male = 1, female = 0.

[c] Party is coded Democratic = 1, Republican = 0.

Figure 2. Effects[a] of Three Attitude Dimensions, Sex and Party in the Social Representation Simulation: Choosing Between the Woman and the Man


Government Intervention
X_3
.80
R_u
Sex
X_1
.601
-.164
.477
Gender Roles
X_4
.262
Equal Rights
X_6
.77
R_7
.308
.94
R_v
Party
X_2
-.235
Group Attitude
X_5
.97
R_w

Independent/ Intervening Variables	Direct Effects On Government Intervention	Gender Roles	Group Attitude	Equal Rights	Indirect Effects On Equal Rights Through Government Intervention	Gender Roles	Group Attitude
Sex[b]	(-.044)	-.164	(-.019)	(.003)	-.092	-.043	-.001
Party[c]	.601	.308	.235	(.060)	.287	.081	.005
Government Intervention	-	-	-	.477	-	-	-
Gender Roles	-	-	-	.262	-	-	-
Group Attitude	-	-	-	(.020)	-	-	-
	R^2=.36	R^2=.12	R^2=.06	R^2=.41			

Source: Computations from survey data in the Fowlkes-Perkins Study of Atlanta Area Party Members, January-April, 1977.

[a] Direct effects are indicated by standardized partial regression (path) coefficients. Only those paths significantly greater than zero at the .01 level are included in the model. The path analysis is based on the following correlation matrix:

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Sex	––					
2. Party	.049	––				
3. Government Intervention	–.014	.599	––			
4. Gender Roles	–.149	.300	.213	––		
5. Group Attitude	–.008	.234	.356	.218	––	
6. Equal Rights	–.040	.429	.576	.386	.261	––

[b] Sex is coded male = 1, female = 0.

[c] Party is coded Democratic = 1, Republican = 0.

Figure 3. Effects[a] of Three Attitude Dimensions, Sex and Party in the Equal Rights Simulation: Choosing Between the Two Men

hypothesized, by encouraging a vote for a social representative, provides an incentive to devote more study to this apparently overlooked attitude in political behavior research.

Summary and Conclusions

In summary, we have defined and measured three attitudes that differentially influence party activists' willingness to support candidates running for high party office on the issues of equal rights for women and putting more women in office. The attitude toward government intervention affects both the choice involving equal rights for women and the choice involving the candidate's sex. The attitude toward gender roles is of secondary importance in the choice involving equal rights but has no impact on the choice between the man and the woman. The attitude toward the legitimacy of groups in the political process is related only to the choice between the sexes. The results suggest that the two simulations activate different attitude dimensions, with attitude toward government intervention declining in importance where the question is one of social representation. Attitude toward gender roles is washed out in the fact of a choice between the sexes that activates instead an attitude about the legitimacy of groups in the political process. Of the two individual characteristics—sex and party—only party is important. While the mediated effect of party on voting for the candidate supporting equal rights for women, through the

Table 2. Factor Matrix for Three Attitude Dimensions

	Factors		
Items*	Gender Roles	Government Intervention	Group Attitude
1. Politics would be improved with more recognition of groups.	−.10	.26	.35
2. Too many people represent groups.	.27	.07	.73
3. Individual characteristics are more important than groups.	−.13	.09	.42
4. It is irritating when someone demands attention because they represent a group.	.15	.11	.72
5. Women should worry less about their rights. . . .	.73	.26	.04
6. Women's most important roles are mother and homemaker.	.72	.11	−.03
7. Men should share in household tasks. . . .	.46	.11	−.08
8. A woman shouldn't expect . . . same freedom . . . as man.	.68	.07	.06
9. Women with children should limit themselves to local level.	.77	−.12	−.02
10. Some businesses are more suitable for men than women.	.60	.13	.22
11. A woman shouldn't get . . . involved in political career until children are grown.	.72	−.01	.04
12. A wife should . . . minimize irritation . . . to male head of family.	.61	.08	−.05
13. Office holding among women should be limited to local community.	.65	.07	.02
14. Women with children shouldn't work outside home if they don't have to. . . .	.76	−.02	.10
15. Government should spend more, less or same time and money on: ensuring equal treatment for minorities;	.08	.77	.18
16. protecting consumer rights;	.10	.67	.13
17. improving economic position of poor;	.01	.76	.18
18. making sure industry doesn't damage environment;	.08	.61	.02
19. providing health care to those who can't afford it;	−.03	.73	.14
20. solving problems of central cities;	.10	.55	.33
21. limiting monopolistic practices among corporations.	.07	.57	−.20
22. I think of myself as liberal/conservative.	.26	.76	.12
Eigenvalue	5.57	3.53	1.35
Percent of Variance	25.3	16.0	6.1

Source: Computations from survey data in the Fowlkes-Perkins study of Atlanta area party members, January-April, 1977.

*Items are abbreviated; for full wording, see the text. Some item responses were reverse-coded to be consistent with the other items in a set.

attitude toward government intervention, is particularly evident, party indirectly affects the vote in both simulations.

The most important part of our study highlights the potential impact of an attitude about groups in the political process on choosing social representatives. From an attitudinal point of view, the existence of such an attitude is suggested but by no means firmly established by this analysis. The limited number of items constituting the group attitude scale is part of the problem, as is the restriction of the application to the election of only one social type, women, in the elite population. In addition, real-world situations seldom present such a clear, unambiguous cue for the activation of group legitimacy attitudes. Situations exist, however, in which elements of an attitude allowing individuals with certain characteristics to represent their group may be important, particularly in the context of reform activities surrounding affirmative action endeavors in party politics and other settings.

From a broader perspective of democratic theory, this research points to a dilemma for individuals of minority-group status who are attempting to achieve recognition for their group in the context of the liberal tradition. On the one hand, the evolution of thought and practice in the twentieth century has given a certain legitimacy to the idea of providing collective goods to various groups. There are, of course, disagreements over who deserves these benefits, but "interest group liberalism," as Theodore Lowi (1979) terms it, is a relatively well-established doctrine. On the other hand, norms about the determinative elements of choosing leaders are still by and large dominated by individualist notions of classic liberal thought.[10] These norms preclude consideration of individual members of groups that unjustly are identified on the basis of certain physical characteristics and are accorded inferior status. Social representation for minorities cannot be claimed overtly by individuals of minority status in the face of such individualist norms. Thus appeals to represent the *opinions* of this or that group are common campaign offerings, but claims to represent *social* characteristics of one's group apparently are recognized to be doomed to failure and are relatively uncommon. The result is policy-making bodies that may be representative of opinions but not of population characteristics.

While the majority of elite opinion probably does reject individual claims to represent minority social groupings of the population, there is at least a small segment that is tolerant of such claims. This variance in response to claims for social representation deserves further study, as do the larger implications of social representation. To this point, much of the academic literature has a built-in liberal bias in that, for example, demographic characteristics of primary voters are thought to be unimportant unless some attitudinal or interest correlations with the various groups are illustrated.[11] It is obvious, however, that apart from issues, social composition can be important to voters as well as to group leaders. A sense of identity with community can be enhanced for women and minorities by social representation. Further, increased social representation means increased opportunities for participation in decision making by members of presently under-represented groups. And increased opportunities at the decision-making level translate into political career opportunities for greater numbers of individual women and minorities.

References

Aberbach, Joel D., and Jack L. Walker (1971). *Race in the City*. Boston: Little, Brown.

Adam, William C. (1975). "Candidate Characteristics, Office of Election, and Voter Responses." *Experimental Study of Politics* 4: 76–88.

Darcy, R., and Sarah Slavin Schramm (1977). "When Women Run Against Men." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 41: 1–12.

Duncan, Otis Dudley (1966). "Path Analysis: Sociological Examples." *American Journal of Sociology* 72: 1–16.

Fowlkes, Diane L., Jerry Perkins and Sue Tolleson Rinehart (1979). "Gender Roles and Party Roles." *American Political Science Review* 73: 772–80.

Gitelson, Alan R., and Idy B. Gitelson (1977). "Adolescents' Attitudes toward Male and Female Political Candidates." *Experimental Study of Politics* 6: 31–58.

---

[10] See the discussion of Mansfield and Scigliano (1978, pp. 25–63). There are, of course, exceptions to the liberal rule. The long-standing practice of the parties to have a committeeman and a committeewoman from the states would be illustrative. Also see Goodin's (1977) comments on the system of geographic representation.

[11] See, for example, Ranney's (1968) contention that demographics are less important than issues in the primary representativeness question. The literature on women in politics also attempts to ascertain what interests or opinions might be differently represented by women politicians. See, for example, Mezey (1978b) and Lee (1976).

Goodin, Robert E. (1977). "Convention Quotas and Communal Representation." *British Journal of Political Science* 7: 255–61.

Greenstone, J. David, and Paul E. Peterson (1973). *Race and Authority in Urban Politics.* New York: Russell Sage.

Hacker, Helen Mayer (1951). "Women as a Minority Group." *Social Forces* 30: 60–69.

Jennings, M. Kent, and Norman Thomas (1968). "Men and Women in Party Elites: Social Roles and Political Resources." *Midwest Journal of Political Science* 12: 469–92.

Karnig, Albert B., and B. Oliver Walter (1976). "Election of Women to City Councils." *Social Science Quarterly* 56: 605–13.

Kim, Jae-On (1975). "Factor Analysis." In Norman H. Nie, et al., *Statistical Package for the Social Sciences,* 2nd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Kirkpatrick, Jeane J. (1975). "Representation in the American National Conventions: The Case of 1972." *British Journal of Political Science* 5: 265–322.

Ladd, Everett Carl, Jr. with Charles D. Hadley (1978). *Transformations of the American Party System: Political Coalitions from the New Deal to the 1970s,* 2nd ed. New York: Norton.

Lee, Marcia Manning (1976). "Why Few Women Hold Public Office: Democracy and Sexual Roles." *Political Science Quarterly* 91: 297–313.

Lowi, Theodore J. (1979). *The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States,* 2nd ed. New York: Norton.

Mansfield, Harvey C., Jr., and Robert Scigliano (1978). *Representation.* Washington, D.C.: American Political Science Association.

Mend, Michael R., Tony Bell and Lawrence Bath (1976). "Dynamics of Attitude Formation Regarding Women in Politics." *Experimental Study of Politics* 5: 25–39.

Mezey, Susan Gluck (1978a). "Does Sex Make a Difference? A Case Study of Women in Politics." *Western Political Quarterly* 31: 492–501.

——— (1978b) "Women and Representation: The Case of Hawaii." *Journal of Politics* 40: 369–85.

Miller, Warren E., and Teresa E. Levitin (1976). *Leadership and Change: Presidential Elections From 1952 to 1976.* Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop.

Pitkin, Hannah (1967). *The Concept of Representation.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Ranney, Austin (1975). *Curing the Mischiefs of Faction.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

——— (1968). "The Representativeness of Primary Electorates." *Midwest Journal of Political Science* 12: 224–38.

Spence, Janet, and Robert Helmreich (1972). "The Attitudes Toward Women Scale: An Objective Instrument to Measure Attitudes Toward the Rights and Roles of Women in Contemporary Society." *Catalog of Selected Documents in Psychology* 2: 66.

Stokes, Donald E. (1971). "Compound Paths in Political Analysis." In J. L. Bernd and J. F. Herndon (eds.), *Mathematical Applications in Political Science.* Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia.

Deconstructing Methodological Falsificationism in International Relations

ROGER D. SPEGELE
University of Nairobi

The idea that international politics can be a theoretical science logically homeomorphic to theoretical physics finds its most perspicuous recent expression in a methodological falsificationist program for its realization. But the program is a syllabus of epistemological errors which, upon detailed examination, collapses into incoherence. This article gives particular attention to three aspects of the program: the principle of interdependent deduction, the falsifiability criterion and the critical testing policy. Despite the systematic and resolute efforts on the part of its adherents to fix a methodological grammar for international studies, the program of methodological falsificationism is revealed to be: essentially a complete failure. The main source of the difficulty is located in the failure to appreciate the role of metaphysics in the sciences which, contrary to the standard positivist-empiricist view, constitutes the driving force behind scientific discoveries. Since a monistic metaphysics, however, may be neither possible nor desirable for the social and political sciences, a deconstructive metaphysical program is recommended. The final conclusion that vastly increased attention needs to be given to ontological and metaphysical issues seems completely warranted.

It would only be mild exaggeration to say that inductivism has become the new "goat" for the failure of international politics to become a genuinely theoretical discipline worthy of the name. Kenneth Waltz, for example, holds the inductive approach principally responsible for the "failure to improve or enlarge the stock of available theories" in international politics (1975, p. 5). Induction, we are confidently informed, is a "dead end" (Waltz, 1975, p. 9). This harsh judgment is but a pale echo of Oran Young's earlier full-blooded attack on "puristic induction" which, we learn, "is one of the most wasteful and debilitating, as well as pervasive, diseases of contemporary political science" (1969b, p. 490). For these ailments the good doctors Waltz and Young prescribe a regime of deduction and heavy doses of testing. Have our physicians in spite of themselves found the right prescription for resuscitating international politics, or is this yet another patent medicine manufactured and bottled in evanescent Positivism? Have they even made the right diagnosis or have they, like the physician in Molière's *Le Médecin Malgré Lui*, discovered the cause of the unfortunate girl's *mutisme* in her inability to move her tongue? I suspect the diagnosis, mistrust the prescription and doubt a panacea; but I suggest that the administration of an old-fashioned emetic, in the form of a deconstructive metaphysical program, may permit a slow, if painful, recovery to good health.

We need to get clear just what the methodological falsificationist research program for international politics comes to. One of the most limpid accounts is provided by Marion Levy, Jr. in his well-known polemic against Kaplan and Bull.[1]

Plaguing both houses, Levy argues (1969, pp. 81–88) against Bull's defense of traditionalism that it is basically incoherent, and against Kaplan's meta-scientific account that it is basically ignorant. In effect, Levy agrees with Bull that there is very little in the way of scientific activity in the study of international politics, but contends that Bull is wrong to assume on a priori grounds that a science of international politics is impossible. Indeed, for Levy, if anything is to be asserted on a priori grounds, it should be that there are no grounds for believing in the traditional distinction between the natural and the social sciences. This claim, in turn, is based upon the assumption that international politics is essentially a theoretical enterprise where theory is understood to be logically homeomorphic to the theories in physics and the "mature" natural sciences. For Levy, the theory-impoverishment in international politics is a scandal and one which, presumably, may be laid at the door of those who have a faulty understanding of the requirements of theory. Kaplan and a host of others are accused and promptly convicted, before Levy's kangaroo court, of being woefully ignorant of just these requirements (1969, p. 89). On his view, it is intellectually dishonest to be pro-scientific, to wave the banner of Science, if one cannot also provide criteria to demarcate science from non-science. Levy, therefore, offers to fill this yawning gap by providing "assertions" (1969, p. 91) as to the nature of science which are said to apply to any empirical science whatsoever, whether the subject matter is human or physical. This is very good news indeed, but let us see.

---

[1] Although I have relied here primarily on Levy's account (1969) for clarity of exposition, reference will also be made to Oran Young (1969a, 1969b), Warren Phillips (1974), Ronald Rogowski (1968, 1978) and Waltz (1975). Morton Kaplan, though idiosyncratic in many respects, also expresses ideas consistent with the program (1969a, 1969b, 1971, 1973). It is not being asserted, of course, that a manifesto was signed somewhere to pursue international politics research according to a certain canon; rather there is a commitment to a more or less well-formed set of underlying ideas which serve as a set of guidelines for its adherents.

For Levy the "heart of the science game" consists of the following elements:

(1) *The Principle of Interdependent Deduction.* "A generalized system of theory . . . has to do with a set of generalized propositions containing variables, hopefully with deductive interdependencies among the members of the set" (Levy, 1969, p. 92; see also Young, 1969a, p. 131; Waltz, 1975, p. 74; Kaplan, 1971, p. 57).

(2) *Simplicity.* "The more abstract and parsimonious the theory, the better" (Levy, 1969, p. 92; see also Kaplan, 1969a, p. 52; Rogowski, 1968, p. 397).

(3) *Falsifiability.* "Apart from existential statements, the propositions of science must at least be falsifiable" (Levy, 1969, p. 93; see also Kaplan, 1969a, p. 55; Young, 1969a, p. 133; Phillips, 1974, p. 163).

(4) *Fruitfulness.* "Good theories are judged above all by their fruitfulness for the further development of theory" (Levy, 1969, p. 93).

(5) *Critical Testing.* "In science, the important thing is to have an idea and then raise the question about confirming or disapproving [sic] it" (Levy, 1969, p. 93–94; see also Waltz, 1975, pp. 12–13; Phillips, 1974, p. 163; Young, 1969b, p. 133).

(6) *Methodological Nominalism.* "It is important in the scientific world to define concepts clearly. There can be no talk of valid definitions in science; there is only the question of whether the definition is fruitful, that is to say, 'Is it useful in the formulation of hypotheses or theorems?' " (Levy, 1969, p. 94; see also Phillips, 1974, p. 164; Waltz, 1975, p. 11; Young, 1969b, p. 137).

Here at least we have a picture of the scientific method which, for all its simplicity, is a seductive and powerful one. It is hard-headed, straightforward and empirical. But is it an adequate picture, and should it, therefore, be adopted as the epistemological and methodological paradigm needed for the advancement of international relations? *That* is the question and my answer is an emphatic *No.*

My general argument is intended to show, first, that this picture of science exhibits an excessive and stultifying concern with logical as opposed to substantive metaphysical issues, reflecting unnecessary anti-metaphysical biases inherited from logical positivism and logical empiricism; second, that, as a result of such biases, it misrepresents what goes on in the natural sciences; third, that the picture cannot be applied to the human sciences in general and international politics in particular, since the subject matter does not permit the application of algorithmic methodological rules; and, finally, that liberation from the fetters of logicism and methodologism provides an opportunity to come to grips with those metaphysical and ontological issues which the too-hasty desire to emulate modern theoretical physics has obscured and without which real advancement is scarcely conceivable.

One other preliminary matter: in what follows the even-numbered principles will not be discussed. As for simplicity, efforts to provide clear and precise syntactical rules lead to the re-emergence of a paradox first noticed by Clavius in the seventeenth century (Harré, 1973). Roughly, the paradox is that if a purely syntactical criterion is chosen regarding whether a deductive connection exists between an explanation and the facts or laws to be explained, then a potential infinity of explanations can be regarded as satisfactory, while on the other hand only a small percentage of these are actually regarded as satisfactory by practicing scientists (Harré, 1973, pp. 358–59). If, on the other hand, semantic criteria are chosen, then one has to show that they do not run afoul of Quine's famous arguments showing that all previous attempts have led to vicious circularity (1953). In general, appealing to simplicity gives the spurious impression that one is somehow by-passing metaphysical commitments when in fact covert appeals to the regularities in nature are needed to avoid circularity. It is important to smoke these out in examining the arguments for simplicity, but this need not be accomplished in this article. Regarding fruitfulness—well, one theorist's *fruitfulness* is another's *fruitlessness*. Simplicity and fruitfulness are, in any event, "aesthetic criteria" and though one would not want to say that "aesthetic criteria" are irrelevant to the scientific enterprise—quite the contrary—the satisfaction of them would not cut much epistemological ice so far as the proponents of methodological falsificationism are concerned. Methodological nominalism is, on the other hand, of central importance to a theory of language and meaning, but there is not sufficient space to discuss it here. Let us, then, begin.

The Principle of Interdependent Deduction

There are two aspects of interest here: (1) the need for a distinction between deduction and induction as justificatory premises for science (logicism), on the one hand, and as modes of discourse, on the other and (2) the nature of the connection between theories and what they purport to explain.

The blood-letting debates of the late sixties between deductivists (e.g., Young, 1969b) and inductivists (e.g., Russett, 1969), following the customary practice of shifting the burden of proof onto one's adversaries, had the dubious distinction of presenting students of the subject with a double false dilemma: *either* one practiced the deductive approach (according to a certain interpretation) *or* the inductive approach (according to a certain canon) *or* one floundered in pre-scientific primitiveness. Such uncogenial double false dilemmas require undermining and this can be accomplished by bringing out the lack of cogency in the opposing horns of the first false dilemma: that science is justified *either* by deduction *or* induction.

Stripped of its rhetorical excesses, Young's argument against Bruce Russett's international regions approach (1967) exhibits the following common syllogistic form:

Major Premise: Inductive arguments are inadequate.
(I) *Minor Premise:* Russett's arguments are inductive.
Conclusion: Russett's arguments are inadequate.

To this *modus ponens* argument, Russett missed the opportunity to reply:

(II) *Premise:* Every observed deductive justification of a science of international politics has been circular.
Conclusion: Young's deductive justification of international politics is circular.

This *jeu d'enfants* is not quite so infantile as it appears at first blush, for it is intended to bring out the fact that if induction needs justification, just for this reason and on the same grounds so does deduction. I hasten to add that neither of these arguments is necessarily unsound (though the premises may be false) in terms of the principles of the classical logic, but this is not what is at issue. What is at issue is the widespread assumption, common to methodological falsificationists, that inductions are just defective deductions—deductions, that is, that do not quite make the grade—and that deductions, on the other hand, carry their validity on their face. But this is not so. Consider, for example, argument (I) above and how Young might attempt to justify it even if we suppose, counterfactually, the premises to be true. One possibility is as follows: suppose *P* (that "Russett's arguments are inductive") is true and suppose *P entails Q* (that "inductive arguments are inadequate") is true as well. Then given the meaning of *entails,* if *P* is true and *P entails Q* is true, then *Q* must be true as well. The trouble with such a justificatory argument lies in its objectionable circularity; it has the very form which it is supposed to justify (Haack, 1975, p. 114).

For inductivists the situation is not strikingly better. Since the premises of an inductive argument refer only to what has been observed so far, the conclusion always goes beyond the information contained in the premises. Hence, in all inductive arguments the conclusion might always be false even though the premises be true. But this means that argument (II), if true, is false and therefore is false. One could always, that is, formulate the following counter-inductive argument:

Major Premise: Inductive arguments like argument (II) have usually been unsuccessful in the past.
(II′) *Conclusion:* Argument (II) is successful.

Whatever the inadequacies of induction, however, they cannot be legitimately used (inductively speaking) to support deduction. Young, for example, might be tempted to argue that what justifies deduction is simply that its instances are valid. But this will not do. Since a valid deductive schema has non-denumerably many instances, the justification of it would have to be inductive and this, as we have just seen, does not establish a result of the appropriate force between premises and conclusion.

At this point one might be tempted to draw the conclusion that deduction is no less in need of justification than induction, but here a distinction needs to be made between induction and deduction as modes of reasoning, and induction and deduction as justificatory principles for science.

Modes of Reasoning. As modes of reasoning both induction and deduction have a role to play in the study of international politics; indeed, the study of international politics is hardly possible without them. Since induction has been the subject of considerable criticism of late, it is pertinent to point out just how much of the reasoning employed in the study of international relations is of the inductive kind. When conclusions are drawn from premises (their evidence), conclusions are drawn which are not entailed by those premises. It does not follow that the argument is in any way unsound. It may simply be an argument in which deductive standards are inappropriate. Consider some statements that might be advanced in international relations:

(a) Brezhnev is a prudent statesman, so he is not likely to invade Western Europe.

(b) Syria and Egypt are mobilizing troops near the border of Israel, so there is great danger of war.

(c) France is a relatively weak nuclear power, so French leaders will probably never threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union or the United States.

Clearly the statement made in the first clause of each sentence is regarded as a reason for accepting the statement made in the second clause. The second statement in each case is in some sense a conclusion from the first; the first can in some sense be called a premise. But the premise does not entail the conclusion. It would not be self-contradictory to say that Syria and Egypt are mobilizing troops near the border of Israel but there is no great danger of war. One might be inclined to say that it does not make sense, but its alleged lack of sense is not of the logical kind. On the other hand, though the premise does not entail the conclusion, it may be a perfectly adequate reason for accepting the conclusion in each case. The arguments, though not deductively valid, are perfectly sound arguments.

Someone may be tempted to explain the non-deductive soundness of the arguments by saying that they are really deductive arguments with a suppressed premise. We might say, for example, with respect to (a) that "all cautious statesmen avoid unambiguously aggressive wars." But by regarding this general statement as a suppressed premise for (a), we do not get rid of the problem of explaining how we can reasonably draw conclusions from premises that do not entail them. But is it at all clear that some justification is needed for induction as a mode of argumentation and discourse? Is it not just reasonable to have a degree of belief in an hypothesis *h* which is proportional to the strength of the evidence in its favor? And is it not also just reasonable to say that the strength of a generalization is a function of the number of its favorable instances in varied circumstances? Hence, to ask whether it is reasonable to place reliance on inductive procedures is simply to ask whether it is reasonable to proportion the degree of one's convictions to the strength of the evidence. Doing this is what "being reasonable" comes to in such a context. A similar argument can be made on behalf of deductive, truth-preserving logic. If the correspondence between the sentences we use and states of affairs we observe were completely arbitrary, then it would not be reasonable to believe that calling a sentence "true" is a property preserved by deductive logic. But it is constitutive of our explanation for the unquestionable fact that human beings are mainly reliable that one of the ways they acquire new beliefs is the use of deductive logic and that deductive logic preserves these true beliefs (Putnam, 1978, p. 107).

So when we ask whether an argument is one to which deductive or inductive standards are appropriate, we know to what we are appealing; but when we ask whether inductive or deductive standards are justified, to what, in general, are we appealing? If there are no Great Standards in the Sky to employ as desiderata, no sense can be given to the contention that inductive procedures are somehow inferior to deductive procedures along some imaginary good-bad continuum.

Now, if the debate between deductivists and inductivists were simply a debate concerning the justification of induction and deduction as modes of reasoning or discourse, then it would be simply misguided in the extreme. Induction and deduction as modes of reasoning no more require justification than set talk among set theorists, FORTRAN talk among computer experts or Leprechaun talk among Leprechauns. Unfortunately, however, both the proponents of induction and deduction in international relations have stretched the meaning of these terms to cover more than they could ever possibly hope to cover. For they cannot be stretched far enough to provide a covert a priori justification for pursuing, to the exclusion of other approaches, research in international politics according to a fixed set of methodological rules. Perhaps God knows which logic is the logic of nature, but we do not; and any epistemological dogma based on the assumption that we do is tendentious in the extreme.

An alternative perspective would treat induction or deduction as one feature of a methodological research program (Lakatos, 1970) which refers, in my use of it, to: (a) a "fuzzy" set of more or less deeply held beliefs concerning the nature and the goals of a discipline and (b) a canon or set of methodological rules, including inductive and deductive logics, *plus* a set of specific research techniques which give practitioners concrete grounds for believing in the realizability of those goals. As research programs they can and will be criticized in the usual ways. If *S* claims that goal *G* can be achieved by means $m_1, m_2 \ldots m_n$ and gives as reasons $r_1, r_2 \ldots r_n$ for believing this, we may object that one of the means is not available as *S* supposes, or we may object that one of *S*'s reasons is false or that *S*'s reasoning is fallacious. By following such an approach to research program appraisal in international politics we can go some way towards de-mythologizing and deconstructing the claims advanced by proponents of alternative programs for international politics, whether they be scientific or metaphysical or whatever. Our subject here, however, is not the inductive research program but the deductive research program which, to avoid confusion with deduction as a mode of reasoning, we have labeled methodological falsification. What are the goals of the methodological falsificationists, and how do they propose to achieve them?

Goals of Methodological Falsificationists

Deduction as Explanation. One important goal is deductive explanation in terms of theory. According to Waltz, for example (1975, p. 4), "Theories explain laws," where "explains," as the title of this section indicates, is to be understood as logical entailment. Putting this together with a conception of theory which sees it as a set of axioms and theorems (Young, 1972, p. 180), what we get as a yield is the familiar hypothetico-deductive system. But this conception of theory is in and of itself singularly unhelpful.

First of all, it trivializes the content of theory by making theory a purely logical notion. Take any putative law statement *(PLS)* and add a theory *(T)* to it deductively so that *(T) entails (PLS)*. Theory *(T)* would, on the methodological falsificationist view, deductively explain *(PLS)*. But then *(T)* could be any set of relations which has the required logical form, and the logical form itself is surely insufficient to confer theoretical status on a set of statements. For example, consider Lewis Fry Richardson's statement (1960) that the growth of an arms race between two nations depends on the amount of armament one nation has vis-à-vis the other, the enormous costs of armament, and the mutual feelings of the nations (as expressed in treaties and trade). This can be represented mathematically as

$$(P) \qquad \frac{dx}{dt} = ky - ax + g$$

where x is the amount of armament the second side has, y is the amount of the first side, $\frac{dx}{dt}$ is the rate at which the first side arms, and g represents the feeling of the first side. The positive constant k is called the defense coefficient, while the constant a is called the fatigue and expense coefficient. Any competent mathematician could derive a "theory" from which the statement could be deduced such as, for example:

$$(P') \qquad \frac{d^2x}{dt^2} = -a.$$

This exhibits the appropriate deductive structure, but without further interpretation (P'), though it deductively implies (P), cannot be said to explain it, except perhaps in some very trivial sense of "explain."

It does no good to say that this counterexample depends solely upon the one chosen, since we can find numerous axiomatically expressed theories which do not explain anything, let alone laws. One example should suffice: Balmer's formula expressing the simple relationship between the wave lengths of lines when an electric discharge is passed through hydrogen. From his theory, and other axioms, Balmer was able to predict the existence of new lines which were later observed. Although Balmer's formula can be put into hypothetico-deductive form, (a) it provides no explanation of any known law (in 1885) and (b) it does not give any explanation whatsoever of the existence of the lines, the size of their wave lengths, their discreteness, and so forth. What Balmer's "theory" seems to do is to organize the known data for the purpose of prediction (Achinstein, 1968, p. 131).

Secondly, the deductive relationship, even when satisfied, would leave unexplained such non-observable theoretical terms as "feelings," "fatigue," and "submissiveness." There is, of course, a parallel problem in the natural sciences where theories contain such indispensable non-observable terms as "genes," "molecules," and "electrons." If we accept the deductive argument that such terms play only a formal role in theories, then they would be deprived of any empirical meaning whatsoever. Similarly, Richardson's terms "fatigue," "feelings," and "submissiveness" would remain impenetrable mysteries: ineffable and inexplicable–a notion anathema to a realistically understood empiricism. What is required, then, is not simply the satisfaction of a formal model, but rather an explanation which links the explanatory mechanism to the existence of certain phenomena–which mechanism, in turn, accounts for the properties of the phenomena. If this requires a commitment to some form of explanation in terms of "natural necessities," then this only shows the extent to which the orthodox positivist picture of science upon which the methodological falsificationists rely is inadequate.

There is another difficulty. The principle of Interdependent Deduction fails to provide an adequate criterion in terms of which rival theories can be evaluated. Consider two rival explanations:

> *Law Statement:* Whenever the temperature of snow rises above 0, it melts.
> The temperature of snow rose above 0.
> The snow melted.

Now suppose we add a theoretical hypothesis to explain the aforementioned law:

> *H:* Whenever the cow jumps over the moon, the temperature of the snow rises above 0.

This fulfills the requirement of deductive adequacy but intuitively fails to convince most of us. Now compare this with the deductive explanation provided by Lessnoff (1973, p. 27):

> *Theoretical Premise:* Snow always melts when the energy of its molecules becomes great enough to loosen the intermolecular bonds that hold them together.
> *Minor premise:* When the temperature of pure snow at atmospheric pressure rises above 0, its molecules acquire energy great enough to loosen the bonds that hold them together.
> *Conclusion:* When the temperature of pure snow at atmospheric pressure rises above 0 it melts.

From the purely deductive point of view, both of these explanations are perfectly sound. Plainly, the deductive principle alone is not sufficient to judge the adequacy of rival theories. Notice that Waltz cannot decide between these rival theories by saying that one is true and the other obviously untrue since, on his instrumentalist account, theories are neither true nor false (1975, p. 8). At this point, methodological falsificationists might appeal to the principle of simplicity but, as we have seen above, the principle of simplicity would not always provide a clear answer and, moreover, that "Snow melts whenever the cow jumps over the moon" seems far simpler than any explanation in terms of intermolecular structure. Hence, the deductive requirement cannot be a sufficient condition for a scientific explanation. But is it a necessary condition of an adequate scientific explanation? Certainly not! When physicists "explain" why a certain track was produced in a cloud chamber by saying that an alpha particle passed through the chamber, they are not engaged in deduction, nor would this explanation be improved in any way by putting it in a deductive form. In general, the very idea of trying to find syntactic or semantic criteria for a concept as global as explanation may well be misconceived. Studies in the "logic of questions" (Hintikka, 1974) have shown convincingly that what counts as a potential answer to a *why* question is dependent upon the knowledge (or beliefs) of the questioner. This means that explanation is a pragmatic notion (Van Fraasen, 1977), but since this is just the feature of explanation which the proponents of interdependent deduction are at pains to deny, their account is surely gratuitous.

Pragmatic Explanations. Methodological falsificationists might want to argue, however, that whatever the pragmatic features of explanation turn out to be, there will be no essential logical distinction between the social sciences and the natural sciences as to their application. The appropriate reply to this is that logical differences are not the only differences there are and this implication is constitutive of the very notion of pragmatic explanation. Consider, for example, the following demand for an explanation: "Why did Kissinger decide to engage in the bombong of Hanoi during the Christmas season of 1972?" To a member of the French Communist party, this question may mean why did Kissinger engage in bombing at all, as opposed to deciding upon the immediate, unconditional withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Vietnam. To a general in the French Army-Air

Force, the question may mean why did the U.S. engage in city bombing when everything we know about strategic bombing shows that it only increases the resolution of an "enemy" to continue fighting and has no effect on the outcome of the ground war. A potential answer to the effect that the bombing served as a *quid pro quo* to bring Thieu to sign the Paris agreements (Szulc, 1974) would be a partial (though perhaps unsatisfactory) answer to the general's question, but no answer at all to the French Communist's one. *Why* questions—and therefore explanations—always presuppose dimensions of relevant knowledge interests (Habermas, 1968; Putnam, 1978). The relevant knowledge interests of the Communist and the general embody sets of presuppositions which reach deeply into what may be called their organic meanings—profound notions about human nature, the nature of war, and what Winch calls (1972, pp. 41–43) limiting notions, i.e., ideas of birth, death and sexual relations. To call these psychological and to relegate them to the periphery of the explanation space is to stretch language beyond permissible bounds.

A possible explanation of Kissinger's actions might be an account in terms of his beliefs and wants. But an account in terms of beliefs and wants would not satisfy a dedicated French Communist who would claim that an agent's beliefs are mere epiphenomena the appeal to which begs the question at issue. Such a person would want to know the underlying social structures which explain these beliefs and wants. Is reality a check on which of these possible explanations is correct? Not in any obvious sense at least. The most dedicated empiricist would not be able to answer the question of whether Kissinger's action can be explained ideologically or by appeal to psychological theory. The alternative explanatory offerings are translations in Quine's sense (1960, Ch. 2) and hence there is no *fact of the matter* which is correct. But if this is so, one might be tempted to reply, then it is equally the case in the natural sciences. A full examination of the problem of the underdeterminacy of theory is obviously not feasible here, but the following difference should be noted. The explanation of the snow's melting in terms of kinetic theory is true in our conceptual world because kinetic theory is a true scientific theory in our conceptual world. In a realistic philosophy of science in terms of which scientific theories refer to "real" objects, where scientific theories do tend to converge, where the correspondence theory of truth specifies truth-definitions for a language and where total theory of knowledge supports it, there should be no difficulty in saying, "Snow melts when the energy of its molecules becomes great enough to loosen the intermolecular bonds that hold them together" is true. Can one say the same about a psychological or sociological theory, *viz.*, that it is true in our conceptual world? Doubts arise here from the inability to resolve the central problem of meaning in the social sciences. To put it as crudely as possible: are meanings "in the head" (Putnam, 1975, p. 223) or are they in the environment? Our failure to answer this central question, or even to be clear about what would constitute any answer to it, shows one specific way in which the human sciences differ from the natural sciences.

Summing up so far, we can say, first, that it is incoherent to treat the domain of international politics as founded upon either deductive or inductive logic because it would then be unintelligible in turn upon what *these* would be founded upon; second, that the implication—common to both methodological falsificationists and inductivists—of having scientific research programs without any a priori elements at all is spurious; third, that no justification for either deduction or induction as modes of discourse is required; and, finally, that deductive forms of explanation, whatever their mathematical power, are not the only kinds of explanations there are, and such a standard would, if applied to research in international politics to the exclusion of other forms of explanation, beg a host of epistemological and ontological questions that ought not to be begged in that way.

The Falsifiability Principle

The acceptance of the falsifiability principle would, it is fair to say, have far-reaching consequences, entailing a thorough sweeping-out of the Augean stable of international politics. According to Waltz, "Most theories of international politics are so imprecise that expectations of outcomes cannot be stated in ways that would make falsification possible. Few theories of international relations define terms and specify the connection of variables with the clarity and the logic that would make falsification possible. Before a claim can be made to have tested something, one must have something to test" (1975, p. 13). Fine. The fact that in applying this principle Waltz has little difficulty in demonstrating that most theory-offerings in international politics do not pass muster is not in itself grounds for rejecting the principle (Hoffman, 1977, p. 1636). It does not follow that the principle of falsifiability should be retained as a desideratum for theory assessment in international politics. In fact, the situation provides a good illustration that co-variance does not equal causality. It is true that most theory-offerings in international politics are unscientific (when compared, for example, to the General and Special Theories of Relativity) and it is also true that they fail to pass the demarcation criterion, but it does not at all follow that they are unscientific *because* they fail to pass the demarcation criterion. In short, most theory-offerings in international politics are not scientific theories, but in not quite the way that Waltz thinks they are not; and it is naive to believe that the application of methodological falsificationism will improve matters. Indeed, since Marx's philosophy of history and Freud's and Adler's psychoanalysis would get excluded from the domain of empirical science and relegated to the domain of the pseudo-scientific, it might well make matters worse. In following some erroneous ideal of "objective knowledge," international politics may well be depriving itself of the possibility of any sort of knowledge whatsoever. In any case, in a society which prizes objective knowledge, and where the imprimatur of science confers status and power on its practitioners, any such principle deserves close examination.

Popper's Formula. What, then, is falsifiability? For a theory to be falsifiable it must be testable, and in order to be refutable a theory must be falsifiable. "Testability is therefore the same as refutability or falsifiability" (Popper, 1963, p. 197). Refutability = testability = falsifiability. In what follows I wish to show that this equation is unacceptable both as description and as prescription.

On Popper's view, a theory is scientific if and only if it is falsifiable, i.e., inconsistent with at least one singular, existential statement which can be tested by intersubjective consensus. Theories are thus construed as universal statements of the "all ravens are black" variety whose potential falsifiers are basic, singular existential statements of the form, "This is a non-black raven." Of course, this is only a severe idealization: scientific theories do not really have this form since this would mean that the epitome of science would be attained by non-lawlike universal propositions disprovable by a single negative instance—the finding of one white raven in Greenland—while all probabilistic theories, which no finite number of observations can disprove, would be regarded as unscientific (Lakatos, 1970, p. 103). Science, however, must be construed as asserting causal connections between events. But if the universal statements of science are to be construed as causal statements, then a single, basic statement can never alone falsify a universal statement. It can only be falsified by a basic statement and a *ceteris paribus* clause stating that no other relevant factors were present.

For example, if our theory is that "All ravens are black," we would not accept the basic statement, "This is a non-black raven," if we had reason to believe that other conditions were operating to prevent *ceteris* from being *paribus;* the universal conditional would not be considered refuted by the discovery of a non-black raven if we had reason to believe that exposure to radiation had affected the pigmentation of birds. For what, after all, is a basic statement? A basic statement, for Popper, is simply a logical consequence of a theory the scientific community agrees to accept provisionally for the purpose of testing; and, I take it, no conscientious scientist would accept a basic statement about ravens without also accepting *ceteris paribus* clauses. Without a *ceteris paribus* clause the claim could always be made that what appeared to be refuting instance was in fact owing to circumstances which the theory had not anticipated and could not possibly have anticipated occurring.

Now, for Popper, a falsifiable theory's potential falsifiers are those basic statements which, in the absence of a special explanation, it prohibits. But this is precisely the point: there may always be a "special explanation" which fails to prohibit any basic statement. What determines whether *ceteris* is *paribus* may be, if one is a Kuhnian, sociological and psychological factors (which Popper dismisses), or it may be, if one is an inductivist, the explanatory history of the theory. That need not be argued here, however. It is sufficient to show that a theory's having a non-empty class of potential falsifiers does not even begin to show that a *ceteris paribus* condition will ever be satisfied, and hence the inexorable disproof procedure breaks down. But if there is a "wedge" between potential falsifiers and basic statements into which *ceteris paribus* clauses must be driven, then falsibiability alone can never equal either non-vacuous testability or, on the hypothesis, refutability. This is one way in which Quine's much-criticized statement, "Any statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system" (1953, p. 43) is strikingly applicable.

An example from international politics may help to clarify this point. One of the more ambitious theories of international politics, often cited as a paradigm of scientific theorizing in international politics (Smoker, 1964; Phillips, 1974), is Richardson's arms race theory (Richardson, 1960). The main difficulty lies in this: Richardson's simple linear functions are derived from central theoretical principles which contain at least one potential falsifier; and, hence, applying Popper's falsifiability principle, Richardson's theory can be put into the box with the scientific theories even though (a) the theory can probably never be non-vacuously tested, and (b) it can be refuted! Hence Popper's formula falsifiability = testability = refutability is incoherent and cannot provide a criterion for eliminating obsurantism in the social sciences.

Richardson's Core Principles. What are Richardson's central principles? They *are not* the equations which are only models derived from the principles:

> The equations are merely a description of what people *would do if they did not stop to think.* Why are so many nations reluctantly but steadily increasing their armaments as if they were *mechanically* compelled to do so? Because . . . they follow their traditions which are fixed and their instincts which are *mechanical* and because they have not yet made a sufficiently strenuous intellectual and moral effort to control the situation. The process described by the ensuing equations is not to be thought of as inevitable. It is what *would occur if instinct and tradition were allowed to act uncontrolled* (Richardson, 1960, p. 12; last emphasis in original, others added).

Let us reformulate this in Popperian terms:

> *Central Theoretical Principle:* Richardson's linear function equations fit the data if and only if people do not stop to think.
> *Potential Falsifier:* A Thinking Person.
> *Popperian Conclusion:* Richardson's theory is falsifiable, testable, and refutable!

Of course, the potential falsifier is a metaphor and would have to be interpreted in terms of the beliefs and wants of policy makers, but this is precisely the point. The form of the statement in and of itself cannot tell us, in the absence of a specified *ceteris paribus* clause which one may never have, whether any basic statement will ever be accepted to falsify it. The line a Popperian might take is to distinguish Richardson's metaphysical principles from his empirical ones, but this won't do because (a) the models are derived from the theoretical principles and inseparable from them, (b) the separation would decrease their falsifiability, and (c) this is precisely what the falsifiability principle was designed to do. Nor can one contend that the experimental techniques do not now exist to falsify the central principles, for falsifiers are *potential* and philosophers of science cannot preclude the possibility of experimental techniques being developed to "look inside" people's brains to determine whether or not they are thinking, i.e., whether they are acting in an instinctive way, following tradition and therefore not-thinking, or whether they are acting creatively and therefore thinking. So we may at some future point be able to falsify Richardson's central theoretical principles, but since no one seriously believes we will be able to decode the brain in this sense for a couple of centuries, one cannot seriously imply that testing of these central principles will actually be carried out.

But falsifiability may not only be weak and ineffective; it may actually be irrational as well. Lakatos found, for example, that neither Prout's theory that the atomic weight of all pure chemical elements were whole numbers nor Bohr's early quantum physics program, both of them scientific success stories, contained *ceteris paribus* clauses; neither of them was submitted to *crucial* experiments. If they had been, these glories of natural science would have been eliminated from the corpus of science. According to Lakatos, the Popperian notion of crucial experiments is a myth. *"There are no such things as crucial experiments"* (1970, p. 173, emphasis in original). He drew the appropriate conclusion that the demarcation principle via potential falsifiers cannot logically or pragmatically do the job required of it. Of course, scientific researchers can always "cook up" an experiment the conclusion of which would make it more than likely that the model or theory would fail, but what would be the point of this? They would not have learned anything. It may be, as methodological falsificationists contend, that following their proposals will enable one to eliminate some errors, but surely this will not be of much help to international relationists who are already (inductively) confident that their theories are filled with errors. What international relationists require are theories in which they can have confidence for the purposes of prediction, explanation, manipulation, etc., and it is difficult to see how this can be achieved through the so-called elimination of errors when researchers have no good grounds for believing they are in error. After all, researchers in international politics cannot be deemed irrational when they protect their theories and models from falsification if there are no reasonable alternatives in the field and if they have good inductive grounds for believing that the initial conditions of human social systems are too unstable to be specified. This is not to hold a brief for inductivism which has its own set of difficulties (see below); it is rather to say that scientific researchers who protect their favored theories and models from falsification, far from being irrational, demonstrate considerable rationality, supported both by the history of scientific practice in the "mature" sciences and by the "logic" of their situation, any alleged inconsistency with Popperian methodological rules notwithstanding.

The Paradox of Demarcation. But this is not all. Notice the paradoxical result of Popper's demarcation criterion (1963, p. 240): both Newtonian science and Richardson's theory are in the science box rather than in the non-science box with Marxian and Freudian theory, but Newtonian science has been refuted, while Richardsonian "science" remains unrefuted and is likely to remain so for the next two or three hundred years. But this result is absurd, for Newtonian theory–said refuted–is one of the glories of mankind and still incredibly accurate within its domain, as anyone with a low-power telescope knows, while Richardson's theory is plainly false. That Richardson's theory is plainly false can be shown by examining its central principles. These principles are based upon a version of scientific (Laplacian) determinism which has been shown false by modern physics, i.e., the General and Special Theories of Relativity, Quantum mechanics and Gödel's incompleteness theorem. Reformulating Richardson's principles, we get:

MP_1: Nature is simple; there are no accidents and the future is contained in the present.

This is complemented by the disjunctive principle:

MP_2: People are a part of Nature (in the sense defined); their behavior can be explained and predicted by simple deterministic laws.

$MP_{2'}$: People's behavior cannot be explained and predicted by simple deterministic laws.

We get as a yield the following deductive form: $[(MP_1 \supset MP_2) \vee (MP_{2'})]$. But MP_1 has been shown false, not simply by some basic statement, but also by our total theory of knowledge, including modern physics. Since MP_1 is false and entails MP_2, then MP_2 is false as well. The falsity of MP_1 entails the truth of $MP_{2'}$ from the point of view of Richardson's principles themselves.

The key point here is that despite the falsity of Richardson's theory, research employing its principles continues unabated in international politics; this is sanctioned by Popperian principles themselves since, according to Popper (1963, p. 197), the falsity of a metaphysical theory does not preclude the development of empirical theories "influenced" by metaphysical theories which are themselves refuted.

Scientific Theories as Metaphysically Laden. The next question is this: can empirical theories even in the "mature" natural sciences always be separated from their metaphysical components? If most of the great scientific advances were based upon metaphysically laden theories which could not be separated from their empirical components, or could be so separated only at the cost of reducing their testability and refutability, then the whole notion of the demarcation criterion collapses right there. If, for example, the Cartesian metaphysical principle, "In all natural processes there is a clockwork mechanism," and the Kantian, "Every event has a cause," are construed as regulative principles, syntactically irrefutable but nevertheless the internal animating and driving force behind many an important scientific advance, then the Popperian demarcation criterion and *a fortiori* any other purely syntactical criterion is self-defeating.

Now J. W. N. Watkins, an astute Popperian, has argued, in a refreshing self-criticism (1975), that while one might be able to distinguish between "Every event has a cause" and "All ravens are black" on the basis of the logical form of the statement, it does not follow that one can, on this basis, differentiate between the metaphysical and empirical content of a scientific system. Watkins gives two cases (1975, p. 93): (1) if the metaphysical components are *incorporated* into the empirical theory, then their elimination might seriously reduce the testability of the theory and (2) if the metaphysical components are not incorporated into the theory as such but there is a metaphysical component in the theory which conflicts with another metaphysical idea external to the theory, then the elimination of the metaphysical component would also weaken its testability with respect to another theory. In neither of these two cases can the logical form of the statement enable one to reconstruct the theory in distinguishing the metaphysical and empirical components of a theory without weakening testability. But this shows that the falsifiability principle is inconsistent with the testability principle, and since testability is an important methodological principle which accounts for the success of modern science, it is the former which must give way.

Is there a meaning in all this for the social sciences and for international relations in particular? The methodological falsificationist program is based upon the erroneous idea that a purely syntactical criterion can serve to eliminate obsurantist ideas and advance the scientific program of international politics. This is a mistake, since any purely logical criterion which serves to eliminate obsurantist ideas also has the undesirable consequence of eliminating powerful scientific ideas as well. If, however, physical science cannot be properly understood without an explanation of the role of metaphysics, its elimination, far from contributing to the fulfillment of its aim of becoming a "mature" science, would in fact make it impossible. In this sense I am in complete agreement with Rummel (1975, p. 4): "To ignore metaphysics is to leave unquestioned the foundations of our social knowledge, our ethics and our epistemology." It does not follow from this that speculative or Kantian metaphysics, once appropriate to the development of the natural sciences, can now provide some foundation for the human sciences. An Eternal Return is scarcely conceivable. Still, this too is one of the questions that an appropriate metaphysics would have to answer and it is equally a question towards which no progress can be made if one's methodological research program excludes consideration of it on the specious ground that scientific advance is only possible by the elimination of all metaphysical ideas. Indeed, the anti-metaphysical Popperian actually assumes what he wants to show. For the argument seems to be that falsifiability wants adhering to if the metaphysical elements in a theory are to be separated from the empirical elements. The Popperian then argues from the alleged separation, as demonstrated by the success of modern science, to the success of the falsifiability principle which is exactly what needs showing.

A More Comprehensive Rationalism. We can sum this section up by saying that Popper's formula—falsifiability = testability = refutability—presents an overly simple picture of science and must be rejected. As we have seen, Richardson's theory is refutable without being consequentially testable even though it is syntactically falsifiable. Many other combinations are possible within a richer, more comprehensive rationalism. One philosopher-theologian claims, for example, that certain theological doctrines have been refuted by empirical evidence even though such doctrines are certainly not scientific (Settle, 1968, pp. 136–70). The cases of Marxism and Freudianism are still different. Many of their central principles are heavily protected from refutation owing partly to the structural complexity of the subject matter itself. Still, at least some of their respective claims have been tested and refuted beyond, as one might say, a shadow of a doubt. Both the *necessary* immiseration of the working classes and the sexually based character of *all* mental disorders have been tested and found wanting. But the fact that the "complete" Marxian or Freudian theory has not been eliminated as a consequence of the refutation of one aspect of it makes it no different, in this respect, from any other major scientific theory (Lakatos, 1974, p. 247).

In general, Kuhn and other historically oriented philosophers of science have shown that a priori grounds for demarcating science from non-science fail to capture the multifarious and pluralistic nature of the scientific enterprise. Many studies of diverse kinds are carried out under the name of "science" and when one dogmatizes about it, without recognizing the diversity it covers, one is sure to go wrong. By the same token we need to be more careful about what we say concerning the *scientific method,* the so-called rules of the scientific game, and the logical form of scientific statements. But this is just what many traditionalists have been arguing all along. For one thing, traditionalists tend to be skeptical of the idea of a fixed, unchanging scientific method and of imposing sharp, ahistorical distinctions between the method and substance of knowledge. Our methods in any domain will depend on beliefs concerning the nature of the subject matter and on beliefs about other subjects. For methodological falsificationists, the belief that states are the primary data of international politics, coupled with the belief that physics is the paradigm of scientific knowledge, is enmeshed in certain beliefs concerning the need to construct systematic hypotheses at a macroscopic level. It is not surprising therefore to find that those who have these beliefs would find the methods of general physics quite appropriate (Levy, 1969, p. 89). Traditionalists, on the other hand, tend to believe that the intentions and actions of agents (individual and collective) constitute fundamental ontologies of international politics and find the methods of physics singularly inappropriate. "But who is right?" one is tempted to ask. The burden of my criticism has been that no progress can be made towards answering this question if one's epistemological program refuses to recognize its existence by reasserting the antinomies which give rise to it in the first place. Even if an argument in favor of traditionalism should fail, however, this would not sustain the falsifiability criterion which has, as it were, failed on its own merits.

The Critical Testing Policy

It might be argued that whatever the weakness in the falsifiability or demarcation criterion, its logical companion—testability—is at least a solid methodological principle in *all* sciences. Just so. Granted its enormous importance for all sciences, I shall argue that the concept of testing is more problematic than is usually supposed, that it can be made fairly precise but only at the cost of drastically undermining its applicability to the social sciences in general and international politics in particular, and that, in consequence, methodological falsificationism collapses as a viable program for international politics.

What is the critical testing policy (CTP)? In international politics, so Waltz informs us (1975, p. 12) this involves executing the following steps:

In order to test a theory, one must do the following:

1. State the theory being tested.
2. Infer hypotheses from it.
3. Subject the hypotheses to experimental or observational tests.
4. In taking steps two and three, use the definitions of terms found in the theory being tested.
5. Eliminate or control for perturbing variables not included in the theory under test.
6. Devise a number of distinct and demanding tests.
7. If a test is not passed, ask whether the theory flunks completely, needs repair and restatement, or requires a narrowing of the scope of its explanatory claims.

This won't do. Waltz's CTP embodies a series of assumptions which are untenable. One assumption is that a sharp line can be drawn between theoretical and observational propositions, for if a theory *T* is to be eliminated on the grounds that it is inconsistent with observational reports, there can be no fuzziness between them; otherwise one might simply be comparing one theoretical proposition with yet another theoretical proposition, and what would be the point of doing this when what one wants is to eliminate false theories? Since Waltz also contends that theories are instruments and, as such, neither true nor false, the whole point of severely testing theories becomes unintelligible. If theories are merely instruments or tools, why bother severely testing them at all? The scientist should just give them up when they can no longer do the job required of them. Waltz does not see that an instrumentalist understanding of theories makes his CTP superfluous.

At the least Waltz must come to grips with an impressive and growing literature concerned to rebut the orthodox positivist account of theory-neutral data. Against the view that proponents of rival theories can be said to be in agreement on data while disagreeing in their interpretations of it, there is Hanson's impressive argument (1958) that proponents of different theories are not just making different interpretations but rather seeing different things just because they have different theoretical beliefs. Each scientific theory contains within it the conceptual categories which determine what we see. The implications of Kuhn's paradigms (1962, p. 192) also works against the notion of a theory-neutral language. Kuhn contends that "people do not see stimuli: our knowledge of them is highly theoretical and abstract." More recently it has been argued by Hesse (1974, Ch. 1) that no observational predicates, including the banal ". . . is red," are theory-neutral in the sense implied by orthodox positivist accounts and implicit in Waltz's CTP. Although there are excesses in these anti-positivist accounts, the arguments are sufficiently compelling to call into question the unproblematic character of observation reports even in the "mature" sciences. If they are problematic in physics, what, then, is their status in the social sciences? The term "observation report" in the social sciences covers (notoriously) a very "fuzzy" set and includes facts, evidence, experience (phenomenological and otherwise), observation, observable evidence, factual evidence, data, etc. To call all these observation "reports" and to pretend they are unproblematic is to beg the question at issue between positivists and anti-positivists. For one of the leading issues dividing these two schools is the logical status of these "empirical" materials, of what counts (and on what basis) as an "observation report." To beg this leading question by assuming an unproblematic concept of observation report in the social sciences does not advance Cartesian clarity.

Demanding Tests. Waltz's assumption 6—the devising of distinct and demanding tests—is clearly the most important of his rules; without it, it is hard to see that there is a program at all, since if there are no demanding tests, theories can never be rationally eliminated, and one slides back into the wages of inductivism. The requirement, one should note, is for *demanding* tests, and though Waltz does not say what a demanding test of a theory is, Popper has not been so negligent. In the first edition of *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* Popper had maintained that a theory, to be testable, had simply to exclude some observable state of affairs. But this was obviously insufficient as a testing principle, since any hypothesis which explains the known facts is testable in this sense of excluding the observed state of affairs where the facts are not present (Musgrave, 1974, p. 6). To avoid a variety of confirmation paradoxes Popper strengthened the requirement of testability to the requirement of *independent* testability and strengthened the requirement of *independent* testability to the requirement that the hypothesis actually pass some independent tests (Popper, 1972, p. 244; Musgrave, 1974, pp. 6–7). Consider Richardson's theory once again. Its most successful application has been in its explanation of the arms race between the two World Wars where the "fit" between the model and the data is fairly impressive. But on Popper's revised theory of confirmation, this would not count as a genuine test or confirmation at all, since a theory cannot receive a confirmation from the situation it was designed to explain. The Richardsonian might say that the models have been applied to other historical situations, thereby providing additional confirmations (assuming there are any). Popper's theory of confirmation denies that these could count as confirmations; they are simply *ad hoc* explanations and *ad hoc* explanations cannot count as "genuine" confirmations.

One might want to claim that such a theory of confirmation is far too formidable for the social sciences, and indeed it is. But what follows from this observation if not the untimely demise of the MF program itself? Indeed, the methodological falsificationists are faced with a dilemma. If the proponents of the MF program are to avoid the paradoxes of induction where every "arms race" one comes across is construed as a confirmation of Richardson's models, some account must be forthcoming of the obvious fact that theorists have background knowledge about the likelihood of a test being passed. If, on the other hand, one attempts to deal with the paradoxes of confirmation by assuming background knowledge, then the requirement that a theory must make new predictions appears impossible to avoid. Choosing the first horn of the dilemma makes confirmation far too easy and opens the way to a veritable orgy of *ad-hocness*. Indeed, an examination of what might be called "the *ad-hocness* strategy" of theorists using Richardson's models (Smoker, 1964; Caspary, 1967; Hollist, 1977) shows the importance of Popper's requirement. When the models do not fit the data of known historical phenomena, it is a relatively easy matter to revise the model, to add new parameters, to "work in" budget constraints, to reinterpret the data, to use more sophisticated measures, to engineer new fits, and so on *ad indefinitum*. All this activity does not add up to one severe test so far as the convinced Popperian is concerned, since no new predictions or novel facts have been forthcoming. Moreover, a non-Popperian testing procedure leads straight back into the clutches of inductivism (the avoidance of which constituted the rationale of the MF program to begin with) and the accompanying paradoxes of confirmation. Choosing the Popperian horn of the dilemma, on the other hand, may go some way toward resolving the problem of subjectivism and relativism in the natural sciences, but only at the expense of making the MF program for international politics a disembodied ideal, wrong as to current practices and impossibly utopian as to future goals.

Successful Predictions. That the social sciences are lamentably weak in making successful predictions will be granted by even the most orthodox of positivists. Though no Grand Ledger of successful predictions is kept, this may be a consequence of not having sufficient positive entries. Moreover, in Popper's non-instrumentalist critical rationalism, science involves more than the making of successful predictions; it requires sets of methodological rules for the testing of predictions. The best way to test predictions is, of course, to conduct controlled experiments and, apart from some areas of psychology, controlled experiments are generally *not* carried out in the social sciences, and *not* at all in international politics. Even in quantitative economics the testing of predictions is not generally done and, if recent analyses are to be believed, the area of successful prediction in economics is shrinking (Hollis and Nell, 1975).

Does this imply that successful testing and making of predictions cannot be carried out in the social sciences at all or *in principle*, as one frequently says? Certainly not. There are some restricted areas of the social sciences, e.g., the question of intelligence quotient and racial origin, which might be made precise enough for the application of rigorous testing procedures. Furthermore, one wants to be very careful about what can and cannot be done in science, but the constraints are impressive. Three of them deserve mention here.

(1) There is the old problem of the self-confirming and disconfirming prediction. An economic theory from which an apparently valid prediction of business recession can be deduced may be falsified by the activity of the business community in response to that very theory. And a premise which is initially false, to the effect that a bank is in financial difficulty, may lead to a run on that bank which in fact leads it to fail. Often this sort of problem is simply regarded as a technical one. In principle, one says, the changes that occur can be predicted and one's model adjusted accordingly, but in reality this is not possible, since social agents—for example, political leaders—are forced by the nature of the social system itself to plan their foreign policies in advance; they must rationally try to predict whether they can do so effectively or not (MacIntyre, 1973, p. 331). Such appeals to a constraining reality are heavily discounted by philosophers who tend to search for conceptual distinctions, but this tendency on their part may itself be a function of an inordinate reliance on the analytic-synthetic distinction. A showing that something is not possible owing to certain "deep" features of social systems which one has not even begun to plumb may be a very good argument indeed against *X*'s or *Y*'s ever occurring in fact.

(2) Popper himself presents a powerful argument against certain kinds of predictions in the social sciences and history; his refutation is based on the impossibility of predicting the future growth of human knowledge:

> (i) The course of human history is strongly influenced by the growth of human knowledge.
> (ii) We cannot predict, by rational or scientific methods, the future growth of our scientific knowledge.
> (iii) We cannot therefore predict the future course of human history (Popper, 1957b, p. vi).[2]

One of the important grounds for believing that premise (ii) is true has to do with our inability to predict conceptual change itself. Since the way in which we identify what human beings are doing is partially a function of conventionally established social-linguistic categories, then, if we now predict in our current vocabulary what so-and-so will be doing at time $t + 1$ and if there is a conceptual change, we run the risk of not being able to identify what so-and-so will be doing. "But how do we know there will be radical conceptual change?" one is tempted to ask. We know it inductively, which is why Popperians are barred from making this argument. Virtually everything we know about historical change tells us that there will be radical conceptual changes which we could not even begin to predict in our current vocabulary. An unpropertied citizen of ancient Rome would not have been able to view his society in terms of Marxist categories nor a nineteenth-century hysterical Viennese bourgeoise in Freudian or Lacanian ones. Projecting our knowledge of the past onto the future, we can assume conceptual changes which will change the very terms in which social actions will have to be characterized; and nothing in our present vocabulary will permit us to gain a foothold on such holistic changes.

It goes without saying that physical concepts do not change in that way; we would still be able to count descriptions of the conductivity of metals as relevant to our understanding of them by invoking the principle of conceptual charity (Quine, 1960, Ch. 1). The principle of conceptual charity, however, cannot be so easily invoked in the social sciences precisely because one of the participants in the identification process has no grounds for giving us a license to warrant invoking it since the participant, and *a fortiori* the social scientist whose descriptions depend upon the meaning conferred upon them by the participants, has no grounds for saying what sort of conceptual changes will take place and what the consequences of such conceptual changes are likely to be. The principle of conceptual charity can be invoked in the natural sciences precisely because there has been a long history of explanatory successes and discoveries which enable us to say with reasonable confidence that when Mendel referred to "genes" he was referring to the same thing we today call "genes." On the other hand, there is no comparable history of explanatory success enabling us to say that what Talleyrand meant by "balance of power" (or whatever) is what we mean today. The meanings of social concepts are largely internal to sociolinguistic communities and hence their changes obviously cannot be predicted without a total explanatory model of conceptual change which we are not, realistically, going to get.

---

[2] A recent article by Urbach (1978) shows that Popper's claim to have logically proved (ii) is faulty. Urbach's argument, however, only shows the limitations of the necessary and sufficient condition model in disputes of this sort. So, while Popper falsely claims to have logically proved premise (ii), his arguments are still persuasive in toto.

Consider, for example, the concept of "negotiation," and important one in international politics today. Plainly, when we now say that a political leader is negotiating, we are not just saying that his activity is one which can be described in purely physical terms of muscle twitches and so on. Nor are we saying that negotiation is a matter of what is inside the head of the negotiator, though this is an important feature of any account. We are saying that what counts as "negotiating" in our culture is at least partly a matter of the social-linguistic environment.

One implication of this basically Wittgensteinian notion can be brought out by a "thought" experiment. Imagine the people of a tribe brought up to believe that what we call negotiation, the exchange of views for the purpose of reaching agreement on a settlement of terms, was absolutely forbidden. "How absurd to exchange ideas, to bargain, to come to terms! Whenever anyone wants something in our tribe, he just takes it," these people say. Whole sets of concepts presupposed by the concept of negotiation would be different, such as buying and selling, the marketplace and public and private property. But these concepts are not only constitutive of one another, they are also constitutive of even more abstract concepts in terms of which such rules are defined. Even the concept of personal identity would be different since the identity of the "I" is parasitic on having minimal criteria of corporeal ownership. Murder, violence, sexuality, birth and death would change in ways we obviously could not anticipate. This is what Wittgenstein meant, I think, when he said, in connection with a somewhat parallel example, "For here life would run on differently. What interests us would not interest *them*—Here different concepts would no longer be unimaginable. In fact, this is the only way in which *essentially* different concepts are imaginable" (1967, p. 388). Since, that is, there is no *trans*-interest concept in terms of which we can identify the full character of the changes that would come about as a consequence of changes in our basic concepts and since human behavior has to be predicted in terms of those concepts, the notion that we can fully predict human behavior may not, in a particular case, even be intelligible to us in our current vocabulary. We may, as Wittgenstein implies, be able to imagine it, but only as a kind of science fiction story created by human invention and imagination, and analogous to imagining how people would behave if they had an utterly different concept of negotiation. What applies to negotiation applies as much to other key social concepts.

Recognizing that I have no right to help myself to as yet unmade conceptual distinctions and argumentation, I suggest that it may still be useful to set out why the predictive goal of methodological falsificationists appears to be a very remote goal indeed.

(a) Scientific prediction depends upon being able to identify the subject matter to be predicted.

(b) To identify human actions requires a prior understanding of the meanings of the concepts in terms of which human beings determine what is to count as tokens of *X*ing and *Y*ing.

(c) Meanings are not just in people's heads (Putnam, 1975, pp. 223–26), but also at least partly in the social environment.

(d) Therefore, to predict human behavior scientifically one needs an explanatory model which pre-identifies the relative meaning contributions of a speaker's social environment and psychology.

But of what would such a model consist? It would have to be a total explanatory model of human and social meanings and this is just Popper's premise (ii) suitably "unpacked" and interpreted. On this one substantive issue, then, it is hard to escape the conclusion that Popper is right (in not quite the sense he meant, of course) and his detractors wrong.

(3) There is still another argument which indicates the sorts of constraints that exist on prediction in the human sciences. The argument, due to Putnam, is that even if we possessed an ideal theory of human behavior and even if physicalism were true, it still would not follow that we could carry out the predictions "in real time." "It may be, for example, that the shortest deduction of what I will do five minutes from now (or of the probabilities of the various alternatives) would take more than a thousand years to compute for an optimal computing system using an ideal theory of me and an optimal theorem-proving program. In that case this would be a sense of 'in principle' in which my behavior wouldn't be predictable in principle in this way..." (Putnam, 1978, p. 64). Someone might want to claim that even if human behavior is not predictable, one can still explain it. But, first of all, the methodological falsificationist cannot make this move without making irremediable concessions to induction, for, as we have seen above, any explanation of human behavior whatsoever can be made consistent with the known facts by making appropriate changes in the initial conditions. So this move would not

be legitimate in terms of the MF program. But even if it were, Putnam casts doubt on our ability to carry it out:

> To speak of explaining, not some very general facts about human psychology, but some specific phenomena as why we find some explanations "natural" and not others, or why we find some views "unreasonable," or even to deduce any characterization at all of such matters from a hypothetical description of our functional organization may well require so much "real time" that the human race will have long ceased before such a deduction is carried out! (1978, pp. 64–65).

All this is sufficiently convincing to show that the MF program is not viable, I think, but it now remains to ask: "What has gone wrong?"

Penultimate Conclusions. What has gone wrong with methodological falsificationism is that it is based upon two unstated assumptions shared by the inductive program it is intended to replace, viz., that the success of science can be understood ahistorically and non-pragmatically. These two assumptions are very much interrelated and connected with yet a third (stated) assumption of the methodological unity of the sciences (Levy, 1969, p. 105). All three are untenable. The two unstated assumptions will be treated forthwith, but the tangled issue of the methodological unity of the sciences must needs await (alas!) fuller development in a separate paper.

Methodological falsificationism as a program for theory-acquisition in international politics arises in reaction to inductivism whose stress upon statistical manipulation, precise measurement, and the patient accumulation of confirmable, low-level hypotheses is regarded as excessive and self-defeating. The alternative picture of science presented by methodological falsificationism is based upon the generation of hypotheses (for which there are no rules) *plus* the critical policy of testing (for which there are a set of rules) for the weeding-out of false theories. Now, either such rules have "bite" or they do not have "bite." If they have "bite" then a "single, replicated negative instance" (Kaplan, 1971, p. 16) will serve to eliminate the hypothesis. Is it rational to adhere to such a rule? If one applies the rule retrospectively to the history of natural science it turns out that its relatively conscientious application would have led to the elimination of most of the important discoveries of modern science—Bohr's theory of the atom, Prout's theory, Newtonian theory itself—before they had a chance to prove their mettle (Lakatos, 1970). It goes without saying that a rule which cannot be rationally applied in the natural sciences cannot, on the assumption of methodological unity, be rationally applied in international relations.

Paradoxically, Waltz appears to agree, for, having listed his seven steps for testing theories, the sixth one of which, remember, is the devising of "distinct and demanding tests," he informs us three pages forward that tests should not after all be too demanding lest one discard poorly developed theories. Indeed, he enunciates (1975, p. 15) what is in effect a new testing rule: "The rigor and amplification of tests must be geared to the precision or generality of the expectations inferred from the theory." Hence, the methodological rules do not have any "bite." But how is one to execute Waltz's new rule? Clearly, one has to make some prior appraisal of theory-offerings, and if this is not induction I do not know what is. It is easier to harangue about the perils of induction than to avoid them. So, one slips back into induction, but not, one should note, into the classical empirical version represented by Singer (1972) and Rosenau (1971). Methodological falsificationism collapses into radical conventionalism. Theories are neither true nor false but useful instruments (Waltz, 1975, p. 4); the severity of tests is a matter for subjective *decision* on the part of the theorist; and the elimination of theories itself becomes (see Waltz's step 7 cited above, p. 115) a matter of *decision.* In this version of conventionalism, however, the community of practicing scientists do not make these crucial decisions; the individual scientist makes the decisions. The set of methodological rules becomes a set of maxims which the individual scientist decides to follow according to his or her lights. But what is a rule which is private in this sense? It is (as Wittgenstein's private language argument shows) *no* rule at all; it is absurd to say that one can follow a rule privately. The methodological falsificationist program for international politics collapses into unintelligible solipsism.

The collapse of methodological falsificationism results, we have said, from its ahistorical and anti-pragmatic assumptions. An examination of the history of natural science would have shown that in "normal science" practicing scientists do not attempt to falsify their hypotheses but on the contrary accept them as true and try to find evidence to support them (Kuhn, 1962). This still leaves open the prospect that in revolutionary science—the best scientists in their profound discoveries of nature—the principles of methodological falsificationism have been followed. An examination of historical evidence casts doubt on this proposition as well. For example, a methodological rule which has to be central to the MF program is a rule to distinguish "legitimate" adjustments in theories through the introduction of auxiliary hypotheses and illicit adjustments through the introduction of "theory-saving" *ad hoc* hypotheses. Such a rule is indispensable to the MF program, since without it one would never be in a position to say when a contradiction between a theory and a possible falsifying prediction is not being resolved in a purely linguistic way. Attention to the history of natural science would have shown both that (a) the introduction of auxiliary hypotheses is a common practice in the physical sciences—the negative weight of phlogiston, the initial postulation of another planet of Uranus, Leverrier's hypotheses of a group of intra-Mercurial planets, the contraction hypothesis of Lorentz and Fitzgerald, etc.—were all introduced with the claim that they made the associated theories better and (b) that there is *no* precise rule, and there may never be one, for distinguishing the legitimate from the epistemologically illicit cases, i.e., the Lorentz-Fitzgerald (illicit) contraction hypothesis (Zahar, 1973), say, from Leverrier's (legitimate) hypothesis (Grunbaum, 1976, p. 347).

The ahistorical bias which accounts for these "inconvenient" counterexamples is complemented by the anti-pragmatic bias. For attention—this time to the history of the *philosophy* of science—would have revealed that all attempts to "reconstruct" theory choice in terms of syntactic or semantic notions have been disastrous failures. This does not imply, as some philosophers of science would have it (Feyerabend, 1975), that theory choice in the natural sciences is subjective; it implies rather than the application of objective criteria, i.e., explanatory power, simplicity, consistency, scope, etc., is historically relative in the innocuous sense of presupposing a given scientific historical context. Though there is room for considerable disagreement about what these criteria are, certainly one of the most important is pragmatic predictive success. Such otherwise diverse thinkers as Descartes, Leibniz (1678), Whewell (1840) and Duhem (1906) regarded predictive success as of decisive importance in science. Its importance has been given new impetus by the failure, most recently of positivism, to reconstruct science in terms of formal criteria such as verifiability, confirmability or falsifiability. Though successful prediction is not all there is to science, it does loom very large in the methodological falsificationist program. But if so, as has been argued, there can be no reasonable hope this criterion will ever be adequately satisfied. Since a retreat into inductivism hardly seems feasible and since the collapse into radical conventionalism appears a dialogue between self and soul, the specter of subjectivism, irrationalism and of a bankrupt relativism in the social sciences become not a fanciful fantasy of epistemologists but an imminent reality. The cure for these ills lies neither in philistine avoidance nor in programs which misrepresent what goes on in the natural sciences and what can go on in the human sciences but in the recognition that there is no escape from the great metaphysical, ontological and epistemological issues, not even in the banal repetition of a dying positivism's last oaths.

Concluding Deconstructive Remarks

We have suggested in a general way what has gone wrong with methodological falsificationism and it now remains to ask: what should be done next?

Despite the evident risks of pretension and linguistic inflation, the term "deconstruction" is meant to point the way. For "deconstruction," a neologism due to the French philosopher Jacques Derrida (1967, 1972, 1978), conveys exactly the inevitable tension between aggressive hermeneutical studies of philosophical "texts" underpinning a positivist-empiricist social science and the covert implication that this task can be accomplished from some imaginary non-metaphysical standpoint. On Derrida's view, human beings thrust against the limits of language as soon as they open their mouths to speak or take up their pens to write. He invites us *not* to "destruct" traditional occidental metaphysics in the early Heidegger's sense of ripping away the Kantian veils to reveal Being in all its pristine pre-Socratic silence, but rather to deploy a transgressive strategy of textual criticism, of inventing neologisms, of manipulating what he calls "indecidables," and by showing in detail that human language really is a motley.

Derrida's program links up with a long tradition of anti-monism reaching back to the Sophists and enmeshing such otherwise diverse figures as Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein, Heidegger and (perhaps) Putnam. What differentiates Derrida from other anti-monists lies in his willingness to engage the metaphysical tradition not by (metaphysically) announcing yet another anti-metaphysical program or by articulating a "new" conceptual scheme but by vigorous, indispensable and creative textual criticism. In contrast to those in thrall to a fixed picture of language, of which positivist-empiricism is the latest specimen, Derrida shows that there is no escape from our interpretive categories and certainly not in any version of the fallacy, "Everyone is out of step except me and my friends." Deconstructive metaphysics is the only metaphysics we shall ever need or want.

In supporting Derrida's deconstructive program, I am far from implying that it can be just torn out of its political, social and disciplinary matrix and offered up as the solution to the growing variety of metaphysical ailments in the social sciences. Still, some analogue of Derrida's program is necessary if all that splendid talk of a post-behavioral political science is to be more than a meretricious interlude permitting the re-establishment of positivist dogmas in second intension. One specific suggestion, therefore, is this: the development of a regional, historically oriented deconstructive program internal to international politics as a counter to the unfortunate current disposition to skim off the latest products of a favored philosophy of science. Such a program would serve to uncover the implausibility of a naive, theory-free positivist-empiricism which drastically underestimates the extent to which we are moved by obscure and ill-formulated theories which escape criticism because they are never brought out into the open.

The objectives of the envisaged program would be: (1) to discover what there is, what there ain't and what there might be for a true theory of international politics to be true of; (2) to determine, in the light of (1), how mere human beings, as opposed to a Laplacian super-mind, could know or understand such a theory; (3) to investigate the moral features of our world in terms of which any purely theoretical investigation of practical life would have to answer; and (4) to formulate such investigations in the hermeneutical recognition that it is too late for absolute ontologies and truths (Heidegger, 1969, p. 24).

Admittedly, no effort has been made here to make such a program philosophically compelling for international politics, but this task is, I think, a profoundly attractive and important one. The motivation for it arises, negatively, from the failure of all previous epistemo-metaphysical programs and, positively, from the indispensable thought that we do sometimes understand what the Other is saying and doing. If there is a truth here, let us hope it is a *long-term* deconstructable one.

References

Achinstein, Peter (1968). *Concepts of Science.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.

Caspary, W. R. (1967). "Richardson's Model of Arms Races: Description, Critique, and an Alternative Model." *International Studies Quarterly* 2: 63–88.

Derrida, Jacques (1967). *De La Grammatologie.* Paris: Minuit.

——— (1972). *Marges De La Philosophie.* Paris: Minuit.

——— (1978). *Eperons: Les Styles de Nietzsche.* Paris: Flammarion.

Duhem, Pierre (1906). *The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory.* Translated by Philip P. Wiener. New York: Atheneum, 1962.

Feyerabend, Paul (1975). *Against Method.* London: Verso.

Grunbaum, Adolf (1976). "Ad Hoc Auxiliary Hypotheses and Falsificationism." *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.* 27: 329–62.

Haack, Susan (1975). "The Justification of Deduction." *Mind* 85: 112–19.

Habermas, Jürgen (1968). *Erkenntnis und Interesse.* Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Hanson, N. R. (1958). *Patterns of Discovery.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Harré, R. (1972). *The Philosophies of Science.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Heidegger, Martin (1969). *Zur Sache Des Denkens.* Tübingen: Max Niemeyer.

Hesse, M. (1974). *The Principles of Scientific Inference.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hintikka, K. J. (1974). "Questions about Questions." In M. K. Munitz and P. Ungar (eds.), *Semantics and Philosophy.* New York: New York University Press.

Hoffman, Stanley (1977). "Review of *Handbook of Political Science.*" *American Political Science Review* 71: 1634–36.

Hollis, M. and E. J. Nell (1975). *Rational Economic Man.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hollist, W. Ladd (1977). "An Analysis of Arms Processes in the United States and the Soviet Union." *International Studies Quarterly* 21: 503–27.

Kaplan, Morton A. (1969a). "The New Great Debate." In Klaus Knorr and James N. Rosenau (eds.), *Contending Approaches to International Politics.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

——— (1969b). *Macropolitics.* Chicago: Aldine.

——— (1971). *On Historical and Political Knowing.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Kuhn, Thomas (1970; first published 1962). *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Lakatos, I. (1970). "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes." In I. Lakatos and Alan E. Musgrave (eds.), *Criticism and the Growth of Scientific Knowledge.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

——— (1974). "Popper on Demarcation and Induction." In Paul A. Schilpp (ed.), *The Philosophy of Karl Popper.* La Salle, Ill.: Open Court.

Leibniz, G. W. (1678). "Letter to Conring." In

Philosophische Schriften, Vol. 2. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag.

Lessnoff, M. (1973). *The Structure of Social Science.* London: Allen and Unwin.

Levy, Marion, Jr. (1969). " 'Does It Matter if He's Naked?' Bawled the Child." In Klaus Knorr and James N. Rosenau (eds.), *Contending Approaches to International Politics.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

MacIntyre, Alasdair (1973). "Ideology, Social Science and Revolution." *Comparative Politics* 5: 321–42.

Musgrave, Alan E. (1974). "Logical versus Historical Theories of Confirmation." *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 25: 1–23.

Phillips, Warren R. (1974). "Where Have all the Theories Gone?" *World Politics* 26: 155–88.

Popper, Karl R. (1957a). "The Aim of Science." In *Objective Knowledge.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

——— (1957b). *The Poverty of Historicism.* Boston: Beacon Press.

——— (1959; first published 1934). *The Logic of Scientific Discovery.* London: Hutchinson.

——— (1963). *Conjectures and Refutations.* London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

——— (1972). *Objective Knowledge.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

——— (1974). *The Philosophy of Karl Popper.* Edited by Paul A. Schilpp. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court.

Putnam, Hilary (1975). *Mind, Language and Reality.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

——— (1978). *Meaning and the Moral Sciences.* London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Quine, W. V. (1953). "Two Dogmas of Empiricism." In *From a Logical Point of View.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

——— (1960). *Word and Object.* Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

——— (1969). *Ontological Relativity and Other Essays.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Richardson, Lewis Fry (1960). *Arms and Insecurity.* Pittsburgh: Boxwood Press.

Rogowski, Ronald (1968). "International Politics: The Past as Science." *International Studies Quarterly* 12: 394–418.

——— (1978). "Rationalist Theories of Politics: A Midterm Report." *World Politics* 22: 296–323.

Rosenau, J. N. (1971). *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy.* New York: Free Press.

Rummel, Rudolph J. (1975). *Understanding Conflict and War,* Vol. I. New York: Sage.

Russett, Bruce M. (1967). *International Regions and the International System.* Chicago: Rand McNally.

——— (1969). "The Young Science of International Politics." *World Politics* 22: 87–94.

Settle, T. W. (1968). "A Prolegomenon to Intellectually Honest Theology." *Philosophical Forum* 1: 136–70.

Singer, J. D. and S. Jones (1972). *Beyond Conjecture in International Politics.* Itasca, Ill.: Peacock.

Smoker, Paul (1964). "Fear in the Arms Race: A Mathematical Study." *Journal of Peace Research* 1: 55–63.

Szulc, Tad (1974). "How Kissinger Did It: Behind the Vietnam Ceasefire Agreement." *Foreign Policy* 15: 21–69.

Urbach, Peter (1978). "Is Any of Popper's Arguments Against Historicism Valid?" *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 29: 117–30.

Van Fraassen, Bas C. (1977). "The Pragmatics of Explanation." *American Philosophical Quarterly* 14: 143–50.

Waltz, Kenneth N. (1975). "Theory of International Relations." In F. Greenstein and N. Polsby (eds.), *Handbook of Political Science,* Vol. 8. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.

Watkins, J. W. N. (1975). "Metaphysics and the Advancement of Science." *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 26: 91–121.

Whewell, William (1847). *The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences.* New York: Johnson Reprint Co.

Winch, P. (1972). *Ethics and Action.* London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1967). *Zettel.* Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Young, Oran R. (1969a). "Aron and the Whale: A Jonah in Theory." In Klaus Knorr and James N. Rosenau (eds.), *Contending Approaches to International Politics.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

——— (1969b). "Professor Russett: Industrious Tailor to a Naked Emperor." *World Politics* 21: 486–511.

——— (1972). "The Perils of Odysseus." *World Politics,* supplement 24: 179–203.

Zahar, E. G. (1973). "Why did Einstein's Programme Supersede Lorentz's?" *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 24: 95–123, 223–62.

Temporal and Spatial Diffusion in the Comparative Analysis of Social Change

DAVID KLINGMAN
University of Southern California

The conceptual and methodological outlines of a new approach to the comparative analysis of social change are expressed in a general time-series regression model which can serve as a framework for developing specific theories of social change for particular variables. The approach seeks to explain the variation over time in a macro-level attribute or action of a social system as a function of a combination of within-system, across-system, and across-time processes: (1) incrementalism or momentum, or the within-system temporal diffusion of the dependent variable; (2) within-system causal development, or the influence of other characteristics of the system itself; (3) spatial diffusion, or the spread of the dependent variable from system to system; and (4) global contextual forces, such as war, depression and shortage of resources. In addition to reconsidering the nature of "the comparative method," the discussion focuses on the process of diffusion and how it fits in with the other processes, especially from a time-series perspective.

Despite the continuing controversy over the nature of comparative social inquiry, the seeds of a new approach to the comparative analysis of social change lie in several relatively recent and seemingly unrelated developments in several disciplines. Careful consideration of those developments suggests the outlines of a new theoretical and methodological framework for analyzing the variation in macro-level social phenomena across time as well as space. Two developments in particular combine to form the foundation for this new framework: first, the increasing attention to the inter-system diffusion of social phenomena and related problems of dependence among societies; and second, the increasing utilization of time-series analysis in the social sciences.

In an increasingly interdependent world, comparative social scientists are beginning to realize that social phenomena occurring within a given society are not isolated and self-contained, but rather are affected by domestic events occurring within other societies. At the same time, analysts of international relations are becoming aware that domestic events occurring within individual societies affect the interactions among those societies as a group, and vice versa. But equally important is the growing understanding that the variation in and covariation among social variables can be analyzed temporally (i.e., across time within a single society) as well as spatially (i.e., across societies at a single point in time). Moreover, temporal patterns of covariation within one society can be compared with corresponding patterns in other societies, and temporal variations within one society may even be causally linked to those within other societies.

While these insights broaden the scope of social scientific explanation, they should be viewed as supplementing rather than supplanting the more traditional perspective of within-system causal development, or the influence on a given dependent variable of other characteristics of the same society. Also not to be overlooked is the ubiquitous process of incrementalism or momentum, in which each change in a given social variable builds on previous changes in that same variable. Finally, all social phenomena occurring both within and between societies are affected by variation over time in such global conditions as war, depression and shortage of resources.

This article develops the conceptual and methodological outlines of an approach which views social change as a function of the four basic sets of processes mentioned above: incrementalism or momentum; within-system development; across-system diffusion; and global forces. These relationships are expressed in a general time-series regression model which can serve as a framework for developing specific theories of social change for particular variables. A different quantitative approach to the study of social change over time (Hamblin, Jacobsen and Miller, 1973), while dealing with

---

Earlier versions of different portions of this article were presented at the 1979 annual meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association and the Western Social Science Association. Among the many colleagues who contributed to the development of the article without necessarily adopting its ideas, particularly deserving of mention are Francis Hoole, Patrick McGowan, Guy Peters, Spencer Wellhofer, and the anonymous referees for this *Review*.

two of the same concepts, namely diffusion and development, treats them as separate processes and never really incorporates them into a single model. Also unlike our approach, it does not employ econometric methods in the analysis of its equations, and consequently does not deal with the process of momentum or incrementalism (e.g., using lagged endogenous variables) or the implications of autocorrelation (which could explain the extremely high R^2 coefficients reported by Hamblin, Jacobsen and Miller).

Our discussion will focus on the process of diffusion and how it fits in with the other processes listed previously, especially from a time-series perspective, for this is the key element in the proposed approach. The article therefore briefly reviews and integrates several bodies of literature which seem to have developed fairly independently in several disciplines: Galton's problem; diffusion of innovations, disorder and public policy; and elementary econometrics. But first it will be useful to reconsider the nature of "the comparative method."

"The Comparative Method" and Units of Analysis

Several unnecessary barriers to the approach outlined here have grown out of the continuing debate over the nature of comparative social inquiry. Many of the debaters seem to have forgotten that all science is inherently comparative (Campbell and Stanley, 1966, p. 6), and precious few have questioned the need to grant "the comparative method" some kind of special epistemological status (see Benjamin, 1977). Ordinarily, non-experimental empirical analysis has involved the examination of the covariation among the attributes of a set of cases at one point in time. Such "cross-sectional" investigation of human attributes is complicated by the fact that human beings exist in groupings, the largest being societies and nation-states, whose "macro-level" attributes affect the "micro-level" attributes of the individuals which comprise them, and vice versa. This situation has two important consequences for the study of social phenomena. First, cross-sectional analyses of the attributes of individuals across social groupings should properly incorporate in the analysis the attributes of the groups to which the individuals belong. Second, the attributes of the groups can themselves be analyzed cross-sectionally, with the group being the unit of analysis, rather than the individual.

It can be argued that "multilevel analysis," which employs both macro-level and micro-level variables in a cross-sectional approach, is the distinguishing feature of "the comparative method" (Przeworski and Teune, 1970). In practice this has meant the use of macro-level variables in studies seeking to explain micro-level phenomena, known as "contextual analysis." That is, many of the participants in the debate over "the comparative method" have apparently assumed that the only variables worth explaining reside at the individual or micro-level of analysis. The debate has therefore focused on various strategies for explaining individual-level behavior manifested within different societies, notably "the most similar systems design" and "the most different systems design" (Przeworski and Teune, 1970). However, Meckstroth (1975) has pointed out that both types of design require the prior specification of the theoretical status of the macro-level variables on which the compared societies are supposed to be similar, or which are to serve as intervening or antecedent variables making a given micro-level relationship different from one society to another. He further argues that "the most similar systems design" tends to overestimate the importance of between-system differences, whereas "the most different systems design" tends to underestimate their importance.

The reasons for this preoccupation with micro-level behavior and the bias against macro-level analysis of societal attributes are not entirely clear. Despite the hazard of reification, complete understanding of human behavior requires analysis of its collective as well as individual manifestations, just as meteorology requires an understanding of the "behavior" of air masses as well as the atoms and molecules which comprise them. Indeed, many of the most important and interesting concerns of social science, such as the actions of governments, require macro-level analysis. Yet one of the principal participants in the debate over "the comparative method" (Lijphart, 1971, 1975) criticizes this type of analysis, branding it "the statistical method of comparison." One wonders why cross-sectional analysis is deemed legitimate when applied to individuals within societies, but not to societies themselves.

The most cogent criticism of macro-level cross-sectional analysis involves the purely practical limitation on the number of cases available for analysis, leaving insufficient degrees of freedom to include enough variables to capture the complexity of social processes (Lijphart, 1971, 1975). The degree of severity of this problem, however, depends upon the unit of analysis and kinds of variables chosen for study. Although there are still only about 150 sovereign nations in the world (depending on definitions), many of which do not record much in the way of accurate data, Murdock's *Ethnographic Atlas* (1967) contains fairly complete information on 65 cultural traits characterizing 863 societies. Furthermore, the number of organizations of a given type, such as local governments, within a society or nation-state can be quite large.

In addition to advocating cross-sectional analysis of "sub-system" units, Lijphart (1971, 1975), among others, has recognized the possibility of circumventing the "limited N" problem by adding the time dimension to comparative analysis. The statistically illegitimate method of doing this, called "case-stretching" by Lijphart (1975) and derisively labeled "the multiplicative N-extender" by Sigelman (1977, p. 303), is to include multiple time-point observations (e.g., years) for each case (e.g., nation) in one's data set. Unfortunately, such observations cannot legitimately be treated as separate cases because they are not statistically independent. Another use of the time dimension has been the analysis of successive cross-sections, observing changes in the relationships among variables which vary across a given set of cases at each point in time. But as a number of authors have argued, the dynamic process of social change is best captured by time-series analysis, or analysis of the variation in and covariation among variables which vary across time-point observations of just one case.

In comparative analysis, patterns of temporal variation and covariation in a given set of time-series variables can be compared across cases. Such a strategy, which will be referred to here as "comparative time-series analysis," has been advocated before, most effectively by Moul (1974); but examples of actual empirical analyses employing the strategy are rare (see Peters and Klingman, 1977). It is a variant of a quasi-experimental strategy which Caporaso (1973, pp. 22–26) calls "the control series design" and which most closely approximates the classic experimental design by providing both temporal and spatial dimensions of comparison. Thus it can be argued that the best research strategy for comparative social inquiry is really no different from any other non-experimental strategy based on the general scientific method. Of course, any research strategy entails its own peculiar problems of measurement, and analysis of "aggregate" (macro-level) data is no different, especially concerning the availability of data very far back in history and the comparability of measures across cases and over time within cases (Deane, 1968; Pryor, 1968). Furthermore, time-series analysis (i.e., econometrics) poses some special problems, primarily serial dependence between successive observations, or trend, and between successive residual errors, or autocorrelation (see Ostrom, 1978).

Despite these problems, comparative time-series analysis is the method best suited to address the kind of comparative analysis called for by Teune (1975, pp. 197–98): the derivation and testing of general theoretical statements oriented toward "systems analysis of macro and micro processes . . . cross-system (more than one country), cross-level (individuals and the country or organization) and cross-time (several years)." This statement serves to reinforce the major point of this section, that there is a wide variety of units of analysis at various levels of aggregation whose attributes vary across time as well as space, and the best strategy for analyzing those dimensions of variation does not constitute some special "comparative method." In contrast to the limited number of cases allowed by macro-level cross-sectional analysis, the variation available for study by comparative time-series analysis is limited only by the extent of quantifiable information recorded by history.

Furthermore, comparative time-series analysis can be applied to virtually any unit of analysis for which at least two quantitative variables are available on at least two cases, each with at least approximately ten time-point observations. Such a unit of analysis could range from the individual through various types of groups and organizations and ultimately the society, the nation-state, and even the supranational organization. Moreover, as in individual-level contextual analysis, independent variables characterizing higher-level units may be included in analyses of lower-level ones. Of course, in "aggregate" analysis, variables representing aggregations of lower-level units residing within higher-level ones are routinely mixed in with the "global" or "emergent" properties of the higher-level units themselves.

Finally, the various problems associated with aggregation and disaggregation of data identified by Hannan (1971), among others, do not automatically apply to the approach outlined here. Those problems involve cross-level inference; that is, they primarily concern the extent of agreement between relationships among macro-level variables and relationships among corresponding micro-level variables. Comparative time-series analysis, as envisioned here, instead focuses on relatively identifiable social units, such as nation-states, with inferences involving only one level of analysis, rather than arbitrary aggregations of individuals, such as census tracts, with inferences involving two levels of analysis. Although the variables characterizing those units may include aggregated properties of their components and contextual attributes of the larger systems to which they belong, inferences are presumed to be restricted to the level of the chosen unit. Similarly, although the problem of system identification plagues all social research, the special problem of system transformation over time does not automatically apply here, to the extent that the chosen time period covers only the simultaneous, continuous existence of all of the chosen cases. Unlike successive cross-section analysis, in which relationships among variables can change drastically from time point to time point, analysis of variation and covariation across time within each case can capture even major structural changes in continuously existing systems, if the right variables can be identified. The issue of what sorts of structural changes constitute the death of an old system and the birth of a new one remains unresolved and subject to judgment.

The remainder of this article will demonstrate an additional capability of comparative time-series analysis apparently heretofore unrecognized: the ability to incorporate the process of cross-system diffusion into time-series regression models of macro-level social change. This means the ability to model directly the phenomenon of statistical dependence between cases, known in cross-sectional analyses of societal traits as "Galton's problem."

"Galton's Problem" and the Concept of Semi-Diffusion

Apparently the first treatment of social diffusion occurred in anthropology in 1889 with comments by Sir Francis Galton on a research paper by Edward Tylor which interpreted a cross-sectional correlation between two dichotomous (present/absent) societal traits as indicating functional (causal) association. That is, the presence of one trait in a given society was presumed to cause the occurrence of the other trait in that same society, based solely on the observation that most societies which had one trait had the other, and that most societies which did not have one did not have the other. Galton pointed out that the correlation might be spurious because both traits may have been "derived ... from a common source" and were thus "duplicate copies of the same original" (Tylor, 1889, p. 272). Thus, any cross-sectional relationship between two social traits may be an artifact of the diffusion of one or both of the traits, either independently or together, from society to society, rather than a product of causal connection between the two traits.

In subsequent discussions of Galton's problem, diffusion is seen as transpiring primarily through "pure borrowing" (Ross and Homer, 1976) of traits by one society from another through the usual channels of interaction between societies; through imposition of traits by conquest, colonialism, and economic dependency (Moul, 1974); or through "societal fission" (Strauss and Orans, 1975), primarily migration or separate societal development from a common original. Statistically, Galton's problem means a violation of the basic assumption of independence among observations. It implies that cross-sectional correlations between pairs of societal traits may be biased and, where sampling of societies is involved, may render standard tests of significance unreliable because the number of independent cases may be much smaller than the total sample size (Naroll, 1976). Galton's problem has caused great consternation in anthropology and, to a lesser extent, sociology. In comparative political science, on the other hand, it has been largely ignored, either because it is not taken seriously or because it has only recently been noticed at all.

At least ten different solutions to Galton's problem have been proposed and, as Ross and Homer note (1976, p. 3, n. 9), their number is

> proliferating rapidly. Keeping an accurate count of them is increasingly difficult as it is not clear which solutions ought to be considered independent inventions and which represent duplication from a common original, due to high levels of interaction within the academic community!

Most of these proposed solutions involve some form of adjustment of cross-section sampling procedures, such as stratification of the sample by region or geographic proximity (Naroll, 1961). Similar in purpose are attempts to remove the effects of diffusion (measured, for example, by the similarity of "linked pairs" of societies) by methods of partial correlation analysis, both first-order (Naroll, 1964, 1970) and second-order (Wirsing, 1975). Such solutions have been shown convincingly to be generally ineffective by Loftin (1972, 1975) and by Strauss and Orans (1975, 1978).

Considerable disagreement continues, however, as to whether the operation of functional (causal) association can be statistically separated from the process of diffusion. Indeed, the arguments have become so varied, arcane, and convoluted that ultimate agreement seems hopeless. Ironically, the most effective solution is probably also the simplest and most obvious: replication of hypothesized functional relationships within standard sub-regions of the world (Strauss and Orans, 1978). This solution is remarkably similar to Przeworski's and Teune's (1970) "most different systems design" for comparative research, although that design is never acknowledged.

Meanwhile, apparently unknown to these disputants, Pryor (1976) has proposed detecting lack of independence among observations by examining patterns in a "diffusion possibility matrix" based on measures of diffusion potential between *all* pairs of societies, such as language similarity as well as geographic proximity. A variable based on these patterns can then be included in analyses of functional relationships. Similarly, Ross and Homer (1976) have advocated evaluating functional versus diffusional explanations by incorporating in regression equations measures of diffusion of each of the traits whose functional association is being examined, "such as the score of the geographically closest neighbor sharing the same language" (Ross and Homer, 1976, p. 14). Apparently overlooked by all of the above is Jackman's (1973) treatment of diffusion as a contextual variable influencing the domestic affairs of nations. Jackman suggests measuring diffusion with indicators of international dependence, such as the Trade Composition Index (Galtung, 1971), to reduce specification error in regression models of domestic processes.

Interestingly, the main line of defense for those who refuse to take Galton's problem seriously is a non-statistical argument: that diffusion is unlikely to occur where the diffusing trait is incompatible with the culture of the recipient society (Blaut, 1977, p. 346). Thus, some societies will be "immune" to a trait that is spreading through other societies that find the trait useful (Moul, 1974, p. 152). The diffusion of traits only to societies capable of sustaining them is referred to in the literature on Galton's problem as "semi-diffusion," whereas pure diffusion with no functional basis is referred to as "hyper-diffusion."

Some authors, such as J. de Leeuwe in a comment on Strauss and Orans' first article, go so far as to maintain that "Galton's problem is partly a sham problem and partly practically unimportant . . . for . . . there is the possibility that the diffusion is at least partly an effect of the functional relation between the traits concerned" (Strauss and Orans, 1975, p. 586). Strauss and Orans chide such a notion, claiming that it would make it possible "to avoid Galton's problem by claiming that every case of [adoption of a particular pair of diffusing traits] is an additional [confirmation] for [one's functional] theory" (1975, p. 584). Nevertheless, in a comprehensive analysis of patterns of cultural diffusion in Murdock's (1967) worldwide ethnographic sample, Smith and Crano (1977, p. 145) find support for the notion of semi-diffusion, asserting that "societies are not passive receivers of traits, but rather that the extent of diffusion is purposive and influenced by trait content." Indeed, the concept of semi-diffusion underlies a key feature of our proposed framework for the analysis of social change: the incorporation of the processes of both within-system development and cross-system diffusion in a single model of social change over time.

Diffusion, Development and the Time Dimension

Following its origination in anthropology, the study of the diffusion of social phenomena has sprung up in other disciplines. As with the various solutions to Galton's problem, however, whether this spread was due to diffusion or to independent re-invention is difficult to ascertain, given the scarcity of cross-referencing among studies of the topic in different disciplines. But some disciplines have clearly been slower to adopt (or invent) the idea than have others. The direct focus on the process of diffusion of innovations among individuals and groups as the main engine of social change, rather than on cross-system diffusion as a contaminating variable in within-system causal explanations, has taken firm hold in sociology (Rogers and Shoemaker, 1971; Zaltman, Duncan and Holbek, 1973). This literature reinforces the idea of semi-diffusion, here referred to as "selective adoption," that diffusing innovations will be adopted only if they will be useful for the recipient unit. It also emphasizes the internal characteristics of recipient units in the explanation of the pattern of adoption of any particular innovation.

In political science, the study of the diffusion of political phenomena got started later and, not surprisingly, in several separate subareas. The study of the diffusion of political information (Chaffee, 1975) is closest in spirit to the sociological manifestation of the concept, and further emphasizes the effect of the structural characteristics of a communications network on the pattern of spread of a particular piece of information throughout that network. Another political phenomenon seen as prone to diffusion is political instability, notably military coups (Midlarsky, 1970, 1975; Li and

Thompson, 1975) and civil disorder (Midlarsky, 1978). These studies, although methodologically quite different from those previously discussed, also focus on the question of whether disorder diffuses randomly or is influenced by the domestic conditions which characterize disorder-prone political systems.

Because it requires consideration of both within-system and between-system processes, the concept of diffusion parallels the growing attention in the field of international relations to the linkages between domestic and international processes in a shrinking, increasingly interdependent world (Rosenau, 1969, 1976). Similarly, the concept of diffusion echoes the processes of "parallel national action" (Nielsson, 1978) and more formal types of national integration (Haas, 1976), as well as the economic and political "dependency" between less developed and more developed countries (Chilcote, 1978). Nevertheless, within political science interest in the phenomenon of diffusion itself actually took hold, first, perhaps not coincidentally, in the same sub-area as did comparative public policy analysis: American state politics. The seminal work in this new area of inquiry was Walker's (1969) analysis of the adoption of new policy programs in the states, including the social, economic and political correlates of state innovativeness. Walker's study was then followed by such refinements as examination of state innovativeness in specific issue areas (Gray, 1973); consideration of the influence of the federal government on policy innovation (Rose, 1973; Menzel and Feller, 1977); and analysis of policy diffusion among local governments (Bingham, 1977). As in the other sectors of the literature on diffusion, attention is turning to such considerations as the characteristics of the diffusing innovation, the internal conditions and characteristics of the adopting unit, and the external pressure to adopt (Eyestone, 1977).

Interestingly, the Walker approach has recently been linked to the concern with Galton's problem and hence applied to the cross-national context in an overt attempt to assess the relative effects of development and diffusion on the adoption of social security programs (Collier and Messick, 1975). The evidence they seek for the existence of developmental prerequisites for the adoption of social security, and of "hierarchical" diffusion from more developed countries to less developed ones, is mixed. Collier and Messick recognize the likely effect of developmental prerequisites in a pattern of diffusion down the hierarchy of development; yet they fail to directly consider selective adoption or semi-diffusion as an explanation for social security adoption. That is, perhaps countries that have not yet achieved a prerequisite level of development will be "immune" to the innovation (Moul, 1974, p. 152).

Further, although they discuss the diffusion of other phenomena such as technology, labor movements, and liberal ideology, Collier and Messick do not discuss the possibility that the earlier diffusion of these phenomena among susceptible countries subsequently produced social security programs through the internal policy process in those countries. Eyestone (1977, pp. 446–47) expresses the idea more negatively: "Diffusion patterns may record the spread of necessity rather than the emulation of virtue: leaders may lead because they are also the first to suffer the undesirable side effects of urban and industrial growth which create demands for state policy response."

Although diffusion obviously takes place over time as well as space, most empirical treatments of diffusion have not employed a time-series perspective. Rather, the analyses are still structured cross-sectionally, with such variables as date of first adoption of a policy program or date of first contact with Europeans (Divale, 1976) becoming essentially another static attribute of each case. The problem is that using only cross-sectional analysis, there is no way to determine whether: (1) two statistically correlated traits really are functionally unrelated and were independently re-invented in each society by sheer coincidence; (2) these traits really are functionally unrelated and just happened to diffuse separately through the same set of societies; (3) they were functionally related (i.e., one trait was invented, causing the other to develop) in the society where they originated and then diffused separately or together through the same set of societies; (4) they semi-diffused, with the first trait diffusing through the given set of societies, generating in each the development of the second trait; (5) they developed causally in each society separately, with the first trait being independently re-invented and generating the development of the second trait; or (6) they developed through different processes in different societies. The only hope for disentangling the effects of diffusion and development lies in analysis of these processes as they operate over time as well as space.

Another use of the time dimension has been examination of the across-time pattern of the cumulative number of adopters of a particular innovation, or "knowers" of a given piece of information. The substantive interpretation and mathematical specification of the familiar S-shaped pattern has varied. Chaffee (1975, p.

88), among others, interprets the pattern as a normal ogive, or a cumulative plot of the normal distribution. Thus, it represents a null or random model of the diffusion process characterized by the free flow of information throughout an atomized, unconstrained (i.e., non-structured) communication network in which individuals interact at random. Chaffee notes that the truly interesting patterns of diffusion are instead the non-random ones, in which structural constraints are imposed on the flow of communication. Similarly, the S-shaped pattern of diffusion can be interpreted as a logistic or growth function whose origin, rate and extent are influenced by the process of reinforcement (Hamblin and Miller, 1976). Alternatively, it could be argued that the S-shaped pattern reflects the decreasing marginal utility of innovations, in that they tend to be adopted slowly when they are new and strange, then quickly when they have "caught on," and slowly again when they become passé. This point will enter into the discussion of models of spatial diffusion appearing later in this article.

In other fields, indicators of external influences have been incorporated into time-series models of basically within-system processes, for example, the influence of Soviet military expenditures on U.S. defense budgeting (Ostrom, 1977), and the influence on state education expenditures of similar spending in neighboring states (Manser, Naylor, and Wertz, 1971). But the first study to take a time-series approach directly to the study of diffusion (Klingman, 1977) examined lags in the across-time relationships among national government expenditures of a given type in Sweden, Denmark and Norway from 1890 to 1965 in an attempt to delineate patterns of regional leadership and followership in the development of policy. That analysis, however, did not attempt a multivariate assessment of the relative importance of indicators of both inter-system diffusion and intra-system development, which is, as this brief review of the literature has suggested, the foremost question in the study of diffusion. The remainder of this article will develop a theoretical and methodological framework which can guide investigations of the role of diffusion and development in specific processes of social change.

Diffusion and Autocorrelation

In an interesting application of a time-series concept to the process of diffusion, Loftin (1972, 1975) has drawn a parallel between Galton's problem in cross-sectional analysis of relationships among societal traits and serial autocorrelation in time-series analysis. He even refers to Galton's problem as "spatial autocorrelation" and recommends using standard measures of autocorrelation to detect the operation of Galton's problem in regression analyses of functional relationships among traits of spatially ordered societies (Loftin, 1975, p. 139). He asserts that autocorrelation is "correlation between successive observations" of one variable (Loftin, 1972, p. 430). Such is not the case. Rather, autocorrelation arises from dependence between successive residual errors in estimating a dependent variable on the basis of one or more independent variables (Christ, 1966, p. 228).

Let us examine this difference more closely, first defining the terminology and symbols to be used. The simple regression (ordinary least squares) model for two variables measured across a set of observations (either cases or time-points) is

$$Y = a + bX + e \qquad (1)$$

where Y is an interval-level dependent (endogenous) variable; X is an interval-level or dichotomous independent (exogenous) variable, or predictor; b is the slope or regression coefficient (the estimated number of units of change in Y for each one unit of increase in X); a is the constant or Y intercept (the estimated value of Y when X is zero); and e is the residual error term or disturbance.

For any given observation, e is the difference between the actual value of Y and the value of Y estimated by the regression ($a + bX$), and represents the effects of all unmeasured variables on the regression. Across all observations, the mean of e is zero and the magnitude of its standard deviation, called the standard error of estimate, varies inversely with the strength of association between X and Y. The sampling distribution of e is assumed to be normal and the variance of this distribution is assumed to be uniform across all values of X (or expected values of Y, predicted from X by the regression)—the assumption of homoscedasticity.

In order for these assumptions to hold, the value of e for any given observation must be random and thus independent of the value of e (or X) for any other observation. Thus, the pattern of residuals across all observations should be a random one, even when the observations have been ordered along some theoretically meaningful dimension, such as time or space (i.e., geographic proximity or propinquity—e.g., language similarity, colonial ties, etc.) or simply the value of X (or the expected value of Y). When the pattern of residuals is not random, i.e., when they show a systematic trend across the ordered observations, then the actual values of *Y* will be consistently above expectation in some segments of the ordering dimension (e.g., the early time period, a certain region of the world, or high values of *X*) and consistently below expectation in others.

Under these circumstances the disturbance term will no longer be random, but instead will reflect the systematic influence of one or more unmeasured variables *or* non-linearity in the measured variable (i.e., curvilinear relationships between them) or in the regression parameters (i.e., changing values for the slope and constant). The disturbance term is then said to be autocorrelated, and Kmenta (1971, pp. 451–72) shows the difficulty of determining the exact source of the problem. The major effect of autocorrelation is to render inefficient the estimates of the regression parameters and is thus one source of specification error (see Ostrom, 1978, pp. 25–31). Standard tests have been developed to detect the presence of autocorrelation, such as the Durbin-Watson *d* (Kmenta, 1971, pp. 295–97).

In cross-sectional regression analysis of the relationship between two interval-level characteristics of societies ordered by region, for example, diffusion could indeed be an unmeasured extraneous variable systematically altering that relationship. That is, the dependent variable might be systematically higher than expected in one region because of the spread of that characteristic from one society to the others in that region. It also might have spread less extensively in an isolated region. Diffusion that occurs more extensively within certain groups than others (and less extensively among the groups) is called "segmented diffusion" by Eyestone (1977). Such differential patterns of diffusion might indeed create a non-random disturbance in the regression between the diffused characteristic and another characteristic having a different or nonexistent pattern of diffusion.

It must be made clear, however, that the problem here is not the *trend* across regions in the observations of only *one* of the variables ("correlation between successive observations"), whether that trend is caused by diffusion or anything else (e.g., environmental conditions); rather, it is the systematic patterning of *residuals* in the relationship between the *two* variables. If *both* variables happen to have the same spatial trend (e.g., they diffused in similar patterns), then there will be no systematic patterning of residuals in their relationship. This is true in time-series analysis as well: autocorrelation arises from a non-random disturbance in the relationship between two (or more) variables, rather than from temporal trends within the variables themselves. If the non-random disturbance produces a trend in *one* variable and not in the other, then it is altering the relationships between them and hence is likely to produce autocorrelation. If, however, the non-random disturbance produces the *same* trend in *both* variables, then the relationship between them will *not* be altered, and no autocorrelation will result.

This latter situation precisely characterizes Galton's problem, i.e., the diffusion of two functionally unrelated cultural traits among one set of societies and not among the rest, creating a spurious statistical association between the two traits in cross-sectional analyses. But the above discussion should have made it clear that measures of autocorrelation will *not* detect the similar patterns of spatial trend in the two variables produced by similar patterns of diffusion. Measures of autocorrelation will detect a spatial trend in *one* of the variables (assuming the cases are sorted along a spatial dimension), whether or not that trend is produced by diffusion; but then, the diffusion of only one variable and not the other is not the central concern in Galton's problem. We must echo the conclusion of Strauss and Orans (1978, p. 12) that no rote statistical method can ever with certainty distinguish between functional and diffusional explanations of a given cross-sectional distribution of traits. The best cross-sectional evidence of a functional relationship between societal traits is still a similar magnitude of correlation within standard sub-regions of the world. That is, the best control for the effects of pure spatial hyper-diffusion in cross-sectional research is also the simplest: namely, geographic region.

If Loftin (1972, 1975) were correct in claiming that autocorrelation arises from diffusion-induced dependence between temporally or spatially successive observations rather than between residuals, it would be tempting to discuss temporal autocorrelation as arising from temporal diffusion, that is, the lingering influence *within each variable* of an observation at time *t* on the observation at time *t* + 1, i.e., *trend* in the variables. Again, this is of course not the case; rather, serial autocorrelation arises from a non-random disturbance whose effects on *one* of the variables linger from one time point to the next, thus altering the relationship between the dependent and independent variables (Kmenta, 1971, p. 270). Thus, it is a type of specification error, namely failure to include in the regression model the variable or set of variables causing the systematic disturbance, rather than a product of diffusion between observations over time. This is not to say that diffusion over time does not take place, for indeed in some situations a *trend* in time-series observations *for a single variable* can be viewed as temporal diffusion, with each observation influencing subsequent ones.

Perhaps the most widely known example of this phenomenon is the process of incremental budgeting, one component of which specifies that current budget levels are merely marginal adjustments to the previous year's levels (Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky, 1966, p. 533). Regression models of such processes must employ "lagged endogenous variables" (i.e., prior values of the dependent variable) as predictors (Ostrom, 1978, pp. 46–47). The simplest form of such an "autoregressive" model is

$$Y_t = a + bY_{t-1} + e_t. \qquad (2)$$

For example, expenditures at time t might be viewed as an essentially random adjustment to expenditures at time $t-1$. Thus the slope might be zero, and if the disturbance is not autocorrelated, then current expenditures will fluctuate randomly around a level trend line. Alternatively, the previous period's level of expenditure might be viewed as a base on which to build, thereby creating "bureaucratic momentum" (Ostrom, 1978, p. 46). Thus the slope might be positive, and if the disturbance is not autocorrelated, then current expenditures will fluctuate randomly around an upward trend line. If, however, the disturbance is autocorrelated, then current expenditures will be arranged in non-random (e.g., curvilinear) patterns around *any* trend line, reflecting the systematic influence on expenditures of variables not included in the regression *or* nonlinearity in the regression parameters.

Unfortunately, the presence of both lagged endogenous variables in the regression equation and autocorrelation in the residuals renders the ordinary least squares estimators of the regression parameters asymptotically biased and inconsistent (Ostrom, 1978, pp. 47–51). That is, the sampling distribution of each estimator will no longer have a mean equal to the true value of the parameter, and the variance of that distribution will no longer decrease toward zero as the sample size grows larger. Specifically, when the autocorrelation is positive, the impact of prior values of the dependent variables on its current values will be *over*estimated, and the degree of autocorrelation among residuals will be *under*estimated. The procedures of ordinary least squares and conventional tests for autocorrelation (notably, the Durbin-Watson d) must therefore be replaced, preferably by generalized least squares/instrumental variables (Ostrom, 1978, pp. 51–55).

Spatial Models of Diffusion and Development

The use of time-series concepts in the analysis of distributions of spatially ordered variables is by no means new. Most notably, the examination of non-random patterns in the residuals of regression analyses of spatial variables has been used to identify relevant independent variables that should have been included in the analysis (see Berry and Marble, 1968). However, although spatial patterns of the spread of innovations have been modeled using methods other than econometrics, apparently no one has yet suggested using autoregressive models to describe spatial diffusion cross-sectionally. The form of equation would be identical, except that the subscripts of the endogenous and "lagged" endogenous variables would refer to a spatial dimension (e.g., neighboring societies at one point in time) rather than a temporal one (e.g., serially successive observations of one society). Thus, using s to denote ordinal position in a spatial ordering of societies, the simple autoregressive model would be

$$Y_s = a + bY_{s-1} + e_s. \qquad (3)$$

Using the example of public policy, such a model might describe the diffusion of a new policy through an existing interaction network of officials in different governments (Walker, 1969, pp. 897–98), which one might reasonably expect to be reflected in increased levels of expenditure for that purpose among those governments which adopted the policy earlier than among those which adopted it later. The assumption here is that as the policy innovation diffuses through the network, the adopting governments begin increasing expenditures to implement the policy and continue to increase them over time. This creates a spatial trend in expenditure levels across the spatially ordered governments, with successively later adopters having successively lower expenditures. As in the temporal model, the slope could be zero, reflecting no linear spatial diffusion, or it could be positive (or negative, depending on the direction of spatial ordering), indicating the presence of such diffusion. Also as in the temporal model, non-standard techniques would be needed to obtain unbiased and consistent estimates of the parameters.

Autocorrelation of the residuals in this situation would suggest the influence of domestic-developmental variables or curvilinear patterns of diffusion. In fact, in view of the previously observed S-shaped pattern of diffusion and the theory of the marginal utility of innovations posited earlier, the relationship between neighboring values of a societal characteristic might be expected to be curvilinear. That is, if the variable is interval-level and is one which tends to increase in quantity in a given society over time, then the influence of a given observation on its neighbor should be most pronounced in the middle range of values of the variable rather than in the low or high ranges. This would be expected on the basis of the notion that innovations are adopted least readily either when they are new and strange or when they are passé. Thus the slope of the spatial autoregressive function should be highest in the middle of the spatial dimension and should gradually decrease toward either extreme of that dimension. In other words, the level of the characteristic in one society should influence a neighboring society's level *less* when the level is either low or high, but should influence it *more* when the level is moderate.

Such curvilinearity might be handled by linear transformation, such as the S-shaped "logistic" function (Kmenta, 1971, p. 461):

$$\log\left(\frac{C}{Y_s} - 1\right) = a + bY_{s-1} + e_s \qquad OR$$

$$Y_s = \frac{C}{1 + e^{(a + bY_{s-1} + e_s)}}\,. \tag{4}$$

where log is the natural logarithm, C is an asymptote, and e (not e_s) is the natural constant, 2.71828. If, on the other hand, the curvilinearity is in the regression parameters rather than in the variables (i.e., the slope is linear within different ranges of the value of the variable due to uniform diffusion within, say, regions), then those parameters can be estimated by separate linear regressions for each of those ranges (Kmenta, 1971, pp. 451–72). Finally, if the disturbance is still autocorrelated, it may be necessary to attempt to incorporate the variable causing the problem into the regression. Such a variable will most likely be a domestic-development one, such as level of industrialization.

For simplicity's sake, let us assume there is no curvilinearity in the regression and no diffusion of the developmental variable (designated X) from society to society. The regression equation would then be

$$Y_s = a + b_1 Y_{s-1} + b_2 X_s + e_s. \tag{5}$$

If more than one developmental variable were identified as comprising the non-random component of the disturbance, their inclusion would yield the following general equation:

$$Y_s = a + b_1 Y_{s-1} + \sum_{j=1}^{K} b_{j+1} X_{j,s} + e_s \tag{6}$$

where Y_{s-1} is the value of the dependent variable in the "previous" society in the spatial ordering; $X_{j,s}$ is a vector of K domestic-developmental variables operating only within the "current" society; and b_{j+1} is the vector of K partial regression coefficients (slopes) associated with those developmental variables. Notice that in this model there is still a "lagged" (in a spatial sense) endogenous variable, but the developmental exogenous variable(s) must *not* be lagged. Finally, if the disturbance is still autocorrelated, the remaining steps should involve the more complicated procedures of higher-order autoregressive schemes, distributed lags, and generalized least squares (see Ostrom, 1978, pp. 44–55).

Temporal Models of Diffusion and Development

Now let us briefly examine the temporal case in which both diffusional and developmental processes are operating. Here the observations are for a given set of variables characterizing a few single societies, with the variables observed for each society across a given set of time-points, rather than across many societies at a single point in time. In the simplest form of such a model, the dependent or endogenous variable characterizes one society over time, and one of the independent or exogenous variables is that same characteristic, but for a neighboring society. (Again, "neighboring" can refer to propinquity as well as to proximity.) The characteristic is hypothesized to diffuse from the "exogenous" society to the "endogenous" society, and the former's observations are lagged one period to reflect the time necessary for diffusion to occur. The other exogenous variable in the regression is a domestic-development characteristic of the "endogenous" society and can be either lagged or current with the endogenous variable, according to the theory involved.

The regression equation would thus be

$$Y_{s,t} = a + b_1 Y_{s-1,t-1} + b_2 X_{s,t-1} + e_{s,t} \tag{7}$$

where $Y_{s,t}$ is the value of the diffusing variable in the recipient society; $Y_{s-1,t-1}$ is the value of that same diffusing variable in the donor society; and $X_{s,t-1}$ is the developmental variable within the recipient society. Notice that in this model not only is the developmental variable lagged one period, but there is also a lagged endogenous variable which is lagged in both a temporal and spatial sense. This makes the model "autoregressive" in a spatial sense but not in a temporal sense, since the lagged value of the endogenous variable is not coming from within the same society. As before, such a simple model must assume that the developmental variable does not diffuse from society to society.

As with previous models, the relationships may be curvilinear in the variables, as when diffusion transpires more readily when the diffusing variable is at moderate levels than when it is at low or high levels, forming a logistic function. This sort of curvilinearity will appear in temporal regressions if, as might be expected, the diffusing variable is trended, with its values increasing steadily over time. Again, linear transformations might handle the problem. If the relationships are curvilinear in the regression parameters, one solution is to run separate linear regressions within sub-periods. Finally, an autocorrelated disturbance term would again require the prescribed steps of generalized least squares.

Such a basic model can be extended in several ways. First, temporally lagged but spatially "current" endogenous variables may be included to reflect the influence of prior values of the dependent variable on its current value within the recipient society, making the model temporally as well as spatially "autoregressive." Second, patterns of diffusion among several societies could be examined in sets of equations, each of which uses as exogenous variables the lagged values of the endogenous variables in the other equations. Such an approach would *not* require the use of simultaneous equation procedures such as two-stage least squares (see Johnston, 1972, pp. 376–84) because no *current* value of an endogenous variable would ever appear as an exogenous variable—only lagged values.

Combining all of this yields what might be considered a framework in which to develop specific low-level theories of social change that include cross-system diffusion as well as within-system developmental and incremental processes. Empirical analyses employing such a framework would conceptually require the use of a three-dimensional raw data matrix (variable by society by year). To be amenable to standard computer programs, however, this "data cube" (or, more precisely, "data parallelopiped," since all three sides would not necessarily be equal) would have to be collapsed into a more conventional two-dimensional matrix, as required by the particular program.

The general form of the regression model for such a framework, using slightly different notation, would be

$$Y_{i,t} = a_{i,t} + \sum_{j=1}^{N} b_{i,j} Y_{j,t-p} + \sum_{k=1}^{K} b_{i,k+N} X_{k,t-q} + e_{i,t} \qquad (8)$$

where Y is a diffusing endogenous variable (e.g., level of expenditure for a diffusing innovative policy) varying over both time (dimension t, from 1 to T observations) and space, denoted by two dimensions, each ranging from 1 to N societies: dimension i for the recipient society and dimension j for all societies "donating" the variable to the recipient society. That is, T would define the length of the time period and N the set of interacting societies involved in a particular theory. It is important to note here that by allowing i to equal j, one of the "donor" societies is the recipient society itself in the previous period—that is, the lagged endogenous variable, $Y_{i,t-1}$, the presence of which again would require the use of such non-standard procedures as instrumental variables in order to make unbiased and consistent estimates of the parameters. Note also that the remaining "lagged endogenous" variables, $Y_{j,t-p}$, are not really endogenous because they emanate from outside the Y_i vector.

Again, no simultaneity is involved in this equation because all terms on the right-hand side are time-lagged. p here is the number of periods of lag involved in the diffusion process, and could be conceived in more complicated theories as varying over time or pairs of societies. The right-hand side of the equation also contains an array of K domestic-development exogenous variables, denoted X, each varying only over time within the recipient society. q here is the number of periods of lag for the effects of these exogenous variables on the endogenous variable. It may or may not equal p, and in more complicated theories it may vary from variable to variable or over time. The terms a, b, and e in the equation retain their usual regression meanings.

Finally, a fourth element in the process of social change can be viewed as a set of broad-gauge contextual variables operating only over time and affecting all variables included in the model thus far: namely, global conditions which affect all societies, such as war, depression, and shortage of resources. Adding this dimension to Equation (8) yields

$$Y_{i,t} = a_{i,t} + \sum_{j=1}^{N} b_{i,j} Y_{j,t-p} + \sum_{k=1}^{K} b_{i,k+N} X_{k,t-q}$$

$$+ \sum_{m-1}^{M} b_{i,m+N+K} W_{m,t-r} + e_{i,t} \qquad (9)$$

where $W_{m,t-r}$ is a set of M global contextual variables varying only over time and lagged by r periods. Again depending on the theory involved, r may or may not equal p and/or q, and perhaps could vary from variable to variable or over time.

Including these global contextual variables in the model, of course, entails the risk of multicollinearity between these variables and the other exogenous variables in the equation, notably the within-system developmental variables. The extent of multicollinearity, however, would be an empirical problem contingent upon the specific social change process involved. A complete path model would incorporate links between such global indicators and the other exogenous variables as well as the endogenous variable. Such a model might be amenable to the recently developed methodology of maximum-likelihood estimation of structural equation models (see Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1977), but a thorough examination of this possibility is beyond the scope of this article.

It should be noted that not all terms implied by this general model would have to be included in a given specific model; rather, many terms could be excluded for either theoretical or statistical reasons. In particular, including more than one domestic-developmental variable (X) would increase the danger of multicollinearity. The appendix depicts the simplest example of a model using government spending on social welfare programs and rates of industrialization in three countries. Ignoring for now the effects of global contextual variables, the influences on spending include not only a form of incrementalism (Davis, Dempster and Wildavsky, 1966, p. 533) and such within-system influences as industrialization (Herber, 1967, Ch. 17), but also cross-system emulation (Manser, Naylor and Wertz, 1971).

For some sets of countries or some periods, however, some of the linkages depicted in the appendix may be deemed irrelevant on the basis of a priori theory or external information, or some may prove to be statistically insubstantial or to cause multicollinearity. Other than superfluous indicators of domestic development (X's), the most likely candidates for elimination from such a model might be several of the cross-system linkages, because governments probably emulate only certain other governments rather than all of them. Again, the general regression model is designed to be a framework in which specific theories can be developed rather than an all-encompassing theory itself.

Summary and Conclusion

This article has developed a new approach to the analysis of social change by bringing a comparative time-series perspective to the concept of diffusion and incorporating it into time-series regression models of incremental development. Basically the approach, summarized in Equation (9), seeks to explain the variation over time in a macro-level attribute or action of a social system as a function of a combination of within-system, across-system, and across-time processes: (1) incrementalism, or within-system temporal diffusion of the dependent variable, i.e., the dependence of the current observation on previous ones; (2) within-system development, or the influence of other characteristics of the system itself, with appropriate time lags; (3) across-system diffusion, or the spatial diffusion of the dependent variable from system to system, again with appropriate time lags; and (4) global contextual influences, again with appropriate time lags. This approach, while seemingly complex and methodologically difficult, actually provides a realistic and parsimonious perspective on macro-level social change.

The theoretical and methodological framework outlined here has been derived by merging the literature on the concept of diffusion in several disciplines with the methodology of comparative time-series analysis and, less overtly, with research on within-system development. One of the common themes in the disparate literature on diffusion is the need to consider conditions within systems in analyzing the spread of traits across systems, because systems will vary in their receptivity to external "stimuli." At the same time, analysts of development have begun to realize the possibility that system attributes and actions arise from outside the system through diffusion rather than from inside the system through functional causation.

This article has suggested that both schools of thought can advance even further by adopting a time-series perspective on social change, embracing such concepts as lag, momentum, and incrementalism, and by recognizing the influence of changing global conditions over time on all social systems. Such an approach will facilitate a return to the fundamental purpose of comparative analysis: to explain sources of variation over time and space in the social phenomena which interest us, regardless of whether those sources are internal or external to the social units we study. Such explanation will require not only the broadened conceptual perspective suggested here, but also the broadened methodological perspective provided by comparative time-series analysis of quantitative historical data on as many social units as possible, for as long a span of time as possible.

References

Benjamin, Roger W. (1977). "Strategy versus Methodology in Comparative Research." *Comparative Political Studies* 9: 475–83.

Berry, Brian J. L., and Duane F. Marble, eds. (1968). *Spatial Analysis: A Reader in Statistical Geography*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

Bingham, Richard D. (1977). "The Diffusion of Innovation among Local Governments." *Urban Affairs Quarterly* 13: 223–32.

Blaut, James M. (1977). "Two Views of Diffusion." *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 67: 343–49.

Chaffee, Steven H. (1975). "The Diffusion of Political Information." In Steven H. Chaffee (ed.), *Political Communication: Issues and Strategies for Research*. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, pp. 85–128.

Campbell, Donald T., and Julian Stanley (1966). *Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research*. Chicago: Rand-McNally.

Caporaso, James A. (1973). "Quasi-Experimental Approaches to Social Science: Perspectives and Problems." In James A. Caporaso and Leslie L. Roos (eds.), *Quasi-Experimental Approaches: Testing Theory and Evaluating Policy*. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, pp. 3–38.

Chilcote, Ronald H. (1978). "A Question of Dependency." *Latin American Research Review* 13: 55–68.

Christ, Carl F. (1966). *Econometric Models and Methods*. New York: Wiley.

Collier, David, and Richard E. Messick (1975). "Prerequisites versus Diffusion: Testing Alternative Explanations of Social Security Adoption." *American Political Science Review* 69: 1299–1315.

Davis, Otto A., M. A. H. Dempster, and Aaron Wildavsky (1966). "A Theory of the Budgetary Process." *American Political Science Review* 60: 529–47.

Deane, Phyllis (1968). "Aggregate Comparisons: The Validity and Reliability of Economic Data." In Stein Rokkan (ed.), *Comparative Research Across Nations and Cultures*. Paris: Moulton, pp. 171–85.

Divale, William Tulio (1976). "Using Date of European Contact for Time-Lagged Variables in Cross-Cultural Surveys." *Behavior Science Research* 11: 39–55.

Eyestone, Robert (1977). "Confusion, Diffusion, and Innovation." *American Political Science Review* 71: 441–47.

Galtung, Johan (1971). "A Structural Theory of Imperialism." *Journal of Peace Research* 7: 81–118.

Gray, Virginia (1973). "Innovation in the States: A Diffusion Study." *American Political Science Review* 67: 1174–85.

Haas, Ernst B. (1976). "Turbulent Fields and the Theory of Regional Integration." *International Organization* 30: 173–212.

Hamblin, Robert L., R. Brooke Jacobsen, and Jerry L. L. Miller (1973). *A Mathematical Theory of Social Change*. New York: Wiley-Interscience.

Hamblin, Robert L., R. Brooke Jacobsen and Jerry L. L. Miller (1976). "Reinforcement and the Origin, Rate and Extent of Cultural Diffusion." *Social Forces* 54: 743–59.

Hannan, Michael T. (1971). *Aggregation and Disaggregation in Sociology*. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington, 1971.

Herber, Bernard P. (1967). *Modern Public Finance*. Homewood, Ill.: Irwin.

Jackman, Robert W. (1973). "The Impact of Internation Economic Dependence on Domestic Affairs, or an Approach to Galton's Problem." Presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, New York.

Johnston, J. (1972). *Econometric Methods*, 2nd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Jöreskog, Karl G., and Dag Sörbom (1977). "Statistical Models and Methods for Analysis of Longitudinal Data." In D. J. Aigner and A. S. Goldberger (eds.), *Latent Variables in Socioeconomic Models*. Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Co., pp. 285–325.

Klingman, David (1977). "Galton's Problem in Longitudinal Perspective: Diffusion and Development of Public Policy in Scandinavia, 1890–1965." Presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C.

Kmenta, Jan (1971). *Elements of Econometrics*. New York: Macmillan.

Li, Richard P. Y., and William R. Thompson (1975). "The Coup Contagion Hypothesis." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 19: 63–88.

Lijphart, Arend (1971). "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method." *American Political Science Review* 65: 682–93.

——— (1975). "The Comparable Cases Strategy in Comparative Research." *Comparative Political Studies* 8: 158–77.

Loftin, Colin (1972). "Galton's Problem as Spatial Autocorrelation: Comments on Ember's Empirical Test." *Ethnology* 11: 425–35.

——— (1975). "Partial Correlation as an Adjustment Procedure for Galton's Problem." *Behavior Science Research* 10: 131–41.

Manser, Marilyn, Thomas H. Naylor, and Kenneth Wertz (1971). "Effects of Alternative Policies for Allocating Federal Aid for Education to the States:

A Computer Simulation." In Thomas H. Naylor (ed.), *Computer Simulation Experiments with Models of Economic Systems*. New York: Wiley, pp. 338–51.

Meckstroth, Theodore W. (1975). " 'Most Different Systems' and 'Most Similar Systems': A Study in the Logic of Comparative Inquiry." *Comparative Political Studies* 8: 132–57.

Menzel, Donald C., and Irwin Feller (1977). "Leadership and Interaction Patterns in the Diffusion of Innovations among the American States." *Western Political Quarterly* 30: 528–36.

Midlarsky, Manus (1970). "Mathematical Models of Instability and a Theory of Diffusion." *International Studies Quarterly* 14: 60–84.

——— (1975). *On War: Political Violence in the International System*. New York: Free Press.

——— (1978). "Analyzing Diffusion and Contagion Effects: The Urban Disorders of the 1960s." *American Political Science Review* 72: 996–1008.

Moul, William B. (1974). "On Getting Nothing for Something: A Note on Causal Models of Political Development." *Comparative Political Studies* 7: 139–64.

Murdock, George Peter (1967). *Ethnographic Atlas*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh.

Naroll, Raoul (1961). "Two Solutions to Galton's Problem." *Philosophy of Science* 28: 15–39.

——— (1964). "A Fifth Solution to Galton's Problem." *American Anthropologist* 66: 863–67.

——— (1970). "Galton's Problem." In Raoul Naroll and Ronald Cohen (eds.), *Handbook of Method in Cultural Anthropology*. Garden City, N.J.: Natural History Press, pp. 974–89.

——— (1976). "Galton's Problem and HRAFLIB." *Behavior Science Research* 11: 123–48.

Nielsson, Gunnar P. (1978). "The Parallel National Action Process: Scandinavian Experiences." In Paul A. Taylor and A. J. R. Groom (eds.), *International Organization: A Conceptual Approach*. New York: Nichols, pp. 270–316.

Ostrom, Charles W., Jr. (1977). "Evaluating Alternative Foreign Policy Decision-Making Models: An Empirical Test between an Arms Race Model and an Organizational Politics Model." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 21: 235–66.

——— (1978). *Time-Series Analysis: Regression Techniques*. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage.

Peters, B. Guy, and David Klingman (1977). "Patterns of Expenditure Development in Sweden, Norway, and Denmark." *British Journal of Political Science* 7: 387–412.

Pryor, Frederic L. (1968). *Public Expenditures in Communist and Capitalist Nations*. Homewood, Ill.: Irwin.

——— (1976). "The Diffusion Possibility Method: A More General and Simpler Solution to Galton's Problem." *American Ethnologist* 3: 731–49.

Przeworski, Adam, and Henry Teune (1970). *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry*. New York: Wiley-Interscience.

Rogers, Everett M., and F. Floyd Shoemaker (1971). *Communication of Innovations*. New York: Free Press.

Rose, Douglas D. (1973). "National and Local Forces in State Politics: The Implications of Multi-Level Policy Analysis." *American Political Science Review* 67: 1162–73.

Rosenau, James N., ed. (1969). *Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems*. New York: Free Press.

——— (1976). "International Studies in a Transnational World." *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 5: 1–20.

Ross, Marc Howard, and Elizabeth Homer (1976). "Galton's Problem in Cross-National Research." *World Politics* 29: 1–28.

Sigelman, Lee (1977). "How to Succeed in Political Science by Being Very Trying: A Methodological Sampler." *PS* 10: 302–04.

Smith, Frank J., and William D. Crano (1977). "Patterns of Cultural Diffusion: Analyses of Trait Associations across Societies by Content and Geographical Proximity." *Behavior Science Research* 12: 145–67.

Strauss, David J., and Martin Orans (1975). "Mighty Sifts: A Critical Appraisal of Solutions to Galton's Problem and a Partial Solution." *Current Anthropology* 16: 573–94.

——— (1978). "Residence and Descent is Hyperdiffusional?" *Behavior Science Research* 13: 1–59.

Teune, Henry (1975). "Comparative Research, Experimental Design, and the Comparative Method." *Comparative Political Studies* 8: 195–99.

Tylor, Edward E. (1963; first published 1889). "On a Method for Investigating the Development of Institutions Applied to the Laws of Marriage and Descent." In Frank Moore (ed.), *Readings in Cross-Cultural Methodology*. New Haven: HRAF Press, pp. 245–72.

Walker, Jack L. (1969). "The Diffusion of Innovations among the American States." *American Political Science Review* 63: 880–99.

Wirsing, Rolf (1975). "Second Order Partials as a Means to Control Diffusion." *Behavior Science Research* 10: 143–59.

Zaltman, Gerald, Robert Duncan, and Jonny Holbek (1973). *Innovations and Organizations*. New York: Wiley.

Appendix. Simplified Model of a Social Change Process Involving Temporal and Spatial Diffusion and Development: Social Welfare Spending in Three Countries



$$Y_{1,t} = a_{1,t} + b_{1,1}Y_{1,t-1} + b_{1,2}Y_{2,t-1} + b_{1,3}Y_{3,t-1} + b_{1,4}X_{1,t-1} + e_{1,t};$$
$$Y_{2,t} = a_{2,t} + b_{2,1}Y_{2,t-1} + b_{2,2}Y_{1,t-1} + b_{2,3}Y_{3,t-1} + b_{2,4}X_{2,t-1} + e_{2,t};$$
$$Y_{3,t} = a_{3,t} + b_{3,1}Y_{3,t-1} + b_{3,2}Y_{2,t-1} + b_{3,3}Y_{1,t-1} + b_{3,4}X_{3,t-1} + e_{3,t}.$$

Source: Compiled by the author.

Key: Y_1 = expenditures in country 1
Y_2 = expenditures in country 2
Y_3 = expenditures in country 3
X_1 = industrialization in country 1
X_2 = industrialization in country 2
X_3 = industrialization in country 3

COMMUNICATIONS

ON BOOK REVIEWS

Comment on LaPalombara's Review (Vol. 70, December 1976, pp. 1356-58)

TO THE EDITOR:

In his review of my book, *Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science,* Joseph LaPalombara wrote as follows:

> [Packenham] says (p. 306) that the social scientist should be neither a critic nor an advocate but should "search for truth." Yet this is part and parcel of the behavioral posture of some scholars that leads, as Packenham himself shows, to advocacy masquerading as scientific truth, and to a neglect and abandonment of the *critical* function which necessarily and always must have an underlying normative base. It seems to me well established in our theory if not in our practice of social science that a critical skepticism toward things as they are in society is essential (p. 1358, emphasis in original).

First, I have never stated or implied, on p. 306 of *Liberal America* or anywhere else, that "the social scientist should *be neither a critic nor an advocate* but should 'search for truth.'" My actual view on this matter is well represented by what I *in fact* wrote; this is the full passage from which LaPalombara has selected out a three-word quotation, to which he has added his own words, and of which he has totally changed the content:

> The first and foremost obligation of the theorist, and of the intellectual more generally, is neither to be critical nor supportive of the status quo; it is, rather, to be devoted to the search for truth. It is this quality which principally defines (or should define) the theorist's role in society. *In the search for truth, the theorist may start from premises and come to conclusions that are either critical or supportive of society. Either position is acceptable* for an individual so long as he is engaged honestly and rigorously in the pursuit of truth and so long as no aspect of reality and no societal assumption germane to that pursuit are immune from scrutiny (p. 306, emphasis added).

Thus, far from asserting that the social scientist should be *neither* a critic *nor* an advocate, I stated explicitly and unambiguously that the social scientist may be either a critic *or* an advocate! LaPalombara is not obliged to agree with me, of course—although I confess I am surprised, and also dismayed, to see such vigorous objection to the notion that the scholar's first obligation is to search for truth. Nevertheless, he is obliged to be accurate in stating my position, and this he has failed utterly to do. There is all the difference in the world between the assertion that the scholar's first *obligation* is to search for truth, which is what I said, and the assertion that the scholar should *be* neither a critic nor an advocate, which is what LaPalombara says I said.

Since I never said that "the social scientist should be neither a critic nor an advocate but should 'search for truth,'" it does not follow that "this is part and parcel of the behavioral posture . . . [etc.]."

Second, it is neither self-evidently true nor "well established," in theory or in practice, that "a critical skepticism toward things as they are *in society* is essential." What is essential in social science is a critical skepticism *toward established truths,* an awareness that our understandings of social reality are tentative hypotheses that are always subject to revision in light of facts, logic, and reasoned argument. Such skepticism about what is true, however, can lead both logically and in practice to conclusions supportive of the social order as well as critical of it. The crucial thing for the scholar is to call 'em as he sees 'em. It is no more appropriate for the scholar as scholar to be a knee-jerk critic than a knee-jerk advocate. LaPalombara's dictum that "a critical skepticism toward things as they are in society is essential" would appear to deny the legitimacy of any scholar ever starting from a premise or reaching a conclusion supportive of existing social arrangements. Are conservatives to be read out of the field? Are analyses by liberals and radicals that discover some things in society worth preserving to be thrown out a priori?

Third, LaPalombara also attributes to me a number of other views that are completely different from (and often exactly the opposite of) those that I stated in the book. For instance:

He claims that my definition of political development in will-and-capacity terms at the conclusion of the book *"is exactly where many of us started* before the intellectual homogeneity Packenham deplores began to break apart" (p. 1358, emphasis added). This statement is not only false but also bizarre. LaPalombara wrote in 1963 that "there should be more open and conscious effort to export, not merely American technical know-how, but our political ideology and reasonable facsimiles of our political institutions and practices as well" (1963, p. 60). To this end he offered numerous specific suggestions (pp. 56–60) which I criticized in my book (pp. 264–67). It would be hard to find better examples than LaPalombara's writings of precisely the kind of analysis that it was the main burden of my book to understand and criticize.

In sharp contrast, the definition I adopted in 1973, which reflected a trend in the field that dates from about 1965 or so, was in terms of the will and capacity of a regime, whether or not it had the full complement of liberal democratic institutions and processes (for details, see *Liberal America,* esp. pp. xvi–xviii, xxii, and 336–340, but also 174–91, 196–241, and 257–76). I also made a fundamental distinction in 1973 between (a) protecting personal freedom and (b) the full complement of liberal constitutional democratic institutions. I discussed both (a) and (b) and gave (a) a much higher priority. LaPalombara in 1963 made no such fundamental distinction; he discussed only (b), which he valued greatly. Therefore the statement that his views in 1963 and mine in 1973 were the same is absolutely false.

In another passage, referring to my discussion of the influence of social scientists on U.S. policy makers, LaPalombara writes, "That influence turns out to be, *in the author's view,* a sheer abdication of the responsibility of the social scientist" (p. 1358, emphasis added). In fact, I never expressed such a view in *Liberal America.* Although I was sharply critical of the theories, I made no claims one way or another about "abdication of responsibilities." If, as appears to be the case, LaPalombara wishes to make a blanket accusation of irresponsibility, that is his privilege. But he is wrong to saddle me with his judgment.

LaPalombara claims that I "lumped together" the theorists and failed to notice differences among them. This claim is also false. I divided the writings into many types and subtypes and I analyzed in detail both similarities *and* differences in the literature (see esp. pp. 196–241). In chastizing me for finding patterns in the literature, however, LaPalombara denies to me and others a privilege he often claims for himself. For example, his review repeatedly "lumps" the theorists together: "The so-called theories . . . are not theories at all. . . ," "the intellectual homogeneity . . . began to break apart," "the literature . . . is highly parochial." And only three years after he urged the export of American ideology and political institutions to the Third World, LaPalombara argued that *"Western social science is not much more than thinly-veiled bourgeois ideology"* (1966, p. 15, emphasis added). That's right–not just political development theories, not just political science, but "Western social science"!

In a garbled effort to address the central thesis of the book, LaPalombara writes, "The author makes a good case that the best framework for understanding doctrines and theories of *foreign assistance* . . . is provided by writers like Louis Hartz, Daniel Boorstin, David Potter, Carl Degler, and others. . ." (p. 1357, emphasis added). As a casual reader of the book (or of its subtitle) would know, the book's subjects are doctrines and theories of *political development, not of foreign assistance.*

LaPalombara and I agree that various aspects of the American liberal tradition need to be reassessed, and that tough criticism and vigorous debate are necessary, legitimate steps toward that end.

ROBERT A. PACKENHAM
Stanford University

References

Packenham, Robert A. (1973, 1976). *Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

LaPalombara, Joseph (1963). *Bureaucracy and Political Development.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

——— (1966). "Decline of Ideology." *American Political Science Review* 60: 5–16.

Reply

TO THE EDITOR:

If members of the profession cannot resist narcissistic and exhibitionistic impulses, you, with all due respect, should keep them from the pages of this *Review.* In the case at hand, Packenham invites a public argument of my *1976* review of his *1973* book, a monograph that criticizes the research and writing of others, most of which appeared in the early or mid-*1960s* and were based on research of the late *1950s.*

Shouldn't there be a statute of limitations against these protracted afterthoughts?

JOSEPH LAPALOMBARA
Yale University

Comment on Cannizzo's Review (Vol. 72, December 1978, pp. 1533–34)

TO THE EDITOR:

I was only recently made aware of a review by Cynthia Cannizzo of Rudolph Rummel's *Field Theory Evolving.* Although Rummel subsequently provided a rebuttal to Cannizzo's comments and criticisms, I feel that the nature and style of that review require a more general response from the international relations research community.

I found the Cannizzo review deeply disturbing and equally saddening. My concern is not with the specific criticisms made; my distress relates to the way in which the review is written. What is the intellectual value of statements like the following: "No one has ever been able to improve upon, or overcome, Quincy Wrignt's classic analogy of field theory as a cheese full of maggotts.... Rummel's work does nothing to ameliorate the unpleasantness of this analogy." Or: "Rummels' *Field Theory Evolving* is an affront to philosophers of science, an outrage to statisticians, and will be irrelevant to nearly all international relations scholars and political leaders." Where do such allegations take us as a profession?

Lest I be misunderstood, let me be clear. I am not proposing that criticism be muted, nor am I suggesting that the more established members of the profession be uncritically revered. My plea is for simple courtesy and *constructive criticism.* Reviewers play key roles in the research process and if our discipline is to move ahead, reviewing must be done responsibly. To me responsibility means two things: (1) the assumption that the work under review was the serious and sincere effort of some scholar and (2) the pledge to provide the most useful feedback to the researcher to permit him/her to improve upon that effort. Research is not a game in which scholars rack up points against one another. It is a collective enterprise in which we all gain together, or else we will all lose together.

DINA A. ZINNES

Indiana University

EDITORIAL NOTE

The following articles have tentatively been scheduled to appear in the June, 1980, issue:

Richard M. Merelman, University of Wisconsin, "Democratic Politics and the Culture of American Education"
M. Kent Jennings, University of Michigan, "Comment on Richard Merelman's 'Democratic Politics and the Culture of American Education' "
Fred M. Frohock, Syracuse University, "Rationality, Morality, and Impossibility Theorems"
John F. Padgett, Harvard University, "Bounded Rationality in Budgetary Research"
Ian Lustick, Department of State, "Discounting Disjointed Incrementalism"
James DeNardo, Princeton University, "Turnout and the Vote"
Russell J. Dalton, Florida State University, "Reassessing Parental Socialization: Indicator Unreliability versus Generational Transfer"
Jack Bielasiak, Indiana University, "Policy Choices and Regional Equality at the Soviet Republic Level"
Steven M. DeLue, "Aristotle, Kant and Rawls on Moral Motivation in a Just Society"
William H. Riker, University of Rochester, "Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions"
Peter C. Ordeshook, Carnegie-Mellon University, "Political Disequilibrium and Scientific Inquiry: A Comment on William H. Riker's 'Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions' "
Douglas W. Rae, Yale University, "An Altimeter for Mr. Escher's Stairway: A Comment on William H. Riker's 'Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions' "

Erratum

We apologize for errant proofreading in not catching the consistent misidentification of the author, Robert Lyle Butterworth, in the review of his book (*APSR* 73, September 1979, p. 934).

Being Intelligent about Secret Intelligence Agencies

HARRY HOWE RANSOM
Vanderbilt University

This essay analyzes selected publications since 1974 on U.S. secret intelligence agencies. Published works divide into four categories: memoirs defending the intelligence system, whistle-blowing exposés, scholarly analyses, and reports from executive and congressional studies. What do these materials reveal about the variables determining intelligence system influence in foreign policy decisions? And what do they suggest about criteria for evaluating intelligence performance and product? The finding is that little conceptual progress has been made towards defining the functions of intelligence. But a substantial amount of new illustrative material is now at hand to explore hypotheses such as (1) that intelligence agencies report what they think leaders want to hear, (2) that leaders take decisions without regard to intelligence reports, and (3) that costs often exceed benefits in covert action overseas. We need to understand better the functions of intelligence and to develop theories about the interrelations of information, action, and power within the context of American democratic values. Towards these ends, the article urges the exploitation of the variety of evidence recently published.

Few important subjects have confronted public policy analysts with more formidable obstacles to understanding than the structure and functions of government secret intelligence agencies. Their importance derives both from the theoretically pivotal role of intelligence (information) in decision making and the perhaps unresolvable normative problem of balancing the requirements of American democracy with the presumed need for intelligence agency secrecy.

One major obstacle is the traditional and logical policy that envelops the intelligence activities of government in official secrecy. Not all intelligence work is clandestine. But much of it is and so the entire intelligence apparatus is shielded by official secrecy. This protection sometimes weakens under the onslaught of journalistic or congressional curiosity, yet normally strict controls over the official record are maintained. Usually the public—or the outside scholar—can only know what the government chooses to disclose, Freedom of Information statutes notwithstanding. Consequently, public knowledge is peculiarly subject to manipulation by the intelligence establishment.

A second impediment to understanding is the conceptual confusion, indeed, terminological chaos, surrounding this topic. The term "intelligence" is commonly used interchangeably to refer to a variety of disparate functions, including evaluated information, espionage, counter-intelligence, and covert political action. The most common misuse is to confuse "intelligence" with "spying" and with secret foreign intervention.

These and other obstacles to information and understanding remain. Even so, the number of published works about American secret intelligence agencies in recent years has been enormous and unprecedented. The cloak of secrecy began unraveling in 1960 with the U-2 incident in which President Eisenhower made the unprecedented admission that the United States spies on the Soviet Union by all feasible means. A year later, the Bay of Pigs fiasco trumpeted to all the world that the United States engaged, if ineptly, in covert operations. The secrecy garment was torn again in 1967 when it was disclosed that the CIA was secretly subsidizing dozens of American private organizations. Late 1974, however, became the watershed period, when the *New York Times* disclosed in detail that the CIA had been engaged in domestic spying in violation of its congressional charter. Coupled with CIA complicity in the Watergate scandal, this disclosure began the new era in U.S. intelligence history, initiating a still-continuing avalanche of disclosures about assassination plots, drug testing, mail opening, etc. and of published materials on the intelligence system. This essay focuses on the period since 1974. Up to that time, there was a modest literature on contemporary intelligence, but much of it lacked authenticated, concrete evidence or examples.

The post-1974 literature can be divided into four major categories. First are the personal memoirs of former intelligence professionals, usually written with the help or encouragement of the intelligence system. Such literature is normally reviewed and "sanitized" by intelligence authorities prior to publication. In a second category are the "whistle-blowing" exposés, written by disgruntled former intelligence professionals, reformist journalists or activists. These works are normally not cleared by government censors and in some cases have been impeded by litigation or judicial injunction. In the third category are the social scientists attempting to analyze objectively some aspect of intelligence activities, working primarily from non-secret sources. In a fourth category are the large number of congressional and executive branch studies, hearings and reports, which reflect the compromises of facts and values required by the American competitive political process.

Several basic questions constitute starting points towards an understanding of intelligence policy. These include: what was the CIA supposed to be when it was created by Congress in 1947? What did it become, and why? What has been the nature and quality of its performance? And what ought to be the future structure and functions of a national intelligence system within the American democratic framework? From studying these questions one would hope to see political science served by the development of understanding of the variables that determine how intelligence systems work and of clearly defined criteria for objectively evaluating performance and product. Let us examine publications in the various categories to determine what light they shed on these questions.

Accounts from Inside the Establishment

In the first category are several notable memoirs. Of the recent books by former high-level insiders, William Colby's *Honorable Men* is the most valuable. Only in America could a former intelligence director write a book that candidly discusses his recent experience. Not since Allen Dulles, whose *The Craft of Intelligence* appeared in 1963, has a former CIA Director published a book. Colby's work, written with Peter Forbath, is an important contribution because of his extensive experience from World War II to detente in the wide range of intelligence activities, and the constitutional issues raised. He was deeply involved in the cold war, the Vietnam War, "Third-World" covert operations, and in managing the CIA "scandal" and response to congressional investigations. The book is more useful than the Dulles book, which was uncritical about, and insensitive to, the problem of a secret establishment in a democracy. As might be expected, Colby defends the intelligence system and its record, playing down its failures and its foibles, but his book is no whitewash and he understands the dilemmas posed by secret operations. Colby defines the problem as "threading the thin line between responding to the Congress' constitutional right to know and protecting legitimate intelligence secrets" (p. 13). As an autobiographical account of 30 years in intelligence, Colby's book supplies interesting detail. Among its disclosures is that the White House entourage, including Vice-President Rockefeller and Henry Kissinger, opposed Colby's general policy of disclosing the CIA's past record to Congress and the public. Another category of revealing details concerns America's covert politics in Italy, the CIA's largest covert-action program ever undertaken, which Colby operated between 1953 and 1958, with the objective of supporting "the center democratic political parties" (p. 115), as well as non-Communist trade unions, competitive democratic cooperatives and cultural and civic groups. This was done through the dispensing of tens of millions of American dollars to various Italian recipients in a patently illegal operation. Though illegal, this was done for the purpose of containing communism in Western Europe and countering similar efforts by the Soviet Union which was subsidizing Communist party activities in Italy. Colby claims success for the program in one of those arguments that can be accepted only on faith. A third among many relevations is the startling admission of the enormous power that had been sequestered in the hands of the counter-intelligence division within the CIA, under the leadership of James Angleton, whose organization at one stage was producing, in Colby's view, no "tangible results" but who at the same time could not easily be dislodged from his position of secret power (which included his control of the liaison with Israeli intelligence). Colby found that he simply could not fire Angleton, whom he saw as a liability, because Colby feared that "Angleton's professional integrity and personal intensity might have led him to take dire measures if I forced the issue of either his Israeli relationship or his continued employment" (p. 365).

Honorable Men is filled with additional details about the internal operations of the CIA in its three "subcultures" of the covert information gatherers, the covert political activists and the analysts. Also supplied are details about Vietnam operations in which Colby was deeply involved, the various interventions in Chile, Colby's tenure as CIA director in the stormy period of congressional investigations, and finally his dismissal by President Ford.

Colby expresses faith that secret intelligence agencies can be brought within the controls of the American constitutional framework. On the other hand, the symbolism of his title *Honorable Men* seems to be based upon the unacceptable idea that one must ultimately have faith in honorable men rather than laws. Colby's position on this is at least ambiguous. One other missing element in this otherwise impressive book is any detailed account of the significant successes of the intelligence system.

In *Secrets, Spies and Scholars* (1976), Ray S. Cline, who spent 30 years as an intelligence professional, offers an autobiographical account of the development of U.S. intelligence. His is somewhat less revealing than Colby's book on some of the major policy issues, yet it offers considerable detail from an insider's view—being essentially an apology for the intelligence system. Cline served in high intelligence positions in both the CIA and the State Department. Cline offers his book as a "contribution to political science" (p. xii), yet other than his detailed proposals for reforming the structure of the intelligence system, he offers few generalizations or conceptual progress. Perhaps the problem is that he became imbued with the netherworld of secrecy and was unable to step into the role of objective critic of the system for which he worked so long. As he puts it: "The rarified atmosphere of clandestine work intrigued me" (p. 171). Because he was action-oriented, Cline became a clandestine operator, serving as CIA Chief of Station in Taiwan from 1958 to 1962.

Although Cline is generally defensive about, and an apologist for, most of the CIA's activities over the past 30 years, he nonetheless concludes his memoir by proposing a radical structural change that essentially would separate intelligence analysis from clandestine activities. Cline's book is not a systematic survey of intelligence in the political process; it is chiefly valuable as a personal memoir adding some significant insight into the mind-set of an educated intelligence officer and some important details as to the intelligence organization's historical evolution, particularly under Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson.

William R. Corson's *The Armies of Ignorance* (1977) is one of the most useful secondary sources yet published. It is not exactly a memoir, although the author had a long career as a military intelligence professional with a wide variety of assignments in politico-military intelligence work that gave him good insights into secret intelligence. Nor is it entirely a secondary source, for the author has included all-too-numerous verbatim reprints of important official documents. Many of these are fascinating but they tend to clutter up the analysis. Throughout the long book, important "pre-theory" questions are raised. Unfortunately, Corson did not deal with the topic systematically and the book has the quality of a rough draft of what might have been one of the modern intelligence classics. It falls short of that distinction by its discursiveness and loose organization. Perhaps the book's most suggestive section is its first chapter in which the author interprets how a growing intelligence empire has responded to each successive presidency, starting with Truman. The author's general proposition is that "each of the new presidents has come to his role [as first intelligence officer] unprepared to take it over" (p. 4). More often than not, the intelligence system has, in Corson's view, managed to co-opt the presidency. This is an exceptionally insightful inside view of the bureaucratic maneuverings underlying the growth of the American intelligence "empire." Anyone with a serious interest in the organizational growth of the U.S. intelligence system and the interplay of intelligence agency politics cannot ignore this book. It is a valuable resource and reference, although it will be hard going for the general reader, for whom a book half its length would have been more useful.

David Atlee Phillips resigned from the CIA in 1975 to organize former U.S. intelligence officers into the Association of Retired Intelligence Officers and to write *The Night Watch* (1977). Like his efforts to organize an intelligence lobby, his book is a personal memoir designed to spread the CIA gospel—and presumably to counter Philip Agee's *Inside the Company: CIA Diary* (1975) (discussed below). Phillips guides the reader through his career, from the time he was recruited by the CIA in Chile, to his assignment as station chief in Brazil and Venezuela and ultimately as chief of the Western Hemisphere Division of the clandestine services. He was deeply involved in covert actions in Guatemala, Cuba and the Dominican Republic. Phillips has less new to reveal for the historical record of events involving these various notions than he does about the character and personality of intelligence professionals and their world outlook. Essentially, life and secret operations appear to them a game to be approached sometimes gleefully, sometimes cynically. With this book as basis, one finds it difficult to take seriously the clandestine "tradecraft." Essentially, the book takes for granted that the U.S. must conduct covert operations. Phillips does not offer an adequate rationale for such activities; excitement and adventure appear to be the motivating forces for covert operators. Another message that comes through is that the CIA tends to be a personal instrument of the president. This book adds savory spice but too little of substance to the intelligence pudding.

Peer De Silva's *Sub-Rosa: The C.I.A. and the Uses of Intelligence* (1978) is another book that combines the personal memoir with a defense of the intelligence system against its critics. De Silva became a CIA officer in 1953 and served as operations chief for Soviet Russian activities for three years; later he served in the Far East, first in Korea in 1960, and in Saigon as Chief of Station. He offers some insight into the bureaucratic politics and maneuvering in the field among CIA, the armed services and State Department. But readers are not offered sufficient information to form an evaluation of the quality of CIA's work. And the book compounds the conceptual confusions that abound regarding intelligence work, failing to distinguish among "intelligence," "counter-intelligence," "espionage," and "covert action."

Like most others in this category, Harry Rositzke, in *The CIA's Secret Operations: Espionage, Counterespionage and Covert Action* (1977) seeks to counterbalance the widespread public criticism of the CIA. His book is not a timid response, but an astute narrative and analytic account of CIA espionage, counter-espionage and covert action. It focuses on Rositzke's main professional interest since 1946: operations against the Soviet Union. His detailed accounts do not constitute a whitewash, for Rositzke concludes that much of CIA's clandestine activity over the past 30 years has been counter-productive, time- and resource-wasting, or just foolish. But he believes it crucially important to maintain an intelligence and covert action capability in order to protect America's major world-wide interests from predatory adversaries. Even so, he is aware that secret operations are but instruments of foreign policy. Rositzke offers little in the way of analyses of intelligence failures. The failures in covert action, however, he attributes to policy failures. He proposes a modest agenda of unexceptionable reforms.

In sum, the books in this category offer an aggregate of personal experience, attitudes, and world views. Together they supply a significant number of jigsaw pieces to the composite picture of an intelligence system created with the deliberate intention of concealing some of the crucial pieces in the picture. Answers to the basic questions posed at the outset are not frontally addressed by these works.

Polemics, Raw and Refined

In a second category of recent literature are the polemical works of axe-grinders, whistleblowers and activists. Some of these works are by former intelligence professionals, defying secrecy regulations. Others are by journalists and activists aiming to expose what they consider intelligence agency inefficiencies, corruptions or violations of constitutional principles.

Perhaps the most notorious of this category is Philip Agee's *Inside the Company: CIA Diary*. Agee's book is not a true diary, but a reconstructed account of his 12 years in the CIA, during which time he served as a covert operator primarily in Ecuador, Uruguay and Mexico, where he was engaged in bribing politicians, forging documents and other forms of hokery-pokery. Agee came to be disaffected not only from his employer, but also from capitalism. A newly self-styled "revolutionary," he decided to expose all names of secret agents and cover organizations that he could remember—an action that made him a virtual exile. His book supplies some detail about various covert actions in Latin America, how the CIA recruits and trains its own personnel, and how foreign agents are manipulated. While Agee's book has the ring of authenticity, it inadvertently reveals how little was accomplished and how CIA capers resemble the scripts of Marx Brothers movies. This book leaves one wondering whether most covert operators are to be taken seriously.

The Lawless State: The Crimes of the U.S. Intelligence Agencies is, as the title suggests, more of an analytical indictment than an objective analysis. It is a team effort, assembled by a group from the Center for National Security Studies headed by Morton H. Halperin (1976). If one seeks a digest of the vast number of pages of congressional hearings and reports, government commission studies, and journalistic essays and opinion, this book serves that purpose. As the title suggests, the book emphasizes abuses and makes little effort to place the behavior of intelligence agencies within the historical context. The first section of the book deals with the CIA overseas and the FBI at home, with case studies of CIA operations against Allende in Chile and FBI's vendetta against Martin Luther King, Jr. The second section focuses heavily upon the activities of various major U.S. intelligence agencies against the Vietnam War and civil rights protest movements of the 1960s and the book concludes with reform proposals. Its chief value is as a polemical compendium of information on the intelligence investigations, disclosures and "scandals" of the 1960s and 1970s.

Covering much of the same ground but in greater depth is David Wise's *The American Police State* (1977). The hyperbolic title suggests the author's stance, which derives from his concern with the "misuse of the police power of the state against individuals who dissent from established policy" (p. 413). This is the work of a sophisticated journalist who has gone well beyond the published material and official sources. He has interviewed more than 200 intelligence officials and former officials and many of their targets. The book focuses on internal spying by U.S. intelligence agencies, including the CIA, FBI and Internal Revenue Service. Wise may exaggerate in some ways the degree to which the United States had become a "police state" by the late 1960s, but his book should be considered an essential item in any collection of literature on the functioning of government intelligence agencies during the years of the Nixon administration. It contains important details about the all-too-quickly forgotten intrusion by police and intelligence agencies into the lives of Americans and warns of the tendency of agencies designed for national security to injure some things they are trying to protect.

Frank Snepp's *Decent Interval* (1977) gives rare insight into how well the CIA performed operationally overseas. It is an account, based upon the author's personal diaries as well as government documents and interviews, of the final days of the U.S. presence in Vietnam and a striking indictment of the CIA's performance. Snepp's account argues that official myopia, lack of planning and ignoring hard information endangered the lives of CIA operatives and informants and resulted in a hasty American withdrawal in 1975 which left behind thousands of Vietnamese whose loyalty to the U.S. cost them their freedom, or in many cases, their lives. Snepp accuses the government of covering up massive bungling, waste and deception. He published this book in the face of CIA's efforts to prevent its publication and to punish its author. Snepp's purpose was to expose dramatically what he considered to be a poor operational performance. Whatever the merits of his judgments, we are supplied with a datum useful for an overall intelligence agency performance evaluation.

John Stockwell's *In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story* (1978), a personal memoir, focuses on another example of CIA performance, the intervention in the civil war in Angola in 1975–76. Like Snepp and others, Stockwell has published this book in defiance of CIA regulations. After 12 years of service in the clandestine service, Stockwell became disillusioned, pessimistic about internal reform or effective congressional control and decided to argue in print that the clandestine services of the CIA should be abolished. He reached this decision after heading a CIA task force in 1975–76 that ran the CIA's secret para-military intervention in Angola. The CIA's Angola program is the vehicle for his efforts in this book to characterize the clandestine mind and to show the functioning of the secret bureaucracy for covert action. It has become decreasingly rare to have such a view from the inside about the clandestine service, but Stockwell's angry testimony cannot be ignored by those who would understand how the system works.

Also worth mentioning in this category is Joseph B. Smith's *Portrait of a Cold Warrior* (1976). This work is not so much an anti-CIA polemic, but a low-key personal account of a 25-year career in the CIA's clandestine services. Smith's book was presumably cleared for publication by the CIA and it appears to reveal no state secrets other than that the CIA "emperor has no clothes." This book received relatively little attention, for it offers no dramatic exposé, but it contains convincing detail about the moral decay that can characterize an organization based upon deception and the principle that the ends justify any means. Even more arresting is his argument that the clandestine service often created a false intelligence base to justify some of its covert interventions. Smith believes in the crucial importance of an intelligence service and he does not write in hyperbole, but as a sensitive observer he became disillusioned as a CIA professional and deeply concerned about CIA "drift toward Gestapo status" (p. 434). His book deserves a place on the intelligence bookshelf.

Three other books need mentioning here: *Dirty Work,* edited by Philip Agee and Louis Wolf (1978); *Uncloaking the CIA,* edited by Howard Frazier (1978); and *The CIA File,* edited by Robert L. Borosage and John Marks (1976). All are collections of essays and comments generally critical of the intelligence system. The last, *The CIA File,* is the most substantial and least strident of these books. The former two books represent a variety of "New-Left" criticism and many of the writers represent the view that the CIA be abolished.

Another book that may belong peripherally in this category is *The Search for the Manchurian Candidate* by John Marks (1979). Writing as a civil libertarian, Marks makes a serious effort to reconstruct carefully the details of intelligence agency experiments with "mind-control" and behavior modification techniques. This highly secret activity designed to inform the government on how to control human behavior would have remained in the shadows without the efforts of Marks and his associates, armed with the Freedom of Information Act. He details a wide range of intelligence agency experimentation with drugs, hypnosis and a variety of behavior modification techniques and demonstrated that many of these programs went forward in the absence of political accountability.

Applying the Tools of Scholarship

In the category of scholarly works, the number of items remains small. Even with all of the disclosures of recent years, obstacles to research are formidable.

Lawrence Freedman's *U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat* (1977) is an example of a rare effort to study the prime intelligence function of informing decision makers of events and prospects abroad, and to evaluate how successfully the intelligence system has performed that function. Freedman also explores the process of producing intelligence estimates and how the structure affects the product and its influence. His analysis is based not only on the published record but also on interviews with some of the principal actors. The substance of the analysis centers on six case studies, including the "missile gap," the debate over antiballistic missiles, and the search for an invulnerable deterrent. The author's analysis suffers from the lack of access to actual intelligence estimates and more fundamentally the absence of a theory of intelligence. This absence makes it difficult to categorize intelligence "failures" or "successes." Freedman's principal finding is that the perception of external threats is a political process in which prevailing strategic doctrine and U.S. policy makers' attitudes towards defense spending and arms control are as crucial in determining policy as are the intelligence estimates. The book helpfully explodes the myth that perfect intelligence would resolve all policy disputes.

Another book focusing on the internal activities of the intelligence agencies is *Spying on Americans: Political Surveillance from Hoover to the Huston Plan* (1978) by Athan Theoharis. This heavily documented history analyzes the relationship between the presidency and the intelligence system, particularly the questions of accountability and control by responsible political authority. Primary emphasis is on the FBI although the National Security Agency and CIA come under scrutiny. Writing from the vantage point of a civil libertarian, the author finds that all administrations since Franklin Roosevelt's have permitted intelligence agencies too much license, to the detriment of the constitutional rights of citizens. The book has a reference book quality, summarizing a vast amount of published documentation, informed more by a civil libertarian ideology than a conceptual yardstick.

Also notable is *The Reform of FBI Intelligence Operations* (1979) by John T. Elliff, the leading academic specialist on the Federal Bureau of Investigation. His book explores the risks versus benefits of giving the FBI wide authority to gather intelligence about terrorists and spies, or, in effect, the dangers of maintaining an American political police force. He argues that detailed restrictions must be placed upon the FBI and he believes that with such reforms, the bureau can operate within the bounds of the U.S. Constitution. From this book one can gain an understanding of the policy debates, the evolution of the Attorney General's "guidelines" for the FBI, and the dimensions of professional and political responsibility with regard to this aspect of the intelligence function.

American Espionage: From Secret Service to CIA (1977) by Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones emphasizes the half-century of experience with intelligence in the United States from 1898 to 1947. This study, bearing the marks of a doctoral dissertation, explores some new ground with the purpose of putting the contemporary U.S. intelligence system in an historical context. The author's investigation has ranged widely into archival, unpublished, and official documents and memoirs. He is more successful in his research on the period through World War II than in his efforts to analyze the postwar period, which is dealt with in sketchy and discursive fashion. This work has value in demonstrating that many of the issues related to intelligence agencies in America are not new.

Proliferation of Government Reports

Spurred on by *New York Times* reports of late 1974 that the CIA had seriously violated its charter and engaged in domestic spying, a number of important government studies of the intelligence system were initiated. In early 1975 the president appointed the (Rockefeller) Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, the U.S. Senate created the (Church) Select Committee on Intelligence Activities and the House established the (Pike) Select Committee on Intelligence. At the same time, the (Murphy) Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, a joint legislative-executive undertaking, devoted a segment of its wide-ranging study to intelligence. In aggregate, millions of dollars were allocated and hundreds of staff persons undertook to study the U.S. intelligence system during this 1975–77 period. These efforts left in their wake a vast array of published hearings, reports and special studies on what formally was a highly secret function of the federal government. A complete list of congressional hearings and reports on this subject in the 1970s would number more than 100 separate items. Many of these, such as the Church Committee Report (1976), the *Village Voice* (1976) version of the "Pike Papers," and *Appendix U* of the Murphy Commission Report (1975) will serve as important sources for analysts of intelligence and covert operations for many future years. These documents represent considerably more than the "tip of the iceberg" on the subject, although more disclosures are likely to be forthcoming. A valuable reference work including 1000 pages of excerpts from the most significant of the government publications is *The Intelligence Community* (1977), compiled and edited by Tyrus G. Fain and others. Also useful is the bibliography by Blackstock and Schaf (1978).

Conclusions

In sum, the executive purpose and the legislative intent in creating the CIA remain somewhat obscure. Nonetheless, for two decades in the context of cold war consensus, the CIA became the multi-functional agency that operated world-wide in intelligence analysis, espionage, counter-intelligence and covert political action. Now that the consensus has evaporated, evaluating CIA's multi-faceted performance is the challenge, and a necessity. Available but incomplete evidence seems to support the proposition that intelligence has too often seriously failed to forewarn policy makers and that in covert political action costs have exceeded benefits. As of this writing, after five years of executive commissions, congressional hearings and reports and an unending volume of literature of the type described, the executive-congressional decision-making structure has been unable to reach a new consensus on a redesigned intelligence system, legitimized by a "charter" that precisely defines functions and sets limits. I believe this to be a fundamental policy requirement.

Even if answers to certain historical questions remain elusive, what aggregate theoretical knowledge is derivable from the recent literature? Systematic research requires that events and relationships be observable. With respect to secret intelligence, not only are concepts poorly defined, but also many events and relationships are obscured from scholarly observation by secrecy. Even those who have been intelligence professionals normally have worked in tight compartments, and have themselves had access to very limited views of systems and behaviors. Empirical evidence needed for a systemic overview consequently has been in short supply. The above-cited expansion of the bibliographical foundation since 1974, however, offers a wealth of new evidence, suggesting new research frontiers. Perhaps the time is at hand for conceptual progress, inviting the first few steps down the long road to theories of intelligence.

From years of reading and reflection on strategic intelligence, I am convinced that the functions of intelligence constitute the largest gap in our understanding of how foreign policy decisions are made. Discussions of intelligence "failure" abound, but we lack an acceptable theory of intelligence that permits systematic evaluations of performance by clearly defined criteria. The elaborate intelligence process includes a number of steps, from the setting of information requirements to the use of processed information in decisional choice. An understanding of how this process works has been severely hampered by secrecy. If knowledge is power, then political science badly needs better knowledge of the intelligence structure and process. Without it, the descriptive, let alone the explanatory or predictive, power of the discipline remains seriously deficient.

Until disproved, the following hypotheses, partly intuitive, appear to represent reality: intelligence systems tend to report what they think the political leadership wants to hear, and whatever is reported, leaders often take actions without regard for the intelligence reports. If it is true, intelligence makes little difference in policy formation. The unwise decisions after 1947 to combine the disparate functions of foreign intelligence, counter-intelligence and covert political action under the CIA roof have compounded the problem of structuring a proper relationship among secret information, policy making and action in foreign affairs. Intelligence may be less a policy determinant and more an ingredient to be manipulated by policy makers. Once in power, leaders seem compelled to support the maintenance of secrecy. Probably this is because leaders discover that control of secret information provides the leverage for political power. Concerns about the information-power relationship are perhaps the hidden agenda in the current politics of restructuring the intelligence system. Predictably, the politics of reestablishing the intelligence system has become a partisan issue. Note that the Republican National Committee in August, 1979, issued a broadside, condemning the Carter administration's plan for reorganizing the intelligence community, and proposing alternatives. And so efforts over recent years to rearrange the system of intelligence secrecy, to include Congress and the judiciary, and to define precise limits for the activities of intelligence agencies, have met with enormous difficulty. Basic elements of power are at stake. Political science needs to know more about knowledge and power, information and action. We can be encouraged that substantial evidence now is being disclosed, such as that contained in the literature described above, to aid our important search for this knowledge.

References

Agee, Philip (1975). *Inside the Company: CIA Diary.* New York: Stonehill.

——— and Louis Wolf, eds. (1978). *Uncloaking the CIA.* Secaucus, N.J.: Lyle Stuart, Inc.

Blackstock, Paul W., and Frank L. Schaf, Jr., eds. (1978). *Intelligence, Espionage, Counterespionage, and Covert Operations.* Vol. 2 in the International Relations Information Guide Series. Detroit: Gale Research Company.

Borosage, Robert L., and John Marks, eds. (1976). *The CIA File.* New York: Grossman.

Cline, Ray S. (1976). *Secrets, Spies and Scholars: Blueprint of the Essential CIA.* Washington, D.C.: Acropolis Books, Ltd.

Colby, William E., and Peter Forbath (1978). *Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA.* New York: Simon and Schuster.

Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy (1975). Murphy Commission *Report* and *Appendix U,* Vol. 7. Washington: Government Printing Office, pp. 7-102.

Corson, William R. (1977). *The Armies of Ignorance: The Rise of the American Intelligence Empire.* New York: Dial Press, James Wade.

De Silva, Peer (1978). *Sub-Rosa: The CIA and the Uses of Intelligence.* New York: Times Books.

Elliff, John T. (1979). *The Reform of FBI Intelligence Operations.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Fain, Tyrus G., Katherine C. Plant and Ross Milloy, eds. (1977). *The Intelligence Community.* New York and London: R.R. Bowker.

Frazier, Howard, ed. (1978). *Uncloaking the CIA.* New York: Free Press.

Freedman, Lawrence (1977). *U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat.* London: Macmillan.

Halperin, Morton H., Jerry J. Berman, Robert L. Borosage and Christine Marwick (1976). *The Lawless State: The Crimes of the U.S. Intelligence Agencies.* New York: Penguin Books.

Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri (1977). *American Espionage: From Secret Service to CIA.* New York: Free Press.

Marks, John (1979). *The Search for the Manchurian Candidate.* New York: Times Books.

Phillips, David Atlee (1977). *The Night Watch.* New York: Atheneum.

Rositzke, Harry (1977). *The CIA's Secret Operations: Espionage, Counterespionage, and Covert Action.* New York: Reader's Digest Press.

Smith, Joseph Burkholder (1976). *Portrait of a Cold Warrior.* New York: Putnam's.

Snepp, Frank (1977). *Decemt Interval.* New York: Random House.

Stockwell, John (1978). *In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story.* New York: Norton.

Theoharis, Athan (1978). *Spying on Americans: Political Surveillance from Hoover to the Huston Plan.* Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (1976). *Final Report.* Washington, Government Printing Office.

Village Voice (1976). "The CIA Report the President Doesn't Want You to Read: The Pike Papers." Introduction by Aaron Latham. February 16, 1976, pp. 69–92; February 23, 1976, pp. 59–69.

Wise, David (1977). *The American Police State.* New York: Random House.

BOOK REVIEWS

Political Theory and Methodology

Political Theory and Praxis: New Perspectives. Edited by Terence Ball. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977. Pp. vii + 281. $16.75.)

This volume of nine essays was to have been presented to the late Hannah Arendt. It is now dedicated to her memory. The essays are not so much written at the knee of Hannah Arendt as face to face with her work. Most of the authors are informed by what I might call "Berkeley metaphysics": they share a perspective formed in the understanding and vision of political thought which developed in Berkeley (though not only there) between 1955 and 1975.

Such a vision of political thought is characterized by an attention to the terms and metaphors of political discourse; an appreciation of politics as a profoundly human and humanizing activity; an argument that the modern state is increasingly characterized by highly rationalized forms of social organization which tend to dehumanize–depoliticize–important human relationships. Politics is thought of as important in itself, not primarily in terms of "who gets what"; thus "community" and "participation" tend to be more important words than "conflict" and "power." Lastly, this understanding of politics must resist those tendencies in modern thought which would reduce politics to something else (economics, psychology, "needs," perhaps even ethics, etc.).

Two related perspectives dominate here. As a whole (a loose whole), the book attempts what one might perhaps call only slightly too pompously a "transcendental deduction of politics." All of the essays seek to answer the general question, "What makes politics possible?" The analysis centers around the concept of "praxis," i.e., the fusion of thought and action in which activity discovers itself as its own object.

Secondly, by his organization of the volume, the editor makes the implicit argument that the tradition of political thought is still of central importance to modern times. Thus, after an introduction by Terence Ball and an overview of the problem of theoria and praxis by Nicholas Lobkowicz, we have two essays (on Thucydides and Plato and Aristotle) on "Origins"; these are followed by three (on Kant, Hegel, Marx and Nietzsche) on "Developments," followed by three on "Dilemmas and New Directions" (on Hannah Arendt, on "Politics as Action" and on "How people change themselves"). Two concepts govern the argument embodied in this general organization. First, the authors share the view that it is possible for political philosophy to "make a difference," that is, to enhance for human beings the realm in which free choice is possible. It is under the false perspective of causal necessity that human beings most easily avoid rational and responsible choice. As J. Peter Euben argues, "The belief in necessity is self-fulfilling." Secondly, the realm of free and responsible choice is generally for the authors the realm of speech, or, as Habermas now teaches us to call it, of "communicative competence." Ball argues that "Language makes politics possible."

Thus for all the authors there is potentially a realm, tenuous and of the moment though it be, in which the theoretical life and the life of action are not incompatible. Such moments are evanescent, as Nichols' analysis of politics as action and rebellion makes clear; but they are nonetheless redemptive and renewing of humanity. It is as this point that I enter a first criticism. The volume omits any serious consideration of Christian thought. Even if one accepts Ball's argument that Plato's thought is enimently "practical" and not a withdrawal from the world, there remains a whole strain of thought in which the tension between understanding and action runs more darkly than it does for the authors these writers consider. St. Augustine, for instance, was greatly bothered to the end of his life by the holy ascetics who removed themselves from the world for a life of perfection and understanding. Ball does note that the choice seems to be to "change the world or to leave it"; but the option of leaving the world is given short shrift and is almost never seen in full tension with the possibility of changing it. Later developments of this problem show up in the concatenation of medieval arguments which result in the slow development of the idea of "office," in Montaigne, Calvin, and importantly in Rousseau. By jumping from Aristotle to Kant (and Carl Raschke's Kant looks forward rather than backward), we are never given any analysis (except in Lobkowicz' brief overview) of *how* the "conceptual history"–the genealogy–of theoria and praxis evolved. If the modern "theory-practice problematic . . . is radically different than in antiquity," then we would like to know why and how. Lobkowicz' denial that there was a theory-praxis problematic at all between Descartes and Kant is either wrong or too cryptic to be left in such a bald form.

Thus far I have emphasized what the authors have in common, for this is that rare collective book which hangs together. A few words about each of the essays is also appropriate, for they are of interest individually as well as collectively. Lobkowicz' essay is an overview of the history of theory and practice. It remains an overview, with most of the themes developed at greater length in his book on the topic. His central concern is to show that there are (still) actions which are intrinsically meaningful without reference beyond themselves to other actions. This was inherent in the Greek conception and still carries a validity, even in our age which attempts to deny such a vision.

J. Peter Euben has written a profound, scholarly meditation on Thucydides and more centrally on Thucydides' argument about the role of Pericles. Since for Thucydides the reconciliation of political thought is only achievable by human beings and defines their humanity, Euben is led to pay attention to the centrality of leadership and of its relation to citizenship. If I read him correctly, he would have us learn from Thucydides that part of the crisis of contemporary citizenship is the crisis in leadership. (The volume would have acquired an interesting symmetry with an essay on Max Weber.) Terence Ball's essay argues that it is Aristotle and not Plato who begins to present an understanding of the person of thought as stranger to the polity. Aristotle is the parent of more modern "instrumentalist" views, albeit an unwitting one.

Carl Raschke's essay contains two separate arguments which do not come together for me as easily as they seem to for him. First, he is concerned to rescue Kant from Hegel's interpretation, viz., that Kant leaves us with a radically bifurcated understanding of the self. This involves Raschke in a proper and important focus on the will in Kant's thought. Secondly, however, he tries to link his understanding of Kant on the will to essays such as "Idea for a Universal History." Thus he depicts an almost dialectical relationship between the moral self and the realm of "nature." For Raschke, this becomes a link to Marx, in that Kant seems to be arguing that the moral will can only be realized under certain historical and social conditions. This is an interesting claim; but it seems to place Kant closer to Hegel (though not Hegel's interpretation), rather than to Marx.

For Peter Fuss, Marx almost allowed us to escape from the prison of Hegel's concept of human emancipation. Marx's indebtedness to Hegel was so great, however, that he merely resurrected Hegel's civil service as the proletariat. Anything "universal," it would seem, cannot for Fuss provide the grounds for a reconciliation between theory and practice. In this vision of the importance of "parochialness," Fuss seems to touch on some themes which Euben raised in his essay.

Edward Andrew's piece continues some of the themes on the relation of Marx and Nietzsche of which he has written elsewhere. This is good material, even if occasionally he lines the two up side by side and merely points at similarities. There are important relations between the two, especially on the epistemological level. I wish that Andrew had been able to address himself to the fact that though the two resemble each other greatly epistemologically, they remain very different on the level of *who* is to take action. Here there is an interesting dialogue between Andrew's attraction to both Nietzsche and Marx and Fuss' pained rejection of Marx.

Richard J. Bernstein presents Hannah Arendt's understanding of theory and practice with his usual clarity and insight. He then sketches a critique which has as its basis some of the ideas which are central to Raschke's essay, namely, that moral and political freedom must be understood as possible only under certain social conditions. Thus, while he accepts Arendt's view of political freedom, he tries to conjoin it with a vision of "social liberation." It is an important critique, not completely new, though Bernstein was one of the first to make it. I suspect that it is a much more radical critique of Arendt than Bernstein admits.

Raymond Nichols has written a difficult, interesting attempt to mesh different notions of comedy with ideas of political action. He claims that it is not enough to speak of "action" as a good itself; rather one must speak, as he claims Arendt does not, of different types of actions and thus of different types of comedic rebellion. Perhaps this is right, but Arendt does give a defense of not doing so. I suspect that under the scintillation and fireworks and seeming unconventionality of Nichols' essay, there lurks a very conventional vision of the relation between ethics and politics, one which Arendt was at pains to reject.

Finally, Brian Fay writes an essay rooted in critical theory which describes an "educative" vision of theory and opposes it to an "instrumentalist" one. At root, Fay argues, humans are caught in certain pictures of understanding which produce self destructive patterns of social relationships. He poses the problem profoundly and well: it was Nietzsche's problem too. For if we are deeply structured in a perverse way, who are we to be if we would do other than what we do? And to this, Fay must only say, no answer presently exists.

In fine, a good book: provocative, scholarly, generally integrated by a common vision. "Berkeley metaphysics" perhaps, but we have and continue to learn much from them. It reminds us that neither are our problems without a history, nor is our history without problems.

TRACY STRONG

Amherst College and Smith College

Idealism and Revolution: New Ideologies of Liberation in Britain and the United States. By David Bouchier. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979. Pp. ix + 190. $19.95.)

Failed radical movements produce critics who need only hindsight to appear as profound social theorists. The enterprise seems useful enough–the understanding of such movements and their failures could teach us much about problems of social criticism, reform, and reconstruction in these troubled times. In this "sociological inquiry into some of the social movements of the sixties," David Bouchier rejects sterile academic criticism. He declares that "this is not just a critical analysis but a sympathetic, positive and active one" (p. ix). Unfortunately, "sterile academic criticism" is a phrase which characterizes the book's weaknesses.

Bouchier's work is marked throughout by this combination of good intentions and failed performance. Questions posed for answering are not answered, arguments claimed to have been made are not to be found, empirical investigations alluded to are not described or apparently used, and analytical frameworks are put forth but not employed.

The first two chapters of the book delineate a model for the comparative analysis of radical ideologies. By "model" the author means nothing more than a "conceptual scheme." This scheme is based on Mannheim's sociology of knowledge, the problems of which Bouchier treats with care and insight. The model focuses on three "cognitive problems" of radical ideology–de-legitimation, dis-alienation, and commutation. In other words, radical ideology must challenge the legitimacy of existing institutions, must overcome the felt powerlessness of its adherents by explaining how those institutions might be changed and must disseminate and validate its claims to knowledge.

Unfortunately, this scheme is put to poor use in the descriptive studies of chapters 3 through 6. Bouchier candidly warns the reader that these accounts of movement ideologies, focused on Students for a Democratic Society in the U.S., the International Marxist Group in Britain, radical women's liberation in both countries and the counterculture, are "loosely structured" around his categories.

The studies are derivative, pedestrian and punctuated by non-sequiturs and value judgments. For example, according to Bouchier, SDS failed as a social movement because of the theoretical errors of rejecting liberalism and Marxism. The IMG faltered because of its commitment to Marxist orthodoxy. Women's liberation avoided the errors of revisionism and sectarianism only to fall prey to reformism. And, of course, the drug-crazed hippies of the counterculture produced no ideology at all. So much for the sixties and radical ideologies.

Some interesting ideas are presented in the last chapter, "Radical Idealism and Revolution." "Radical idealism" is the label given by Bouchier to ideologies which are based on the notion of the end of scarcity, which focus on alienation, and which maintain that consciousness is capable of producing movements for social change. The author mistakenly claims that he has shown such ideologies have a "transformative potential." Since such ideologies are the products of marginal intellectuals, since marginal intellectuals are on the increase and since they have access to "potent new forms of knowledge" and the mass media too, therefore, the transformation of industrial societies is imminent and "mass society pessimism" about powerlessness, cooptation, apathy and capitalist resilience is passé.

All of this is further marred by assertions which are contradicted pages or only paragraphs away. The result is sloppy social science, superficial history, and jargon-ridden journalism. Bouchier finally declares that "social science can produce the reasoned, self-critical basis for a genuine understanding of modern society, leading to an effective radical critique" (p. 170). Maybe. But if this book is an example of what he means by social science, don't bet on it.

LARRY D. SPENCE

Pennsylvania State University

The War Game: A Critique of Military Problem Solving. By Garry D. Brewer and Martin Shubik. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979. Pp. ix + 385. $18.50.)

Two experts with long experience in modeling, gaming and simulation (MSG) seek in this volume to provide a critical overview of the methods and context of their war-related applications, and to secure support for steps to improve the technical quality and policy pertinence of those applications. They present information, conclusions and recommendations pertinent to parties directly involved—MSG developers, sponsors, and managers—and those who because of public policy responsibilities find themselves using MSG results or dealing with policy and budget proposals supposedly arrived at through applications of models, games and simulations. More broadly, the book should interest social scientists concerned with the quality control of innovations in the policy sciences as well as those concerned with the analytic basis for defense policy. In important respects, the volume deals more with the sociology of knowledge and knowledge-related techniques in an institutional context than with the internal technical elements of models, simulations, and games. The study was in large part conducted under the auspices of the RAND Corporation with funding from the Department of Defense.

The War Game begins with general background on modeling, gaming and simulation and their uses for military and defense problems, provides an intriguing historical review of the devleopment of the techniques for those applications, and summarizes the fundamental nature and major applications of major technical parts of the field (mathematical and game-theory models, manual games, man-machine games, machine simulations). It then draws on the results of a survey by the authors in cooperation with the General Accounting Office to describe the practices and self-awareness which prevailed at the time (the early 1970s) with regard to the purposes, construction and operation, and policy contributions and resource costs of MSGs. Because they are concerned not with the techniques in a vacuum but instead with them in the U.S. national security system, they then examine in considerable detail the participants and the process as a whole with respect to MSG for military applications. Finally, they pull together the explicitly reformist strands which run through the volume in a lengthy set of recommendations to improve the use of MSG techniques to provide a more trustworthy, self-conscious, and professionally disciplined contribution to defense decision making.

They provide a more than sufficiently documented argument to the effect that current institutional and technical practices warrant the gravest reservations in relying on the results of models, games and simulations for defense policy. In part this is because of the paucity they found of quality concerns (with input data, with assumptions setting parametric values and stipulating relational terms, with sensitivity testing) and quality control practices (documentation, external review, identification of MSG builders). More fundamentally, their institutional analysis of roles and incentives and disincentives suggests that current modes of doing business with respect to defense related MSG applications makes self-correction highly unlikely. In these respects, their warnings have serious implications for non-defense applications as well. To correct this unfortunate situation, they advance recommendations drawn from two frames of reference. The first is that of the scientific professions and the authors suggest steps to make MSG practitioners more subject to the quality incentives which are incorporated into scientific professions. The second is that of consumer protection with recommendations for sanctions by informed consumer representatives to discourage shoddy work. Concern with the safeguards which should be imposed on MSG applications pervades the volume.

There is no doubt that the case for improved safeguards is made convincingly and those who seek to manage the development or use the results of modeling, gaming and simulation are provided with useful suggestions of a quite practical nature. In other respects the volume is less rewarding. The authors assume but do not establish the desirability of an MSG profession as distinct from the participation in MSG activities of persons whose primary identity lies elsewhere (e.g., military operations, national security affairs, statistics, applied mathematics). They stop short of pursuing the substantive bias with regard to policy recommendations the current way of doing business is likely to produce beyond the suggestion that it will reinforce buyer policy preferences. If certain considerations are persistently under-represented in the uses of modeling, gaming and simulation (the authors suggest that those linked to "soft" variables are), there may well be a bias toward technology intensive options. If the bias is to rationalize already preferred choices, their suggestion for adversary uses of MSG should go further and specify who the adversary should be to be really motivated by different interests. Here other parts of the executive branch capable of sustained bureaucratic effort need to receive consideration. Self-monitoring by professionals with a homogeneous world view and source of funds has not been very impressive elsewhere. Why should models, games and simulations be an exception? While a large amount of money is spent on them annually (over 30 million dollars), the issue of whether or not these expenditures matter in a special sense seems moot. The discussion of policy use in this book does not get to the point of induced policy variance. Nor is the relative contribution compared with other methods addressed, i.e., have models, games and simulations introduced more distortion and erroneous judgment than would otherwise prevail? Clearly these are difficult questions to answer, but they are cardinal questions for those with any but the most immediate interest in the MSG industry or efficient expenditure. Unfortunately, the numerous descriptions of MSGs provided stop before the authors treat the national security merits of their conclusions.

DAVIS B. BOBROW

University of Maryland

Leadership. By James MacGregor Burns. (New York: Harper and Row, 1978. Pp. ix + 530. $15.00.)

James MacGregor Burns contends that for some time we have lacked a theory of leadership, not only one appropriate to democracy, but a general theory of universal application. In American thought, this deficiency is understandable, since our political roots lie in the revolt against arbitrary executive authority. We created the position of chief executive in our Constitution, but constrained it as though to defeat what we had created. Throughout our history, our view of leadership has been negative, largely because of our experience with varieties of political bossism. We, therefore, never generated an affirmative theory or doctrine of political leadership "that recognized the vital need for qualities of integrity, authenticity, initiative and moral resolve" (p. 25). Moreover, the term "leadership" has become hackneyed. It is a favorite nostrum, perhaps because of its confused and conflicting conceptualizations.

Accordingly, Burns has set out to redefine leadership in the hope that a better understanding of the phenomenon and an appreciation of what it can contribute may clarify the needs of our time. As he says: "If we know all too much about leaders, we know far too little about leadership. We fail to grasp the essence of leadership that is relevant to the modern age and hence we cannot agree even on the standards by which to measure, recruit or reject it" (p. 2).

This is the task Burns has set for himself and in this work has provided a reevaluation of the concept and a provocative analysis of its significance. The posture that he adopts is to describe various leaders, e.g., Wilson, Mao, Lenin, Hitler, not in order to "solve" leadership problems or necessarily to predict what kind of a leader a person might become, but to raise questions inherent in the complexity of leadership processes (p. 25).

Burns has been a student of leadership for some time. Indeed, it has been the principal theme of his distinguished work. From his early outstanding political biography of Franklin D. Roosevelt through his other notable works on the presidency and American politics in general, the problems of and the need for leadership have been a central concern. This book is, therefore, a distillation of Burns' prodigious scholarship and concerned reflection on the subject.

The book is divided into four parts. Part 1, entitled "Leadership: Power and Purpose," includes two chapters in which the author evaluates the state of our present understanding of leadership, presents his rationale for its redefinition, and states his own. Part 2, consisting of three chapters, is devoted to the various factors that contribute to the selection and recruitment of leaders. These chapters examine the prevailing conceptions of the psychological, social bases of leadership, and the crucibles of leadership in the social and political opportunity structures. Part 3 discusses transforming leadership in its historic and comparative roles in England, France, China, the USSR, and the United States. Part 4, the largest section, appraises the extensive literature on political leadership as it is manifest in various roles: opinion leadership, group leadership, party leadership, and legislative and executive leadership. The concluding section pulls it all together and explores the implications of the conception of leadership that is offered and its practical implications. A separate section on sources at the end of the book is itself an illuminating compendium of the extensive literature that the author has consulted.

Burns lays the foundation for his conceptualization by arguing that the academic literature on leadership is fragmented and has not really followed the direction of its insights. "Scholars have worked in separate disciplines and subdisciplines in pursuit of different and often unrelated questions and problems" (p. 3). But modern psychology, sociology and psychiatry have for some time discredited an instinctual and non-interpersonal conception of leadership based on traits held by some. Leadership is not a thing, but a relationship between leaders and followers. And this relationship, to Burns, is primarily a psychological one.

Burns rejects the conception of leadership that equates it exclusively or solely with power and domination. He proposes a conception that, he believes, offers a richer and deeper grasp of human relationships than conceiving of them only in terms of power. Too often, Burns maintains, the latter equates leadership with coercion and exploitation. But "not all human influences are necessarily coercive or exploitative. The most powerful influences," he contends, "consist of deeply human relationships in which two or more persons engage each other" (p. 11).

To be sure, leadership is a power relationship that rests on more than motives and resources. It must also include purpose. Intent and purpose can open up the mutually supportive or symbiotic aspects of leadership. Power without purpose is naked power, which is not leadership at all. True leadership consists of "leaders inducing followers to act for certain goals that represent the values and motivations, the wants and needs, the aspirations and expectations of both leaders and followers. Leadership is inseparable from followers' needs and goals" (p. 19).

Burns is critical of much of the literature on the psychology of leadership. Of limited value is psychoanalytic theory with its emphasis on oedipal conflicts. These may result in guilt and wounded self-esteem for which wishes for power provide defenses. The striving for political influence may flow from motivations other than a wish for power: for example, the need for self-actualization. Indeed, Burns denies that any single factor explains the motivation of leaders or would-be leaders. Psychoanalytic theory has other limitations. It slights "the role of followers who closely mold the behavior of leaders" (p. 61). It also makes insufficient allowance for learning and fails to "provide an adequate explanation of the dynamic biological and social interaction in personal growth or of healthy or rational potentials in human beings" (p. 63). Skinner's behaviorism is also inadequate because it "minimizes motivation and overemphasizes environmental factors" (p. 63).

In Maslow's theory of motivation, which rests on a conception of human needs, Burns finds the psychological grounding for a satisfactory theory of leadership. In Maslow's conception, human needs are ranked hierarchically. In the development of motivations, physiological needs are primary, followed by needs for safety and developmentally by stages where the needs for affection and belongingness become dominant. Once a lower need is met, a person can give priority to the next higher level. The author concedes that Maslow's theory is "imprecise and confirming empirical studies are limited," but nevertheless states, rather surprisingly, that "such evidence exists and has been supported by historical experience" (p. 70).

Leaders and followers are located at various need levels which determine their orientations toward politics. Thus "individuals whose needs for safety are dominant are likely to react to political events with uncertainty and insecurity when dealing with normal political processes, and with a yearning for a leader who may serve as a guide and a simplifier" (p. 66). The need-level of followers, therefore, determines their response. Thus, FDR's popularity in the thirties came about when workers, "their immediate needs satisfied, felt secure enough to throw their collective weight into the economic struggle over industrial unionism" (p. 70).

The research that Kohlberg and others have done on moral development furnishes a theory that complements Maslow. In this theory, moral development occurs in stages. In the earliest stage, human conduct is moved to compliance out of fear of punishment from superior power. Then follows a stage of adolescent conformity and conventionality. On the most mature level, morality is the result of rational choice and adherence to rationally chosen principles. These two theories are complementary, so that progressive moral development and progressive need development animate leadership, "politicize it, and enliven it with moral purpose" (p. 73), defining its goal and greatest contribution.

Leadership plays its proper role in elevating people from lower to higher levels of needs and moral development. And true leaders come from self-actualizing individuals who are motivated by a desire to grow, to be efficacious, and to achieve, rather than to be famous; in short, to fulfill themselves. Self-actualizers are true leaders because they are sensitive to the needs of others and learn from others. Therefore, "self-actualization means the ability to lead by being led" (p. 117), and self-actualizing leaders can lead followers toward their self-actualization by helping them to become aware of their "true" needs.

The true leadership relation is not limited to politics. It is a powerful educative relationship that helps followers to rise to higher levels of fulfillment and moral development. As Burns writes: "It is only when leadership itself is seen as pervading virtually every level and sector of society, rather than being limited to the formal institutions of government, that one can say with confidence that it is mainly in the crucible of leadership that the transmutations of 'lower' needs into higher and the refinement of political demands takes place" (p. 119).

Leadership is thus manifest in two basic types: transactional leaders and transformational leaders. Transactional leaders have an exchange relationship with their followers. Such leaders respond to and further the interests of their followers. Transactional leaders resemble the broker politicians who commonly characterize American politics, the prototype of the politician in a democratic pluralistic politics. The function of transactional leaders, in whatever association they are found, is adaptability. Although transactional leaders respond to human wants and needs, the relationships are superficial because "they are dominated by quick calculations of costs and benefits" (p. 258). Transactional leadership is, therefore, constructive, but limited.

By contrast, transformational leadership is leadership at its highest level. "Such leadership occurs when one or more persons engage with others in such a way that leaders and followers raise one another to higher levels of motivation and morality" (p. 20). Their purposes become fused. The best modern example is Gandhi, "who aroused and elevated the hopes and demands of millions of Indians and whose life and personality were enhanced in the process. More explicitly such leaders operate at need and value levels higher than those of their followers" (p. 43). They can, therefore, appeal to the more widely and deeply held values, such as justice, liberty and brotherhood. They can redefine aspirations and gratifications to help followers see their stake in new, program-oriented social movements. Yet, Burns recognizes, too, that means and ends may conflict. "Some of those believing in equal opportunity today may also believe in certain modes of conduct, endless debate, for example, or elaborate procedures for judicial review, that make the attainment of equal opportunity far less certain" (p. 43). Nevertheless, "essentially the leader's task is consciousness-raising on a wide plane" (p. 44).

Both transactional and transformational leaders contribute to human purpose. Transactional leadership relations teach or express those moral values embodied in means—honesty, fairness, and the nonoring of commitments. Transformational leadership is concerned with the end-values, such as liberty, justice, and equality. In our time, Wilson and FDR are examples of the more principled types of leadership.

The leadership Burns seeks then has several characteristics. It is collective—"as followers respond, symbiotic relationship develops that binds leaders and followers together into a social and political collectivity" (p. 452). Leadership is dissensual because "conflict produces engaged leaders, who in turn generate more conflict among the people. Conflict relevant to popular aspirations is also the key democratizer of leadership" (p. 453). Leadership is causative; it makes a difference. "The most tangible act of leadership is the creation of an institution—a nation, a social movement, a political party, a bureaucracy—that continues to exert moral leadership and foster needed social change long after the creative leaders are gone" (p. 454). And yet, "the most lasting and pervasive leadership of all is intangible and non-institutional. It is the leadership of influence fostered by ideas embodied in social or religious or artistic movements, in books, in great seminal documents, in the memory of great lives greatly lived" (p. 455).

Leadership is morally purposeful and transforming leadership is elevating. Thus, the most dramatic test in modern democracies of the power of leaders to elevate followers and of followers to sustain leaders was the civil rights struggle in the United States. There were those who pandered to base instincts, the very negation of leadership, but many more who appealed to the spirit of a "moral commitment of the American nation to high ideals," as Myrdal said years later (p. 455).

Leadership is a provocative and stimulating book. It presses for a new perspective on leadership, uses wide-ranging examples, and is written in an earnest and, at times, impassioned style, diluted by redundancy. It expresses a deeply felt social urgency and concern that give force to its message. In a sense, this is not only a book about leadership; it calls for new, intensified, and uplifting political relationships. Burns seeks more of the intense commitment that is found in social movements. Leadership, in this sense, is the chosen instrument to that end.

Burns' redefinition of leadership stems from a psychological approach which is highly controversial. Sometimes called "The Third Force" in psychology (alongwide psychoanalysis and behaviorism), humanistic psychology, which questions the preeminence of both the rationalistic and empirical in psychology, has attracted a devoted following, as well as vigorous criticism. The differences it has with other schools of psychology stem not only from methodological grounds, but also from fundamental philosophical assumptions. Within the scope of this review, such differences cannot be discussed adequately. Our concern must be limited to its relevance to political science.

It must be said at the outset that despite the coherent linkage between Burns' conception of leadership and the theories of motivational and moral development, they lack the precision of a theory. How shall we proceed now or in the future to test the validity of many of the propositions, other than impressionistically?

Burns' conception of leadership as a means for progressive change from lower to higher levels raises certain questions. Because my orientation is more scientific and pragmatic, I regard this new conceptualization with considerable skepticism. To put it bluntly, I think of political leadership as a means toward "getting things done," and this may be enough. In our times, we have seen leaders and movements that aimed at transcendence of "lower" needs succumb in the end to self-interest, corruption, and abuse of power. What is the defense against such developments in Burns' conception? It can also be argued that durable, moral change has resulted from the more limited exchange relationships of transactional leaders, with perhaps less cost, than from transformational leaders.

The conceptual difference between transformational and transactional leaders is clear, but in reality how much difference is there? The broker and the great reformer are often combined in the same person.

In the end, for all the importance that the study of leadership deserves (and we are in debt to Burns for reminding us of present confusions and inadequacies), one wonders whether humane purposes are as good a defense as are constraints of means. Perhaps there is wisdom in our ambivalence toward leadership. Excessive hopes for and reliance on leadership may well be at the cost of institutionalized norms that defend us against the vagaries of authority. Fundamentally, democracy and liberalism must rest not on personal and elevating leadership, but on institutional leadership and conditional attachments to them according to their governing competence checked by their accountability. Isaiah Berlin once said that it was characteristic of the twentieth century to treat problems not by solving them, but by redefining them. Burns' redefinition has opened a new and challenging perspective for all of us to ponder.

LESTER G. SELIGMAN

University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defense. By G. A. Cohen. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979. Pp. xv + 369. $18.50.)

Whatever its merits, much of the recent scholarship on Marx's philosophical humanism puts off the reader from the more controversial claims of Marx's theory of history. In this regard, G. A. Cohen's elaboration of an "old-fashioned view" of historical materialism is a major *tour de force.* Cohen takes seriously Marx's "guiding hypothesis" that the level of development of the productive forces explains the historical development of production relations, class struggle and other noneconomic activities. As a writer schooled in Marx and in Anglo-American philosophy, he provides a clear, unconventional and powerful account and defense of Marx's theory of history. To his credit, Cohen has already inspired books by two of his students on a similar theme (William H. Shaw, *Marx's Theory of History,* Stanford, 1978; John McMurtry, *The Structure of Marx's World-View,* Princeton, 1978). Cohen's own argument, however, is far more interesting.

Cohen pursues a pivotal distinction in *Capital* between material and social aspects of production, the material being defined as the physical labor process itself, the social as the set of production relationships in which this process occurs. The material aspects are the human content of the productive process, the social its relatively transient historical forms. This distinction enables Cohen to capture Marx's persistent emphasis on the laborers' skill and applied scientific knowledge as part of the material development of human productive powers (despite the confusion of some critics, Marx does not use the term *material* as opposed to *mental* but as opposed to *social*). Given this distinction, Cohen also offers a novel interpretation of communism as the abolition of social roles and the emergence of richly diversified human individuality.

According to Cohen, Marx defends a functional theory: the production relations come to be as they are through an historical process because such relations are suited to develop the productive forces. He follows Marx in suggesting that certain productive forces and social classes will encourage or select items coherent with their needs from the relatively autonomous, specific historical traditions of a society. That a certain political phenomenon might serve a certain function does not mean that such a phenomenon already exists or will simply arise within a given society. Instead, Cohen's account calls for an examination of the quirks of actual history. Unlike fashionable caricatures of Marx's guiding hypothesis, Cohen's account traces the dialectical role of production relations, class conflict and historical traditions in arresting or spurring on the productive forces.

Although Cohen draws examples mainly from the transition from feudalism to capitalism, he also appeals to contemporary socialist experience in evaluating the theory. Ironically, Cohen's "productive forces" analysis provides broad alternative models for explaining how the Russian or Chinese revolutions could be socialist, taking into account the international setting and their ability to learn from more advanced U.S. and European technology, in a far more flexible way than many recent humanist accounts of Marx's theory (Avineri's or Richard N. Hunt's, for example). Though he reads Marx's distinction between the socialist realm of necessity and the eventual communist realm of freedom too narrowly, Cohen properly utilizes subsequent socialist experience to suggest far greater potential for cooperative and political motivations in necessary production than Marx himself did. Cohen elaborates the postulates underlying Marx's views on class oppression as a necessity to produce a sufficient surplus for socialism and communism, and hence clarifies the structure of an alternate view (pp. 214, 324–25; unfortunately, Cohen pays insufficient attention to Marx's own study of political experience as a vehicle for refining his theory). All these arguments are made with exceptional care, clarity and rigor.

Cohen's two philosophy of science chapters on functional explanation are the best part of his argument. Here he observes that, given the general theory, Marxists often make functional claims to explain such facts as: "Left-wing commentators receive little space in major American newspapers," even where the exact causal story (the how) may be lacking. Cohen contrasts Marxian use of functional explanations, based on the development of the productive powers and envisioning class conflict and revolution, to the conservatism of structural functionalism. Through sophisticated comparisons with biology, he shows that some functional explanations are true (as opposed to Hempel) and that some Marxian explanations may be numbered among them.

Yet although Cohen suggests that the theory explaining the function and not the correlation or function is the primary feature of Marxian (or Darwinian) explanation, he overstresses relatively simple examples of function—for instance, concerning economies of scale in a firm. Curiously, he gives no major, worked-out examples of functional explanation either from Marx's own writings or from subsequent history which would have rendered his defense of Marx's theory more plausible. For instance, Marxists have often misinterpreted racism as an "epiphenomenon" and neglected its role as a divisive force among workers. Yet Marx stressed the functional character of racist ideology, and characterized the success of the English ruling classes in stirring up racism among English workers toward Irish immigrants as "the secret of the impotence" of the English labor movement. Similarly, for the contemporary United States, Michael Reich has shown that where black workers are paid the lowest, U.S. white workers also receive their lowest incomes and the income differential between most whites and the top one percent of whites is at its greatest. These arguments suggest that racism serves the capitalist class but not the workers of a majority nationality. Yet as functional explanations, such arguments are static and ahistorical. Is there an accompanying causal story to be told about how racism develops which would explain its varying intensity and consequences in different historical situations because of ruling-class interests?

This frequent lack of historical or political flesh on Cohen's solid theoretical skeleton—a defect which, despite his Marxism, he shares with many Anglo-American philosophers—is the most disappointing feature of the book. Though he attempts to delimit the parts of the theory which he will cover, he touches upon many important issues without sufficiently examining them. While he remarks the relevance of subsequent socialist experience for Marx's theory, he never explores whether class conflict continues in Russia or China or whether either one was or is socialist. Cohen suggests that reforms under capitalism will succeed where the workers fight militantly to obtain them and where such reforms will serve a function by stabilizing the system. But such "stabilization," as he fails to notice, often occurs at the expense of the workers' movement. For instance, many radicals (probably including Cohen) would view today's U.S. union leaders as tied in with the capitalist establishment; yet they are so in part because of a coordinated cold war attack by government and business which resulted in the expulsion of 10 unions from the CIO in the late

1940s and the blacklisting of communists and other militants. More vigorous rank and file unions like the ones that conducted the sit-down strikes of the late 1930s were apparently not functional. Further, though envisioning a need for proletarian revolution and socialist transformation in the West, Cohen offers only an alternative Marxian interpretation of capitalist "growth-mania" as opposed to reducing the hours of labor, and omits any discussion of war or other circumstances which might generate a strong radical movement.

In a single volume, he need not—and could not—have discussed all of these difficult issues. As his own argument elicits them, however, he seems to spend disproportionate philosophical energy and subtlety on relatively fine distinctions in Marx's theory of the productive powers. Nonetheless, the considerable achievements of Cohen's account will outlive its defects.

ALAN GILBERT

University of Denver

Individuality and Community: The Social and Political Thought of John Dewey. By Alfonso J. Damico. (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1978. Pp. vi + 137. $10.50.)

The principal objective of this study is to indicate and assess the ways in which Dewey's writings relate to individuality and community. Hence, the book is properly subtitled, "The Social and Political Thought of John Dewey." It is fortunate that there has been no dearth of Dewey's writing. He was a lifelong, persistent and prodigious writer. There is no problem about allowing Dewey to speak for himself as he had always done. In fact, the list of his writings from the late nineteenth century to 1936 covered 65 pages (see Schlipp, pp. 611–76) and he was still writing in nis nineties.

Since most of what Dewey has to say appears properly in lengthy quotations from Dewey himself, one need not question Dewey's position. Nor is there any dearth of writing about Dewey. Damico's list of such writing is in fact much longer than the list of Dewey's writings. This list contains many items, some suggestive and favorable to Dewey, some quite critical, and some that appear rather remote from Dewey's problems.

Dewey, at an early stage, was concerned about the progress of natural science, at a later stage by pragmatism and by his belief in instrumentalism which, according to Damico, could be the answer to the need for a reconstruction of philosophy. In the *Quest for Certainty* it could of course mean more than that. A community is "a group of men engaged in collective action who share common beliefs and have some degree of common understanding." Such communities must, of course, gather together groups of economic concern and those of governmental concern. A problem that initially appears is how to concentrate on the development of groups that serve common community interests and operate, for example, without serving restricted groups—whether governmental or otherwise. This is a problem that led Dewey to concentrate on the need of those which emphasized the development of positive rather than negative action, specifically for the support of liberalism and democracy. This led him at an early stage to beware of negative communitarianism. In his famous *Liberalism and Social Action*, Dewey declared that the book was "provocative and unsatisfying." His complaint was that the problems of liberalism "fell between two stools." "A liberal is one who gives approval to the grievances of the proletariat, but who at the critical moment invariably runs to cover on the side of the masters of capitalism." A liberal is also "one who professes radical opinions in private but who never acts upon them for fear of losing *entré* into the courts of the mighty and respectable." Dewey's remedy for such behavior was his insistence upon the need to cultivate *general education* as well as to cultivate positive communitarian action. This is clearly of first-rate importance.

It is perhaps of some interest to note that the *American Political Science Review* republished in 1947 what Dewey had published in 1927 about the difficulties that had confronted positive attempts to develop communitarian groupings. The article then suggested that institutions and priorities should look toward processes controllable by human intelligence. It is unfortunate, the article concluded, that this has not become "common coin" among students of politics.

This is necessarily a brief and fragmentary analysis of the large and often contentious literature on Dewey's many writings and hence of the impact of such literature upon *Individuality and Community*. Alfonso Damico should be commended for his treatment of the material he has consulted. He might, however, be urged to expand his analysis in the next edition of his book.

JOHN D. LEWIS

Professor Emeritus, Oberlin College

Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy: A Reexamination of the Foundations of Social Science. By John W. Danford. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978. Pp. xiv + 265. $17.00.)

John Danford's monograph, judged as a contribution to intellectual history, is an intriguing and at times an exciting study. His principal argument is that Ludwig Wittgenstein's later philosophy, because it emphasizes the contextual basis of knowledge and because it does not abjure asking questions for which there are no certain answers, bears a striking resemblance to the epistemology of Aristotle (in the *Ethics*) and even Plato (in the *Meno*). The foundation for political science provided by this epistemology is one which encourages scholars to address questions concerning the ends of the state without subjecting them to the criticism of being unscientific.

But it is the epistemology of Hobbes and Locke, Danford argues, which provides the foundation for contemporary political science. According to Danford, it is their positivistic framework and their unsupportable views about language which have excluded from disciplinary discourse questions which could not be handled "scientifically"–i.e., in a manner comparable to the methods of geometry or the natural sciences. The major implication of the triumph of the Hobbesian tradition, Danford believes, is the trivialization of political science into a study of mere political means.

This is an argument artfully developed. Especially noteworthy is Danford's sharp comparison of the resolutive-compositive method developed in Hobbes' *De Corpore* (which requires unambiguous definitions of political terms) and the dialectical method in Aristotle's *Topics* (which takes as a point of departure the ambiguities inherent in common speech). Although Hobbes and Aristotle both, at different points in their writings, used a variety of methods, Danford nonetheless separates the two approaches analytically. Important parallels between the Greeks and Wittgenstein are thereby clarified.

When judged not only as a contribution to the history of ideas, however, but as a contribution to the growing literature on Wittgenstein's philosophy of language and how it bears on political thought, the volume has some serious deficiencies. First, Danford tends to accept uncritically some conventional dualisms: *viz.*, ancient versus modern and ends versus means. But Wittgenstein himself was very uncomfortable with rigid dichotomies of this sort. Early on in his career, he noted that the distinction between "rules" and "descriptions" of games is not as tidy as one might initially suppose.

A Wittgensteinian should therefore be troubled with Danford's dichotomies. How much do we learn from creating a gulf between "ancient" and "modern" in political science? Are we forced to ignore Thrasymachus as an ancient political scientist because his method is closer to that of Hobbes? Must we refuse to take seriously the passionate liberalism in contemporary social science because we have already committed ourselves to the view that the moderns, as such, do not address themselves to questions of ends?

A related problem concerns a more central Wittgensteinian point. Wittgenstein invites us to consider how generalizations of phenomena, without attention to particular cases, are often vacuous. Danford, in citing this aspect of Wittgenstein's thought, criticizes political science for its too-frenetic search for general political essences, without first seeking out particulars.

But having acknowledged this important prescription, Danford proceeds to ignore it by focusing on the general sins of contemporary political science without first examining particular cases. Political scientists, we are told, shy away from significant questions, renounce normative concerns as unprofessional, and demand general theory instead of less grandiose explanation. Who are these culprits? The most contemporary is Karl Deutsch, whose *Nerves of Government* (dated 1966, but based on scholarly work done at least a decade earlier) receives a footnote. But what has happened to the generation of scholars nurtured on a critique of the positivism of the Vienna Circle? A Wittgensteinian perspective would invite the theorist to "look and see" (*Investigations,* Par. 66). This Danford has not done.

A more careful survey of contemporary political science would have revealed an ever-growing literature which does not fit easily into Danford's caricature. How should we interpret the seriousness with which many political scientists have discussed John Rawls' theory of justice if we believe that political scientists do not want to address questions of ends? How should we understand the influence on many political scientists of scholars such as Clifford Geertz if we believe that they all abjure questions which cannot lead to certainty? By overgeneralizing his critique of social science, by creating a political science "Everyman," Danford does not address some important work in the discipline.

A second result of ignoring contemporary practitioners is that Danford's study is not sensitive to the likely costs of today adopting a Wittgensteinian epistemology. Perhaps students who have self-consciously renounced Hobbesian positivism have also lost any standard for truth. Explanation is unnecessary, Wittgenstein tells us, "unless *we* require it to prevent a misunderstanding" (*Investigations,* Par. 87). But suppose we incorrectly believe we do understand? What if we cease searching for explanation when further questions might uncover deeper truths? Can the demand for a thorough search of particular cases in today's complex world be at odds with the demand that we address our attention to the big questions? I do not want to suggest that my queries cannot be adequately addressed by a Wittgensteinian, but I do think it incumbent on a scholar advocating a new foundation for the study of politics to give future students at least a sense of the superstructure that the foundation can support.

A book which makes the claim that "our science of politics . . . is radically defective" (p. 1) and bases its critique on Wittgensteinian philosophy, obligates its author to "look and see." Danford has written a compelling history of ideas, but he had not responded to some core Wittgensteinian challenges. He has uncritically accepted conventional dichotomies and has ignored the particular sins of political scientists in a general critique of the discipline. The true foundations of political science therefore remain obscure.

DAVID D. LAITIN

University of California, San Diego

The Correspondence of John Locke: Vol. 3, Letters Nos. 849–1241; Vol. 4, Letters Nos. 1242–1701. Edited by E. S. de Beer. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978, 1979. Pp. vii + 801; ix + 801. $75.00, each.)

With the publication of Volumes 3 and 4 of Locke's correspondence, E. S. de Beer moves his readers squarely into the most significant period of Locke's life. Volume 3 contains nearly 400 letters, the greater part of which were written while Locke was in political exile in Holland. The very first of these letters is one of those remarkable missives addressed to his friend and distant relative, Edward Clarke, to whom Locke dispatched detailed suggestions for the rearing of his children. The Clarkes were thus putting Locke's educational theories into practice and scrupulously advising him of the results. In light of their findings, Locke then made revisions in the manuscript letters which, he explained, "I keep by me on purpose, [as] I shall myself find occasion for additions or alterations" (p. 1). As extensively revised, this portion of Locke's correspondence became *Some Thoughts Concerning Education,* one of the most profound and influential classics of modern educational philosophy. The correspondence reveals that it was during these years in exile that Locke completed work on his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding,* the *Epistola de Tolerentia* and *Two Treatises of Government.* He published the last two works anonymously and took exquisite pains to conceal their authorship throughout his life. For those who, like Peter Laslett, regard Locke's precautions on this score as "paranoid," this volume of Locke's correspondence, written while he was a political exile, should be required reading. The judicious Locke was able to preserve his life, liberty and estate, while completing his major works and extending his influence enormously only through the exercise of a unique and all-encompassing caution, the character of which is brought home to us as we read this portion of his correspondence.

Volume 4 covers the period 1690–1694, those remarkably active and productive years following Locke's return to England from exile in Holland. As one digests these successive volumes, the realization grows on one that in some fundamental sense these letters constitute the only form of autobiography that the unfailingly cautious Locke would ever have left. To be sure, one observes that even his very personal letters are written with circumspection; nevertheless, they reveal something of his relationships with an astonishingly broad range of relatives, friends, companions in "the commonwealth of learning" (as he was wont to describe his closest friends, statesmen), and a broad array of people whose lives touched his. Locke's correspondents included such scientist-philosophers as Isaac Newton and Robert Boyle and a number of very serious writers and publicists, such as Philippus van Limberch, Jean Le Clerc, and William Molyneux. It is rewarding to follow the prolonged exchanges between Locke and substantial men such as these and occasionally even of some help in one's own efforts to come to grips with the various "literary devices" used by Locke, especially intentional contradictions. When one such contradiction in his *Essay* was rightly pointed out in a letter from William Molyneux, Locke replied that "the seeming contradiction between what is said p. 147 and p. 341, is just as you take it, and I hope so clearly expressed, that it cannot be mistaken, but by a very unwary reader. . . ." Quite a few contemporary interpreters of Locke would do well to ponder his response to Molyneux and similar aspects of his correspondence. With four volumes of this correspondence now published, the first half of de Beer's heroic efforts have been made available. Thanks to them, we now have a rather more complete picture of Locke the citizen and statesman and Locke the philosopher, to say nothing of many other manifestations of his character that have been revealed through this correspondence.

ROBERT H. HORWITZ

Kenyon College

Western Political Theory in the Face of the Future. By John Dunn. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979. Pp. viii + 120. $17.95, cloth; $4.95, paper.)

Western Political Theory in the Face of the Future is particularly disappointing because it concerns an important subject and John Dunn should have been the ideal person to discuss it. I had even looked forward to reading it with considerable anticipation. Dunn has written well on revolution, Africa, and John Locke, among other subjects, and therefore would seem the perfect author for a book with the rather pretentious title of *Western Political Theory in the Face of the Future.* Unfortunately, the book just isn't very good.

Part of the problem stems from the project that Dunn has set himself: "This book asks a single—perhaps indeed a naive—question. Do the traditions of understanding politics which have been developed in Europe over the last two and a half millennia possess any real residual capacity to direct us in the face of the world which now confronts us?" The fact that his answer is, on the whole, "no" is never clearly put. Actually, he spends most of the book telling us what those "traditions of understanding politics" are. A necessary task, no doubt, but one that rather overwhelms everything else in a 117-page book.

In fact, he never really addresses his own question but rather, in his words, attempts "a sketch of some of the central anomalies of our political understanding today—in what we value politically and what we suppose to be politically possible. It is a sketch both of how these anomalies have come about and of how they now stand." There is a great deal on how they came about and relatively little on how they now stand.

The book is broken into four chapters with very little or no introduction or conclusion. The former is sorely missed; the latter is desperately needed. The four chapters are "Democratic theory," "liberalism," "nationalism," and "revolution?" The question mark occurs only after "revolution," although it would also be appropriate following all the others, since the analysis engenders in me at least the feeling that the author is asking whether any of these sets of beliefs have anything to offer us in our attempt to face the future, and concludes that they don't. He doesn't suggest anything that does.

There are a number of good points about the book. It is particularly encouraging to see nationalism taken seriously as a problem in contemporary political theory and while it is correctly presented as a serious difficulty, cultural nationalism is shown in a positive light. It would have been better if this potential contradiction had been explored more thoroughly.

Each of the chapters is quite interesting in itself, and if you are a compulsive footnote reader, as I am, the footnotes, amounting regularly to a third of a page, are, if a bit distracting, always valuable. The footnotes are the best feature of the book and make each chapter worth exploring. On the other hand, positions that one might have thought worth arguing with are often simply dismissed. Taking just one example: Carole Pateman's *Participation and Democratic Theory* is dealt with in a footnote labeling it "innocent."

In the preface the author says that it is "intellectually and perhaps even morally reprehensible, at least for those whose profession is to teach about politics, not tacitly to have such a sketch (as this) at the back of their minds—at their disposal." It is perhaps equally intellectually and morally reprehensible learnedly to reject most political theory as being incapable of dealing with the future without being willing to suggest any direction to take toward changing that situation.

LYMAN TOWER SARGENT

University of Missouri, St. Louis

Rousseau and Representation: A Study of the Development of His Concept of Political Institutions. By Richard Fralin. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978. Pp. 251. $15.00.)

Richard Fralin's *Rousseau and Representation* is a welcome addition to the ever-renewed literature on Rousseau's political thought. Clearly written, Fralin's study is the fruit of extraordinarily thorough research, both in Rousseau's corpus and the vast secondary literature. More important, Fralin focuses our attention on the frequently ignored but vital issue of the political institutions appropriate to a free community.

Departing from the usual practice of reducing Rousseau's political thought to the principle of the general will (*Social Contract*, Books I–II), Fralin insists on the importance of Rousseau's many writings dealing with practical political matters. The Dedication to the *Second Discourse*, *Political Economy*, *Letter to d'Alembert*, writings on the Abbé de St. Pierre, *Letters Written from the Mountain*, constitutional proposals for Poland and Corsica: all take their place as essential components in Rousseau's complex but ever-fascinating political teaching.

Fralin's central thesis is best presented in his own words:

> The tensions between Rousseau's sweeping concept of popular sovereignty, which appears to give virtually unlimited political power to the people, and his institutional ideal of elective aristocracy, which places severe restraints on the people's exercise of sovereignty, reveals a deep ambivalence in Rousseau's attitude toward "the people." It is difficult to imagine a more radical concept of democracy than that set forth in the general principles of the *Contrat social*. . . . But if one turns from these general principles to a careful examination of how Rousseau intended the institutions of this democracy to function, it quickly becomes apparent that his concept of democracy was far less radical than these general principles might lead one to believe (p. 193).

Rousseau's preferred political regime is one in which, despite frequent popular assemblies, "the people exercise very little real power" beyond a "passive and negative" role.

Fralin's principal conclusion—and probably his greatest contribution—is the analysis of Geneva's constitution and political history as one of the sources of Rousseau's "ambivalence" toward direct popular control over day-to-day political affairs. Of particular value is the evidence of parallels between Rousseau's position and the political opinions of the moderate bourgeoisie in Geneva.

While Fralin has surely earned the right to interpret the texts, not everyone will agree with his reading on some key points. For example, Fralin seems to play down the critical distinction between "sovereign" and "government," even though it is central to his theme (cf. Ch. 4 with p. 155). Sometimes Fralin substitutes an inferred "development" of Rousseau's ideas for the dialectic of theory and practice. When interpreting Rousseau's denial that the "general will" can be represented, Fralin ignores the prior use of that concept by Diderot (cf. *Geneva Manuscript*, I, ii and Diderot's "Natural Right"), confuses "will" with what Rousseau was the first to call "public opinion," and misses the importance of the group theory of politics set forth in *Political Economy* (St. Martin's Press, 1978, pp. 212–13) and applied in *Social Contract*, III, ii.

More serious, perhaps, is Fralin's underestimation of Rousseau's historical pessimism and preference for the ancients. According to Fralin, Geneva was the "most important" influence "that shaped [Rousseau's] thought and gave it some degree of unity" (p. 72). Yet Rousseau himself claimed that his "system" was an elaboration of the so-called "Illumination of Vincennes," which gave rise to the *First Discourse*. And the only text written at that moment, the speech of Fabricius (*First Discourse* [St. Martin's Press, 1964, pp. 45–46]), establishes the Roman Senate as "the most noble" and "worthy" government in history.

Surprisingly, Fralin is silent on the import of this passage. Although he stresses the praise of Geneva in the dedication to the *Second Discourse*, Rousseau remarks there that Rome—not Geneva—is the "model of all free peoples" (*Second Discourse* [*Ibid.*, p. 80]). To be sure, Fralin cites similar praise for Rome in the *Letters Written from the Mountain* (p. 127), and is almost alone among commentators to give the *Social Contract*'s analysis of Rome (IV, iv–vii) the attention it deserves. In his notes, Fralin admits that Rousseau generally favored the ancients over the moderns, and that Plato was his "acknowledged master" (pp. 224–25). But in the body of his book, Fralin maintains that the ancients were not the critical influence on Rousseau's teaching (p. 77).

These criticisms may well be the inevitable quibbles of one who has long pondered the work of a thinker as rich and complex as Rousseau. It is possible to have reservations about Fralin's interpretation of the "general will" and still assert that few works illuminate Rousseau's practical political analysis as well as *Rousseau and Representation*. By digesting the last generation of scholarship and applying it to a vital issue of modern political thought, Fralin has made a major contribution to our understanding of Rousseau as a political theorist.

ROGER D. MASTERS

Dartmouth College

Marx and History: From Primitive Society to the Communist Future. By D. Ross Gandy. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979. Pp. ix + 190. $14.95.)

As indicated by the title, this short book is an effort to explain Marx's and Engels' philosophy of history. An outgrowth of Ross Gandy's Ph.D. dissertation, the work is based on a reading of the 40-volume *Marx-Engels Werke,* the *Grundrisse* and *Notes on Indian History.* This ambitious project is much to Gandy's credit in that it has enabled him to synthesize the many ideas of Marx and Engels on history which are scattered throughout their various works and correspondence. As a pedagogical tool, however, the book suffers from a failure to include in either the text or the footnotes sufficient reference to the identity of the works cited by the author. Whether one is interested in assessing the significance of the supportive evidence used by Gandy to establish his point of view or in pursuing an interesting point mentioned in the text, access to the *Marx-Engels Werke* is indispensable.

Gandy's chief preoccupation is with debunking the ideology of "official Marxism," a reference to those writers who have reduced the study of history to a deterministic science and to the dominant ideologies of the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties, both of which are based on generalizations derived from this science. The seeds of this sterile concept of human behavior, as Gandy points out, are to be found in numerous passages throughout the works of Marx and Engels. Most notable perhaps is the foreword to the *Critique of Political Economy* (1859) by Marx in which he attempts to summarize in a few words the results of his extensive investigations. Three broad assertions deserve to be mentioned. First, he claims that "in the social production of their life men enter into definite relations that are indispensible and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces." Second, Marx asserts that it is the relations of production which condition "the social, political and intellectual life process in general." And last, that "in broad outlines Asiatic, ancient, feudal, and modern bourgeois modes of production can be designated as progressive epochs in the economic formation of society" (Robert C. Tucker, ed., *The Marx-Engels Reader,* Norton, 1978, pp. 4–5).

What could possibly explain the origins of these unqualified statements about human behavior, statements which plainly contradict the principles of dialectical reasoning espoused by both Marx and Engels? *Marx and History* contains few insights concerning the epistemological questions raised by such apparent contradictions. What the book does offer is a more comprehensive understanding of Marx's theories of social change than has been offered in the past by adherents of strict determinism.

Gandy is largely successful in this effort despite an awkward and often repetitious organization of the book's contents. In his chapters on precapitalist, capitalist and communist modes of production, Gandy adduces much evidence to discredit those who would reduce Marx's ideas to monocausal explanations. For example, despite the impression left by the foreword, Gandy demonstrates that Marx wrote that the Asiatic, ancient and feudal modes of production did not evolve one from the other but rather that each was a distinct mode which evolved out of "primitive communism," and with entirely different historical consequences. These chapters therefore offer a more accurate if not always more flattering explanation of Marx's and Engels' assessment of history.

Gandy concludes with a discussion of social classes, sociological theory and an appendix on "Marx's Theory of Revolution," demonstrating once again the complexity of Marx's account of social change. Gandy has attempted a much-needed reinterpretation of Marx's theory of history—one that, everything considered, deserves the reader's attention.

RONALD J. HUNT

Ohio University

Authoritarianism, Fascism, and National Populism. By Gino Germani. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1978. Pp. ix + 292. $17.95, cloth; $5.95, paper.)

This is another of the now long series of books devoted to the reinterpretation of the fascist phenomenon. For over a decade there has been an almost frenetic preoccupation on the part of academics—Anglo-American, Italian, French and German—to come to terms with something called "generic fascism." One could very well spend all of one's professional time attempting to keep abreast of the literature that has become available during this period. Happily, Germani's recent book is one of the better works to be found in that depressing abundance. He deals with his material with reworkable analytic skill and breadth of knowledge. Germani ranges over the European and Latin American political scene with a familiarity born of wide experience and gifted insight. His book is clear in theoretical intention, well crafted, freighted with any number of suggestive analyses and trenchant asides. He rejects the notion (so attractive to specialists concerned exclusively with the detailed history of individual countries) that fascism was a political and socioeconomic phenomenon restricted to the Italian peninsula, or to Mussolini's Italy and Hitler's Germany. He lodges the fascist experience under the broad category "modern authoritarianism," one of whose notable forms if "totalitarianism." Subsequent analysis considers the various political and socioeconomic functions that distinguish fascism from totalitarianism's communist or Marxist variants. Once we have discerned its historic functions, Germani proceeds to distinguish between "classical" fascism and its functional surrogate in authoritarian regimes instaurated under military auspices. However "fascist," some of these latter regimes can manipulate populist appeals that attract broad-based popular participation. What links the classic fascism of Europe and the surrogate fascisms of Brazil after 1964, Chile and Uruguay after 1973, and Argentina between 1966 and 1970, is the historic function they all presumably discharge, which is the "demobilization of subordinate classes" (p. 79). Marxist authoritarianism, in its most typical totalitarian form, represents, on the other hand, the primary mobilization of those same classes (p. 25).

For all the plausibility of Germani's account, there is a nagging difficulty that seems to attend all this. It seems reasonably clear that to make their revolution, Lenin's Bolsheviks exploited the mobilizability of displaced petty-bourgeois, mostly peasant, elements made available in wartime Czarist Russia. Not so clear is the role of the subordinate classes in the Fascist revolution. By the time of Mussolini's March on Rome there were over half a million workers mobilized in Fascist syndicates, almost three times as many as were organized in the socialist General Confederation of Labor. Was this "primary mobilization" of the "subordinate classes," or did it constitute a "demobilization" of those same classes? The most recent evidence indicates that Fascist successes in bringing (mostly agrarian workers) into the Fascist syndicates was *not* the result of coercion (cf. Paul Corner's recent *Fascism in Ferrara, 1915–1925,* Oxford, 1975), but represented massive defections from the ineffectual socialist and Marxist organizations.

If such was the case, why must Fascism be understood to represent the "demobilization" of the subordinate classes, while Bolshevism represents their "primary mobilization"? Could it be because the Fascist syndicates subsequently served to "reintegrate" those subordinate classes into the "traditional system," while the Bolwhevik trade unions did not? But the Fascist regime was anything but traditional. Germani tells us it was totalitarian, a novel political system which shared species traits with a similar system created by Stalin. Were the subordinate classes of the Soviet Union not similarly "demobilized" and "reintegrated" by draconian Stalinist repression into a totalitarian regime?

Perhaps the distinction can be made on the basis of the fact that Mussolini permitted the superordinate classes to exist under Fascist totalitarianism, while such elements were exterminated by a less benign Lenin and Stalin. But did not Stalin create their "functional analogue" in the "new class" that dominated the system more systematically than the factional and heterogeneous privileged classes of Fascist Italy? Surely, if the traditional "ruling classes" of Italy conceived Fascism their janissaries, they were to be sadly disillusioned. The middle classes who searched out Fascism to serve their purposes received only "ersatz satisfactions" rather than "concrete gains" (p. 235).

But perhaps we can salvage something of all this by discovering that Italian Fascism was, after all, "irrational," its program "contradictory and incoherent" (p. 238). If it was all so irrational, we could hardly expect anyone to be satisfied, and in fact the middle classes purchased their demobilization of the subordinate classes and their dissatisfactions at the "cost of prolonged economic and social stagnation" (p. 76). Soviet Russia, apparently, stagnated neither economically nor socially. All of which is very curious.

The fact is, however excellent his exposition, Germani seems to remain captive to any number of unexamined political science fictions. Even Nicos Poulantzas, for instance, has recently recognized that Fascist Italy enjoyed one of the most impressive rates of industrial and economic growth in capitalist Europe between the wars (cf. N. Poulantzas, *Fascism and Dictatorship* [London: NLB, 1974]). Many have further recognized that the ideology and the programs of Fascism were not as "irrational" and "incoherent" as folk wisdom would have it (cf. A. J. Gregor, *Italian Fascism and Developmental Dictatorship* [Princeton, 1979]).

All of which leaves us with a tangle of issues. If the subordinate classes of Italy were demobilized by Fascism, they were not more, nor any less, demobilized in the Soviet Union. If they languished under the dominance of a superordinate class or classes in Italy under Fascism, they seemed to have languished neither more nor less under the ministrations of Stalinism's "new middle classes" (cf. Nigel Harris' recent *The Mandate of Heaven* [London: Quartet, 1978]). If Italian Fascism was "irrational" and "incoherent," it was no more, nor any less, irrational and incoherent than Lenin's Bolshevism, predicated as it was on the Marxist expectation of a saving revolution in the capitalist West—an expectation that did not fade until 1925 with the advent of Stalin's "creative development" of a "national socialist" Marxism.

What we are left with is a stimulating book. It will provoke discussion and contribute to a more profound understanding of the phenomena that have shaped, and are shaping, our world. It makes a contribution to that understanding. But it does not, in itself, provide an unambiguous and convincing understanding.

A. JAMES GREGOR

University of California, Berkeley

Law, Legislation, and Liberty, Vol. 3: The Political Order of a Free People. By F. A. Hayek. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979. Pp. xv + 244. $14.00.)

Throughout a long scholarly career F. A. Hayek, winner of a Nobel Prize in Economics (1974), has been one of the most learned, articulate, and passionate contemporary advocates of the "classical" liberal doctrine that enjoyed its apex of popularity in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. *The Political Order of a Free People* is the third and final volume of *Law, Legislation, and Liberty*, a work in which Hayek aims "to fill the gaps" in his earlier book *The Constitution of Liberty*. It is thus "supplementary to and not a substitute for" the previous book, which aimed "to restate . . . the traditional doctrines of classical liberalism in a form suited to contemporary problems and thinking" (pp. xii–xiii).

As its title suggests, *The Political Order of a Free People* has the greatest direct relevance of the three volumes in *Law, Legislation, and Liberty* to the concerns of political scientists. Hayek begins the book by citing what he believes is a widespread contemporary disillusionment with democracy, a disillusionment that he traces to the replacement of limited, constitutional government in our time by democratic governments of unlimited powers. The latter sort of government, Hayek argues, defeats the very aim of democracy, since its policies are necessarily determined by the need to "bribe" particular interests in return for electoral support, rather than by the opinions of a true majority of the electorate.

The subservience of government to special interests can be overcome, Hayek contends, only by depriving it of its power to satisfy their demands. To this end, governments must be rendered subordinate to a set of more fundamental rules that not even a majority of the elected representatives can override. It would seem that such a subjection of government to law was precisely what the American Founders sought to bring about; but Hayek denies that the American Constitution, or any other, has succeeded in accomplishing that aim. The problem is that legislative bodies, instead of confining themselves to the enactment of "laws" in the strict sense—that is, general rules having no reference to particular individuals or classes—have usurped the function of "administration" as well, thus assuming an arbitrary power to benefit whichever groups they choose at the expense of the rest of the people. Since it is impossible, however, for the people's elected representatives, let alone the people themselves, to "govern a complex society in detail," a further consequence is the assignment of enormous, arbitrary power to the bureaucracy charged with administering the laws (p. 144).

The remedy for this situation, ideally, Hayek believes, would be the establishment of a new constitution in which two wholly distinct representative bodies were charged with the respective functions of making "laws" in the strict sense and conducting the government (including most of what we presently call "legislating") in strict accordance with those laws. Hayek does not recommend, however, that a country already having "a firmly established constitutional tradition should replace" it with his model (p. 107). For the amelioration of conditions in established constitutional democracies such as Britain and the United States, Hayek seems to rely on the power of rational persuasion to incite the electorate to cut down the excessive powers that have been usurped by their governments.

If the reforms Hayek desires are achieved by one means or the other, the result would be the revivification of a "market order" in which the material rewards received by individuals were determined by the impersonal force of competition rather than by political fiat. Hayek offers an acute defense of the contemporary relevance of classical economic principles against the criticisms of other economists, by stressing that the advantages of competition to society as a whole, in terms of an increase in the general standard of living, "do not depend on it being 'perfect,' " or on its participants' being perfectly "rational" (pp. 65, 76). While he points out the self-defeating character of government attempts to control the economy in the name of an abstract standard of "social justice," Hayek's position is less doctrinaire than that of some other "libertarians": he concedes the need for government to assure "a certain minimum income for everyone," for a (limited) antitrust policy designed to curb the anti-competitive effects of discriminatory pricing, and for "some progression of the direct taxes . . . to offset the tendency of indirect taxes to be regressive" (pp. 55, 84–85, 127).

Persuasive as Hayek's economic arguments are, his broader political understanding of freedom and its institutional requisites embodies serious difficulties. By concentrating almost exclusively on the (admittedly important) economic component of freedom, Hayek is led at times to denounce contemporary liberal democracies for their welfare-statism in terms that could almost make the reader forget the enormous difference in the state of freedom (and government by law) between those democracies and the totalitarian regimes. And his dismissal of the present American regime as a monstrous caricature of "the ideal of the separation of powers" (p. 179) shows an insufficient appreciation of how that separation continues to operate in this country to protect individual liberty—even if it does not issue in the particular policies that Hayek favors. The disciplined, programmatically divided parties that Hayek advocates (p. 113), on the other hand, would be likely to produce results much less conducive to freedom, at least in the American context.

At a deeper level, Hayek's defense of the principles of a "free society" suffers from an excessively narrow, or abstract, conception of the nature and purpose of human life. The desire for a just distribution of goods may well be, as Hayek contends, an atavistic emotion (p. 165); but it remains a fundamental element of political life that cannot be dismissed simply by pointing out its inconsistency with the goal of maximizing abundance. Still less can the advocate of freedom afford to "disregard . . . the injunctions" of "the prophets and philosophers," such as Moses, Plato, and Rousseau, on the ground that they failed to appreciate the contribution that the market economy makes to the advancement of civilization (p. 166). Hayek fails to articulate adequately the "non-economic" ends to which economic goals are subservient (p. 168); to do so would ultimately require an enterprise in trans-historical political philosophy, the very possibility of which his argument seems to deny (pp. 162–63). At a more practical level, further reflection on those ends might suggest the need to adjust economic policies to accommodate them, rather than insisting on the incompatibility between the principles of freedom and "the pursuit of a known common good" (p. 165).

Although Hayek has properly distinguished his position from "conservatism" in the European sense, his thought does embody the overall tension between "traditionalist" and "libertarian" elements that characterizes what is loosely called the "conservative" movement in America. Thus, while appealing to people to subordinate their individual desires to the rule of law, Hayek justifies such restraint in terms of its conduciveness to the realization of their subjective "values" (p. 169). He upholds the value of "tradition" only by citing it as the optimal means of achieving "progress" (p. 167). Despite expressing deference towards established constitutional traditions, he sometimes speaks of the future in apocalyptic terms that are reminiscent much more of Rousseau than of Burke (pp. xiii, 152). And while lamenting the irrationality of the policies that present-day governments pursue, Hayek himself insists on the subordination of reason to a process of "cultural selection" that he stresses is nonrational (pp. 6, 166). Precisely because of the "modern" theoretical principles on which it rests, Hayek's argument—like that of his nineteenth-century liberal predecessors—thus seems vulnerable to the attacks of the Left, despite his prudent warning of the threat that such attacks constitute to the cause of freedom.

DAVID LEWIS SCHAEFER

Holy Cross College

Body Politics: Power, Sex, and Nonverbal Communication. By Nancy M. Henley. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977. Pp. ix + 214. $9.95, cloth; $3.95, paper.)

For Nancy Henley, politics is everywhere. It manifests itself in the day-to-day interactions around us in the form of nonverbal (and also verbal) means of expressing status and power, submission and dominance, authority and control. Henley, a social psychologist, has written an often fascinating, sometimes irritatingly polemic, and always informative review (and in many cases a reinterpretation) of a vast body of recent literature on social interaction, body language, and environmental psychology. Her central theme is that "nonverbal behavior is a major avenue for social control on a large scale, and interpersonal dominance on a smaller scale" (p. 179).

While many students of nonverbal behavior focus on its use as a means of expressing emotion or intimacy, Henley is concerned with the nonverbal manipulation of power relationships, especially (though far from exclusively) those between women and men. In chapters dealing with territoriality and personal space, environment, control over access and time, gesture and demeanor, touching behavior, eye contact, and facial expression, Henley provides a number of intriguing hypotheses about the ways in which nonverbal behavior is asymmetric between superior and subordinate and can be used to express acceptance of or challenge to the status quo. Many of the points she makes are amusingly and anecdotally illustrated in addition to being supported by studies from the experimental research literature.

About territoriality and personal space, for example, we learn that "dominant animals control greater territory; that they are freer to move in other animals' or common territory; that they are accorded greater personal (bodily) space; and that subordinates yield space to dominants when approached or in passing" (p. 29). Indeed, high-status people even take up more space with their signatures. "The higher your place on the academic ladder from undergraduate to professor, one study found, the bigger your signature is likely to be" (p. 31). More generally, individuals in subordinate roles (of whom children may be the paradigmatic type) lack control over their own time, the space about them, or even their own bodies. Each area is subject to invasion or control by superiors with little or no warning and little or no redress.

In the chapter on the politics of touch, Henley devotes some space to rebutting the widely held view that in our culture touching is either a means of conveying friendship or support and comfort or has a function latently sexual in intent. She reminds us that touching has a clear power dimension, and that at least as typical a picture is that of a superior status person touching (or patting, or holding) the inferior status person, or the lower status individual supplicating for the privilege of being allowed to touch the superior's flesh or accoutrements (e.g., kissing the Cardinal's ring). "Rights of possession of another person are indicated, much as territorial rights are, by putting an arm around the other's waist, holding the other's hand, or otherwise touching the other's body or property" (p. 127).

In her discussion of demeanor and gesture, Henley reviews studies which show that subordinates are more likely to look down to avoid the challenge of direct eye contact with superiors; that those of lower status are less likely to stand erect (i.e., "to walk tall"), and also less likely to make expansive gestures redolent of power (e.g., arms akimbo). Similarly, subordinates are less likely to maintain a relaxed posture and demeanor in the presence of superiors than vice versa. I found particularly interesting her discussion of the impact of nonverbal behavior which is regarded as "unnatural" or inappropriate (e.g., because these behaviors contradict other factors governing the status quo such as gender). Henley points out that use of nonverbal symbols of power by women (and other powerless people) may be ignored or punished or (in the case of women) reinterpreted as sexual advance rather than as assertion of dominance.

In her discussion of language and social interaction, Henley makes a number of interesting points about requisite forms of address in asymmetric relationships, the largely culturally determined nature of differences between men's and women's speech patterns and even speech timbre, and the use of jokes as a means of supporting the social order (e.g., in one study of laughter among colleagues at mental hospital staff meetings, the target was never higher in the hierarchy than the person making the crack and usually lower [p. 71]). I found especially intriguing her discussion of the use of interruptions as an indicator of status (e.g., in one study of faculty department meetings, "women were interrupted much more [proportionally] than men and within sex interruption patterns followed a hierarchy of status within the department" [p. 69]).

While some political scientists would have the principal focus of the discipline be on the "art or science of government," others, like Harold Lasswell, have argued for a broad definition of politics as the manifestation of power or authority relationships. With this definition in mind and Henley's review of the existing literature in hand, political scientists might be encouraged to investigate the politics of day-to-day life (e.g., office politics or the politics of the family). At a minimum, political scientists should be encouraged to consider the ways in which we can learn about politics at all levels by observing interpersonal behavior at both the verbal and the nonverbal level.

BERNARD GROFMAN

University of California, Irvine

Evaluation Research and Development Activities. By Francis W. Hoole. (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1978. Pp. 205. $14.00, cloth; $6.95, paper.)

Evaluation research is increasingly of interest in many social science fields in this country and abroad. With the increased scope of government activities and expenditures, and with the growing skepticism in its ability to successfully implement its programs, the need for systematic evaluation has been recognized by policy makers and scholars alike. More government programs mandate evaluation and allocate funds for this purpose, and at the same time, more courses in program evaluation are being offered in universities. Characteristically, such courses concentrate on domestic programs. Francis Hoole's book is intended primarily for students of developing nations, and in this sense it is a welcomed contribution. Comparative evaluation research within and among nations might add to our understanding of how cultural, institutional and structural variables affect the consequences of public policy.

Evaluation Research and Development Activities provides a methodological overview of impact evaluation research in the context of development activities. Although neither comprehensive in scope nor detailed in presentation, the author covers effectively and vividly selected issues, including problems of research design, applied research and research utilization. The presentation is clear and lucid and the examples and case studies are well chosen and thoroughly documented.

Chapter 1 outlines the author's conception of impact evaluation research. Essentially, this is a straightforward overview of the stages of empirical quantitative research in the context of assessing causal relationships between program variables and target variables. Such a conception is unbalanced, and the chapter's title, "The Methodology of Evaluation Research" may mislead the student. Although personally I share the author's preference for quantitative research, the state of the craft does not justify conveying to students that there is one, agreed-upon methodology. Formal theory, naturalistic observation, qualitative case studies and analytic induction have all been used in evaluation research. If there is a consensual message in the methodology of evaluation research, it is to select the method that is best suited for one's purposes and circumstances. Furthermore, impact evaluation is only one type of evaluation research. Process evaluation or implementation is another important type. It is exactly the problem of implementation that cannot be ignored when evaluating development programs. The Indian and the Turkish experiences with "five-years development plans" are only two cases in point. A comprehensive evaluation should include both process and impact, and, when feasible, cost-effectiveness analysis. What we have here, then, is a text that advances *a* methodology for *one* type of evaluation research.

Chapters 2 and 3 address issues of research design. After pointing out the weaknesses of pre-experimental designs in terms of internal and external validity, Hoole elaborates and exemplifies the potential of quasi-experimental designs, in particular time-series and non-equivalent control groups. In Chapter 4 data on the Mexican televised learning program Plaza Sesamo is used to demonstrate the usefulness of a randomized experimental design. Throughout these chapters it is either assumed that readers are familiar with statistical techniques such as OLS estimates, the Box-Jenkins method and the Durbin-Watson *d*, or that the discussion would stimulate self-learning. As Hoole points out, "This book is intended primarily for development specialists . . . who desire an overview of evaluation research but do not want to read a long methodologically oriented book on the topic" (p. 21). For the self-learner a useful bibliography is provided.

Chapter 5 overviews important applied research problems. These include goal identification in unstable environments, measurement difficulties, ethical concerns and organizational resistance to evaluation research. Of course, these problems are not unique to programs in developing nations. But Hoole maintains that "What is different in the developed and developing contexts is the nature and severity of the various applied research problems" (p. 132). For example, data collection and organization resistances are suggested to be more severe in the developing context.

Chapter 6 focuses on research utilization problems. How can evaluation findings contribute to a greater rationality in the policy process? To minimize utilization problems, it is suggested ". . . to integrate the evaluation research approach into the policy-making process, rendering it a decision-making aid which can be used as appropriate by policy-makers to provide timely feedback information on the impact of ongoing activities to them" (p. 151). This proposition is operationalized and exemplified by including an hypothetical evaluation subsystem into the World Health Organization budgetary process. Organizational solutions may indeed facilitate the flow of feedback into the decision-making process. But would they induce change in the behavior of decision makers? According to Hoole it depends on the nature of the decisions, the relevance and the timing of the research findings and the attitudes of the decision makers. It remains for another book to develop and document these hypotheses in the context of development activities.

DAVID NACHMIAS

University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee

Politics as Friendship: The Origins of Classical Notions of Politics in the Theory and Practice of Friendship. By Horst Hutter. (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1979. Pp. vii + 204. $7.50.)

Horst Hutter, a promising theorist, believes that both Marxism and democratic pluralism have failed. Seeing east and west locked in stalemated conflict, with little justice on either side, he recommends a search for the common humanity of the combatants. His contribution to this quest is a study of ancient friendship.

Hutter begins by constructing a framework for interpreting classical thought. He argues that friendship always has political relevance because it unites and divides, tends toward equality, and involves power. He also portrays friendship and enmity as dialectical relationships between Self and Other. Self wishes to enhance its positive and to minimize its negative self-images through a self-performance that attracts Other's applause. Self's efforts can lead to openness toward Other (friendship) or to closure and the will to master Other (enmity).

The author then examines ancient practices and theories. He contends that the Greek social structure, with its rigidly sexual division of labor, gave rise to male (and occasionally female) friendship groups called *hetaeries.* These aristocratic age-grade cohorts shared everything and acted together in war, law, and public affairs. Thus, when Plato and Aristotle debated the relations among friendship, communism, and politics, they were not inventing moral abstractions; they were drawing paradigms from experience. The Greek social structure also created unique psychodynamics. The sexual division of labor produced male-female hostility, stimulated homosexuality, and was at least partially responsible for *paidikon eros,* the peculiar Hellenic combination of pederasty and civic education. Plato's ambivalence toward this institution reflected his inner struggle between socially induced homosexual inclinations and the realization that pederasty was politically divisive. Later, when the *polis* was disintegrating, Aristotle more decisively rejected *eros* in favor of unity.

Plato and Aristotle conceived diverse political theories of friendship because their historical experiences differed. Accepting sensuality, Plato maintained that eros is the soul's first step toward ideal beauty and truth, and that it properly culminates in *philia,* friendship in the vision of the transcendent Good. Politics could be understood as a harmony of erotic and philosophic souls. (Hutter dubiously classifies Plato's notions as proto-democratic.) Despising *eros* as a character defect, and preferring empirical reality to the Forms, Aristotle argued that the higher faculty of reason was the basis of *philia.* The *polis* could be viewed as a rational community whose members loved each other for their virtue as they strove to reconcile personal and common interests. Similarly, Cicero's theory of friendship was historically determined. In late republican Rome, the dominant social institution was *patria potestas* and politics was a vicious power struggle of the great families. Now friendship was virtually impossible and it could not serve as the foundation of order. Cicero saw *concordia,* a kind of grudging truce, as the basis of the state and he regarded *amicitia* as a consolation.

Hutter concludes—inexplicably, in the light of his work on Plato—that the prerequisites of a friendly politics are "a consciousness of the value of human personality, irrespective of any metaphysical justification of personality, a this-worldly orientation, and an anthropocentric religion" (p. 179) and "societies which combine patterns of symmetrical and complementary differentiation" (p. 178). Moreover, he decides that, although modernity meets the former criteria, role structures and other alienating forces cause it to fail in the latter. While the author's treatment of the ancients is well researched and informative, this analysis is subjective and somewhat shopworn.

Hutter would deserve greater acclaim had he not ignored important issues. Methodologically, he assumes the fact-value distinction, the validity of the historicist position, and the utility of Hegelian and Freudian concepts without argument. Substantively, he explains the self too quickly as an "unmetaphysical" locus of social interactions and he contradicts experience by denying the possibility of personal and political friendship in our time, perhaps overgeneralizing the complaints of the alienated.

JAMES M. RHODES

Marquette University

The Social and Political Thought of Leon Trotsky. By Baruch Knei-Paz. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978. Pp. xxi + 629. $34.95.)

It was Trotsky who noted that revolutions tend to be verbose, and he himself vastly contributed to that notion. Endowed with great literary facility and a zest for coining memorable phrases and sarcastic definitions, he penned sketches of men and life with such craftsmanship that their vigor and imagery survive even in translation. Perhaps, however, there is a subtle disadvantage in the sparkling brilliance of his style. Those who read him tend to quote the quotable but skim over the substance of ideas.

Reading Baruch Knei-Paz's book, we realize with some surprise how little we know of Trotsky's social and political thought. Countless volumes, not to mention reams of articles, have been written about him, yet they contain relatively little thorough and deeply probing analysis of his thought, and that goes even for the rightly famous (even if somewhat uncritical) biographical trilogy by Isaac Deutscher. Most of this writing concentrates on what Trotsky did—either the activities of his very brief career as a prominent history maker or his backing of causes and taking sides on issues. Knei-Paz concentrates on *why* Trotsky did what he did, specifically, what social and political *theory* made him say what he said and do what he did.

The thesis of Knei-Paz is that social theories were a decisive influence in Trotsky's life, not in an absolute, rigidly deterministic sense, but rather in the sense of providing an intellectual backbone of a world view that gives shape to the "soul" as the spine does to the body. Theory and life, warns Knei-Paz, can never quite be set in an equation, for there are definite limits to the powers of the former. Life can crush the intellectual backbone as easily as it sometimes crushes real bones, leaving behind hunchbacks and paraplegics.

Though Knei-Paz is not overly sympathetic towards his subject, his book may become the most lasting monument we have to Trotsky's creativity. First, by bringing forth the fact that certain sociohistorical conceptions were a constant motivation for Trotsky's activities, he vests Trotsky's career with a certain logic, order and intelligibility. The image of Trotsky as the brilliant improviser who thrives on chaos but whose abilities pale and dissolve in boredom the moment that orderly, systematic, and long-term effort is required, is, at least in part, rectified. Temperamentally Trotsky remains an improviser but intellectually he emerges as farsighted and consistent. Second, by carefully analyzing and scrutinizing Trotsky's sociopolitical thought, the author is able to show the extent to which Trotsky's ideas are original and *per se* of lasting value.

The key concept for Knei-Paz is that of permanent revolution. Three-fourths of the volume revolves around it, to wit, part 1, entitled, "The Theory of the Permanent Revolution," part 2, "The Permanent Revolution: From Theory to Practice," and part 3, "The Permanent Revolution 'Betrayed.' " (The last part of the book is called "The Revolutionary as Man of Letters.") Of course, except for most of Part 1 the author does not literally focus on this concept but rather uses it as a prism through which other concepts and ideas of Trotsky can be seen and understood. Moreover, permanent revolution is discussed in conjunction with the related concepts (or; rather, conditions) of backwardness and of "uneven and combined development." It is these three concepts taken together that formed the cornerstone of Trotsky's understanding of the Russian Revolution in its pre-1917 period, in its Leninist period, and also in its Stalinist "degeneration." Furthermore, they were decisive in the formation of Trotsky's views on the contrast and interrelationships between revolution in Russia (and other undeveloped countries) and revolution in the industrialized West.

Trotsky's concept of backwardness is in a way the most crucial because it is the foundation from which the two other concepts grow. Knei-Paz's summary of Trotsky's ideas on backwardness (p. 95 ff.) is a model of brilliant exposition of a writer's thoughts. What took Trotsky, polished stylist though he was, hundreds of pages to say and not very clearly at that, is here explained comprehensibly, yet without oversimplification, in less than four pages. Trotsky is credited with originality for perceiving that the backward countries will not simply follow the path of the modernized ones but, though borrowing consciously and unconsciously, will evolve a different pattern both on the economic and social levels. Hence their history, and future revolutionary path, will of necessity be different.

The essence of this differentness is, according to Trotsky, the result of the "uneven and combined development" which takes place in a backward country and which is characterized by a relatively rapidly advancing economic sector and a lagging sociopolitical sector. This makes the phenomenon of permanent revolution both necessary and inevitable.

Unbeknownst to Trotsky, and apparently also to Knei-Paz, there was another Marxist thinker who wrote extensively on the effects of backwardness at the very same time as Trotsky or even a little earlier, but whose mostly untranslated writings are not widely known to this day. He was Constantin Dobrogeanu-Gherea (Kats), a Russian populist who escaped to Romania in 1875, turned Marxist, and became *the* theoretician of the Romanian Socialist Party and also a teacher to most of the early Bulgarian and some Serbian Marxists. Though personally in close touch with most leading Marxists, including Engels and especially Kautsky, only a few tidbits of his writings have ever been translated in the West (a few articles in France, in the 1890s).

Dobrogeanu-Gherea also considered that the socioeconomic development in the backward countries would not retrace the path of progress which the industrialized countries had followed, but neither did he consider that the backward countries would go through a specific historical pattern characteristic for them all. He noted that in Russia the economic system was turning capitalist and large-scale industrial plants were multiplying while the political order was still largely feudal. In Romania, on the other hand, it was the political system which was already largely bourgeois while the economic development was hopelessly lagging. Consequently, the nature of the tension and contradictions between the understructure and superstructure in the two countries was entirely different. Not surprisingly, though he dwelt explicitly and extensively upon the problem of socialism in backward countries, Dobrogeanu-Gherea never put forward a theory to apply to all of these countries. In none of his writings are Trotsky's "uneven and combined development" or "permanent revolution" even mentioned, though he obviously must have been aware of them. Essentially he expected, and favored, evolution that would be individualized and would only in a general way conform to the outlook of historical materialism. [See Constantin Dobrogeanu-Gherea, *Neoiobagia: Studiu economico-sociologic al problemei noastre agrare* (The New Serfdom: An Economic-Sociologic Study of Our Agrarian Problem) (1910), in *Opere complete* (Bucharest: Ed. Politica, 1976–1979), Vol. 4; *Ce vor socialistii Romini* (What Do the Romanian Socialists Want) (1886), Vol. 2, pp. 7–126; "Postscriptum sau cuvinte uitate" (Postscriptum or Forgotten Words) (1908), Vol. 3, pp. 486–504; "Asupra socialismului in tarile inapoiate" (About Socialism in Backward Countries) (1911), Vol. 5, pp. 43–75.]

Thanks to Knei-Paz's definitive study of Trotsky's ideas, it will now be possible to proceed with different comparative studies without first having to plow through the 60 to 70 thick volumes (not counting archival material) of Trotsky's writings. Though he himself disclaims having engaged in a comparative study, the author has certainly vastly facilitated this task for others by approaching Trotsky's ideas within the broad context of the ideas of, and about, the Russian Revolution. Thus the scope of the volume in many ways transcends Trotsky the individual for which reason it will be even more useful than such other related and excellent political biographies as Israel Getzler's book on Iu. O. Martov and Abraham Ascher's on P. B. Axelrod. It certainly would be very helpful if we had a volume on Lenin that matched the quality and scope of Knei-Paz's study of Trotsky.

LADIS K. D. KRISTOF

Portland State University

The Anti-Authoritarian Personality. By William P. Kreml. (New York: Pergamon Press, 1977. Pp. xi + 118. $16.00.)

The Anti-Authoritarian Personality identifies four psychological predispositions for "New Left" ideology: impulsiveness, introspection, opposition to conventional standards of order, and rejection of power relationships. These traits evolve from an "unconventional and unauthoritarian relationship with the political state" mediated by occupation and heredity.

William P. Kreml develops this thesis with a review of the literature in political psychology and a textual analysis of major works about the authoritarian personality. He finds two groupings of variables, construct and style, which emerge from the nine variables of the original F-scale. When these groupings are arrayed as the axes in two-dimensional space, communism, socialism, liberalism, conservatism, and fascism produce a U-configuration. This finding accords with Eysenck's conclusion about ideology and Rokeach's findings about dogmatism. The essence of the anti-authoritarian personality is the left-right dimension, which includes the construct variables of "anti-order," "anti-power," "impulsiveness," and "introspection." The book devotes a chapter to each of these concepts and integrates the work of "counterculture" exponents such as Herbert Marcuse, Erich Fromm, Mario Savio, Allen Ginsberg, and Thomas Hayden with the writings of Jean-Paul Sartre, Edmund Burke, John Adams, and C. B. MacPherson.

The integration of a complex literature is helpful but dated. The political psychology literature review includes no studies since 1961 and a section on "more recent considerations" reviews only three articles since 1969. Indeed, one-third of the bibliographic citations were written before 1960; only one-fifth were written since 1970; and none later than 1973. Considering the 1977 copyright and the publisher's statement that reproducing the author's typescript makes the volume rapidly available, this selectivity is hard to understand. New left activists and philosophers may not have written much since 1969, but the number of scholarly publications citing Adorno has remained constant at approximately 100 per year.

The most important section of the book is a factor analysis of 2493 student interviews from the Indiana University campuses in May 1970. The empirical analysis finds nine factors of anti-authoritarianism—each substantively close to one of the four variables extracted from the literature review. The five most important factors explain 37 percent of the variance of the hypothesized left-right political dimension.

Ironically, however, Kreml's findings have the same weakness that inspired his work. Critics of the authoritarian personality argued that the F-scale suffered from response set; that is, a finding of authoritarianism required only that respondents agree with the survey items. Similarly, most items of Kreml's anti-authoritarian scale load on factors of agree items or factors of disagree items; there are three factors of *all* disagree items, four factors of *all* agree items, one factor of all but one agree item, and a final residual factor. The five factors that explain 37 percent of the variance of the left-right political dimension are all agree or all disagree factors—four have all agree items.

More succinctly, 33 percent of the variance of the main dimension is explained by factors which include only agree items. Since support of the Left also requires that respondents only agree with the survey items, response set inflates the relationship between the left-right scale and the anti-authoritarian scale. Midwestern students preoccupied with the death of four Kent State students only three weeks before the survey might simply have dismissed an apparently irrelevant survey by agreeing (or disagreeing) with everything.

A few other problems remain. The author's writing is awkward. Clauses such as: "...should permit us to not only be able to understand the considerable emphasis which..." (p. 84) make the work difficult to read. Errors and omissions in the literature review create doubt about accuracy. For example, Kreml mistakenly attributes Philip Converse's discussion of the consistency of attitudes in belief systems to *The American Voter,* and he never mentions Converse's 1964 article on "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics." In addition, he cites David Easton and Robert Hess—not David Easton and Jack Dennis—as authors of *Children in the Political System.* Finally the subject itself seems anomalous in the complacent 1970s, although it remains an important focus of studies in personality and politics. Kreml's philosophical discussion of the linkage between ideology and the polity is an important contribution to this literature. *The Anti-Authoritarian Personality* therefore deserves a spot on any complete bibliography of ideology.

C. ANTHONY BROH

Duke University

Liberalism and the Modern Polity: Essays in Contemporary Political Theory. Edited by Michael J. Gargas McGrath. (New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc., 1978. Pp. ix + 305. $12.50, cloth; $5.95, paper.)

Fourteen authors offer their opinions on liberalism in this book, and not one has anything good to say for it. Although most of the opinions, and some of the authors, might be called "liberal" in today's usage, liberalism itself takes a lambasting. When something is said to be done in "typical liberal fashion" (p. 202), this does not mean beautifully, correctly, or justly; it means with foolish formalism or vicious neglect.

Moreover, the tone of criticism is neither reverential—as if in the presence of authority—nor challenging—as if authority were to be taken seriously. Rather, the tone is carefree and almost contemptuous. One of the authors asserts that "the dominant cultural system of liberalism . . . pervades every nook and cranny of society" (p. 252). I do not know whether this book is a nook or a cranny, but it is surely not pervaded by liberalism—unless one could say that liberalism has reached such a condition of palsy as to reserve all its doubt of authority for its own authority and to devote all the energy of liberty to attacking itself. To the extent that liberalism remains the "dominant cultural system" in this country, it could hardly be satisfied with its dominance, if this book is evidence. The authors do not seem properly grateful to liberalism for the freedom of speech and scientific inquiry granted and guaranteed to them by liberalism. Somehow—one is not quite sure how—they should think better of the only system in the world today which allows them to speak ill of it while living well under it.

This is not to say that the criticisms made of liberalism are unreasonable or slight. James L. Wiser contrasts the classical "structured soul" to the liberal "open self" and hopes for a rediscovery of the classical spirit without resurrecting its dogmatic forms. One way to do this might be to consider "the transcndent realm" as an *ascent* from "the immanent realm," not a rejection or "turning away" (p. 8). John R. Wikse explains Marx's opinion of authenticity as a critique of liberal man even though he acknowledges that the notion of authenticity appears to have originated with nonliberal thinkers such as Stirner, Kierkegaard, and Heidegger. Authenticity is thus seen as a danger more to Marxism than to liberalism. Jean Bethke Elshtain examines the "liberal heresies" (meaning heresies against liberalism) of existentialism and repressive feminism, and rejects them as leading to moralism and violence. But again, this result is blamed on "certain components of liberal thought" (p. 53) that are smuggled into existentialism and thereby into radical feminism. The alternative promoted is Freud, not a liberal thinker (though to be sure, a Freud purged of the idea of salutary repression, p. 49).

"Classical liberal notions that conceive of the mind as a calculating, interest-maximizing machine" come under attack from James M. Glass, who advocates the theories of Jung. He believes, with Jung, that liberal culture "barbarously overvalues" (p. 77) rationality. But if we all become more and more conscious of the unconscious, are not the opportunities for domination by rationality enhanced? Kathy E. Ferguson finds in the anarchist feminism of Emma Goldman the basis for a radical critique of liberalism's economic and sexist oppression. Both kinds of oppression must be overcome because, she says with ringing good sense, "it is difficult to see how a boring and alienating factory job is preferable to a boring and alienating home life" (p. 98). In "Hobbes, Liberalism and America" H. Mark Roelofs traces the current American conception of community to Hobbes, whom he explains as combining bourgeois morality and Protestant pietism in an exhausting and uncreative tension.

Mulford Q. Sibley's chapter is distinguished by its recognition that distributive justice is mainly concerned with material needs, but, he says, "we must give the material world its due before we can transcend it" (p. 151). He hopes to give both material and nonmaterial needs their due in a new society. As opposed to Wiser, Sibley forgets perhaps that the vulgarity of the material world must be not merely avoided but rejected and held down, if material needs are to be transcended. William Leiss considers "The Social Function of Knowledge in the Liberal Tradition," and while denying liberal hopes for greater control of our lives through knowledge or technology, endorses Marx's hope that control can be achieved, and without the imposition of hierarchy, in the advance of the "general intellect" (pp. 186, 190).

Theodore J. Lowi characterizes the modern liberal state as "the state of permanent receivership," in which government guarantees the continued existence of bankrupt enterprises without directly assuming responsibility for them. His proposal is that government should assume direct responsibility, but for less. In the notion of *isonomia*, somewhat inflated, J. Peter Euben presents the Greek understanding of political equality in contrast to the "mechanical equality in modern liberalism" (p. 210). To him, *isonomia* means "to be with others" (p. 218), but above or below them? Euben does not discuss the relationship between *isonomia* and rule. Deena Weinstein and Michael A. Weinstein criticize the current policy research of sociologists because it makes them "hired hands" of "currently vested interests" (pp. 233, 235). How does the scientist avoid this? Apparently by keeping his nose out of "the durational character of human existence," which dignifies, by varying, at least the housewife's routine (pp. 240–41). Edward S. Greenberg, in "Liberal Culture and Capitalist Hegemony," describes liberal culture as if it were his robust enemy and contained none of the people and followed none of the policies today called "liberal." Michael J. Gargas McGrath's essay on Nozick reproaches him for neglecting Marx's insight that we are social creatures. But what about "the fact of our separate existence" (p. 278), which Nozick brings to the fore? The discovery that McGrath has identified Bill Russell as Wilt Chamberlain (appearing in TV ads for the telephone company, p. 281) makes us suspect that *he* does not appreciate the fact of our separate existence and everything that fact implies.

HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, JR.

Harvard University

Treason, Tradition, and the Intellectual: Julien Benda and Political Discourse. By Ray Nichols. (Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas, 1978. Pp. x + 270. $16.00.)

This book deals with the long effort of

Julien Benda (1867–1956) to formulate an appropriate role for the intellectual–or *clerc* as he put it–in modern politics. Central was Benda's landmark *La Trahison des clercs,* published in 1927. Ray Nichols takes us well beyond this classic formulation of *le clerc* (appropriately masculine in contrast to his rivals in the lay realm!) to the entire range of Benda's casting and recasting of the problem from the early essays in *Revue blanche* through his long association with *Nouvelle Revue francaise.*

As Nichols notes, this range of writing is, among other things, an impressive life span which "almost exactly coincides with the tumultuous eras of the Third and Fourth republics, Vichy, and the Nazi Occupation." Most importantly for Benda's singular preoccupation with *les intellectuels,* his own intellectual engagements began with the Dreyfus case, as a Dreyfusard, and ended at the zenith of Existentialism in postwar France. He started out fascinated by an ivory tower that had become *engagé* in a rationalist counterattack against anti-Semitic reactionaries and he ended by labeling Jean-Paul Sartre, author of a trenchant analysis of anti-Semitism, an apostle of irrationalism. The latter indictment, of course, was not against the author of *this* work, but in reaction to Sartre's formulation of the writer's role. Sartre would not let the writer escape social responsibility, whereas Benda would; yet both were absorbed in the *role* of the intellectual, a quintessential *social* issue.

Nicholas rightly observes in Benda certain Manichean predispositions–his early conception of *les heureux* and *les souffrantes,* his later notion of *les clercs* and lay persons. Underlying all was the duel between Socrates and Callicles, between neo-Kantism and Bergsonism, between rationalism and irrationalism. The difficulty was to make such categories fit politics and its tendency to blur such dichotomies, if not to turn these distinctions on their heads. Benda had no feel for such deception, professing instead, with Socrates in the *Gorgias,* a desire to renounce "the honors at which the world aims . . . only to know the truth, and to live as well as I can, and . . . to die as well as I can." Yet, Benda's admiration for Socrates came from afar: Benda was not a practicing philosopher and he enjoyed worldly honors. These differences raise an important question about *Treason, Tradition, and the Intellectual.* Why devote an entire book to Julien Benda?

Nichols says of *La Trahison* that it was "no isolated work; . . . it was an outpost, warning of a greater, labyrinthine structure which loomed beyond." It was "a summing-up, but only in mid passage." This assessment is made almost halfway through Nichols' book. But what lay beyond? *La Trahison* may have made Benda a "man of notoriety," but hardly a person engaged in building more labyrinthine structures. Instead, there is "a figure of some international note" whose opinions "were sought on diverse matters," who "was bothered to see a library that did not possess one of his books and was pleased when asked to contribute to reviews." This hardly accords with the Socratic dictum to eschew earthly advantage for heavenly justice. Nichols takes all too seriously Benda's later books and essays which seem little more than portentous observations on events and personages of the day.

No one can be faulted for having one good idea, in Benda's case his archaic usage of "clerk." Yet, the very term is used to condemn "political passion" and those who devote their minds to it as they participate in political activity. Nichols wonders aloud about Benda's neglect of political theorists, but the answer comes back in the very conception of *les clercs.* One marvels at Benda's wish to be heard and to remain aloof at the same time.

What one must ultimately be concerned about is not so much the engagement or detachment of intellectuals as their refusal to treat politics as a form of action and knowledge worthy of serious thought for its own sake. Benda seems as much at fault here as those he criticizes. The problem of relating thought to political action has to do with developing means that will enable intelligence, not intellectuals, to assume an ever-increasing role in public policy. Such influence will come from genuine political theory, not from role playing.

ROBERT J. PRANGER

American Enterprise Institute

Orientalism. By Edward W. Said. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978. Pp. xiii + 369. $15.00.)

Marx and the End of Orientalism. By Bryan S. Turner. (Boston: George Allen & Unwin, 1979. Pp. x + 98. $21.00, cloth; $8.95, paper.)

Orientalism, or at least that part of it which is concerned with the Islamic Middle East, comes under severe attack in each of these books. Edward Said and Bryan Turner both insist that all studies of the history, culture, society, or politics of Islam in the Middle East and of Muslim states in that area distort reality to the extent that they are guided by the presuppositions of orientalism. Nor does either one hesitate to indict by name the scholars to whom we usually look for guidance about this vital area; only a handful are spared their accusations. However, Said and Turner do not present their briefs in the same fashion, nor do they seek similar redress.

Edward Said, for example, bases his accusation against orientalism on a fairly thorough analysis of the major writings of several scholars whose names have been associated with the academic study of the Orient since the seventeenth century, as well as those of contemporary scholars. What is more, he pays equally careful attention to the writings of authors who sought to present the Orient in a more subjective manner and even considers the writings of those who, involved in the political affairs of the area, tried to explain the people and the land to their own fellow citizens. Said sets out his reasoning about these matters in detail and introduces the larger argument by an extensive discussion of his method. By contrast, Turner is much more laconic. His thin volume is primarily based on the secondary literature about the problems inherent in Marx's discussion of the Asian mode of production and his failure to pay sufficient attention to Asian or oriental political entities. With the exception of a passing reference to the great nineteenth-century French orientalist and philologist, Ernest Renan, Turner bases his judgments about orientalism on the writings of half a dozen contemporaries, all of them social scientists. Using the new form of parenthetical reference, he states his arguments tersely and simply refers the reader to a large body of recondite literature. Whereas Said is as concerned about the general reader as about the specialist and frequently restates his argument to make it clearer, Turner addresses himself exclusively to those interested in the problem of Marxist interpretation and comes close to a clear statement of his argument only in the final pages of the volume.

Simply stated, Said's book is about the politics of discourse as it applies to the Middle East. He contends that orientalism must be understood as arising out of a particular political culture, as being shaped by the presuppositions of that political culture, and as shaping in its turn that political culture as well as the political culture of the subject area. (The pun, to speak like Said for a moment, is intentional.) His goal is to sensitize scholars, to make them aware of what he calls the "old ideological straight jacket" of orientalism (p. 326), to bring them to question their presuppositions. Yet, ready as he is to denounce those scholars who study the area in what he deems an incorrect manner, Said balks at offering more precise guidelines about how to pursue non-orientalist studies of the Orient. And, his disclaimers notwithstanding, the logic of his argument is such that the most he can aspire to is an angry protest or an impassioned expression of anguish. Insofar as Said is correct when he contends that all academic knowledge about the Middle East is warped and twisted by the political climate in which it arises (see p. 11), or when he endorses Michel Foucault's insight that because of the political climate all attempts at imagery and representation necessarily distort the real object (see pp. 272–74), he must accept the implacable limits of such reasoning: if our knowledge or power of imagery is limited by the horizon of our political and cultural milieu, then self-consciousness or awareness of our plight does nothing to push back the limits of our horizon; at the most it can incline us to be less arrogant intellectually. Stated in these terms, Said's argument seems to be little more than a radical version of Socrates' analogy of the cave applied to Middle Eastern studies. However, it is less compelling than that earlier version, both because it denies the existence of a way out and because it fails to explain how Said could himself become apprised of his bounded milieu.

Bryan Turner's more modest goal keeps him from such dilemmas. He, after all, is persuaded that Marx's understanding of man and society was fundamentally sound and needs only to be articulated in new modes. While he would like to see someone engage in a thorough critique of the theoretical origins of orientalism and of its results, much as Said has done, Turner does not see that as his task. Apparently unaware of Said's work (as Said is of Turner's), he fails to take advantage of such a learned ally. Instead he contends that although Marxism could dismantle orientalism once and for all, it must address itself to more immediate problems. Above all, it must somehow purge itself of those forms of Marxist thought which resemble orientalism. Turner identifies these forms and explains how they resemble those of the enemy, but he is unable to effect the purge. One reason he fails is that he is primarily interested in reviewing the literature of Marxist analysis. This leads him into numerous subsidiary arguments about the correct interpretation of Marx and thus into an extensive critique of recent Marxist scholars. However interesting this may be, it does not make up for his failure to pursue the immediate argument any more than his commendable grasp of Weber and Durkheim compensates for his limited grasp of what constitutes orientalism and its subject area.

If orientalism comes to an end, it will not be due to any of Turner's assertions about the merits of Marxism. And if Said is to be believed, Marx would be of little help in such an undertaking, for his arguments belie the same kind of subordination to the limits of a political and cultural climate as do those of the orientalists. Clearly, of the two volumes under review, Said's is the more comprehensive and even the more interesting. It is extremely well written and of astounding breadth. While Turner's acquaintance with the scholarly literature about Marxist and sociological analysis is striking, Said's detailed knowledge about the history of orientalism and his familiarity with the various disciplines out of which it arose are overwhelming. Said speaks learnedly about literature, philology, history, and politics, as well as about the secondary literature concerned with each of these disciplines. In sum, he has written a book which is in many respects an intellectual *tour de force.*

For all its merits, however, Said's book is not without faults. In the first place, even though he presents a basically sound critique of the foibles of orientalism and even of some of the better-known orientalists, he says nothing novel. Those of us who study the Middle East knew long ago of the problems inherent in the scholarly work of the early orientalists. We have long been puzzled by the harsh judgments of Renan about the thought and the religion of the Semitic peoples, just as we have been bemused by the insularity of Lane and intrigued by the extravagances of Flaubert or Burton. Likewise, we have learned to recognize the biases which mark the work of some contemporaries and to treat their scholarship accordingly. Awareness of such prejudice and bias called forth serious attempts to reexamine the roots of our various disciplines and to the formulation of questions and approaches that would allow us to study foreign cultures impartially. Secondly, Said's contention that the foibles of orientalism are the necessary outgrowth of a particular political and cultural milieu is simply not persuasive. As was explained above, his argument falters due to his inability to explain how he alone has achieved enlightenment. Thirdly, Said's argument suffers from the same fault that plagues modern military theoreticians: overkill. Where a deft slash with a razor would effectively dismantle an argument, Said wades in with a pick-ax. Or when he has effectively shown up a worthy opponent, Said dilutes his point by carrying it against an incompetent opponent. At other times he tortures a passage until it yields a meaning quite distinct from that which it originally seemed to have. Frequently he does this unnecessarily and thus succeeds only in weakening an otherwise sound argument. Finally, there are faults of carelessness: several errors in the transcription and translation of foreign languages, as well as numerous typographical errors.

What Said has really done is to write a competent intellectual history of orientalism, complete with references to minor influences and to the way serious scholarship led to or was prompted by imaginative literature and by political or economic incentives. But, except for the suggestion that this phenomenon is somehow linked to a human incapacity to arrive at a correct perception of the other, he has failed to identify its motive force. Ultimately, Said's problem is racism—the problem of explaining why otherwise intelligent and decent individuals assent to invalid and denigrating opinions about groups of people foreign to them. While he is surely correct to suggest that the problem is as ancient as Aeschylus, not to mention Abraham, he must go farther: he must explain why such judgments arise.

Still, despite these substantive faults, Said's book is appealing. He has taken a problem of great proportion and pursued it broadly and deeply. Moreover, by writing at a level that will attract the attention of many audiences and by presenting his evidence so that both the specialist and the general reader can evaluate its merits for themselves, he has pointed to the larger questions behind an otherwise tiresome quarrel. Similarly, his attempt to show that the problem falls into an arena beyond that of academic knowledge, that it affects and is affected by imaginative literature as well as by politics, infuses the quarrel with new vigor. Thus even though I remain skeptical about the soundness of Said's basic postulate, I cannot help but admire the clarity, force, and comprehensiveness of his exposition.

CHARLES E. BUTTERWORTH

University of Maryland, College Park

Justice or Tyranny: A Critique of John Rawls's "A Theory of Justice." By David Lewis Schaefer. (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1979. Pp. xiii + 137. $12.50.)

There are at least two obvious ways in which Rawls' theory of justice represents a sharp departure from previous Anglo-American political theory. First, he proposes a hypothetical thought experiment, the "original position," for resolving moral disagreements (people are to imagine that they choose principles for a society without knowing any particular facts about themselves which might bias the choice). Second, Rawls has carved out a moral position quite distinct from the two positions most commonly invoked in contemporary discussions—utilitarianism, on the one hand, and equality, on the other. By arguing that inequalities are justified when they maximize the *minimum* share, Rawls has managed to appeal to representatives of both of these rival camps.

In *Justice or Tyranny?* David Lewis Schaefer misrepresents Rawls on both of these essential points. First, Schaefer simply dismisses the original position because it is not a procedure we could actually implement:

> Because there is no conceivable human situation that could resemble Rawls's original position, the debate over which set of principles would be accepted in such a situation has no possible relevance to human affairs (p. 87).

This is to miss the point of a thought experiment which appeals to what people *would* choose under hypothetical conditions of fairness. We are to imagine ourselves in the original position in order to filter out biases and arbitrary factors. Whether people could institutionalize such a procedure is beside the point. It is the principles of justice—and not the procedures of the original position—which are meant to be institutionalized in actual life.

Second, Schaefer confuses Rawls' position at various points with *both* utilitarianism and equality. For example, he describes Rawls as someone who "fundamentally accepts the Benthamite perspective" and who views "the good of society as merely a sum of individual utilities" (p. 89). This is, of course, to confuse utility with Rawls' doctrine of primary goods and to confuse an aggregate maximizing principle with the Rawlsian position that the minimum should be maximized. Schaefer also confuses Rawls' position with equality. In the epilogue he attacks Rawls for advocating a "redemptive egalitarianism" intended "to combat inequality *as such*, whether founded on convention or on nature, industry or on luck" (italics in original, p. 106). Here Schaefer simply ignores the potentially inegalitarian implications of Rawls' position: maximizing the minimum share may *increase* inequality (if there are incengive effects). Rather than combat all "inequalities as such" Rawls has offered us an argument about the conditions under which inequalities could be justified.

There are, of course, important questions to be raised about Rawls' account of the original position (and its merits compared to other decision procedures) and Rawls' argument for maximum justice (and its merits compared to other principles). But rather than refer the reader to this discussion of those problems, I would recommend the two books already published (by Brian Barry and Robert Paul Wolff) and the June 1975 symposium in this *Review*.

JAMES FISHKIN

Yale University

Plow Women Rather Than Reapers: An Intellectual History of Feminism in the United States. By Sarah Slavin Schramm. (Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1979. Pp. ix + 441. $17.50.)

Sarah S. Schramm's book is part of a small but growing (and often collegial) effort by American political scientists to understand feminist principles and practices. The "new spirit" of feminist scholarship is apparent from the outset. In the preface, the usual sorts of acknowledgements for academic aid and comfort are amplified by gratitude expressed to numerous individuals for help with specific research tasks and suggestions. The direct avowal of partisan purpose as a feminist, coupled with the equally sincere effort to attain as much scholarly objectivity as possible, and optimism about a creative tension between the two, are also striking from the start.

The study itself has several strengths that make it useful reading for persons interested in the development of American feminism. It is based on extensive archival research and reading, including many lesser-known as well as familiar works of feminists. The author is conscious of definitional and methodological difficulties in approaching this huge and amorphous subject, and deals with them straightforwardly. Although there is, inevitably, overlap in her categories and artificiality about her pigeonholes, she succeeds in presenting the material in manageable categories. The vignettes of several feminists, especially Sojourner Truth and Amy Lowell, are brilliantly done and memorable. The bibliography is large, eclectic and annotated; and several clever illustrations work well with the text.

There are also problems with the book that mar its initial impression and go some way towards reducing its value for scholarship. As the subtitle indicates, it is an "intellectual history." It deals with ideas *tout court*, in isolation from all but the most rudimentary indication of changes in society, economy and polity during the period covered, which stretches from the colonial era to the mid-twentieth century. Little sense is given of the life-circumstances of the feminists whose ideas are used, and perhaps more puzzling, it is almost impossible to glean an understanding of systematic approaches to feminism from the scattered references to individuals. The normal dilemma faced by authors in such matters—arrangement by topic, chronology, or person—is resolved in favor of topicality almost completely, with an occasional nod to chronology. This decision extends even to the use of the permanent present tense, which is initially confusing and ultimately quite annoying. It gives the book an air of a TV documentary rather than a scholarly study, and in this way the author does her readers, and herself, a grave injustice.

This mood is carried to an extreme in the "dialogues outside time and space" that open each section, a bold gesture that fails, for this reader in any case. The idea is to give a sense of the variety of ideas held by feminists on each successive topic, and introduce each participant. But the oddity of having Mary Wollstonecraft conversing with Gertrude Stein, Marshall McLuhan (and 15 or 20 others) is not relieved, as it would be in a conventional "dialogue of the dead," by light shed upon specific personalities and characters. The major defects of the book—a kaleidoscopic fragmenting of the material, and an obtrusive presentism—are here distilled into a few pages before every chapter.

For these reasons, the book fails to give much sense of the development of ideas, or any sense of the connections among the ideas held by any particular thinker. Although the topic is feminism in the United States, ideas are also drawn from major British feminists, and even occasionally from such worthies as Plato and Hobbes, with little notice of the complexities in their ideas touching on these topics, or consideration of what role they play in the development of *American* feminism.

Schramm's title, initially a puzzling one, turns out to be well chosen for her purposes. Her concern is with the pioneers of feminism, the plow-women or sowers of the seed, rather than those who reap the harvest. Rather than providing a concise definition of feminism she presents it as the sum of a series of loose generalizations based on pioneering works. Her own study, like most of those now being written, has the defects and strengths of a pioneering epoch, too. Feminist scholarship as a field for concentrated work is novel now, and difficulties with methods or definitions are still here to wrestle with. One might wish her book other than it is in certain ways, but not quarrel with her sober optimism about the long frontiers of feminism which we still face. She is herself a plow-woman in a worthy cause.

NANNERL O. KEOHANE

Stanford University

The Ideology of Form: The Influence of Organizations in America. By David Schuman. (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath, 1978. Pp. x + 196. $17.95.)

David Schuman in *The Ideology of Form* advances the thesis that organization theory provides an explanation for the founding and organization of American society. Using Max Weber's definining attributes of bureaucracy, he argues that "it is within the model of bureaucracy that Federalist thought most easily fits, and further that we are still very much dominated by bureaucratic thought today" (p. 11).

The book is organized into seven chapters: (1) American Politics as Administration: The Roots, (2) A Strand of History, (3) The Ideology of Form, (4) Identity and Society: The Setting of the Problem, (5) Identity and Organization: Problems of the "New Theory," (6) The Idea of the Past, Once More, and (7) What May I Hope. The argument regarding the bureaucratic nature of Federalist thought and historical developments as bureaucratic reforms is accompanied by a normative position that is critical of the dehumanizing tendencies inherent in bureaucratic organization. Efforts of the human relations school and other "new theorists" are viewed either as manipulative or as an insufficient response. In chapter 6, Schuman turns to the past and takes from sources outside the "Federalist heritage" themes that are viewed as providing a different foundation that "could serve as a starting point for the future" (p. 136). These include the themes of community, decentralization, politics, liberty, and power.

Schuman follows the tradition of many political scientists who assume that the American federal or national government is *the* government. His book is devoid of references to federalism as a system of government characterized by multiple units of government having overlapping and concurrent jurisdiction over the same land and people. He quotes Tocqueville approvingly about the importance of municipal institutions to the spirit of liberty, and emphasizes Jefferson's proposal for ward republics without considering the place of such ideas in a theory of federalism. Instead, Jefferson's ward republics are a manifestation of decentralization in Schuman's language.

Schuman makes use of a very extended literature, but many of the authors of that literature would, in all probability, protest the way that their efforts are used. In a discussion of Charles Lindblom, for example, we find the following:

> Given the American pluralist society, the best method of making decisions is incrementally. Society moves a half-step at a time. The individual, alas, becomes a muddler—a little paint here, and a few nails there. All this, Lindblom argues, has virtue (p. 57).

Many of Schuman's assertions have the ring of unreflected thought. The following are indicative:

> The system had to be constructed to keep the people from forming together in large democratic masses (p. 18).
>
> We know that the Puritan community lasted only one generation (p. 22).
>
> In any state which desires an active, participating citizen, it is incumbent upon the government to provide public space for such participation (p. 74).
>
> In other words, either to destroy or check the use of power is to destroy an individual's capacity to do good (p. 75).
>
> The Constitution, while granting rights to the individual, provided no space for him or her to use those rights. With no space, citizenship is almost meaningless (p. 143).
>
> The dialectic is foolproof. For every idea there is an automatic and standardized criticism (p. 161).
>
> Welfare payments would be governed by something other than bureaucratic rule. Indeed, they would be governed by those who were most affected (p. 178).

While Schuman is concerned with problems of fundamental importance, I am not persuaded that he has made a useful contribution in laying out the analysis of those problems. Much of what he does I consider to be fundamentally erroneous. Some of these errors are apparent in the above statements.

VINCENT OSTROM

Indiana University

Karl Mannheim's Sociology of Knowledge. By A. P. Simonds. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978. Pp. viii + 205. $14.95.)

This is a useful book in rectifying our "image" of Mannheim although incomplete in its examination of its two explicit themes: an introduction to the work of Karl Mannheim, and an introduction to the sociology of knowledge. It must be acknowledged at the outset, however, that A. P. Simonds recognizes his study as a compromise, and thus it is neither an intellectual biography of Mannheim nor a definitive study of the sociology of knowledge.

Simonds is especially concerned with Mannheim's early German period (essays from 1921–31) when he was involved with working out the nature of social knowledge and how it is acquired. Unfortunately, Mannheim's two essays in *Ideology and Utopia* (1929) have apparently determined his "image" while failing to promote the methods of inquiry he wanted to develop.

Simonds sketches the standard criticisms of Mannheim: "failure to avoid the self-destructive consequences of relativism, commission of the genetic fallacy, illegitimate reduction of the cultural 'superstructure' to a material 'base,' hypostatization of a collective 'mind,' etc." (p. 9). Simonds rejects these criticisms, arguing in the later sections of the book that Mannheim was well aware of the issues involved in these criticisms, that translators have veiled his meaning, and that a close reading of the texts will show "that the effect of the standard arguments about relativism and reductionism was to pose false (or at least thoroughly misleading) alternatives—alternatives which serve to obstruct rather than to advance inquiry" (p. 9).

Mannheim is presented as always arguing against the notion that the sociology of knowledge is "an attempt to reduce knowledge to material facts that are extrinsic to the sphere of meaning" (p. 29). The sociology of knowledge is not concerned with determining a *causal* relation between thought and its existential basis. Instead the *meaning* of modes of thought can be adequately *understood* only if we come to know their social origins.

Behaviorism, which studies only "externally perceivable reactions," cannot penetrate into social reality, and the sociology of knowledge must not be condemned as reductionist because it makes different ontological assumptions as compared with positivist social science. The sociology of knowledge, part of the *Geisteswissenschaften*, depends "on the fact that the epistemological knowing subject is also an historical acting subject" (p. 34). Thus social sciences have a distinct subject matter; their data are "invested with meaning." The sociology of knowledge seeks understanding, not explanations, of thought. To account for thought in terms of its social origins or bases is a problem of interpretation (hermeneutics), and thought is not merely *reduced* to its origins by the sociology of knowledge.

The main methodological problem is to show how to determine criteria for distinguishing between a true and a false account of what any expression "means" (p. 50). There is a major epistemological problem here. Meaning can be found objectively in texts, etc., when agent and observer share a framework of reference. Simonds makes clear that Mannheim rejects a doctrine of textual autonomy. Mannheim's position is that *meaning* in the expressive sense can only be determined by reference to the intentional object in the artist's, thinker's, or creator's mind, and this in turn requires reference to the "historical background" of the object, extrinsic to it. Thus, the interpretive method of the sociology of knowledge is required by a science that would comprehend a world composed of cultural (expressive) objects (p. 52).

One of the most important contributions of Simonds, in my judgment, is his stress on Mannheim's notion that the modern world is especially needful of cross-contextual communication, for there are now more than ever numerous universes of discourses that need to be bridged. Discourse within the same universe of meaning does not require the sociology of knowledge. Of course, not all extrinsic evidence is adequate, and Simonds' work effectively sketches the kind of evidence that the sociology of knowledge must find to clarify intended meaning, particularly as applied to the history of ideas. Simonds' discussion in chapters 4 and 5 of procedures used in interpretation, the use of ideal types, the imputation of cultural constructs (such as the "Protestant ethic") in the interpretation of an individual, and the problem of the relationship between intersubjectively accessible evidence and agents' self-awareness are all handled nicely, and provide a partial introduction to interpretative method in the sociology of knowledge.

The last two chapters, concerned with the relation of the sociology of knowledge to empirical social theory and to critical theory, are more vehicles for Simonds' views that Mannheim's, and significant ideas are touched upon but inadequately developed. In regard to empirical theory, Simonds' book is useful in saving Mannheim from the frequent misrepresentation that his method implies a reduction of knowledge to facts, of thought to social origins. Subjectivist critics of behaviorism, Simonds seems to be saying, might find in Mannheim's sociology of knowledge a way of dealing with meaningful action while retaining some kind of scientific validity. What bothers me is that Simonds does not really show how empirical theory can be developed from this approach, nor how it differs from a part of normal historical research.

Finally, although the defenders of a "critical rationalism" (e.g., Popper) and a "critical theory" (e.g., Adorno) differ in other respects, they have agreed on attacking Mannheim's sociology of knowledge as incapable of criticizing the status quo. They claim that the "existentiality" (*Seinsverbundenheit*) of all thought from the perspective of the sociology of knowledge "destroys *any* standards to which critique might appeal and it therefore leads inevitably to an indiscriminate and thoroughly passive acceptance of anything at all" (p. 161). Simonds insists that for Mannheim the historicity of thought implies only partiality of perspectives, and implies nothing regarding the truth-value of a thinker's assertions (p. 169). The very function of the type of inquiry required by the sociology of knowledge is to enhance the possibility of inter-subjective communication, which in terms affirms "the existence of a common world and hence of truth." Sociology of knowledge inquiry tries to expand conceptual frameworks, which implies the possibility of a universal framework.

For Mannheim, man is a craftsman; scientific inquiry is a perpetual, critical, and self-corrective process; the corresponding social ideal is a critical community of inquirers (p. 175). This attempt to reduce the frequent contemporary tendency to "talk past one another" indicates "a commitment not to accommodation but to engagement" (p. 183). Truth is historical; as such it includes not only the present given, but also that which stands to be realized (p. 185). Mannheim affirms the standard of a single, comprehensive truth that encompasses the partiality of any single conceptual context. Because the purpose is not necessarily reconciliation of all competing concepts and claims, but their communication, comparison, and criticism, the sociology of knowledge is not without critical capacity.

If a thorough assessment of Mannheim's contribution to social science, an introduction to the sociology of knowledge, or a balanced assessment of the major methodological problems in contemporary social inquiry is desired, this book will not provide any of these. Regarding the latter, the greatest defect in my judgment is that Simonds mentions but does not adequately deal with the work of students of social inquiry who accept the intentional aspect of social reality but who also value, and are trying to work toward, *some* kind of scientific verification. This book is pulled in too many directions, and neither the explicit nor implicit themes are adequately analyzed. Nevertheless, it is useful in calling for renewed attention to, and proper understanding of Mannheim's early work by those who are working on the "unresolved issues of contemporary social theory."

ARTHUR LENNART KALLEBERG

University of Missouri, Columbia

The Political Economy of Distribution: Equality versus Inequality. By Michael Don Ward. (New York: Elsevier, 1978. Pp. 188. $16.95.)

The Political Economy of Distribution is an ambitious cross-national analysis that seeks to locate the principal determinants of inequality within nations. The form of inequality with which Ward is concerned centers on the distribution of such social goods as income, wealth, and access to health, nutritional, and related benefits.

As a first step, Ward devotes a lengthy chapter to the definition and measurement of inequality. The result is an index of inequality for 120 countries with the following four components: (1) a Gini ratio of income inequality; (2) a "social immobility" index taken from Gurr and based on school enrollment ratios, size of the middle class, and extent of discrimination; (3) a welfare index adapted from Hibbs and based on infant mortality rates and the like; (4) a ratio of three measures of affluence to three measures of poverty; and (5) a ratio of telephones per capita to telephones per capita in "the major cities." Note that all except the first of these components are themselves composite measures.

While I am sympathetic to Ward's measurement efforts, I am uncomfortable with his solution. First, many of the components of his overall index are of doubtful face validity. Take, for example, the fifth (telephone) component, the validity of which Ward takes two sentences to justify: "If the telephones are concentrated in one major city, then by inference so are the bulk of [economic, social, and political] activities. This situation is one which is characteristic of inequality" (p. 35). These are at best weak assertions rather than justifications, involving heroic inferences. Similarly, I am not convinced by the three measures of affluence that go into the fourth component. For example, given the varying degrees to which governments promote foreign tourism as an industry, I do not find the number of Hilton hotels a particularly useful measure of affluence. The same goes for motor vehicle deaths, which reflect too many other factors (age of vehicles, road conditions, and so forth) to be taken as a measure of affluence.

A second general problem that might escape the casual reader is that Ward's overall inequality index conceals a large amount of missing data. Despite his attempt at comprehensive coverage of 120 countries (market *and* nonmarket economies, etc.), data for his first component (income inequality) are available for only 66 *market* economies (p. 31; incidentally, it is thus odd that the *N* varies when nonmarket economies are excluded—compare Tables 2.8 and 2.10). Similarly (and despite the note to Table 2.5), Table 2.7 shows that data for one component of the affluence measure are available for less than half the cases. Indeed, from Table 2.8 it is clear that of tne ten pair-wise correlations among the five inequality component indicators, *only two* are based on more than three-quarters of the 120 cases analyzed. Unfortunately, Ward lists the exact *N* for only the first component.

Third, I find Ward's overall index difficult to interpret, given that it combines so many measures (some of *them* already composites) of varying face validity. This difficulty is not alleviated by the correlations between the component measures of inequality (Table 2.8), since only one of these is larger than, for example, the linear correlation of .79 between per capita energy consumption and inequality (Table 3.1). If Ward's inequality index is validated by the correlational and factor analytic exercises of chapter 2, then by the same token energy consumption rates also reflect inequality. I suspect that few will find this position defensible. Indeed, the resulting country scores (Table 2.11) belie even Ward's own subsequent statement that the Scandinavian countries are "among the most egalitarian in the world" (p. 168), since they are actually scored as much *less* egalitarian than Italy, Switzerland, and the United States.

Two other points. First, recent analyses (e.g., Allison, *American Sociological Review*, December 1978) indicate that Gini ratios are more limited than Ward asserts (p. 23). Second, I doubt Ward's claim (pp. 37–39) that sector-based and "individual" measures of income inequality are unrelated: for example, the correlation between the two using data reported by Taylor and Hudson, and Paukert (see Ward for references) is .69, a figure higher than any of the correlations between Ward's individual-level Gini ratios and any of his other four component measures of inequality (Tables 2.8 and 2.10).

The remaining three analytic chapters consider, in turn, the effects of economic development, policy effort and political mobilization, and international determinants of inequality. While I have some reservations about specific aspects of the analysis (for example, the "formalization" on pp. 105–06 is tedious and unnecessary, and the subsequent estimates do *not* show that policy variables "mediate" the effects of economic development), these chapters are generally well done. In particular, chapter 5 is innovative and suggestive with its argument that international factors are the most important determinants of inequality within nations. As the most interesting chapter in the book, it helps to clarify a major avenue for further inquiry.

ROBERT W. JACKMAN

Michigan State University

The Limits of Legitimacy: Political Contradictions of Contemporary Capitalism. By Alan Wolfe. (New York: Free Press, 1977. Pp. xv + 432. $14.95.)

In this provocative book, Alan Wolfe is engaged in two closely related enterprises. First, he wants to provide a political perspective for understanding the development of Western capitalist states over the past 200 years. Second, he wants to analyze the current legitimacy crisis which he believes confronts all liberal democracies with the emergence of late capitalism.

Along with other neo-Marxist theorists such as O'Connor and Mandel, Wolfe argues that modern capitalist states are caught between two contradictory imperatives: the need for accumulation and the demand for legitimation. What is distinguishing about Wolfe's analysis, however, is the rather peculiar political reading he gives to this common theme. As Wolfe explains it, "The symbolic political expression of this duality is liberal democracy, for liberalism becomes the ideology of and justification for accumulation while democracy upholds the importance of legitimation, of some kind of popular partipation and some equality of results" (p. 7). While on the one hand, liberal democracy reflects the hegemony of the capitalist ruling classes over the political system, it is also the expression of the democratic demands of the working class for a more responsive state. In short, Wolfe maintains that at the heart of Western democracies there exists an irreconcilable tension between the logic of liberalism and the logic of democracy which reflects the inevitable class conflict that takes place in all capitalist societies.

The book itself is divided into two distinct parts. In the first part (234 pages), Wolfe sketches out how over the past 200 years six temporary "solutions" have been offered "to resolve, or at least mollify" the tensions between liberal and democratic conceptions of the state. The first solution, the "Accumulative State," arose out of the confrontation and compromise between the industrial bourgeoisie and an older regime of merchants and the nobility. While it was designed to promote capital accumulation through the active intervention of government into the economy, "when the task of legitimation became necessary with the rise of the working class, it was too contradictory to work" (p. 247).

The Accumulative State was superseded in the middle of the nineteenth century by a new conception of the state which was preoccupied with the problem of legitimation. In the idea of the Harmonious State, suggests Wolfe, two distinct strands of thought, Spencerian liberalism and Saint-Simonian organicism, came together to justify existing capitalist arrangements and to emphasize the fact that all classes had a common interest in allowing the bourgeoisie to control the state apparatus. Theoretical inadequacies, however, combined with the corruption of late nineteenth century political life "made harmonious doctrines seem shallow and led to new solutions to the problem of the state in capitalist society" (p. 248).

One such solution came in the form of the Expansionist State. Faced with the contradiction between liberalism and democracy, Wolfe argues that the ruling classes turned to foreign expansion as a solution to domestic problems. World War I exposed the inadequacies of this solution for it revealed that capitalist states were not only subject to inter-class conflict, but intra-class conflict as well. After an initial flirtation with corporatism, the Franchise State emerged as a new solution to harness discontent in both these areas. By delegating public power to private organizations, the Franchise State sought to regularize class conflict by extending itself to all politically important groups in society. Ultimately, however, it only succeeded in mystifying the political process and promoting further political irresponsibility. As its own voluntary arrangements began to break down under the pressures of class conflict and war, the Franchise State went into decline as "the state began to assume the power that belonged to it all along" (p. 249).

In the post-World War II era, Wolfe suggests that two final solutions have been offered to solve the political contradictions of capitalism. The Dual State, which came into existence in the United States between 1963 and 1973, was essentially two states in one: one which sought to preserve order and another which sought to maintain a democratic facade. The Transnational State represented an attempt to go beyond the limitations of the nation-state through such organizations as the Common Market and the United Nations. Much like their predecessors, these solutions also were trapped in the contradictions between liberalism and democracy.

In the second part of the book (90 pages), Wolfe turns to consider the legitimacy crisis of the late capitalist state. According to Wolfe, late capitalism corresponds to "the exhaustion of political alternatives" offered by liberal democracy to solve the tension between accumulation and legitimation. "As the tensions between liberalism and democracy manifest themselves . . . resolutions may be sought in an authoritarian direction (toward the primacy of accumulation over legitimation) or in a democratic direction (the assertion of legitimation over accumulation)" (p. 252). Wolfe himself comes to stand firmly on the side of democracy in this struggle and in the final chapter proposes a number of ways in which democratic dreams might be revitalized in an alienated political world.

The scope of *The Limits of Legitimacy* is nothing less than monumental. By drawing heavily upon the work of such theorists as Perry Anderson, James O'Connor, Gabriel Kolko, and Theodore Lowi, Wolfe has provided a broadly sketched political history of the state in capitalist society. Unfortunately, it is a political history which is in many respects far too eclectic and much too loosely argued. What Wolfe presents is not a theory of the state, but a typology of the state. Moreover, certain crucial concepts in this typology such as accumulation and liberalism, legitimation and democracy, political contradictions and economic contradictions are so inappropriately interchanged that their distinctions are lost. What is the nature of the state? To what degree is it autonomous from or dependent upon the economic order? How do late capitalist states differ given separate paths of historical development? Such traditional questions are never adequately answered in Wolfe's study.

These problems notwithstanding, *The Limits of Legitimacy* is a highly suggestive work which will have to be confronted on one level or another by any future study of the state in capitalist society.

EDWARD J. HARPHAM

University of Houston

Class Ideology and Ancient Political Theory: Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle in Social Context. By Ellen Meiksins Wood and Neal Wood. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978. Pp. x + 275. $17.95.)

Ellen and Neal Wood argue that a common ideology shapes the thought of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle (the "Socratics")—an ideology that serves the interests of the declining landed aristocracy. The Socratics, according to the Woods, tried to revitalize the aristocracy in order to counter the expanding democratic elements of Greek society. Far from embodying Greek life and values, the Socratics' inegalitarian political thought negates the democratic essence of the Greek city. The lower and middle classes developed the city as a means of wresting power from the aristocracy, a means of freeing the subjected laboring class from its exploiters. Historically, politicization meant democratization: the democratic city replaced the household, the stronghold of the aristocracy, as the primary political-economic base.

If the Woods are correct, Westerners should admire not the Socratics, as they have been inclined to do—for they were in fact counterrevolutionaries—but rather the truly revolutionary Athenian city. Athenian laborers were free and independent "as is possible where a *class* of labourers exists at all—more independent, of course, than the free proletariat of the modern age, and, because of their political role, more free even than later "petty-bourgeois' classes of independent producers." The Woods also intend to revise our conception of philosophy: philosophy is not disinterested reflection but a means of political partisanship. Socrates' teachings about definition, knowledge, and the soul are not "doctrinally pure," but "permeated and shaped by elements of his political ideology." That "philosophy at its very source was ideologically motivated and fashioned" suggests to the Woods the nature of the philosophic enterprise altogether.

Given the Woods' understanding of the nature of thought and inquiry, it is not inappropriate to note the democratic ideology that permeates and shapes their scholarship. Many of their incorrect statements about the Socratics can be traced to this ideology. Moreover, their intention is partisan: by placing the

Socratics "in social context," the Woods intend to release the hold the Socratics have over Western thought and therewith to free us from an antidemocratic heritage.

Of Socrates, for example, the Woods ask: "How does one account for Socrates' excoriation of the people, if it is not an expression of his social status and connections?" They seem not to entertain the possibility that one might hold an opinion because it is a true one, supported by argument. Although they do state that Socrates denounced democratic politics because he believed that democratic man "lacks the specialized knowledge necessary for sound political judgment and decision," they refuse even to consider the validity of such an antidemocratic notion. They therefore fall back on "social status and connections" as the explanation of this opinion. They thus maintain, contrary to tradition, that Socrates must have been an aristocrat. Democratic ideology underlies this fanciful supposition. To support their picture of an aristocratic Socrates, the Woods bring up such facts as Socrates' refusal to teach for money. This suggests to them that Socrates was a member of a leisured class. As to Socrates' renowned poverty, they suggest that it resulted from a renunciation of wealth due to a philosophic conversion. One might expect, however, that such a conversion would entail a disdain for the aristocratic way of life, but the Woods make no attempt to reconcile Socrates' self-imposed poverty with his aristocratic partisanship.

In Aristotle's inegalitarianism, the Woods find a view that man is fundamentally wicked. As proof of Aristotle's belief in man's wickedness, the Woods cite Aristotle's statement that men commit evil not simply for the sake of material necessities but also for the sake of superfluity. They do not see that Aristotle's view of man's capacity for evil implies a rather high view of man. Men want much more than material necessities. Moreover, the Woods do not mention Aristotle's cures for this propensity for evil, moral virtue and philosophy, actualizations of man's highest potential. Why would the Woods accuse Aristotle of believing in human wickedness? Could their reasoning serve the view that the good society can be achieved through overcoming material scarcity? That is, could it be in the service of promoting a certain egalitarian ideology?

According to the Woods, Plato faced the problem of the separation of thought and action, a problem that grew out of the aloofness of aristocrats, men of thought, from democratic politics, the sphere of action. By reconstructing the city so as to give aristocrats power, Plato was able to unite thought and action. Plato thus introduced hierarchy and inegalitarianism into the historically democratic city. In making this argument, the Woods have no difficulty in assimilating the philosopher, who rules in the *Republic,* to the aristocratic gentleman, whose interests they claim Plato shared and served. For the Woods, the fundamental distinction is between laborers and leisured class, philosophers and gentlemen belonging to the latter. They do note that the philosopher in the *Republic* is not interested in ruling, and that there is an ambivalence in the *Republic* about whether virtue is contemplative or active. They explain the ambivalence by claiming that the disjunction between thought and action is a political rather than a philosophic problem. Since Plato identifies virtue with the aristocratic class, he believes that in the historical, democratic city, virtue must be contemplative. Only in the city transformed to give the aristocrat power can virtue be active. This explanation of the *Republic*'s ambivalence about virtue, however, is weak. If the city in the *Republic* is the one transformed for the aristocrat, as the Woods contend, why would the ambivalence about virtue, the tension between thought and action, remain? We must wonder whether, contra the Woods, the more fundamental problem in the *Republic* is philosophic, whether the Woods have failed to identify what the *Republic* is about.

The philosopher-kings remain apart from the city, even when they rule. This fact does not fit well into the Woods' thesis. The philosopher-kings remain apart from the city, perhaps just as mathematics, the core of their education, abstracts from the natures of the phenomena in the world. These mathematically educated philosophers may be the appropriate rulers of the *Republic*'s city because the city as city ignores the individual, particular natures of its citizens. In spite of the three classes in the city, the *Republic*'s communism indicates that the city is fundamentally egalitarian and also tyrannical, since the equality must be imposed contrary to nature. The *Republic* explores the collision between the universalizing, homogenizing tendency of the city and the heterogeneous parts of which it is composed. If there is merit to this suggestion, Plato did reveal the essential character of the city, as the Woods understand it, but he revealed a tyrannical dimension that the Woods would find repellent. To the extent that Plato criticizes the city in the *Republic,* he defends the particulars, the individuals, against the universal of the city. How far this interpretation differs from the Woods' is seen in the Woods' belief that Plato sides with the universals against the city, in which individualism flourishes. The Woods' position is understandable in light of egalitarian ideology which sees no problem in reconciling individualism and equality. On this point the Woods have much to learn from Plato. It will be impossible for them to do so, however, as long as they persist in collapsing philosophy into ideology. Indicative of this collapse is their assumption that because the Socratics were not "neutral disinterested spectators" of political conflict they are necessarily partisans. But one might have a greater interest in viewing and establishing an integrated whole than in advocating the claims of a part. A study of the Socratics, different from that undertaken by the Woods, might point the way to a resolution of the conflict between the aristocratic partisanship the Woods attribute to the Socratics and the Woods' own democratic partisanship. The principal concerns of the Socratics were whether it is possible to overcome the partiality of the parts, and whether there could be a unity of thought and action that does not sacrifice the parts to the whole.

MARY POLLINGUE NICHOLS

Catholic University of America

American Politics

The Creation of a Democratic Majority, 1928–1936. By Kristi Andersen. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979. Pp. xv + 160. $13.00.)

Considerable disagreement exists among students of American voting behavior concerning the role of voters in electoral realignments. Some maintain that active members of the electorate convert from one party to another to bring about realignment. Others contend that realignments result from the lopsided mobilization of new voters into one of the parties.

The Creation of a Democratic Majority, 1928–1936 makes a compelling case that the New Deal realignment was produced primarily by the mobilization of previous nonvoters, especially first- and second-generation immigrants, into Democratic party ranks. This case is based upon both individual and aggregate data. The individual data (presented in chapter 4) are virtually the same as those contained in Andersen's chapter in *The Changing American Voter* (pp. 74–95) and will be familiar to many. A reconstruction of the distributions of party loyalties in the 1920s and 1930s, from reports on partisan changes and first votes by respondents in the 1952–1972 Michigan election studies, demonstrates vividly the contribution of new voters to the Democratic majority.

Because estimating previous party loyalties from responses of contemporary electorates is a questionable procedure, Kristi Andersen has devoted considerable attention to validation. The estimates remain questionable, in three important respects at least, in spite of her efforts. First, Independent to partisan changes cannot be distinguished from partisan stability on the basis of these data, with the likely consequence that the percentage of Independents is underestimated seriously for earlier times. While not weakening the mobilization explanation for the New Deal realignment, this leaves unresolved the precise mechanics of that mobilization. We cannot determine whether the new Democrats came from the ranks of Independents or were preadult partisans as a result of socialization—a determination which would be particularly helpful in understanding the potentialities of contemporary American politics. A more serious problem involves inherent limitations in the criterion data used for validation. Andersen assumes that remembered partisan changes are valid for the period of interest, 1920–1936, because reconstructions of partisan distributions from recall are roughly accurate for more recent times. This assumption is questionable. One might expect more reporting error for the period of change (1928–1936) than for the subsequent period of stability. Finally, analyses of panel data by Richard G. Niemi, Richard S. Katz, and David Newman show that recall seriously underestimates partisan change, thus posing a new challenge to the validity of Andersen's reconstructions. For these two reasons, we cannot be sure that actual partisan conversions were rare from 1928 to 1936 just because they were rarely remembered.

These frailties of the recall data make it essential that the case for mobilization be given broader empirical support. Leaving few stones unturned, Andersen has amassed several types of aggregate evidence to provide such support. National vote totals, vote totals from seven urban counties, and registration figures for selected areas are analyzed in chapter 2. Ward-level data from Chicago are scrutinized carefully in chapter 6. All these data tell the same story. The surge in participation in the late 1920s and early 1930s benefited the Democratic party almost exclusively, demonstrating in yet another way that strong forces of voter mobilization were responsible for the realignment.

The individual and aggregate evidence reinforce one another. After *The Creation of a Democratic Majority,* it seems clear that the mobilization of new voters created the New Deal Democratic majority. Theories of electoral change which presume widespread conversion require a strong corrective given these findings. Theories of generational replacement must acknowledge the special role, for the New Deal realignment at least, of the entry into the electorate of new groups whose parents were not members of the previous electorate.

Andersen's work has important implications for the study of electoral behavior, and a particular strength of the book is the skillful manner in which she draws them out. First, the findings for the 1928–1936 period support the basic thrust of the "Michigan model" of voting behavior. Party identifications were found mainly to be inherited from parents where parents were partisan and to be developed from early voting experiences where parents were not. Once formed, partisan loyalties proved highly resistant to alteration. Second, the findings undermine a common image of voter rationality in which the partisan loyalties of most voters derive from issue preferences. Issue-based development of partisan loyalties is restricted primarily to non-immunized voters (the young and nonvoters) during a realignment period. Finally, these findings lend dramatic support to a Schattschneideresque view of electoral change in which voters move in and out of the active electorate in response to *political* forces. Even if one is inclined to be more cautious than Andersen in generalizing this process to other times and places, there is no doubt that it is a vitally important mechanism in democratic politics.

All in all, *The Creation of a Democratic Majority* is an excellent and important book. It will have a substantial impact on the field of electoral behavior and is "must" reading for those interested in the mass bases of politics in general or of American politics in particular. The book enjoys the rare distinction of helping to resolve a major controversy in a field. Because of it, we now stand on firmer ground in building theories about the role of mass electorates in electoral change.

PAUL ALLEN BECK

Florida State University

Affirmative Action and Equal Opportunity: Action, Inaction, Reaction. By Nijole V. Benokraitis and Joe R. Feagin. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1978. Pp. xix + 255. $17.50.)

Over the past 10 years, most Americans have come to recognize that "something more" than formal nondiscrimination is needed to hasten the advancement of women and minorities and to help many of them to overcome handicapping effects imposed by social discrimination. Precisely what that "something more" should be, however, has provoked intense policy conflict, much of it centered on the federal government's Affirmative Action programs.

The disputants invoke the same ultimate normative objective of a society in which race and gender are irrelevant to law and policy. But they differ sharply on what equal opportunity and social justice mean and require, whether the use of race- and gender-conscious means, especially group preferences, is equitable, and whether such means will facilitate or impede achievement of the agreed-upon ultimate social objective. When the quest for a more broadly based equality of opportunity is weighed against other important affected values, the different balances drawn set the stage for intense public disagreement.

Since public debate of these complex, important, and vexing issues has generated at least as much heat as light, there is a special need for careful analysis of the subject and for thoughtful policy prescriptions. Regrettably, the work under review, co-authored by two sociologists, contributes little to meeting either need.

After an initial brief account of Affirmative Action as government policy, the study concentrates on reviewing the amount and type of employment changes for women and minorities in both public and private sectors during the last decade; attention is also given to data on students and faculty in higher education. In Benokraitis' and Feagin's judgment, the rate of progress is unimpressive. Only slim gains have taken place, especially in higher occupational positions, and Affirmative Action can take credit for only a portion of these modest gains.

The root cause of inadequate progress, argue the authors, lies in the government's lack of genuine commitment to Affirmative Action and its ineffective implementation of the policy. Their policy solution, similarly, urges the development of aggressive government-sponsored Affirmative Action programs that "put real teeth, consistent sanctions, and enforced compliance into the decades-old quest for equal opportunity" (p. 212). Given the present political and judicial environment, however, Benokraitis and Feagin conclude that the prospects for invigorating Affirmative Action are bleak. (These downbeat estimates were made before the Supreme Court decided the *Bakke* case in mid-1978 and, of course, before the *Weber* decision in mid-1979.)

The study is greatly weakened by the authors' enthusiastic and uncritical embrace of an extreme conception of Affirmative Action (and, implicitly, of equal opportunity), which they then apply as both the measure of employment progress and the policy objective that must be achieved. Affirmative Action requires, assert Benokraitis and Feagin, that public and private organizations "act positively, affirmatively, and aggressively *to remove all barriers, however informal or subtle,* that prevent access by minorities and women to their *rightful places* in the employment and educational institutions of the United States" (p. 1, emphasis added). This perspective explains the gloominess of their assessment of employment gains and underscores the quantum step-up in government intervention and coercion they have in mind when calling for effective Affirmative Action programs with "real teeth . . . and enforced compliance."

This expansive definition of Affirmative Action expresses the outlook of its most dedicated partisans; unhappily, many of the biases and limitations of this sectarian approach to the problem reappear in the study. For example, the existence of discrimination is routinely inferred from dissimilar group employment rates; when overt discrimination cannot be identified, the elastic notion of subtle discrimination is used to provide the explanation. The authors' preoccupation, in either case, is with achieving the "proper" employment results, implicitly defined in terms of group proportionality or parity. Benokraitis and Feagin do cite views contrary to their own, but rather than develop or engage them seriously, they typically discount them as insubstantial, unsubstantiated, or as strategems of what they see as a political backlash that selfishly seeks to thwart Affirmative Action. Whatever the authors' intentions, therefore, their work too often reads as advocacy intended to reinforce fellow believers than as analysis meant to enlighten or convince those who are conflicted or otherwise undecided on the key issues.

ALLAN P. SINDLER

University of California, Berkeley

A Measure of Justice: An Empirical Study of Changes in the California Penal Code, 1955–1971. By Richard A. Berk, Harold Brackman and Selma Lesser. (New York: Academic Press, 1977. Pp. xix + 312. $19.50.)

A Measure of Justice is an excellent empirical analysis of how law evolves. It is a detailed examination of legislative changes in the California Penal Code from 1955 through 1971. The authors used statistical procedures with a limited blend of "standard historical analysis" to examine the impact of a variety of variables, with the goal of revealing the kinds of influences that were important in the process of changing the penal code. They also attempted to determine which of the influences were more important than others. From the standpoint of policy analysis, one of the most important objectives of the study was to determine whether or not the California penal code was shifting the adversarial balance within the criminal justice system and, if so, whether the shift tended to favor the prosecution or the defense (p. 3).

The importance and significance of the book extends beyond the field of criminal justice to the area of legislative policy making and American politics in general. Considerable attention is given to both the internal variables affecting the legislative process and those outside forces that impinge on the institution and process. As such, the activities of legislative leaders, lobbyists, interest groups, and others concerned with penal code legislation are important to the analysis. The heart of the book is an empirical analysis of the entire universe of over 700 legislative changes in the code. The result is a successful transformation of categories of events into real numbers. The code revisions were categorized in terms of legislative targets, including functionaries within the criminal justice system such as law enforcement, judges, prosecutors, etc., and potential and convicted offenders. The categories also included changes in the kind of behavior labeled "illegal" and sentence severity.

The statistical analysis of the coded changes revealed several trends. The legislative sessions tended to divide into brief periods or sessions in which those pushing civil liberties achieved success, while others resulted in changes that tended to favor the police and prosecutors. Berk, Brackman and Lesser conclude that "the two types of criminal justice officials (police and prosecutors) most closely associated with law enforcement interests appear to have been least successful in obtaining criminal code revisions consistent with their priorities" (p. 162). However, the authors conclude that historical trends could not satisfactorily explain the legislative output.

The data did reveal rather clear trends in terms of criminalization and penalties. For example, there was a marked increase in criminalization and sentence severity. The impact of a full-time professionalized legislature also was suggested by the finding that legislative output increased substantially when the legislature began meeting every year. The observed trends, however, did not indicate that the forces of law and order were the clear beneficiaries in that many of the revisions involved consumer and public interest matters. According to the authors, the one clear winner was the state as "all sides seem committed to the philosophy of controlling undesirable behavior by criminalizing it" (p. 186).

In an attempt to explain the trends, the authors examined two broad categories of independent variables. The variables inside the legislature included party control, partisanship and lobby influence, while the outside variables included crime statistics, public opinion and newspaper coverage. The correlation analysis indicated that the percentage of Democrats tended to correlate with increased criminalization and penalty severity, while greater Democratic strength also tended to decrease support for the goals of law enforcement interests. Partisanship did not appear to be a significant factor, but lobby influence had critical effects on penal code legislation. Of the outside variables, only newspaper coverage seemed to be significant. However, one of the few problems with the analysis may be the somewhat subjective nature of the discussion of lobby influence. They identified "effective influence" in terms of the lobbyists' estimates of their success, and from newsletters, journals and interviews. A number was then assigned to law enforcement and civil liberties lobbies. The process of converting subjective data to numbers does seem somewhat questionable. Secondly, whether the coverage of a single newspaper—*The Los Angeles Times*—can qualify as an independent variable in relation to legislative output appears highly questionable in a state as large and politically complex as California. The paper is important politically, but most observers probably would be reluctant to attribute such a degree of influence.

The extensive multivariate analysis did reveal interesting relationships such as the conclusion that changes favoring law and order forces may increase crime rates. In short, they suggest the politically significant view that there may be causal links between code revision and measures of criminal activity. In short, revisions favoring prosecutors and increasing criminalization result in increased success in the processing of crime while revisions favoring defendants may cause a decrease (p. 271).

This is an important book both substantively and methodologically. It buttresses the contention that quantification of legislation is a valid and productive research undertaking. Secondly, the data indicate that changes in the penal code do matter in that some parts of the political system and segments of the population are affected in differing ways by such revisions of law. Similar analyses in other policy areas of legislative law changes should be undertaken and the authors of this volume are deserving of much praise for their significant contribution to policy analysis research.

LARRY L. BERG

University of Southern California

The Control of Oil. By John M. Blair. (New York: Vintage Books, 1978. Pp. xxii + 441. $3.95, paper.)

The Brotherhood of Oil: Energy Policy and the Public Interest. By Robert Engler. (New York: New American Library, 1977. Pp. xi + 338. $2.50, paper.)

As a "new" policy phenomenon, relative energy scarcity has been with us for almost a decade, a longer life than most policy phenomena experience, with unfortunately little evidence of declining relevance. If it is the task of social science to probe the origins of important political problems and to offer solutions, then these two books are exemplary. Despite different approaches to the subject matter, the authors' explanations for energy shortage are remarkably similar, as are their resulting policy prescriptions. The late John Blair, an economist and former assistant to the Federal Trade Commission and to the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, emphasizes issues such as oil industry concentration and preferential taxation. Robert Engler, a political scientist and academician, spends little time on technical issues and instead sketches broadly the historical background of the 1973 price increases, the government/corporate interface in the Nixon years, and the role of a federal bureaucracy that allegedly is "sympathetic, captive, innocent, or incompetent." Both authors are highly critical of U.S. energy policy and of the posture of the oil industry in the evolution and implementation of that policy.

Engler raises the question, but does not answer it: where does the public interest lie, or ought to lie? Surely the public interest does not merely begin where private interests leave off. But if the public interest in energy matters overrides and contains various private interests, then how does one sort and delineate these overlapping jurisdictions? Moreover, how homogeneous and coherent is the public interest in energy? Public preferences have not been expressed as to whether cheaper energy or more secure sources of supply has the higher priority. Moreover, the American middle class, accustomed to a life style and mode of transportation that is very energy-intensive, and consuming far more energy per capita than the poor who could and should be otherwise compensated, has not been willing to pay the world price for oil and natural gas, thus hastening the depletion of domestic reserves. Nor is the public fully aware that, despite the sharp recent price increases, the real price of petroleum (minus inflation) as of 1978 remained less than the 1944 price, thus providing only a sudden and very belated incentive to develop alternative energy sources and to explore massively in high-cost areas. The public has likewise not fully confronted the tough tradeoff between efficiency and equity in terms of regulation; nor has it faced the reality that debate over the public interest on energy matters can scarcely be restricted to the American sphere when approximately half of the petroleum consumed in the United States comes from abroad. Given these uncertainties regarding this Rousseauistic concept, it is not surprising that conceptions of the public interest have been of minimal help in the formation of a national consensus on energy policy.

Blair tends to assume the public interest and focuses instead on patterns of power and control within the oil industry. His approach is thus quite congenial to that of many political scientists. The fifth chapter lays bare the international pricing formula which guided production decision making during the pre-1973 era. Blair outlines why such a formula was necessary from the perspective of price stability, how the policy was implemented with the aid of excess production capacity in the Texas oil fields, and why the policy collapsed in the fall of 1973. While other sections of the book may be more useful to the general reader, this fifth chapter on international control is of greatest interest to the specialist.

What both authors conclude about energy policy, however, is that far-reaching breakup of the oil industry (divestiture) would assist in solving the nation's energy problems. The premise is that divestiture would lead either to greater intra-industry competition and therefore a more vigorous attack on exploration and development, or to subversion of OPEC market control, or both. Regarding the former argument, were the premise tenable, one could find many more plausible targets than the oil industry, including steel, computers, and automobiles. Yet economies of scale and the size of capital requirements call into question the validity of the breakup strategy. Alternative energy source development in solar and exotic technologies is also restricted not by lack of competition but by the relative lack of attractiveness of such investments even at current energy prices. Regarding the latter argument, OPEC could probably survive divestiture better than could the American public interest. OPEC might have to assume a few more management responsibilities a bit sooner than it would like. But the real political consequence would probably be a more rapid transfer of market power from the consumer nations and from the now more enfeebled corporate intermediaries to the OPEC leadership. Thus, as a very readable history in political economy, each book makes a significant contribution. But as a guide to the sound development of current national energy strategy, each misses the mark since it does not fully recognize how different is the pre-1973 market controlled by the consumer orientation and the post-1973 setting increasingly controlled by OPEC. Neither book emphasizes sharply enough that the only way the United States can escape the drag of foreign oil dependency is either to reduce demand significantly or to create excess production capacity through major energy discoveries or the innovation of a comparatively cheap alternative energy source. Institutional shortcuts unfortunately are rather futile diversions away from these difficult but central tasks.

CHARLES F. DORAN

Johns Hopkins University

The Politics of the Equal Rights Amendment: Conflict and the Decision Process. By Janet K. Boles. (New York: Longman, 1979. Pp. x + 214. $6.95, paper.)

Any author who writes a scholarly book on a major political struggle while that struggle is still being battled out, necessarily places her or his text in a situation where it will receive unusually stiff public scrutiny. Janet K. Boles' careful examination of the politics surrounding the ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment is such a text and Boles is fully aware of the thankless task she has taken on, for her preface notes: "The dispassionate analytical language of the social scientist may seem obscene to those who care so deeply about the amendment's fate" (p. x). As one who shares Boles' feminist sentiments regarding the ERA, I think her attempt to be "fair to both sides" is far from obscene, and, in fact, provides some valuable insights into anti-ERA sentiments and tactics that could prove valuable to the feminist cause.

The book seeks to unravel the mystery of why the amendment encountered such strong opposition in many state legislatures after breezing through the Congress and 22 legislatures with the support of the traditional national political bases of power. In an early chapter Boles presents a solid overview of the sociopolitical milieu of the previous decade that facilitated congressional passage, but her primary focus is the applicability of the interest group conflict and community conflict models to the conflict over ERA in Georgia, Illinois, and Texas. Ratification was achieved readily in Texas simply because no opposition groups attempted to influence the outcome. In the absence of competition, legislative decision makers handled the ERA much as the interest group model would predict. In Illinois where the legislature was divided, and in Georgia where the opposition held the upper hand, Boles argues that the community conflict model best explains the dynamics which resulted in non-ratification. The presence of statewide conflict introduces a bias against the adoption of any new policy.

Boles continually forces her data into the categories provided by these models because her stated theoretical purpose is the development of a theory of political decision making under conditions of high conflict. In the absence of any references to the resolution of other conflictual issues in state politics, the resultant theory is not convincing. More importantly, the focus on synthesizing the two models leads the author to ignore or slight some of the most intriguing questions raised by the unexpected battle over the ERA. Many of the legislators who were interviewed indicated that no other issue had ever generated such intense reaction, yet Boles does not consider why this might be the case. She does give some treatment to the tactics and interactions that are attributable to the fact that most of the lobbyists in this conflict were women, and very cautiously notes that the ERA may have brought the sexist prejudices of male legislators into the decision process, but this is all done rather cursorily. Boles' heavy reliance on the traditional models precluded the significant theoretical breakthroughs that might have occurred if the peculiar intensity of this conflict had been examined as a case study in the politics of gender. Boles' exclusive focus on the dynamics of decision making once the particular form of the conflict materialized, caused her to neglect the socioeconomic conditions giving rise to conflict, and thus we are left with no insights on a crucial decision-making question raised by the ERA, namely the differences between state and national decision making. Congressional extension of the ratification period, a seemingly more difficult political task than ratification, and the continued failure of the state ratification process, make this question even more salient today.

The book's particular value lies in its analysis of how the ERA's proponents' use of rational public education campaigns only served to increase the level of confusion among those who had doubts or fears about the issue, ultimately operating to the advantage of the opponents. Once the level of conflict intensified, legislators failed to differentiate between the two sides, labeling both "emotional" and "irrational." The proponents' appeals to abstract values such as "equality" or "justice under the law" did not have the same legislative impact as the opponents' appeals to their personal interests in the home and the family. "Instead of stressing the concrete benefits to be gained with ratification, supporters often displayed the amendment as a moral imperative." Boles concludes that rejection of the ERA may serve as a symbolic "no" for persons who feel that their self-determination has been eroded by remote institutions over which they have no control. Unfortunately, this observation is merely tacked on in a summary paragraph without supporting evidence.

Boles' failure to explore systematically why the ERA has generated such intense conflict in the society at large is the major weakness of this book. Public opinion polls indicate that this issue has captured a very wide audience.

Surely this interest must be related to social changes that affect individuals in significant ways. From this perspective, Boles' suggestion that the amendment might have been routinely ratified if it had only been introduced in the states two years later is unpersuasive. However, the book is still well worth reading, as it is intelligently written and provides many fascinating details on ERA politics. More complete analyses are sure to follow, but I would suspect that this book will serve as an important starting point for all future work on the ERA.

IRENE DIAMOND

Purdue University

Rockefeller of New York: Executive Power in the Statehouse. By Robert H. Connery and Gerald Benjamin. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1979. Pp. 480. $15.00.)

This book should become a classic for its contribution to the field of state government. Although it documents the administration of only one "active-positive" governor with long tenure, it supports the thesis that political actors and processes profoundly affect the quality of life in a state. Admittedly one case study cannot form an hypothesis, but it can illuminate the extent to which the actions of a powerful politician who thoroughly enjoyed his job could move others to do his bidding.

Connery and Benjamin explore in depth the means by which Rockefeller asserted executive leadership in the statehouse. They give us a careful, balanced and detailed review of his major public policy initiatives between 1959 and 1973. Massive efforts were made across a spectrum of complex and seminal policy areas: higher education, mental hygiene, drug addiction, low- and middle-income housing, mass transportation, pure water and land-use planning. Although Rockefeller took up problems one by one, it is the cumulative effect of his decisions that measures his impact.

Comparative research has shown that New York has consistently been the most generous state in education and welfare, to name only two areas. It has retained its position as one of the most innovative states in the federal system. Although this appears to confirm the governor's initiative and active political involvement, the Dye School would claim that public policy in New York as elsewhere is determined largely by wealth, and that the efforts of a powerful governor cannot significantly affect policy outcomes (Thomas R. Dye, *Politics, Economics and the Public*, Rand McNally, 1966). Certainly wealth is one determinant of spending for any state program; but wealth does not explain why New York is as far above the educational expenditures expected for its economic base as Ohio, for example, is below, or why New York is as far above the expected per capita welfare expenditure as California is below. If economic factors are supposed to determine expenditures, then how can we explain the fact that Rockefeller sought and obtained eight tax increases during his 15 years in office? During his administration, the individual tax burden rose to a higher level than in any other state. Rich states, like rich people, have the *ability* to fund generous programs, but ability does not go hand in hand with will. New York's generosity is no more typical of states than the Rockefeller family's generosity is typical of millionaires.

The political power of a governor is critical and policy outcomes can be shaped by the type of political party he operates and the other resources he commands. Rockefeller moved early to consolidate control over the New York Republican party and make it responsive to him. His presidential ambitions were tied to this effort. He needed to control and direct his state party and implement his program within the legislature in order to capture the presidential nomination. His involvement in national politics, though unsuccessful, had a great impact on politics within the state. Other New York politicians were always aware that they were dealing with a potential presidential candidate and this circumstance enhanced the governor's personal power.

Rockefeller's ability to move his program through the legislature regardless of its partisan stripe became legendary. "With regard to legislative issues upon which he had taken a clear and highly visible stand, Rockefeller believed that he had to win, not only because of the substance of the issue, but also because defeat would weaken him on matters that would arise later" (p. 434). Connery and Benjamin believe that a trend toward legislative professionalism may limit the influence of future governors. My research indicates that increased staff assistance and other improvements tend to make legislatures more responsive to the needs and concerns of citizens, permitting and inducing them to act as partners rather than resistors in the governing process.

Rockefeller inherited a political system that made the governor a key figure in public policy development. New York's constitution gave to its governor unparalleled formal resources such as tenure potential, item veto, budgetary power, control over appointments and the authority to reorganize. The authors show how

Rockefeller used all these formal tools and added extraordinary abilities of his own to persuade and cajole. Influence with a large number of elite persons enhanced his ability to govern. His personal fortune was a major asset. Few governors could afford to maintain a New York City office for the state at their own expense. Although perhaps dealing with an extreme example, this study reinforces the findings of the importance of political actors and processes.

One is hard pressed to find a defect in this excellent work. Hence it was surprising to discover the assertion that Edward Logue ran the New Haven urban renewal program under Mayor *Chester Bowles* (p. 263). For the real incumbent, Richard Lee, as well as for the Yale political scientists who participated in the genesis of Robert Dahl's *Who Governs*, this misnomer may come as a shock, but one which is soon forgotten in the book's overall mastery of detail.

The book shows that the efforts of one powerful governor who enjoyed and used political power shaped the scope and direction of state government. In fact, Rockefeller was criticized for not staying within the economic restraints which should have limited his efforts to find solutions to social problems. (Thomas Dye, take note.) Here is the irony in the ongoing confrontation between the economic and the political explanations of public policy. Rockefeller was an activist executive in a situation of limited resources. His desire to transcend the economic constraints on state government resulted in many innovative measures; but it also led to action in times when the acceptance of constraint might have been a wiser course. In the end his greatest achievement was bound up with his most telling failure. His achievement was the quality of leadership he offered. His failure was his unwillingness to accept the limits of his circumstances. *Rockefeller of New York* documents this irony admirably.

SARAH MCCALLY MOREHOUSE

University of Connecticut, Stamford

A World of Men: The Private Sources of American Foreign Policy. By Lloyd S. Etheredge. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1978. Pp. xv + 178. $12.50.)

During the past decade, students of foreign policy making have devoted substantial attention to the ways in which psychological characteristics of foreign policy decision makers affect policy outputs. Two approaches have been particularly prominent in empirical studies of personality and foreign policy. One approach employs survey research to examine the relationship between psychological dimensions and substantive policy preferences. The second approach is psychohistorical; it uses primary and secondary source materials to code psychological profiles of foreign policy makers. Typically, the survey approach is used to study middle-level national security policy makers, e.g., foreign service and military officers. The psychohistorical approach is usually applied to foreign policy decision makers at the highest levels, e.g., presidents and secretaries of state. Lloyd Etheredge's study employs both of these approaches to assess the impact of personality on United States foreign policy.

This book's survey section is based on responses to questionnaires mailed to 300 foreign service officers stationed in Washington during late 1971; there were 126 respondents (42 percent). For comparative purposes, Etheredge also surveyed 49 mid-career military officers at the National War College and 39 domestic affairs specialists of the Office of Management and Budget.

The survey section tests ten hypotheses which connect personality variables with policy positions and perceptions of international behavior. As Etheredge writes:

> The State Department study . . . is based upon five traditional theories about personality effects on policy ((a1) interpersonal generalization, (a2) displacement of subjective fantasy goals, (a3) inverse interpersonal generalization, (a4) defects in mental health that would produce deviations from cooperative internationalism, and (a5) the interaction of personality with organizational setting) and upon five theories about the effects of personality on perception ((b1) self-based inference, (b2) attribution (i.e., projection) of subjective fantasy goals, (b3) inverse self-based inference, (b4) defects in mental health that would produce systematic effects on reality-testing, and (b5) the interaction of personality with organizational setting); . . . the purpose of testing was to determine their *applicability* to these specific men in the area of foreign policy thinking (p. 9).

Because there are ten different hypotheses, and three separate samples, Etheredge's findings are complex. However, he does conclude "that personality traits shape both (1) policy preferences and (2) perceptions of intentions of other nations" (p. 59). In general terms, his two principal hypotheses are confirmed. More significantly, Etheredge argues that although the internal consistency between personality, perception, and policy orientation gives the appearance of rationality, this impression is false. What is actually involved is the syndrome Robert Jervis has labeled "irrational cognitive consistency" (*Perception and Misperception in International Politics,* Princeton, 1976, pp. 128–42).

In the psychohistorical section of his book, Etheredge investigates "whether intra-elite *variations* in personality characteristics produce *variations* in policy preferences so that some personality characteristics unique to a key decision maker need to be measured and taken into account to explain why some policies are adopted rather than others" (p. 70). This study's temporal domain is the period 1898–1968; the sample includes 36 high-level decision makers: presidents, secretaries of state, and major foreign policy advisers. Etheredge is principally concerned with two personality dimensions: dominance over subordinates and extraversion. These variables were operationalized by "searching scholarly works, insiders' accounts, biographies, and autobiographies for the men under consideration. Passages relevant to two personality dimensions—general *dominance over subordinates* and *extraversion* were excerpted (by Etheredge), retyped (omitting explicit clues that would identify the individual involved or the scholarly source), and included in dossiers" (p. 71). The dossiers were then evaluated by three judges (including Etheredge) to code the personality variables. The author then proceeded to test two specific hypotheses: (a) that there is a positive correlation between dominance and advocacy of the use of force, and (b) that extraversion is positively correlated with advocacy of cooperative U.S. policies toward the Soviet Union. Etheredge's data analysis supports both of these hypotheses.

In general, this is a very good book which has much to recommend it, but three shortcomings diminish its overall merit. The first is the failure to include a copy of the survey instrument. As a result, the reader is largely unable to assess the validity of Etheredge's operationalization of his variables. This work could also have been improved by a more thorough discussion of the theoretical literature. Etheredge appears to know this literature, but it is not well integrated with the study's largely empirical approach. Finally, the large number of specific hypotheses, and the analysis of the data from three separate samples, renders Etheredge's findings quite amorphous. A more well-focused investigation of a subset of the most significant hypotheses would have been more enlightening and more successful in demonstrating the author's basic argument. Despite these shortcomings, this book will be of substantial interest to students of U.S. foreign policy making and the psychological correlates of decision making.

DAVID GARNHAM

University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee

Crisis and Legitimacy: The Administrative Process and American Government. By James O. Freedman. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978. Pp. xi + 324. $15.95.)

This excellent study of the problems and processes of administrative regulation in the United States has two explicit themes. The dominant one is historico-political in its analysis of "the recurrent sense of crisis attending the federal administrative agencies" and its development of an approach to "a theory of the legitimacy of the administrative process." Scarcely less important is the author's endeavor to "illuminate the darkness that sometimes obscures a more complete understanding of the role that the administrative process plays in the governance of a modern democracy" (p. ix).

Implicitly, the volume is also—for the lay person, and this describes most political scientists these days—almost illuminating exploration into such basic topics as the Administrative Procedures Act of 1946, enforcement proceedings, the role of hearing officers, formal and informal procedures, and the comparative performance of several independent regulatory commissions (SEC, FTC, and EOC) and regulatory entities within more traditional federal agencies (e.g., HEW).

Yet this is by no means an elementary work. The technical competence of a professor of administrative law and vice-provost of the University of Pennsylvania Law School is abundantly evident. This is a study of both breadth and depth. I strongly recommend it as an introduction to administrative regulation for political scientists and their graduate students.

However, Freedman's work has some limitations. The consideration of administrative regulation in terms of its relationship to the separation of powers, the usual judicial norms, our ambivalence toward any form of economic regulation, our concern with bureaucracy, and our skepticism of some presumed regulatory expertise is done with an understanding of the basic foundations of American government and politics. But the attempt to approach a theory of the legitimacy of administrative regulation misfires on the fact that the difficulties lie, not, as the author implies, within the boundaries of administrative law and regulation but within our own popular and political ambivalence toward the general form and structure of American government as a whole. The legitimacy of administrative law and regulation must be primarily dependent on the legitimacy of the larger whole of which they are part. Nevertheless the discussion of the five topics just above is sophisticated and illuminating in a much broader political sense than is common among most legal works. In a sense this segment of the book is an unusually competent explanation and justification of the need for and place of administrative law and regulation in our present version of a democratic society.

Moving from its political and economic setting into the intricacies of "the administrative process" itself (an unfortunate and confusing phrase which came into use after World War II and which is used in this work), the analysis of the secondary thematic components—concerning details of administrative procedure and the comparative performance of certain regulatory agencies—is unusually clear and useful. However, if one is looking for suggestions about how to reform the regulatory administrative system, there is, with one notable exception, little to find here, from either a legal or more general administrative efficiency point of view.

The exception is important, however, for the work concludes with an unusually penetrating examination of, as the author notes, the important but little studied informal administrative procedure of summary action. This is the process involved in immediate action against, for example, a contagious disease or the distribution of poisonous food. Here the suggestions for reform are several and persuasive. As Freedman points out, such informal processes —to which relatively little attention has been paid in comparison to the more well-known formal processes of notice, hearing, rule making and enforcement—comprise perhaps 80 percent of the administrative regulatory process.

In conclusion, let me add that the writing is clear; topical development is logical; the notes, bibliography and index are superbly helpful; and this book has been a pleasure to read from a literary point of view. I look forward to the more complete analysis, including proposals for the reform of both formal and informal administrative regulatory processes and their organizational and decision-making structures, of which Freedman is clearly capable. Meanwhile, this is a first-rate Volume 1.

PAUL P. VAN RIPER

Texas A&M University

Deciding What's News: A Study of CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, Newsweek, and Time. By Herbert J. Gans. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1979. Pp. xvii + 393. $12.95.)

Although most readers won't realize it until they've finished reading, *Deciding What's News* is a good book. Realization comes only after plowing through what is often a repetitious and tedious 350-page volume.

It seems that the major reason for the repetition and tedium is that the author, Herbert Gans, decided sometime around 1975 that his original field work for the book, done at CBS News, NBC News, *Time* and *Newsweek* between 1965 and 1969, had to be updated for the seventies. So he returned to NBC, *Time* and *Newsweek* in 1975 to redo his participant observations and returned once again in 1978, this time to update his two earlier sets of interviews.

Unfortunately, longitudinal research does not mix so well with participation observation. So the result of all this updating was not more validity, but was, instead an increase in length and concomitant decrease in focus.

But despite its unnecessary repetition, Gans' book will interest journalists, political scientists, and sociologists. And, although *Deciding What's News* will not have near the popular appeal of David Halberstam's *The Powers That Be*, all serious students of mass media would do better investing in Gans instead of Halberstam.

In making his case, Gans has chosen four types of data—personal interviews at NBC, CBS, *Time* and *Newsweek*; several months of participant observation at those places; a do-it-yourself content analysis of almost 3500 news stories which span eight years; and a serious review of the literature concerning the sociology of news. (His footnotes fill almost 30 pages and provide some of the more interesting reading in the book.) There is no research design per se. For the most part *Deciding What's News* is an old-fashioned blend of quantitative and qualitative evidence.

As for theses, the book has more than its share. I detect five major premises: that national news is dominated by high-status people doing things which generally make them look good, and low-status people doing things which make them look bad; that national news organizations are dominated by the bourgeoisie, in the flesh as well as in philosophy; that news is as much (or more) determined by the *values* of its producers as by the needs of the news organizations; that the "para-ideology" of newspeople includes eight "enduring values," among them being ethnocentrism, belief in responsible capitalism, individualism, "moderatism," the desirability of social order and the intense need for strong national leadership; that news, as currently defined, has a serious class bias which favors the status quo.

For general students of media and politics, perhaps the most important thesis—and the most tightly argued—is that in the long term the national news pays more attention to and "upholds the actions of elite individuals and elite institutions" (p. 61). Of course, with the types of data he has at his disposal, Gans can show only that the news pays more attention to the elite than anybody else, not that such attention always "upholds" them. But Gans argues persuasively that by always portraying social disorder as the worst possible type of news development, news media play into the hands of the people who must control disorder—members of the established political elite, especially the president.

For communications researchers the most important thesis may well be Gans' conclusion that the Edward Epstein theory of news is inaccurate. Barely mentioninig Epstein, Gans disputes forcefully the idea that news is what the organization needs, or is set up to find. Gans concludes that "in the final analysis, the news determines the news organization more than the organization determines the news" (p. 93).

Gans deserves credit for integrating his own research with the work and theory of others who plow the same intellectual fields. And Gans, on several occasions, ties sociological theory neatly and sensitively to his own topic. Gans writes, for example, that "although journalists may not be aware of it, they are perhaps the strongest remaining bastion of logical positivism in America" (p. 184). I hadn't been aware of it myself, but I think Gans makes a good point in suggesting it.

One part of *Deciding What's News* which is sure to upset journalists is Gans' notion that news is really part of a submerged class struggle in which the middle class has overwhelmed the others, and is acting, even unknown to itself, in the interest of the elite classes. Gans seems to think that the only classes not getting anything out of the current news system are the lower classes. It would appear, however, that at least some of the advantages which our news system produces—such as leaders who have to fear the wrath of the free press, at least on occasion—do serve the working class as well as the elite or the bourgeoisie. But, despite a tendency on Gans' part to engage in quasi-Marxian interpretations of the news process, his shortcomings in this book are more often editorial than empirical.

One final flaw in Gans is a concluding chapter that neither fits the rest of the book nor makes much sense. Entitled "Multiperspectival News" (multiperspectival appears nowhere in my dictionary), this chapter recommends that the federal government establish a National Endowment for the News which will fund news organizations willing to do news that is more useful, less federal and, above all, less geared to middle-class definitions of news. Even if we ignore problems with the First Amendment (the government decides whose news is multiperspectival enough to be funded), we would still have to consider who would wind up applying for and getting those new grants. The professional middle class perhaps?

In the last analysis, *Deciding What's News* may be among the more accurate and more comprehensive of the contemporary treatments of news decision making. Unfortunately, with Gans forgetting that the medium is part of the message, the benefit of the book is a little obscured by its greyness. This is one of those instances in which you can't tell a book by its cover. The book is better than that, and for students of mass media, deserves to be read.

MICHAEL J. ROBINSON

Catholic University

Search for Consensus: The Story of the Democratic Party. By Ralph M. Goldman. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1979. Pp. xi + 417. $17.50.)

This history of the Democratic party focuses on the party's successes and failures as an instrument for the construction of a national consensus. Goldman examines the development of organizational structures and their evolution at different party levels, the rise and fall of party leaders, the changing patterns of interest group activity in the party and the influence of various interest groups on party evolution. The contributions of national political leaders to the search for consensus, the roles of major groups in the process, the relationship between the evolution of party organizational structure and the search for consensus, and the nature of the public issues and governmental crises which have been at the center of the search are examined in historical sequence. The Democratic party in the performance of other functions attributed to political parties does not receive the same thorough treatment in Goldman's history of the Democratic party. This study does not achieve—nor does it claim to achieve—any larger goal of explanation of the roles of political parties in democratic societies in general nor of the American political system in particular.

A more extensive discussion of such topics as the alternative explanations for the changing coalitional structure of the Democratic party in the post-World War II period, the shifting patterns of support for various types of governmental programs, and the alternative explanations for the relative decline since the 1950s in the proportion of party identifiers, particularly strong party identifiers, would have enhanced the contributions this history makes to our understanding the role of the Democratic party in the American political history. A more extensive and more critical examination of the implications of recent reforms in the Democratic party's organizational structure and presidential nominating process for such elements of the search for consensus as the potential for electoral success by party candidates, the ability and willingness of the legislative and executive wings of the national party to cooperate in the formation and enactment of policy, and the integration of federal, state, and local political leaders through the mechanism of the political party would also have enhanced this study. While the party may be viewed as a consensus building institution, what happens to the performance of that function when many of the other functions of the party are assumed by other institutions within the political system? Can the party continue to perform as the pre-eminent consensus building mechanism, or will it also lose that function? These questions do not receive the attention they merit.

Goldman is intrigued by the potential development of a trans-national party system; this is a minor but interesting focus of the book. The difficulties which the Democratic party would face in cooperating with political parties of other nations in achieving transnational goals are briefly discussed. The prevailing cultural norms such as anti-party sentiment, acceptance of the belief in non-intervention in the politics of other nations (the frequent discrepancy between public belief and governmental action is not noted by Goldman), and the belief that the American party system is not compatible with the party systems of other nations would inhibit significant participation in a transnational party system. The preconditions for American involvement in a transnational party system and the implications of such involvement receive only limited treatment, and the nature of a transnational party system is only briefly discussed.

M. MARGARET CONWAY

University of Maryland

Understanding Modern Government: The Rise and Decline of the American Political Economy. By Edward S. Greenberg. (New York: John Wiley, 1979. Pp. vi + 197. $11.95.) $11.95.)

One need not fully accept a Marxist theory of the state to appreciate the intimate relationship between the development of capitalism and the growth of the state. To students of American political history, moreover, it should be no surprise that Greenberg finds the "incubating period" for this relationship in the United States to have been the turn of the twentieth century. Following the famous agreement which terminated radical reconstruction, the United States engaged in an extraordinary burst of both state-building and industrial expansion tied together in a way that quite properly permits a characterization of the federal government of that period as an executive committee for the development of capitalism.

During this period, the power of the state, especially relating to control of the economy, was substantially increased with the creation of the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce and Labor as well as the Federal Trade Commission, Interstate Commerce Commission and Federal Reserve Board. And much of this expansion of the state's capacity to govern appears to have been directly tied to the interests of at least some segments of the business community. To a considerable extent, expansion of the state reflected an at least partially successful effort on the part of corporate elites to use the federal government to protect themselves from both the potentially ruinous consequences of all-out commercial competition and from the regulatory efforts of sometimes hostile state legislatures.

Perhaps the first beneficiaries of this turn of events were the railroads. The Interstate Commerce Commission Act of 1887 called for "just and reasonable" railroad freight rates. "Just and reasonable," meant one thing to disgruntled farmers but quite another to the railroads and the new commission itself. To them, just and reasonable meant the right to a profit. While the act forbade long haul-short haul discrimination, more important to the railroads, the act permitted joint rates and forbade rebates and other forms of discrimination that the roads had been forced to grant shippers. Essentially, the ICC Act, along with the subsequent Elkins Act, Hepburn Act and Transportation Act of 1920, seemed designed to protect the railroads from the risks of competition.

The 1914 Federal Trade Commission and Clayton Acts extended to other corporations the privileges granted the railroads. The Federal Trade Commission Act outlawed "unfair methods of competition in commerce." The companion Clayton Act prohibited price discrimination, tying agreements, rebates, and exclusive contracts. Although the FTC and Clayton Acts have been called anti-trust legislation, the "unfair" practices outlawed by the regulatory portions of the two acts were generally not the practices favored by monopolists. They were, more frequently, the very practices which established corporations had unsuccessfully attempted to eliminate through various private arrangements. The FTC and Clayton Acts were designed to preserve market stability and the economic status quo.

At least as important as these pieces of legislation was the 1914 Federal Reserve Act, which centralized control over the supply of money and credit. Under the terms of the act, the newly created federal reserve banks were empowered to control the reserves of member banks through changes in the rediscount rate and reserve ratios, and through the issue and retirement of reserve notes. The relative decentralization of the National Banking System had been replaced by a centralized system of monetary and credit regulation. While under the National Banking System, the Treasury had exercised some control over the money supply, the Federal Reserve Act gave the bankers the right to elect the district boards and hence placed the newly centralized controls in their hands.

And, of course, the courts also played a vitally important role in the development of capitalism during this era. In a famous series of cases between 1877 and 1898, the Supreme Court developed the doctrine of due process in such a manner that it came to be a substantive limitation upon the power of state legislatures to regulate private property.

Because of the intimate ties between capitalism and state-building in America, there is at least a prima facie case for the Marxist theory of the state that *Understanding Modern Government* seeks to apply to the United States. And, indeed, Greenberg offers an interesting view of the nature of the relationship between capitalism and government, as well as a provocative analysis of the possible future of this relationship in the United States. Some of Greenberg's points are not totally novel. In fact, some can be found in his own earlier work. The volume's concluding chapter, moreover, takes on an unnecessarily conspiratorial tone. Yet *Understanding Modern Government* is written in a lively way that may make the volume especially useful in the classroom, even to those who may disagree with some of its major premises. All in all, Greenberg makes available in a coherent and concise form an important perspective on American government in the twentieth century.

BENJAMIN GINSBERG

Cornell University

Accountability in Urban Society: Public Agencies Under Fire. Edited by Scott Greer, Ronald Hedlund, and James L. Gibson. (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1978. Pp. 304. $18.50, cloth; $7.95, paper.)

Accountability in Urban Society at first encouraged me to energize my stereotypes about collections of conference papers, but in the end the book transcended the comfortable but awkward features of its genre. I mark it as a book well worth reading by wide ranges of those concerned with today's governance and administration.

The early cues to engage stereotypes are everywhere. Thus the collection presents papers given at a 1977 conference on "Institutional Accountability in Urban Society" at the University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee. Concerns about the genre surface quickly. One twinges at the length of the lead-time—about average for the genre in this case; and one laments that such publications scarcely ever capture the face-to-face dynamics that often enrich conferences and indeed constitute their basic *raison d'être*. In addition, a cover ad notes that the collection is one of a series of "reference volumes," and this raises concerns about summary treatments that might provide skimpy fare for many readers. Further, the volume's table of contents arrays 14 papers around four themes: professionalism in the delivery of public services; the impact of political institutions on accountability; accountability controls; and research designs for studying accountability. Nothing compelling there. Moreover, the volume's early materials provide little motivation to read on, and only very brief editorial comments stitch the volume together. Conventionally, also the volume early (p. 7) invokes the usual dual reasons for conferences and the publication of their papers and proceedings: the topic "is an issue of great salience today [but] it is not one which elicits broad academic concern. . . ."

Such unpropitious first-glance features of the book aside, I found the volume gratifying and rewarding. What accounts for this outcome? Let me sketch five factors that contribute to my judgment that my time was well spent in mulling over its contents.

First, the volume insistently and effectively urges that public-sector accountability *is* a topic that grabs attention, and should. In diverse ways, editors and authors clearly share that conviction deeply, and they marshal their rationales convincingly to boot. This combination makes the book a compelling one which lays credible claim on the reader's time and energies.

Second, the view of accountability is pleasing. In ways both subtle and obvious, two points get made convincingly. Thus as Ann Lennarson Greer emphasizes in the preface (p. 7), "intentionally crafted social devices for guaranteeing accountability" can be as much bane as boon, encouraging the innovation of techniques of evasion as well as inducing the intended compliance. The ironic regression is plain: the evils of bureaucracy often require bureaucartic remedies, which in turn generate awkward consequences, and so on. In addition, getting a favorable balance of intended effects from our social devices for guaranteeing accountability requires a critical husbanding: this means "the protection of properly placed trust . . . the lubrication that allows the society to act . . . the means of transforming accountability into individual responsibility, without which no governance can be effective and equitable." This places the pursuit of accountability in a useful context. The task includes technical and procedural issues, that is, but far transcends them. As Greer notes, the holistic task involves "creating a moral culture for a high technology."

Third, the overall quality of the component papers is unusually high. Certainly, each reader's interests and skills will generate personal favorites. I found special attractions in Michael Lipsky's "The Assault on Human Service," as well as in David H. Rosenbloom's "Accountability in the Administrative State." In contrast, I found less useful the section on research designs for studying accountability, and I believe I know why. The selections there focus on program evaluation, following those like Campbell who set very high standards for any improvements on their work.

Fourth, the selections in *Accountability in Urban Society* cover a broad and generally pleasing range. The bulk of the volume has a summary tone and a strong institutional flavor, to be sure, emphasizing as it does the implications and challenges for accountability of legislatures, interest groups, courts, the professions and so on. However, this goes down quite easily. Thus individual contributors deal with conceptual issues, and the volume gets useful direction from such pieces as "Reconceptualizing Legislative Accountability" by Ronald R. Hedlund and Keith E. Hamm. In addition, the institutional emphasis is often managed innovatively. For example, several examples of fine craftsmanship spice the volume, and for me an especially revealing perspective is provided by James L. Gibson's "Performance Indicators in the Court System" and also by the empirical test of the marginality hypothesis in James H. Kuklinski's "Legislative Accountability." And some useful balance is provided by case studies of two significant but neglected aspects of accountability—the ins and outs of peer review by professionals and the impact of audits. Scott Greer and Floyd E. Stover, respectively, provide these strengtheners of the volume.

Fifth, the several selections reinforce one another in multiple ways, with broad agreement on details as well as general thrust. For me, this heightens the volume's impact. Others might enjoy more contentiousness in the volume, to be sure, as is represented by Virginia Gray's "Accountability in the Policy Process" and Robert K. Yin's "Are Traditional Research Designs Responsive?"

ROBERT T. GOLEMBIEWSKI

University of Georgia

Poverty and Social Change. By Kirsten Grøndbjerg, David Street, and Gerald D. Suttles. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978. Pp. vii + 248. $16.00.)

There are several positive features of *Poverty and Social Change,* authored by three scholars with much experience and numerous publications in the field. This book provides an incisive, composite history of American social welfare policy. This accomplishment is supplemented by an excellent bibliography and a chronology of major welfare events and legislation in Western Europe and the United States. Chapter 5 on "Who is What Among the Poor" contains some relevant social data, although material in this area becomes quickly dated.

Frankly, this is not a broad-canvas book and key ideas about the "professionalization of bureaucratic reform," and the bureaucracy as the enemy of the poor are standard fare among so-called radical critics of the welfare state. Again, the authors cannot be held accountable for using interesting ideas employed by other scholars, nor can they be charged with the time lag between the production and review of their book. Consequently, it would be unfair to expect them to have anticipated the major social welfare adjustments of the Carter administration, such as the use of targeted aid to the disadvantaged, and the increased reliance on multiple forms of social assistance.

Nevertheless, this book contributes to the easy and oft-stated assumption that the American polity ignores social welfare concerns. It is hardly worth acknowledging that poverty is miserable and that the interests of powerful groups are more often addressed. Yet history cannot be distorted, especially in the midst of a counter-reformation against the welfare state. When all is said about bureaucratic interests and big business power the facts are that the federal government remains the key bastion of aid and survival for the aged, the sick, and the poor. Paul Peterson has demonstrated how much more redistributive are the tax and benefit systems in Washington compared to those at the sub-national level. There is also evidence about the extent to which the poor benefit from entitlement programs (Social Security, Medicare, Disability programs) that are not means-tested. Fully 70 percent of post-transfer aid to the poor comes from these sources, while only 30 percent flows from income-tested sources such as A.F.D.C., and Medicaid.

The cold fact is that enormous sums of federal dollars flowed into social welfare programs under "Great Society" auspices, and considerable amounts of these funds went to the needy. It has been estimated that some $141 billion dollars, or 46 percent of all social welfare expenditures in 1978, went to those below the standard poverty line. The world in the heads of some so-called radicals is quite different from the balance sheet set forth in the latest Brookings social scorecard—*Setting National Priorities: The 1980 Budget.* It is not neo-conservative apologetics to point out that we spend more on the Social Security program alone than on defense; or that the poorly publicized achievements of the Carter administration have been to concentrate on the needy within the budgets of HUD, the unemployment assistance program, and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. The survival of our older cities depends on federal aid; programs such as Title I and B.E.O.G. have disproportionately benefited blacks and other minorities; and all social spending rose from 48 to 60 percent of the total between 1955 and 1978 (the federal contribution of social aid rising from 22 to 56 percent during the same period).

The other side of the social policy coin is the deteriorating economic situation in the United States. The vast social programs of the late 1960s were animated by a social and economic surplus. Today, it is much more difficult to implement strategies that serve the needs of the poor and needy. Certainly, the rule of entitlement programs, such as S.S.I. and Social Security, must be reevaluated. The course of events throughout Western Europe makes clear the importance to the poor of broad social benefits programs in housing, education, and welfare. There are many legitimate criticisms of American social policy. The critical nature of federal resources and activism on behalf of the needy is not one of these shortcomings. Our problem is to rethink the political and social utility of various programs, concentrating on those with the maximum policy outcome. Grøndbjerg and her colleagues may be excused for ignoring these points in their welcome volume. It will no longer do to retail a distorted view of the welfare state as an enemy of the poor at a time when there are growing forces more negative to the amelioration of social injustice than the caricature "Liberal" as a Washington social type.

EDGAR LITT

University of Connecticut

The Legislature as an Organization: A Study of the Kansas Legislature. By Marvin A. Harder and Raymond G. Davis. (Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas, 1979. Pp. x + 183. $11.50, paper.)

The legislature of Kansas has been one of the more innovative of state legislatures in respect to organizational change. It was the first to establish a legislative council (and apparently the first to abandon it). It surely must have been among the first to establish a research staff to do what we now call "policy analysis." And, indeed, the establishment of the Legislative Coordinating Council in 1971 to replace the old Legislative Council and to lend coherence to the system of staff agencies, standing committees and interim committees of the legislature, was also something of an innovation.

Explaining how and why these changes came about and how they have affected the operation of the Kansas legislature is a major theme of this volume. To a political scientist this is the most interesting part and the only one which makes any kind of contribution to the literature on the legislative institution. The remainder of the work consists of purely descriptive accounts of the various organizational components of the legislature, although there is an attempt to put this into a theoretical perspective.

As the title suggests, Marvin Harder's and Raymond Davis' perspective on the Kansas legislature is an organizational one. Although the approach is not as novel as the authors claim (the Eagleton Institute studies of state legislatures have a similar orientation), perhaps their work is unique in the extent to which it consciously applies the concepts and framework of organization theory to the study of a legislature. Actually, there is no theory presented here or is there any attempt to apply or test a theory in a legislative setting. Only the categories and vocabulary of organizational theory are used to provide a framework for the selection of objects for analysis.

Three of the major concepts from organizational theory that the authors employed are (1) *task environment*, external groups that influence the setting and attaining of goals of the organization; (2) *technology*, the means of accomplishing the purposes of the organization; and (3) *buffering*, the means of reducing the impact of unpredictable variations in the task environment on the technology of the organization. The first concept is simply the environment of the system with which we are familiar from Eastonian systems theory. "Technology" is simply shorthand for processes, operating procedures and methods. "Buffering," however, is peculiar to organization theory, and at first glance might appear to be fruitful in the analysis of legislatures. But, in fact, the authors find difficulty in citing any significant examples of buffering in the legislature, outside of a few measures such as establishing its own legal counsel which buffers the impact of the executive branch. The reasons for the difficulty are easy to understand; the legislature is, above all, designed to be a *responsive* institution. Buffering it from its environment serves to reduce its responsiveness, so whatever might be gained in efficiency would thereby reduce effectiveness in the performance of this institution's major function.

The limitations of organizational theory in helping us understand the legislature are abundantly revealed here. Certainly, the legislature is an organization, and studying it as such could be fruitful, as the authors maintain. The trouble is that virtually all of the literature in organizational theory pertains to hierarchical types of organizations where formal authority rests at the top and where recruitment, promotion, and the systems of incentives and status are structured quite differently from those of legislatures. The concepts and categories of this theory can readily be employed in studying the legislature, but they thus take on entirely different meanings. What is needed is a theory pertaining to organizations where authority is equally shared by all members, where differences in power among members are relatively minor, where the organization itself has no control over recruitment of members and their tenure, and where goals and incentives are largely influenced by the "task environment" rather than by elements within the organization. The present volume does not present us with such a theory.

Harder and Davis should, however, be commended for their diligence and attention to detail. The volume is very rich in its factual information about formal features of the Kansas legislature. Harder is a long-time observer of this legislature and served for some time as staff aid to Governor Robert Docking where his duties involved legislative liaison. Davis' field is public administration and is no doubt responsible for supplying the organizational perspective to this volume. Each is a highly competent scholar in his own area, but it appears that in this volume their competencies did not mesh well together.

JOHN G. GRUMM

Wesleyan University

In the Matter of Color: Race and the American Legal Process, The Colonial Period. By A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978. Pp. xiv + 512. $15.00.)

Both the splendid array of civil rights leaders and liberal establishmentarians clapping on the dust jacket and the extraordinary support aiding this book's completion (ranging from urgings by Earl Warren to foundation grants ample enough to employ 17 research assistants) suggest that Leon Higginbotham's *In the Matter of Color* should be what Oxford University

Press dubs it: "A major event in American legal history."

But is it? Thus far reviewers primarily identifiable with current civil rights issues have been more inclined to answer affirmatively than have specialists in the legal history of slavery. The question is not feckless. *In the Matter of Color* is the first volume of a projected multivolume opus aimed at analyzing definitively the relationships between law and race from colonial times to the present. The topic of inquiry is as important as it is difficult to analyze adequately. Whiggish historiographical tendencies to moralize about the subject almost inevitably intrude into our research and writing on it. (See A. Nash, "Reason of Slavery," *Vanderbilt Law Review* 32: 7–218, for an examination of why.) Space limitations here preclude an elaborate assessment of whether Higginbotham has succeeded in the task of definitively analyzing the "law of slavery." I shall have to concentrate on three main reasons why increasing knowledge of American legal history and heightening approbation of *In the Matter of Color* are not likely to go hand in hand. (See also M. Tushnet, *University of Chicago Law Review* 45: 906–18, for an able extended critique.)

The book's self-assured, didactic prose is undercut by numerous inaccuracies. For example, two of the most crucial maxims in the law of slavery are rendered erroneously. "In favorem libertatis" is consistently misspelled. Put into the very literate mouth of Lord Mansfield is the phrase "fiat justitia, ruat coelumtet" (p. 352), which I can only translate as "Let justice be done though the heavens fall–and to hell with the Tet offensive." Black abolitionist David Walker is credited with the amazing feat of penning a ringing anti-slavery paragraph in 1831 (p. 386)–amazing because he died in 1830, and even more so because the source given in Higginbotham's footnotes turns out to be white abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison.

A reviewer might well not cavil at these inaccuracies were the book's tone somewhat less overbearing. But almost certainly he would be much less confident than the author about one of the book's most basic assumptions: that selecting just six colonies for examination will "provide . . . fair examples of the whole spectrum" (p. 15). If the work of Higginbotham's predecessors and contemporaries suggests anything at all, it is that, for instance, omitting North Carolina while including South Carolina has the effect of masking important dissimilarities. My confidence is not increased when I note one of his few references to the omitted jurisdiction entails using uncritically what is probably, after *Dred Scott,* the second most frequently misused case in slavery jurisprudence, the 1829 North Carolina decision *State* v. *Mann* (see Nash, 74f.).

Most important, and most troubling, is the book's historical and historiographical self-isolation. Except for describing the influence of Barbadian upon South Carolina slavery and for discussing Mansfield and Sommersett's case (in much less illuminating fashion than recent treatments by William Wiecek and David Brion Davis), it proceeds as if American mainland slavery developed almost entirely apart from other slaveries and from the European political tradition. One serious consequence is that, lacking the European "backdrop" so usefully present in, for example, Robert Cover's *Justice Accused* (New Haven, 1975), the description of how statutes and judicial decisions suppressed blacks overpowers, in superabundant though not always systematic detail, the explanation of why such suppression occurred, or why some white religious minorities began to dissent from the assumptions of slavery. *In the Matter of Color* proceeds almost as if neither the past decade's research on general American legal history nor that on the legal history of slavery mattered. Only one of the author's co-toilers in the latter vineyard, Nash, is dealt with at all, while Robert Cover is relegated to the bibliography. The writings of Daniel Flanigan, Michael Hindus, Arthur Howington, and Mark Tushnet are not even mentioned. Ignoring, or cavalierly dismissing as pro-slavery apologetics, some or all of this literature is unsatisfactory. True, the substantive focus of this literature has been chiefly upon nineteenth-century slavery. Yet because much of it makes certain assumptions about the shape of colonial slavery and because some of it uses analytic models more sophisticated than the curious mélange of economic determinism and liberal idealism characterizing *In the Matter of Color,* Higginbotham could have usefully drawn upon and perhaps successfully challenged it.

To sum up, the first volume of Higginbotham's would-be definitive opus, although very useful as a compendium of the legal data of oppression and although marvelously infused with a passion for justice, is an analytic disappointment. I hope that forthcoming volumes will prove stronger on this count. Otherwise, all the heartfelt encomiums and all the "trendy" approbation of its contemporary message will not turn the product into a major event in American legal scholarship.

A. E. KEIR NASH
University of California, Santa Barbara

Defense Politics: A Budgetary Perspective. By Arnold Kanter. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979. Pp. viii + 152. $12.50.)

Arnold Kanter has written an intelligent and incisive account of defense politics around a budgetary perspective during the Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson administrations. For its small size, it is remarkably wide-ranging, covering personnel policy and civilian efforts to shape military policy, as well as the struggle for funds, all supported by a useful array of interesting data. This brief review concentrates on the parts I personally found most interesting—the consequences of the different concepts of rationality employed by President Dwight David Eisenhower and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. The coming rehabilitation of Eisenhower's reputation could well begin with this book.

As Kanter puts it,

> Fiscal guidance in the Eisenhower budget system made each service recognize that expansion of its activities and budget necessarily came at the expense of its sister services. By explicitly recognizing these resource limitations, it provided mechanisms for the exercise of allocational rivalries. As a result, political responsibility for choices was diffused and some of the burden for rejecting proposals was pushed down onto the services. The "anti-ceilings rhetoric" of PPBS, by contrast, had the opposite effects (p. 90).

There were no ceilings in planning, programming and budgetary systems because they were the epitome of substantive rationality. You got what reason said you should have—no more, no less. Since the denial of one program didn't necessarily mean more for another—after all, each was decided on its own merit—no service had a reason to attack another's program and much reason to unify against the secretary. Where Eisenhower turned the services down repeatedly on any and all grounds other than military—grand questions of national security, the integrity of the domestic economy, the difficulties of inflation—all of which would be counted as non-substantive, McNamara told them why their military judgment was bad. Consequently, Eisenhower got what he wanted with much less difficulty. Who was the more rational?

Among the most important claims made for program budgeting during the McNamara era was that program decisions implied budgetary decisions; this was not so. The reasons for the gap between aspirations and reality are instructive. Programs were supposed to be imbedded with a Five Year Defense Program. This could only have been accomplished if there were perfect symmetry among programs; this was never achieved. And while the Defense Department civilians were awfully busily monitoring for compliance with procedures of the Five Year Defense Program, the real choices were inevitably pushed forward to budget time. For their part, once they saw the lay of the land, the services delayed their submissions. For its own part, the office of Secretary of Defense was so overloaded with Draft Presidential Memoranda, updating the defense program, working out the program structures, and all the rest, they were late in replying to such service submissions as did come in early. The McNamara regime apparently was storng on decision making—each decision was made over and over again.

Now McNamara did not intend inter-service rivalries to disappear. On the contrary, he hoped they would be reinforced but in a different, more productive and more rational way. Instead of these petty disputes called inter-service rivalries, they would argue about competing to accomplish missions toward which all had something to contribute. These functional rivalries would generate better information defined as information related to service capabilities and missions. All of us know this did not happen. For one thing, the overlap among services was far from perfect. There were some redundancy among them but not enough apparently to enforce rivalry. Apparently the incentive the McNamara system created for service cooperation overrode functional rivalries. Their disagreements declined and McNamara began rejecting unanimous recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Kanter concludes that

> PPBS in McNamara's Pentagon produced a number of unintended—and undesirable—consequences. They were perhaps best characterized by the administration's inattention to the incentives of its uniformed subordinates and by its insensitivity to its own vulnerability to overload. It apparently overestimated its ability to compel compliance from the military services and badly miscalculated the implications of ignoring fiscal constraints. The result was an administration characterized by a hard-working and aggressive civilian leadership in national security policy but one whose impact on out-puts was substantially indistinguishable from that of its predecessors (p. 94).

If the question of rationality is put differently—Does it pay to look smart or be smart?—Eisenhower has the edge.

Building upon the considerable work of students of bureaucratic politics, and on the seminal study of Crecine and his colleagues on defense budgeting, Kanter has added much that is new and valuable. It is a characteristic of good books that they encourage others to make use of them in unexpected ways.

AARON WILDAVSKY

University of California, Berkeley

President Eisenhower and Strategic Management: A Study in Defense Politics. By Douglas Kinnard. (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1977. Pp. xi + 169. $13.75.)

Several large puzzles remain about President Eisenhower which the political historian who employs newly available records should seek to answer. Briefly, the main ones are:

1. Beyond President Eisenhower's squishy syntax (that incidentally had not been conspicuous in the SHAEF period), how much did he think in the simple, civics-course terms with which he usually expressed himself publicly regarding the political process: balanced budgets, strategic doctrine, procedural proprieties, the proper role of the presidency, the Congress, and other officials, etc.? Or, how much did Eisenhower understand and employ the politics that occurred in the government over which he presided? As openers, one can scarcely deny his success in national politics and earlier, in NATO politics.

2. How strong a leader was Eisenhower within the camp of his own administration? With specific reference to national security policies, how much did he defer to his conspicuous secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, and how much to his military chiefs? There is some evidence that we underestimated Eisenhower at the time. See, for example, Louis L. Gerson's *John Foster Dulles* (New York: Cooper Square, 1967), which alludes to more initiation of foreign policy and more direct guidance of Dulles than has usually been credited to Eisenhower, although the force of Gerson's statements is weakened by necessarily vague documentation. It is more common to note that Eisenhower was not solicitous of his military chiefs' views, and indeed, that he sometimes ignored them. Does this add up to exceptional independence?

3. How should Eisenhower be judged on his management of cold war pressures? After Sputnik (1957–61), Eisenhower seemed less inclined to invest in national security than did the public, or at least than did some prominent politicians like Senators Stuart Symington and John F. Kennedy. Both Nixon and Kennedy in 1960 campaigned against what the public widely perceived as weak presidential leadership in foreign and defense policy. A study in the mid-seventies of Eisenhower's foreign and defense policy leadership should be concerned with whether the opposite was not in fact the case: whether Eisenhower's restraint in building a first generation of ICBMs and in matching the Soviets in space were not in fact the desired kind of self-restraint in the face of cold war pressures.

Measured against this agenda, Kinnard's book is a responsible but modest study of Eisenhower as "strategic manager." He asserts in the concluding chapter of his short, clearly written book that Eisenhower was strong and decisive as president, answering the second question. He does not prove or demonstrate this conclusion, however. The question about Eisenhower's political acuity Kinnard addresses less directly and with no more evidence. There is an assertion in the final chapter that Eisenhower sought to politicize the military chiefs, and it is doubtless true. How self-conscious Eisenhower was about his political actions, including this one, however, remains relatively untouched in detail and documentation. This third question, which has to do with a perspective on the conduct of the cold war, is left outside the scope of Kinnard's study.

This book has considerable merit as a summary of Eisenhower's national security role—the president as commander in chief, in the constitutional metaphor. Kinnard has provided the setting in which to pursue the incomplete answers about this subject, asks several of the interesting questions, and summarizes his own judgments about them in an interesting final chapter that has the great merit of being, in all probability, as accurate a summary statement on the subject that it covers in print. Regrettably, the previous chapters do not document—that is to say, prove—the accuracy of this summary.

One problem is a failure to probe when the data turns up an important puzzle. For example, Kinnard quotes Eisenhower as saying that he would like to prevent both active and retired military officers from making public statements contrary to the president's position. Eisenhower was never able to do that and his failure or inability to do so might have been the launching point of a discussion about his management and political leadership with reference to defense politics. Instead, the author merely notes that before appointing a new service chief or Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman, Eisenhower interviewed the candidate to establish his loyalty to Eisenhower as president. Yet, by the time this statement is made enough data about contending viewpoints among the chiefs and with others, including Eisenhower, has been presented to demonstrate that the loyalty interview was irrelevant.

Another example of the failure to probe occurs when Kinnard quotes Eisenhower as telling Secretary of Defense Wilson and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Radford in March 1956 that it might be better "to encourage some nations to be neutral" (p. 51). This intriguing comment, so contrary to Dulles' stated views, is left dangling.

The most substantial new contribution of this book is the glimpse it gives of an oval office inner cabinet. Kinnard correctly notes that this group was powerful and that it renders moot, or at least off the mark, many criticisms (including mine) of the way in which the Eisenhower cabinet and National Security Council operated.

This book should stand well for readers who want a general coverage of Eisenhower as managing national security policy and programs.

PAUL Y. HAMMOND

University of Pittsburgh

Evaluating Public Programs: The Impact of General Revenue Sharing on Municipal Government. By Patrick D. Larkey. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979. Pp. xvii + 264. $18.50.)

In 1972 Congress passed the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of that year allocating to all general purpose units of state and local government some $30.2 billion over a five-year period. This program, known as general revenue sharing (GRS), was unique among the existing array of federal assistance programs in that no application was required and almost no "strings" were placed on recipient governments in their use of the funds. The program was significant not only because of the large sum of money returned to local governments but also because GRS was considered to be the cornerstone of President Nixon's domestic program—a program he called New Federalism and one whose ultimate impact he promised would amount to a new American revolution.

Because of its unique features, the large sum of money being allocated, and its importance to Nixon's domestic program, GRS quickly captured the attention of large segments of the public as well as the academic community. Interest quickly focused on the question, "How is the money being spent?" and a number of methods have been used by scholars in attempting to provide answers to this question. Some have relied on official reports filed by recipient governments with the Office of Revenue Sharing (ORS), some have relied on surveys (telephone, mail, and personal interviews) with state and local officials, and some stationed monitors in various localities to personally observe and report revenue sharing events.

In *Evaluating Public Programs: The Impact of General Revenue Sharing on Municipal Government*, Patrick Larkey offers an innovative alternative to the estimation of the fiscal impacts of GRS (and by extension, he claims, of other similar programs). Dismissing other approaches as deficient for a variety of reasons, Larkey opts for a technique employing formal models tested and evaluated by means of computer-based simulation efforts. For his sample, Larkey selects five cities: Albuquerque, Ann Arbor, Cincinnati, Detroit, and Worcester, Massachusetts. While this is an obviously small sample size rendering inappropriate generalizations to all 38,000 units of government receiving GRS funds, Larkey argues that these cities "contain many, albeit not all, of the differences among U.S. cities on a variety of dimensions" (p. 41). Seventeen to 23 years of data on revenues and expenditures were collected for each city. These data are used to develop models of municipal budgeting allowing Larkey to posit what he calls counter-factual hypotheses: "What would the revenue and expenditure patterns of particular municipalities have been without revenue sharing?" (p. 226). These hypothetical states then are compared with actual expenditure patterns and deviations are attributed to GRS.

Four models, in fact, are developed and evaluated. Each of these, Larkey admits, are "short-cut" models in that they are largely devoid of information about participants or processes of the budget-making effort. He argues, nevertheless, that his simple models are consistent with more detailed models of municipal budget making. Each model consists of a set of predictive linear equations, the equations being mathematically the same within each model for all functional accounts. Applying these models to budget allocations in the cities selected for analysis, Larkey ultimately selects the Constant Proportion of the Revenue Increment (CPRI) model as the most consistent. This model predicts that any year's expenditure for any functional category will be equal to last year's expenditure plus a constant proportion of the revenue increment. While explicit theoretical reasons for selecting this model are not obvious, Larkey states that this alternative is "simple in structure, uses half as many parameters [as an alternative choice], and performs consistently well under all of the test conditions" (p. 156). The model performs well when subjected to the various goodness-of-fit statistical tests employed by Larkey.

Comparing "net effect" results of the CPRI model with "nominal effects" as reported by officials to ORS, Larkey finds considerable deviation for all cities in most functional categories. For 1973–1975, for example, Cincinnati reported spending 56.5 percent of its GRS funds on public safety; Larkey's analysis indicates the actual percent to be 40.6. For Detroit, officials reported allocating 85.7 percent of their GRS funds for these three years to public safety; Larkey indicates the actual net effect result to have been considerably less (22.2 percent). For all five cities for all three years, Larkey's estimates deviate most dramatically from ORS reports for the categories of public safety (where Larkey's estimates are much lower than ORS reports) and general government (where Larkey's estimates are much higher than ORS reports).

In extending the revenue sharing program in 1976 (by $25.6 billion for an additional 3¾ years), Congress required public reporting of GRS money in the context of each government's entire budget. Many observers believe that this (and other) reporting changes may have resulted in more accurate accounting and reporting procedures by recipients of ORS funds. It would be useful to apply Larkey's models and techniques to post-1976 data in the hope that reported use of the money now more accurately reflects real fiscal impacts.

The original revenue-sharing act and its extension in 1976 have raised a host of intriguing structural and political questions. Included among these are the extent (if any) to which revenue sharing has supported and sustained limited-function local jurisdictions, the effect (if any) of the program on the proliferation of special district governments, its impact (if any) on broadening the scope of general purpose units of government, the degree (if any) to which it has encouraged intergovernmental cooperation, its effect (if any) on increased citizen interest and involvement in local political affairs, its implications (if any) for the monitoring and resolution of local civil rights complaints, and its impact (if any) on local auditing and accounting practices. Students of intergovernmental relations and local politics will find few of these isssues addressed by Larkey's work. They will have to consult other studies employing additional methods. But, for an analysis of the question, "What changes in the revenue and expenditure patterns of local units of government are attributable to GRS?" Larkey's book, which received an award as the outstanding doctoral dissertation in public finance by the National Tax Association-Tax Institute of America, stands as an imaginative, innovative, and welcome addition to existing literature. It should be read by all serious students of public finance and its observations on the present state of policy evaluation should be considered by all those interested in the growing science of public policy analysis.

RICHARD L. COLE

George Washington University

Emerging Coalitions in American Politics. Edited by Seymour Martin Lipset. (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1978. Pp. vii + 524. $10.00, cloth; $6.95, paper.)

Seymour Martin Lipset has here induced 22 academics and political practitioners, and the journalist David Broder, to address themselves to various aspects of coalition politics. Inevitably, the contributions are uneven in quality but collectively they add up to a useful compilation.

The book is divided into five parts: six essays on background and history which trace the emergence and functioning of coalitions from the founding of the republic; two quite lengthy and fairly sophisticated essays by Garry Orren and William Schneider on the voting behavior of the contemporary electorate; four essays on strains in the party system which assess the roles of Catholics, Jewish liberalism, white southerners, and intellectuals; nine essays on the prospects of new coalitions and the role to be played in them by groups ranging from libertarians to left-progressives, including the views of Jesse Unruh and S. I. Hayakawa on the outlook for their respective parties; and a concluding essay by Lipset.

One is struck, on reading the essays, at the wisdom of using the word "emerging" rather than, say, "building" in the title. The view that pervades the book is that both parties and especially the Democrats, are vessels with neither rudder nor crew. The coalitional nature of the contemporary parties is therefore not the result of a conscious strategy by party tacticians but simply the resultant of forces working themselves out in the larger society. In Everett Ladd's well-known formulation, the parties are the dependent variables in the social system. As Lipset has more recently put it, both national parties now resemble the Democrats of the one-party South in being electoral organizations performing the single function of conducting primary elections.

Such a loose and highly permeable party structure does, of course, hold out dazzling possibilities to a wide variety of groups. Skillful mobilization of followers around what may be a pressing but transient concern may lead to the capture of a party nomination, but increasingly this victory is illusory when it is discovered that what has been captured is not power so much as merely a brand name. Jimmy Carter and his followers have had to learn this and efforts are now underway to relieve him of the right to use the brand name in 1980.

In the book's final essay Lipset concludes that "the inherent logic of democratic politics" requires those coalitions which actually seek electoral success to moderate their stands and compromise their principles. This assessment means that some, at least, of the prescriptions laid down in the book's section on the prospects of various ideological strains in American life are doomed to failure. This results from the fact that the larger a coalition becomes, the more inharmonious become its component parts. These differences must then be muted by conciliation and compromise or else the coalition becomes unstuck.

Emerging Coalitions in American Politics will be primarily useful for classroom instruction, perhaps as a supplement to a basic text in a political parties course. The book contains little that is new, but the breadth and comprehensiveness of its analysis of coalitions will make it useful for teaching undergraduates. Indeed, one of its principal merits is that many of the essays, those, for example, by Everett Ladd, Michael Novak, Andrew Greeley and William Rusher, are succinct summaries of views familiar to members of the profession because they have been presented elsewhere at much greater length.

RICHARD F. SCHIER

Franklin and Marshall College

The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States, 2nd ed. By Theodore J. Lowi. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1979. Pp. xvii + 331. $15.00, cloth; $6.95, paper.)

The first edition of *The End of Liberalism* (1969) established Theodore J. Lowi as one of the most imaginative and provocative critics of the American political system. His indictment of the pluralist politics of the American liberal state, its public philosophy of "interest group liberalism," and of American political science as apologist for the system attracted national attention.

Now comes Lowi, ten years later, with a second edition. Does the new edition present significant changes in Lowi's analysis or his message? The basic idea and message remain unaltered: open-ended delegations of authority have led to a condition of policy without law that can be remedied only through legal formalism, which Lowi still calls "juridical democracy." There are, however, important conceptual additions and developments from the 1970s incorporated in the analysis.

Lowi argues that the crisis of public authority that the United States faced a decade ago has passed and that the nation failed to survive it. What has emerged is a "Second Republic of the United States," the unwritten constitution of which Lowi outlines in the preface (pp. xi–xii). The principal features of the Second Republic are the enshrinement of national power as a positive virtue, the centering of government in the presidency with Congress relegated to the status of a consensual body whose task is to delegate unstructured authority to the president and the administrative branch, a judiciary limited to the protection of the procedural rights of citizens, and policy making by tripartite bargaining between administrators, relevant members of Congress, and self-selected leaders of interest groups.

One of the worst features of the Second Republic is the almost total lack of recognition that it exists. The fact is, Lowi asserts, that "the historic continuity of American national politics has been broken" (p. xiii). The transformation began during the New Deal and concluded in the 1960s. The Nixon administration validated the transition to the Second Republic—which was designed and implemented by the Democrats—by the initiation of revenue sharing. Lowi argues that revenue sharing outdid the Democrats in eliminating legal structure and expanding administrative discretion.

Lowi characterizes the Second Republic as "a state of permanent receivership" (p. 279). This he defines as "a state whose government maintains a steadfast position that any institution large enough to be a significant factor in the community may have its stability underwritten" (p. 280). Its emphasis is on organizational stability and its bias favors established and well-organized interests.

Receivership is implemented by regulation which supports the clientele to be dealt with. It is also abetted by discretionary fiscal policies, such as the Lockheed loan guarantee of 1971 and the guarantee by federal agencies of more than $243 billion in private loans (as of 1976). The upshot of permanent receivership is the socialization of risk. By socializing risk, the government insures the preservation of capitalism, it is able to intervene in the economy and society at minimum cost, and it protects the vested interests of businesses, organized labor, universities, and professional associations.

What are the alternatives to the state of permanent receivership that is the Second Republic? Lowi rejects socialism on the ground that civil liberties would be sacrificed in the transition to it. Instead, he calls for the implementation of "neo-laissez faire" which is to be accomplished through three moves: (1) abolition of most discretionary programs, (2) strengthening of traditional non-discretionary fiscal policies, and (3) abolition of all regulatory policies, such as "fair competition," that cannot be redefined in specific terms.

Neo-laissez faire overlaps with and should be accompanied by juridical democracy which is "the rule of law operating in institutions." The steps for achieving juridical democracy have been modified somewhat in the second edition. Lowi has added presidential action, whereby the president returns to the pre-Jacksonian practice of justifying vetoes on constitutional rather than policy grounds and systematic codification of laws by Congress. Codification would involve simplification and condensation of laws in light of experience and judicial and administrative rulings. He has dropped his previous proposals for a Senior Civil Service (which has largely been accomplished), institutionalization of the ombudsman, and development of regional governments.

The second edition is well worth careful attention. The portrayal of Nixon as interest group liberal par excellence, the demonstration that the new regulation—of occupational safety, consumer product safety, and environmental quality—fits the interest group liberal paradigm, and the conclusion that neither the liberal presidency nor the resurgent Congress survived the 1970s in a condition that enables either to provide the institutional leadership needed to govern the nation effectively square with available evidence. The concept of permanent receivership accurately portrays the contemporary governmental relationship with the economy and society.

However, neo-laissez faire and a somewhat reformulated statement of juridical democracy are hardly adequate solutions to our current political malaise because unrestrained delegation of authority is not its root cause. Restoration of the long-neglected *Schechter* ruling, administrative formality, and thorough codification of federal laws would undoubtedly increase the demand for lawyers. But such actions would do little to strengthen political parties, lessen the tendency of disgruntled citizens to direct their energies into single-issue interest groups, and enable Congress to provide independent policy leadership. Nor will they increase citizen trust and confidence in government, expand direct individual participation in politics, or produce effective executive leadership.

The capacity of the United States to respond to these challenges within the framework of the Constitution of 1787, which may be outmoded but—Lowi notwithstanding—is still very much in force, is highly problematic. It is almost fatuous to suggest that constitutional restructuring along parliamentary lines is the route to travel because it is manifest that, at least in the short run, there is little support for such a trip. The frustration that I feel is acute because there is no readily apparent and feasible solution. It is of no comfort to say that we will just have to "muddle through" when muddling through is a major cause of the present unsatisfactory state of affairs. Perhaps, then, juridical democracy is worth a try. It is not wholly infeasible, it might do some good and it seems unlikely to be harmful. Meanwhile, Lowi's thoughtful analysis should stimulate the search for other correctives.

NORMAN C. THOMAS

University of Connecticut

Liberty's Chosen Home: The Politics of Violence in Boston. By Alan Lupo. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977. Pp. vii + 334. $12.50.)

The busing of black school children into Boston's white ethnic neighborhoods in September, 1974 precipitated one of the worst political crises in Boston's history. With considerable insight and skill Alan Lupo presents a challenging interpretation of the school desegregation process. Lupo argues that the unique concatenation of four sets of factors—class cleavages, generic ethnic conflicts (especially those predating the establishment of a viable black community in Boston), urban-suburban tensions, and racism—defined the context which made court-ordered school desegregation a reality. Moreover, Lupo integrates the dynamics of school desegregation within the larger framework of Boston's historical evolution which enriches his analysis.

The book's tone is somewhat controversial in that Lupo refuses to accept the conventional assumption that racism overwhelmingly explains the principal dynamics of the antibusing movement. Lupo argues that racism is the product of historically reinforced ethnic conflicts and class cleavages that predate the establishment of Boston's sizeable black community in the middle years of the twentieth century. As Lupo illustrates so well, Boston's political, economic and social history institutionalized intergroup hostility. Irish and Italian immigrants were pitted against one another in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Thus, Irish-Italian antagonisms permeated the city's political system, making the immigrants subordinate to Yankee-Brahmin domination. Lupo asserts that a similar dynamic is at work in the 1970s, the only difference being that Yankee control of Boston's prestigious academic, medical, and financial institutions is exercised from the city's affluent bedroom communities instead of from the elegant townhouses of Beacon Hill or the Back Bay. The consequence of continuing Yankee "dominance" is a dearth of leadership on some of the most important political and social issues affecting Boston's survival as a viable urban community. The suburban withdrawal of the city's influential Yankee elite makes a bad situation even worse when "leadership" is masked in the form of self-serving denunciations of Irish and Italian racism. Lupo, therefore, sees hypocrisy reinforcing the political and social attitudes of suburbanites who are protected by affluence from the urban problems daily faced by Boston's Irish, Italians, and blacks.

Lupo is in no way an apologist for Irish and Italian racism. Rather, he is sensitive to the political, social, and economic conditions that give rise to social and ethnic conflicts in Boston. His empathy and ability to articulate the fears and anxieties of Irish, Italians, and blacks strengthens the book. Thus he finds Irish and Italian opposition to desegregation rooted in Boston's notoriously parochial and crude political system. This perspective is epitomized by the Boston School Committee—an institution that has pandered to the worst fears and prejudices of Irish and Italians for generations. However, Lupo presents a compelling portrait of the hard-core opponents of busing in South Boston, Charlestown, and Hyde Park (Irish) and East Boston and the North End (Italian). Opposition to busing is, in part, the result of a recurring ethnic history of socioeconomic marginalization, high rates of joblessness and alcoholism, and the disintegration of families. This process, sometimes lasting three and four generations, results in socioeconomically reinforced antagonism toward outsiders (in the case of South Boston, anyone non-Irish). Inherent in this ethnic outlook is a resistance to change and a crusading mentality that is difficult to overcome once it is aroused. The very way in which the desegregation of the city's schools was directed—through a federal court order—symbolized the ascendancy of an impersonal WASP political order at the expense of a personalized and informal Irish and Italian approach to politics. These political and social upheavals further reinforce Irish and Italian intransigence toward desegregation. The tragedy of school desegregation, therefore, is the zero-sum attitude through which Irish and Italians view their relations with blacks. As Lupo points out, the question of racial and ethnic differences must be analyzed within the larger context of socioeconomic interests: the subordination of city to suburb, the class bias explicit in a desegregation order premised on the mixing of only poor black students with poor white students, and the deterioration of viable urban neighborhoods.

In the final analysis, school desegregation was accomplished with a minimum of violence—over 90 percent of Boston's schools were integrated peacefully. For Lupo the successful integration of Boston's school system was amazing. While most of the United States "saw a liberal city being hypocritical a parochial city with a long history of racial and ethnic distrust and bigotry was, for the most part, peacefully integrating its schools and *that* was the news" (p. 241).

Lupo argues that the successful implementation of school desegregation rests on the skill and leadership of Mayor Kevin White who was an opponent of the desegregation plan but was determined to carry out the law. Much of the book focuses on the day-to-day crisis decision making of the mayor's office in the opening weeks of the desegregation plan in September, 1974. Lupo's detailed analysis of busing from the perspective of the mayor's office is also the main weakness of the book for it tends to limit a more comprehensive assessment of the implications and consequences of busing in Boston. Moreover, Lupo's analysis tends to lionize Kevin White. These flaws, however, are minor. The book provides a number of penetrating insights into the nature of ethnicity, racism, and class cleavages in contemporary Boston politics.

JOHN F. STACK, JR.

Florida International University

The Changing World of the American Military. Edited by Franklin D. Margiotta. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979. Pp. xxii + 488. $22.00, cloth; $10.75, paper.)

The decade of the 1970s was a particularly difficult one for the American military. It had to make some very difficult and unprecedented adjustments in order to accommodate itself to the changing domestic and international environment. For example, the military had to concede that it could not accomplish its objectives on the battlefield; make the transition from conscription to the all-volunteer force; absorb significant numbers of blacks and women; modernize its obsolescent weapons inventory within a declining budget; justify its continued existence and claim to a large share of national resources in an era of detente and burgeoning social needs; and deal with an assertive and frequently hostile Congress.

Through some adroit and innovative civilian and military leadership, the military establishment has made a remarkably successful adjustment. At the close of the 1970s, it is in a relatively better position. Opinion polls show consistently that the military is the most admired institution in this nation; its annual budget has begun to rise in real terms; and support for the use of military force and increases in military spending among the public are at an 18-year high.

However, as it enters the decade of the 1980s, the military finds itself confronted with a continually changing environment. In order to understand and focus research on some of the factors that may affect the American military in this decade, the Inter-University Seminar on the Armed Forces and Society and the Air University held a two-day research conference in October 1976. This conference brought together people from many disciplines and from the academic world as well as the civilian and military bureaucracy. This volume contains 25 of the papers presented at that conference.

The book is broken down into seven parts. The first part explains the fundamental tensions which exist between American norms and traditional military values; part 2 focuses on the major features of the international and domestic environments which may impinge on the American military in the 1980s; the third part describes the changing social milieu in which the military recruits, trains, and retains personnel; part 4 analyzes the potential impact of technological and organizational innovations on military command and control; part 5 discusses the present situation at the service academies; the sixth section contains some prescriptions which may help the military hierarchy cope with the challenges of the upcoming decade; and the last chapter proposes 17 research hypotheses which grow out of the first six sections.

Overall, the editor has done a commendable job in tying together in a coherent manner some diverse pieces of research on widely different aspects of the American military. However, this volume suffers from three weaknesses. First, there is an uneven quality to the individual sections. Some of the selections in this volume are excellent. Charles Moskos' article on the emergent military, in which he develops the "Calling, Profession, or Occupation Typology," has already become a classic. The research hypotheses offered by the editor in his summary chapter are stimulating, provocative, and inclusive.

On the other hand, many of the selections are poor. Gerald Miller's complaints about the trend toward centralization within the Department of Defense demonstrate a lack of understanding of the constitutional nature of civilian control. Similarly, the surveys of students at the air force and naval academies offer trite conclusions, raise more questions than they answer and attempt to justify the weaknesses of their efforts by referring to them as pioneering research.

Second, the book often looks in the wrong direction. Although it is supposed to focus on the world of the 1980s, much of the research deals with the environment of the previous decade to which the American military has already accommodated itself. Furthermore, much of that environment has changed. For example, the Pentagon has already accommodated to the increased information demands by a more assertive and a more hostile Congress, to the lack of support by the American people for military intervention or military spending, and to the diffusion of power within the international political system. Moreover, as this nation enters the 1980s, the Congress has become more friendly and the public has developed a renewed appreciation for military force and higher levels of defense spending. Yet some 80 pages of the book dwell on those specific areas.

Third, in some cases there does not seem any clear rationale for the areas selected or the emphasis given to individual sections. For example, only 38 pages are allocated to discussing the impact of such vital future issues as technology and organizational dynamics, while 76 pages focus on developments at the three military academies. Similarly, no real justification is offered for focusing exclusively on the service academies and ignoring the other levels of the military education system.

The expert in civil-military affairs and national security policy will discover nothing particularly new or insightful in this volume. (Some of the better selections have been printed elsewhere.) However, the book can serve as a useful summary of the research on some areas of concern to the expert. The non-expert will find this volume an excellent synthesis of the current state-of-the-art of research on some aspects of the military profession.

LAWRENCE J. KORB

U.S. Naval War College

Can Organizations Change?: Environmental Protection, Citizen Participation, and the Corps of Engineers. By Daniel A. Mazmanian and Jeanne Nienaber. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1979. Pp. x + 220. $11.95, cloth; $4.95, paper.)

In 1970 the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers initiated "open planning" for new projects—a gesture that seemingly repudiated a century of its tradition and admitted wisdom among its vehement critics. The corps' civil project planning had customarily been restricted to the cadre of economic and political beneficiaries from such projects. Environmentalists had assailed for decades the ecological insensitivities in this procedure. "Open planning" was expected to change both of these conditions, for it would "encourage as broad public and private participation as practical in defining environmental viewpoints on what the public wants" in new projects. This was a deliberate concession to environmentalists and, particularly, a response to the corps' new statutory responsibility for preparing "environmental impact statements" on new projects. It was also an attempt to turn adversity to advantage. The corps embraced what the authors call the "participation thesis": open planning would facilitate public consensus on project proposals and thereby hasten their congressional authorization.

Mazmanian and Nienaber assert that the corps' experience with "open planning" contributes to understanding organizational change. "The Corps appeared to be reacting to demands for change in a fashion uncharacteristic of large and powerful bureaucracies," they state. "Understanding the dynamics of change in the Corps might also shed light on how change in agencies with similar missions could be accomplished" (p. 3). This concise and readable book will appeal, in fact, to three audiences—those concerned with organizational change, environmental politics and public involvement in the administrative process. The initial two chapters set the study in the context of theories concerning organizational change and present the authors' criteria for measuring such change in the corps. The next chapter describes attempts to create a new planning infrastructure within the corps' district offices while three succeeding chapters present case studies in "open planning" on five specific projects. The first of two concluding chapters examines the reaction of citizen participants to the new "open planning" and tests the validity of the "participation thesis." A final chapter appraises the corps' general response to change.

One major conclusion is that the corps substantially "cooled" toward "open planning" after 1974 when it discovered that the technique failed to assure consensus on projects or (worse) on the Corps' favored project designs. The authors assert that this and other material they assemble reveals "a great deal about the potential for change in large bureaucracies as a whole and the process by which this change occurs" (p. 191) but the severe constraints in the research design make the book's contribution toward a theory of organizational change far less substantial, albeit useful. The book succeeds best—quite impressively—in less ambitious but important ways. It offers the most careful, detailed and lucid current evaluation of public participation's impact on a major resource agency. The five case studies nicely balance analytical, empirical and descriptive elements; the narrative is rich in stimulating ideas for further research. The book also calls attention to public involvement in administration as a newly important arena of political behavior. The authors make an important contribution by testing empirically their analytical model of the "participation thesis"; it is, despite some methodological flaws, the most rigorous current approach to that theory. All this is admirable enough for the book to merit an important place in the library of any scholar or lay person interested in environmental politics, public participation, organizational behavior or the corps' institutional behavior.

The last chapter is the least satisfying because the book's major flaw is the relatively meager empirical materials the authors bring to their administrative theorizing. The five case studies undergirding this theorizing are admittedly "not a representative sample of dam building or channelization or flood control activities in any statistical sense" (p. 63) and, moreover, they include no *new* projects. Thus, one cannot know if they adequately characterize the corps' general organizational behavior (as the authors themselves often acknowledge). One could also wish for a bit more methodological finesse in the citizen participation survey. The study lacks data on the citizen attitudes *before* exposure to "open planning" and, consequently, generalizations about the experience's impact seem rather tenuous. Perhaps these limitations prompt the extreme tentativeness of the conclusions. Often the authors seem to argue with themselves: "There are . . . promising indications that the agency is translating the environmental mission into new programs. Yet . . . it is to be seen whether the Corps will want to be able to continue incorporating environmental considerations in its construction activities" (p. 187).

The book's strengths, however, more than compensate for these deficiencies. It should be commended in any case for what it attempts as well as for what it accomplishes.

WALTER A. ROSENBAUM

University of Florida

Must We Bus? Segregated Schools and National Policy. By Gary Orfield. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1978. Pp. xiv + 470. $16.95, cloth; $7.95, paper.)

Must We Bus? is a *tour de force* concerning one of the most divisive political issues of our time. This extraordinarily comprehensive book reflects an awareness of the historical, legal, sociological and political dimensions of the struggle over school desegregation. Gary Orfield is an activist scholar whose own involvement in this issue has both enriched and shaped his analysis. While readers will differ in their assessments of how balanced his treatment of the arguments is, Orfield is always clear about his own values and his recognition of the limits of the empirical evidence he cites. The book accepts as given the desirability of eliminating racial isolation in the schools—especially, as is often the case, when it is the direct or indirect product of government action. This assumption will disturb white opponents of desegregation as well as many minority leaders who, frustrated by the intractability of white resistance, want to focus attention on achieving educational excellence within ghettos and barrios in minority schools. Perhaps because he accepts its rightness and focuses on the processes of desegregation, Orfield does not deal systematically with the outcomes of desegregation for children and communities. While he does explode some widely believed myths and discusses some of the characteristics of effectively desegregated schools, he does not try to examine comprehensively what we know about the effects of desegregation.

Henceforth, no one will be able to write about the history and politics of desegregation without acknowledging what is to be learned from this book. But it is more than a study of a particular policy. *Must We Bus?,* as perhaps no other empirically based study has done, shows how American politics is shaped by racial concerns. Moreover, it tells us much about the role of bureaucracy in policy making and thus contributes to the growing literature on the importance and politics of implementing actions of courts, legislatures and chief executives.

Must We Bus? has three parts. The first looks at the legal basis for busing, the demography of school enrollments that leave busing the only means to attain desegregation in many cities, the relationship between segregated housing and segregated schools, public attitudes, the economics of busing and the alleged conflict between integration and bilingual education for Hispanics. Throughout this section, Orfield tries to set the facts straight and to separate myth from reality while recognizing that one's realities are shaped by one's values.

Part 2 examines the role of the federal government in promising and impeding desegregation. This analysis is largely new and is based on extensive analyses of the written record and interviews with key federal actors and interest groups. Those interested in the political aspects of bureaucracy and in attempts to manage controversy will find this an insightful and lively analysis. But the story told is a sad one. In seeking to demonstrate the importance to public compliance of the signals transmitted by political leaders, Orfield documents the federal retreat between 1964 and 1976 from the commitment to desegregation. The pattern of political and bureaucratic evasion of responsibility for the enforcement of desegregation and outright violation of related law is a sorry tale. The reaction of federal, state and local governments to desegregation represents a case of massive civil disobedience. The message is clear: if we have failed to realize the goals of desegregation it is not because we have tried. Orfield argues that HEW under the Nixon and Ford administrations, in effect, supported practices that sought "separate but equal" schools. This charge is given even more weight by the most recent evaluation of the Emergency School Assistance Act which shows that most of the money in this major instrument of federal desegregation policy was used to enrich the education of minority children in racially isolated schools rather than to promote integration.

The final section of the book has two chapters, the first of which examines the logic and prospects of metropolitan-wide desegregation plans. The final chapter looks at a broad array of policies that seem likely to "make desegregation work." The focus here is on national strategies, and while most of the alternatives are not radical, their political feasibility is glossed over. But Orfield makes it clear that much more could be done; indeed, it seems embarrassing that so little of what he suggests is being discussed (much less implemented).

Gary Orfield's book is a significant study of a continuing source of political conflict and how it is possible to undermine the law of the land and contribute to the obfuscation of the fundamental problems and goals to which desegregation was directed. The book's role in public policy formation may be to sharpen our awareness of some policy alternatives for making desegregation more effective and it will strengthen the hand of the proponents of desegregation by pointing out how the law has been evaded and by exposing some of the myths often used by opponents to justify their position (e.g., that the financial costs of busing are usually substantial). On the other hand, it seems unlikely that the book will change many minds concerning the desirability of busing (or is it desegregation?).

It is widely believed that busing itself is harmful to children and communities and that, overall, school desegregation has not led to positive outcomes. However, the available evidence, though not wholly satisfying, does not support these myths. The most recent and comprehensive analysis of the evidence on the effects of desegregation is found in a special two-part issue of *Law and Contemporary Problems* 48 (Spring and Summer, 1978). As Orfield shows, we cannot desegregate the schools without busing. And no one has yet found a way to improve race relations without forcefully denying the legitimacy of prejudice *and* bringing about interracial contact. Desegregation is the only policy we have that does these things. Perhaps the most important research question we need to address is: just how true is the contention of many blacks and Hispanics: "It's not the bus, it's us!"

WILLIS D. HAWLEY

Duke University

Choices and Echoes in Presidential Elections: Rational Man and Electoral Democracy. By Benjamin I. Page. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978. Pp. xv + 336. $17.50.

Choices and Echoes in Presidential Elections presents a study of the public rhetoric of several presidential candidates (primarily that of Nixon and Humphrey in 1968 and of Goldwater and McGovern) and how that rhetoric compares to the preferences of the electorate. Benjamin Page has therefore tackled a central question of electoral democracy that has long defied systematic evidence. His method is both clever and innovative.

The greater part of this book is concerned with candidate rhetoric on public policy and stands as one of the all-too-rare tests of rational choice, especially spatial, models of electoral competition. While Page examines such subjects as campaigning on "glories of the past and visions of the future," presentation of one's individual qualities and qualifications as a prospective president, and campaign innovations and manipulation, it is the two-thirds of the book that address the theories of Downs and his intellectual progeny that will have the most telling effect on the discipline. That is, Page's central focus is theoretical, both in the narrow sense of testing various aspects of rational-choice models and in the sense of attacking central questions of democratic theory.

From a large compilation of the candidates' public utterances (campaign speeches and texts, interviews, position papers, etc.) Page extracted statements about policies that were also the subject of inquiry in Gallup and Harris polls, ICPSR election studies, etc. Page then located the position enunciated by the candidate in the range of preferences found in the public. The goal was to find, for example, how often a candidate took a "central" position on that issue relative to the public. Page claimed that "on most issues it was possible to discover a single, uncontradicted stand by each candidate" (p. 38). The very nature of his methodology, of course, makes it difficult to verify this claim; this is unfortunate since that is an interesting finding. It is also difficult to assess how he located the candidates vis-à-vis the public. Apparently Page did not attempt to make a very specific matching, for his criteria for candidate "centrality" are not demanding (specifically being in the two middle quartiles of public opinion or on the same side as a plurality of the public, depending on the nature of the interview question). Looking only at a rather generous definition of "centrality" versus extremity is a relatively weak hurdle for tests of the spatial model and could potentially mask more refined but still important variations.

Page's major findings can be summarized briefly. First he investigates the degree of centrality of candidate positions on issues: how close the candidates come to the center of public opinion on each issue. From Downs onward, most theorems in the spatial modeling literature predict convergence to this center, and Page finds that Nixon, Humphrey, and—surprisingly—McGovern were relatively central most of the time (unlike Goldwater). Second, in opposition to these theorems (what Page calls "public opinion theories"), none of these candidates was moderate on all issues. Rather, all were relatively extreme on numerous issues. Third, the instances of extremity were clearly related to party both in being issues which distinguish Democrats from Republicans and which have divided the parties historically (consistent with what Page calls "party cleavage theories"). Fourth, Nixon and Humphrey demonstrated strong consistency on their issue stances from February through November, 1968. The one major exception was Vietnam. Both candidates, like most citizens, became more dovish, but Humphrey shifted farther from the center of public opinion than Nixon. In contrast, "insurgent" candidates (Goldwater and McGovern) shifted towards the center over the course of the election year. Finally, Page documents the extent to which candidates make ambiguous, unspecific claims about their policy stances, and relates this to citizen (mis- or non-) perceptions.

Page makes several truly important contributions. First, he established that it is indeed possible to study the relationship between "objective" reality (i.e., what the candidates actually say and do) and the subjective view of that reality tapped by our most important data source, the questionnaire. Second, he has been able to use these data to investigate propositions that have eluded serious test heretofore. Perhaps the single most important contribution of the spatial modeling enterprise is its undeniable argument that candidate behavior shapes and is shaped by citizen preferences. His work is constructive criticism of this argument in the true sense of the term. He does not just find fault with specific spatial propositions, but locates these failures and suggests how the model can be made more plausible. Third, we learn something systematic about the substance of elections: that the candidates are more responsible as politicians and campaigners than conventional wisdom suggests. Candidates appear "responsible" both in taking a "single, uncontradicted stand" on many issues and in offering the electorate at least some "choice not [wholly] an echo" even in elections such as 1968 that were so frequently typified as offering "not a dime's worth of difference" between the two major candidates.

V. O. Key, Jr. popularized the academic position that the unhappy view of the voter popular in the 1950s forgot that the candidates shaped the degree of possible voter "responsibility." The spatial modeling literature suggests that candidates are office-seekers who eschew public responsibility to seek votes. Benjamin Page's work will, I hope, popularize the academic position that candidates, up to the limits of the electoral democracy, are "responsible" individuals as well.

I find Page's results more supportive of the rational choice enterprise than he does himself. I read the prediction of candidate convergence to the center as "if a rational candidate desires (only) to win the election, and if the candidate is free to adopt whatever positions he chooses, he should converge—or pay the consequences." I interpret Page's results as saying that candidates are constrained by past behavior, nomination politics, and, perhaps most importantly, by their own policy preferences from adopting the best policy positions for winning elections. However, those most severely constrained have paid the consequences.

Choices and Echoes is a book that should be read—carefully—by the entire discipline. It is essentially a path-breaking effort and is not, therefore, the final word on the subject. Instead, it is refreshing, innovative, and insightful. The best I can say for a book is that I enjoyed reading it and that I learned from it. This book meets those criteria.

JOHN H. ALDRICH

Michigan State University

The U.S. Senate and Strategic Arms Policy 1969–1977. By Alan Platt. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1978. Pp. xiv + 129. $13.00.)

Congress and Arms Control. Edited by Alan Platt and Lawrence D. Weiler. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1978. Pp. xv + 227. $18.50.)

The increase in congressional interest and participation in national security issues in the 1970s has given rise to a growing literature on executive-congressional relations, with specific emphasis on arms control and the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty (SALT). *The U.S.*

Senate and Strategic Arms Policy 1969–1977 traces in great detail the evolution of Senate influence in the shaping of U.S. policy on SALT which, together with the selective counterforce targeting concept announced by then Secretary of Defense Schlesinger in January 1974, form two case studies from which Alan Platt derives his conclusions. The collection of essays edited by Platt and Lawrence Weiler contains an examination, from a variety of perspectives, of congressional participation in arms control and national security policies. Taken together, both volumes set forth themes already familiar to students of U.S. national security decision making and arms control; namely, that there has been a substantial growth in congressional participation, especially in the late 1970s, in U.S. arms control and national security policies with a pronounced tendency toward critical review and evaluation; previously, the Congress played only a marginal role in shaping U.S. policy and even during the SALT I period the Congress was largely excluded from the arms control decision-making process; that traditionally most members of the Senate have been ill informed either as a result of their own lack of interest and expertise or, in the early 1970s, because of the penchant in the Nixon-Kissinger era for secrecy; and that, in sharp contrast to the recent past, congressional participation in the SALT process has grown substantially in the Carter administration.

Each of these themes is developed in both studies. The volume edited by Platt and Weiler is notable for its diversity of perspective, with contributions by two members of the Senate, former and present (Clark from Iowa and Cranston from California) and one member of the House of Representatives (Les Aspen), as well as several former and present members of congressional staffs and the executive branch. Included also are a European view by Kurt J. Lauk, and an analysis of the politics of appropriations by Thomas A. Dine; of congressional participation in U.S. non-proliferation policy since the late 1940s by Warren H. Donnelly and dilemmas posed by the inherent need for secrecy in arms control negotiations by Lawrence Weiler. Weiler argues, if somewhat polemically, against the kind of secrecy in arms control practiced by the United States during the early 1970s. But he draws a useful distinction between the need for secrecy in formal and informal exchanges between delegations and for congressional and public scrutiny of even the texts of proposals *after* they have been brought to the negotiating table.

The basic conclusion that emerges from both studies is that congressional, especially Senate, participation in arms control can be expected to continue to increase. This trend the contributors attribute to such familiar causes as the legacy of the Vietnam War and Watergate experiences in eroding executive authority and the dramatic increase over the last decade in the capabilities of the Congress, as a result of the development of extensive congressional staffs for the exercise of legislative oversight in national security issues. Indeed, given the experience of several of the contributors, greater emphasis might have been given to this important change in congressional capabilities, and to an assessment of their impact upon the policy positions of those for whom congressional staff members work. By the mid-to-late 1970s, as several contributors suggest, there was a far greater understanding of the SALT, both within the Congress and in the broader strategic-military affairs community outside the government, not only because of the greater availability of information, but also because of mounting evidence that SALT I had not fulfilled the expectations even of some of its strong supporters. With the growth of Soviet strategic-nuclear forces even within the arms control framework provided by SALT I, it was perhaps inevitable that negotiations for the SALT II Treaty would be subjected to increased scrutiny both inside and outside the Senate. Thus the SALT II debate has been far more extensive both in time and substance than the debate over SALT I.

The present phase in executive-congressional relations has been sharpened in its intensity, to a large extent, by the lack of consensus that exists with respect to the efficacy of arms control in the pursuit of U.S. national security interests. Such is the context within which the executive-congressional debate on arms control and national security has unfolded in the 1970s. Similarly, the reemergence of a broader national consensus, such as existed before the Watergate scandal and the Vietnam War, could be expected to have a profound effect upon the relations between Congress and the executive branch. The breakdown of national consensus on national security issues of the last decade is mirrored both in executive-congressional conflicts and, as also is to be expected, in conflicts within Congress itself. Contributors to both volumes have chosen to focus more on the former than the latter. But greater emphasis might have been placed on the contending groups within the Congress—upon an analysis of the position, tactics and relative influence of the major congressional groups.

Regarding the role of the Congress in the early 1970s, several caveats must be offered to the generalizations about the limitations on congressional oversight contained in both volumes. For example, at the time of SALT I the Jackson Amendment of 1972 established a framework of equal aggregate ceilings in superpower strategic forces embodied subsequently in quantitative terms in the Vladivostok *Aide Memoire* of November 1974. Moreover, certain members of the Senate, even in the Nixon-Kissinger period, had direct influence on the staffing of executive arms control bureaucracies, notably the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. This included the dismissal of much of the original SALT delegation in 1972 which had the tacit, if not the active, support of certain members of the Senate. The requirement that the administration submit annual arms control impact statements, to be scrutinized extensively by Congress, represents yet another example of congressional participation in arms control policies. By the late 1970s, the Senate had gained direct access to the Geneva negotiations on SALT II by means of the SALT Advisory Group, which includes nearly half of the Senate membership. But in general, as Philip Farley and Warren H. Donnelly conclude in their discussion of the control of arms sales and non-proliferation, respectively, Congress can set goals, criteria and procedures, and can encourage, criticize, modify and otherwise express approval or dissatisfaction.

Quite properly, contributors to both volumes point to the fact that expertise in the Congress, by and large, has been the preserve of a few members—now augmented by staff expertise—who have chosen to specialize in national security issues. Expertise and influence, it is suggested, are coincident properties in the congressional impact on executive policy. Linked to congressional appropriations authority, they provide formidable weapons to the Congress in the exercise of its constitutional function. In an extended analysis of the Schlesinger Selective Counter-Force Targeting Proposal of 1974, Alan Platt concludes that Senate influence has been greatest when its appropriations power has been apparent. This was manifest once again in the debate on ratification of the SALT II Treaty with the apparent efforts Senate members to link support for the treaty to increased defense appropriations. Thus both volumes, taken together, provide a wealth of information based on extensive research and experience, together with numerous propositions and conclusions of relevance both to the present phase of the SALT, and the roles likely to be played, respectively, by the Congress and the executive branch in an era in which national security issues will remain prominent and the need apparent for informed judgment in each of the branches of government.

ROBERT L. PFALTZGRAFF, JR.

The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

Ideological Coalitions in Congress. By Jerrold E. Schneider. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1979. Pp. xvi + 270. $22.50.)

It is only fair to note, right off, that my own work was very much in the mind of the author as he wrote his book.

"This study's central hypothesis is that there exists a very high consistency of congressional coalitions across all major policy domains, foreign and domestic" (p. 3). Beyond that, the study is an explicit attack on the pluralist conception of American politics, the alternative being an ideologist interpretation. The content of the ideology is drawn from "four recurrent political themes [that] have exhibited remarkable durability over the millenia. . . : (1) war, militarism, and peace, (2) privilege and deprivation, (3) repression and democracy, and (4) racial (or ethnic or religious) conflict" (p. 18). These four themes provide the basis for categorizing roll calls into four policy domains: foreign, economic, civil liberties-democracy, and race.

Roll-call analysis within the House and Senate of the 92nd Congress (1971–72), and within the first session of each house in the 94th Congress (1975), provides the core of the evidence used to support the proposition that there is a single liberal-conservative dimension on which members of Congress are ordered. Supplementary information consists of interviews with members of Congress, congressional staff, and economists, and from an extensive review of congressional documents, periodicals, and other sources.

In the beginning of the work, special attention is paid to foreign policy. Jerrold Schneider conducted interviews with 97 members of the 92nd House of Representatives, which included 11 items on a variety of foreign policy issues, and coded responses, using a "focused open-ended question strategy" (p. 58). Principal findings are (1) higher consistency in foreign policy attitudes than reported by Converse on 1958 congressional candidates, and (2) a single foreign policy *attitude* dimension in contradiction of earlier findings of multidimensionality in foreign policy *voting*.

The principal test, as I see it, for ideological consistency in roll-call voting across the four domains of policy is based on the level of correlation observed between single measures constructed for each policy domain within each Congress-House combination. However, these measures involve no test of unidimensionality within domains—a practice defended by Schneider. Rather, we must rely upon his classification of roll calls into domains, his judgment of the ideological direction of Yea and Nay votes (reliability test with colleague), and a rank-ordering of members by the number of liberal votes cast.

Support for ideological consistency in roll-call voting across the four policy domains is based on Kendall *tau-b* correlations that vary in value from .5 to .8 with a median of .6. These *are* high correlations but one may still question whether they are high enough to lead to the inference of unidimensionality. There is no test for persisting inter-Congress differences in voting alignments between domains, which would raise doubts about the central hypothesis even in the face of high inter-domain correlations. There *is* a claim that a drop-off in the level of correlation between domestic and foreign policy voting, from 1972 to 1975, is consistent with changes in the times and membership; however, this implies that the level of ideological voting is subject to broad-based variation—without providing insights into the decision rule alternatives.

There is also a strong claim to a much higher level of predictability of congressional voting than is achieved in other studies. Involved is a comparison of inter-domain predictability of rankings in this study with predictive success on individual votes in other studies. In making the comparison, *tau-b* is used as a measure of proportional reduction in error (P-R-E) for ordinal data. However, Schneider failed to square the coefficient, a step clearly designated by the original proponent of the P-R-E interpretation of *tau-b*. When this is done, the predictive success does not exceed that claimed by other studies.

Schneider advances numerous differences between this study and preceding ones to account for his unique demonstration of ideological consistency in congressional voting. Salient among these is his use of roll-call votes cast after the recorded teller vote was instituted in the House in 1971; the problem with the earlier voting record, he states, is that liberals had no opportunities to record their positions. In addition, Schneider believes he has assured adequate representation of all ideological positions by using a sample of 100 members from the House distributed evenly across the decile ranges of the ADA rankings. He argues, "By failing to provide ... the same degree of representation of different policy proclivities Clausen necessarily and invalidly lowered the relationships he obtained among different policy dimensions" (p. 140). Necessarily perhaps.

Following the report on the roll-call analysis, there is a discussion of significant policy differences between the ideological camps suggested by the roll-call analysis. The cited data base is extensive, the discussion is suggestive, as Schneider correctly notes; however, some of the extensive quotations from Congress members and economists could have profitably given way to a more systematic summary of the distinctions observed between Conservatives, Liberals and Progressives.

Much curiosity would also have been allayed by some systematic description of the membership of the ideological coalitions, even in such gross terms as party and region. Nor is there any description of the cohesion of the opposing coalitions despite the author's claim to a new technique for measuring it—which turns out to be the rank-order correlations between the domain measures.

The fate of this work depends upon whether it can withstand criticisms of its method, assuming critics are willing to consider its message. For it is clear that its method is a large part of its message, more than is the usual, even inevitable, condition of any observations on human behavior. And the message that voting in Congress is ideological along one dimension is sufficiently at odds with conventional knowledge that it may invoke either intense controversy or peremptory dismissal. A reaction that I recommend is careful examination and considered response.

AAGE R. CLAUSEN

Ohio State University

The History of American Electoral Behavior. Edited by Joel H. Sibley, Allan G. Bogue and William H. Flanigan. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978. Pp. xv + 384. $27.50, cloth; $12.50, paper.)

Voting and elections have been studied more exhaustively than any other American political phenomena. In recent years, political scientists and historians have contributed a significant new component to this immense corpus of electoral studies as they have subjected the historical experience to systematic, quantitative examination. *The History of American Electoral Behavior* comes as testimony to the rapid maturation of quantitative, historical election analysis, and it stands as a major contribution to the larger body of literature on voting and elections.

The History Advisory Committee of the Mathematical Social Science Board organized a conference in 1973 to demonstrate the special strength and utility of quantitative methods to the historical study of voting behavior. The papers presented at that meeting, variously revised, comprise the present volume. Collections of conference papers are often disappointing. This one, however, is highly satisfying; it realizes the goal that had been set of it, of showing the scope and richness of the "new" history of voting.

All of the papers published in *The History of American Electoral Behavior* are interesting and useful. However, political scientists concerned with electoral phenomena are likely to find three of special value. Joel Silbey, Allan Bogue and William Flanigan present a fine introduction that sketches the history of historical election studies. Walter Dean Burnham, Jerome Clubb, and William Flanigan provide a penetrating essay on partisan realignment that is notable as an attempt to integrate various findings and to order them conceptually. And Lee Benson, Joel Silbey, and Phyllis Field describe nearly two centuries of New York state voting experience; they demonstrate the complexity of the pattern in that one state and argue convincingly for the need to proceed cautiously in the macro-analysis of voting cycles.

Political science at its best is built upon comparative inquiry. One set of comparisons is, of course, the "horizontal"—where a country's political system is in some fashion compared to that of another nation. But a second set of comparisons, the "vertical," is equally valuable—whereby the behavior of a political institution or process at one point in time is illuminated by examining its behavior at other times. That is, social systems vary over time within a country, as well as across national boundaries at any one time, and "history" is a rich laboratory for comparative analysis. The authors of the essays comprising *The History of American Electoral Behavior* appreciate the value of "vertical comparison." They recognize that we can achieve far more secure knowledge of the properties and behavior of parties-elections systems if we exploit the opportunities for historical comparison. And they understand that the availability of electoral data over the course of United States history, together with advanced techniques and facilities for quantitative analysis, provides an especially good base for systematic comparison.

The History of American Electoral Behavior is satisfying as a reminder of the fact that some very good systematic vertical comparison has already been done. But the volume also confronts us as a challenge, reminding us as well of how very far we have to go—both theoretically and in empirical investigation—if we are to begin to realize the promise of the comparative analysis that "history" makes possible.

EVERETT C. LADD, JR.

University of Connecticut

Supreme Court Policy Making: Explanation and Prediction. By Harold J. Spaeth. (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1979. Pp. xiii + 224. $11.95, cloth; $6.50, paper.)

Supreme Court Policy Making is a compact descriptive analysis of how the Court makes policy. The book is organized in eight informative and concisely written chapters. Although the mode of analysis is descriptive, much of the book consists of an intelligent emphasis upon legal realism, empiricism, and a brief but very excellent introduction to the theory and application of decision-making prediction. Harold Spaeth does not cite cases at great length, but, by judicious choice of representative examples, does achieve a lively and accurate commentary based upon illustrative decisions. Chapter 2 comprises a description of the internal procedures and supporting personnel of the Supreme Court as well as a brief discussion of competing conceptions of standing to sue, the scope of and uses of jurisdictional parameters as devices for selecting important cases and curtailing a constantly burgeoning case load. Chapter 3 treats what the author calls "Legal Influences on Decision-Making," primarily emphasizing modes of legal reasoning and a realistic analysis of *stare decisis* and *obiter dicta.* Chapter 4 deals with judicial selection and the unique sense in which the Supreme Court may be deemed representative. Chapter 5 analyzes the nature of the decision-making process as it relates to personal policy preferences of the individual justices. Chapter 6 summarizes in unpretentious fashion the author's truly significant contributions to judicial decision-making prediction; it is a tightly drawn and excellent treatment. Chapter 7 considers a variety of normative and substantive criticisms related to the "ideal of judicial blindness," and Chapter 8 deals with a variety of problems related to compliance with the Court's policies.

Ironically, the single serious question relating to Spaeth's excellent volume arises in chapter 1. Here the author indulges in the time-honored ritual of demolishing the "Mythology of Judging." As he puts it,

> Judges are viewed as bloodless incarnations of human rectitude. From their lips flows a steady stream of sapience. From their pens flows not ink but rather moral concrete into which their judgments are set. *Americans believe (or at least hope)* that judicial decisions are value-free, essentially nondiscretionary, and objective... (p. 1, italics added).

This extravagant sally not only leaves John Milton unchallenged; it sets up the intellectual straw man which is dutifully destroyed in the remainder of the chapter. How refreshing (and realistic) it would be to treat the essential duality of American attitudes toward the Supreme Court and other major federal and state judicial institutions.

On balance, Spaeth's book is an excellent treatment, analytical and parsimonious, illustrative and compact.

JOHN R. SCHMIDHAUSER

University of Southern California

The Judiciary in a Democratic Society. Edited by Leonard J. Theberge. (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath, 1979. Pp. xv + 217. $15.00.)

This volume is based upon a series of papers delivered in 1977 at the National Conference on the Role of the Judiciary in a Democratic Society sponsored by the National Legal Center for the Public Interest. The core of this book consists of eight essays, five of which are supplemented by brief commentaries. Editor Leonard J. Theberge, former president of the center, provides brief introductory and concluding comments.

A major concern of the contributors is the dramatic change occurring in the role of the judiciary from that of a dispute-resolving institution to a major independent policy maker. Ralph K. Winter traces this change along a theoretical continuum from an "interpretive" model of the judicial function toward a "judicial power" model under which the judiciary is affirmatively engaged in policy formulation. Examples that the federal courts have adopted the judicial power perspective abound in later contributions. Nathan Glazer reviews the involvement of federal district judges in the minutiae of prison and mental health hospital administration and other social service programs. Michael M. Uhlmann scorns the Supreme Court's participation in the reapportionment decisions. And other contributions, though some more directly than others, highlight judicial involvement in issues as controversial as affirmative action and as complex as the review of administrative agency decision making concerning energy, environment and consumer protection. As Robert Dixon offers in his commentary, not only has the magnitude of judicial review changed but so has its character. "Judicial review has moved from its traditional focus on negating governmental acts to a restructuring of governmental programs" (p. 81).

Nevertheless, despite this expansion of the judicial role, the basic questions concerning judicial review remain the same. What is the basic source or justification for this power in a democracy? What are the possible benefits or damaging consequences of its exercise? How can the judiciary guarantee the legitimacy and enforcement of its actions? Alternatively, what limitations or checks exist to prevent the courts from going "too far" into the policy-making realm? As Walter Berns argues, the judiciary lacks institutional limits and the political checks imposed by "living constituents" (p. 12). Drawing its authority from the revered Constitution, the judiciary is "the least dangerous branch" only if it chooses to be so.

The contributors have no trouble voicing their shared opinion that judicial activism has gone "too far." Not all are able, however, to address the issue of the proper role of the judiciary with arguments that transcend their personal dissatisfaction with the substance of recent judicial decisions. And though most are sure of the disease, few are certain of the cure. According to Theberge, the conference participants discussed such traditional remedies as election, limited judicial terms, and periodic reconfirmation, all of which were rejected "as potentially more harmful because of the greater importance attached to an independent judiciary detached from the political process" (p. 177).

Encouraging the courts to observe judicial restraint requires, in Theberge's words, "education and professional criticism" (p. 177). Future lawyers need to be educated to appreciate the proper scope of judicial review. Professional criticism impresses upon judges the need for logic and craftsmanship in the formulation of opinions, requirements which should discipline judges to avoid offering their own "social and political sympathies disguised as conventional legal reasoning" (pp. 112–13).

Unfortunately, the emphasis of this volume upon the enlargement of judicial power is glaring testimony to the ineffectiveness of professional criticism. One wonders, moreover, about the wisdom of relying upon a legal constituency to encourage judges to exercise self-restraint. Recent evidence suggests that members of the political elite (including lawyers) are more likely than other members of the polity to accept if not defend the constitutional imperative of judicial decisions. As Robert Bork notes in his comments, no small part of any court's power rests upon the mythical belief "that the Constitution really requires the unpopular things it does" (p. 113).

Indeed, it may at last be time for widespread popular and professional admission that the line between law and politics is blurred. Thus the key to judicial restraint may be the imposition of political restraints. A realistic approach to the problem of judicial activism requires a more searching inquiry than this volume offers into the proper balance between judicial accountability and judicial independence and the role of politics and political power in insuring that balance.

PHILIP L. DUBOIS

University of California, Davis

Privileged Communication and the Press: The Citizen's Right to Know versus the Law's Right to Confidential News Source Evidence. By Maurice Van Gerpen. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1979. Pp. 239. $22.95.)

This book is a useful compendium of information on the news reporter's privilege. It collects the early privilege cases and surveys the legal sources and arguments relevant to the privileges doctrine against the background of social protest that spawned the current debate. It provides a relevant discussion of the First Amendment and of related issues such as the role of the grand jury. After a review of *Branzberg* and its companion cases, there is an up-to-date survey of state shield laws and of recent congressional activity. Recent developments regarding newspaper office searches are treated. Maurice Van Gerpen is careful to present both sides of the various questions raised and himself opts for a moderate position in which the privilege is recognized as a constitutional right but one that must yield where the information sought is directly relevant to litigational issues and cannot be obtained by alternate means.

Van Gerpen does not present a closely knit legal argument in the manner of the law reviews, nor does he seek to contribute to a rigorous political science of the First Amendment. Rather his approach is to attempt a sensible general discussion in the context of real-world events and issues. Students and teachers of the First Amendment, particularly those who have not amassed basic data files of their own, will find this book a very valuable starting point for their research.

MARTIN SHAPIRO

University of California, Berkeley

The Ungovernable City. By Douglas Yates. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977. Pp. xvi + 219. $15.00, cloth; $4.95, paper.)

Douglas Yates' *The Ungovernable City* is one of the more ambitious and original books on urban politics published in recent years. Yates points out that questions that have preoccupied students of urban politics over the past two decades really tell very little about how cities are governed. As he observes, "It is hard to believe that knowing whether a city government has a pluralist or elitist power structure tells us much, if anything, about the way the government deals with busing conflicts, union strikes, street crime, health service delivery, and garbage collection" (p. 11). Even less informative, as he notes, are studies of the demographic correlates of municipal expenditures: "The fact that a government spends *x* amount of money in a department often does not reveal the nature or meaning of the programs the department is, in fact, running" (p. 13).

Yates argues that the best way to understand city politics is to identify the characteristics that distinguish municipal government from state and national government. The most important such characteristic, he asserts, is that cities are involved in "direct, personal service delivery at the street level—when street-level service delivery issues involve trust, responsiveness, and authority relations between the servers and the served" (p. 7). Moreover, city governments are far more accessible to their citizens than those at the state and national level, and therefore they are inundated with demands from innumerable community groups for additional services or for changes in the provision of existing services. Mayors and other municipal officials, however, have little control over street-level bureaucrats, and therefore cannot adequately respond to these demands. The consequence of this extreme fragmentation of power is a pattern of politics which Yates labels "street-fighting pluralism":

> Street-fighting pluralism suggests a political free-for-all, a pattern of unstructured, multi-

> lateral conflict in which many different combatants fight continuously with one another in a very great number of permutations and combinations. Street-fighting pluralism exists [for example] when five different groups in the same neighborhood struggle over policy and expenditures in a local school and when they enlist different city administrators, representatives, or agencies as allies in the fight (p. 34).

It is in this sense, and for these reasons, Yates concludes, that American cities are ungovernable. And the only way to make them more governable is to reduce drastically the variety of services they perform.

This is a provocative thesis. Yet Yates' image of "street-fighting pluralism" is a more accurate depiction of what politics looked like in most large American cities in the mid- and late-1960s than of such politics today. Nowadays mayors are not overwhelmed with demands for more and more services from hundreds of community groups to the same extent they were a decade ago; they are finding it more feasible to withstand strikes (or strike threats) by municipal employee unions; and they have enjoyed at least some success in extending control over municipal bureaucracies by appointing department heads known for their administrative skills rather than their identification with the clients or programs of their agencies, and by importing managerial techniques (and personnel) from the business world. All this is being done in the name of fiscal necessity, and with the support of powerful political forces in the city. In other words, mayors today characteristically are undertaking to govern their cities by piecing together political coalitions that differ in composition and orientation from the ones that prevailed in American cities 10 or 15 years ago. Yates greatly underestimates the resiliency of the "party of order" in American urban politics.

That such a change has come about over the past decade indicates that the ungovernability of cities in the 1960s was not a consequence of the inherent and timeless nature of urban politics. Rather, it was the outgrowth of the political dynamics of the day, especially the explosion of racial consciousness among blacks, the particular way the federal government involved itself in urban affairs during the heyday of the Great Society (federal grants financed many of the community groups to which Yates refers), and the defensive reaction of municipal employees to these developments. All of this occurred at a time when the economy was booming, and hence it seemed feasible for mayors to buy peace by paying off the groups that screamed the loudest. For the very reason that they could gain concessions by pressing demands upon city governments, numerous groups were encouraged to do so. Changes in the structure of national politics after 1968 and the generally slackening of the economy in the 1970s put a damper on most of these tendencies.

This particular explanation for the changes that have occurred in urban politics over the past 15 years is merely my understanding of these developments; it may or may not be true, and, in any event, Yates certainly is not to be faulted for failing to write the book I would have written. True or not, however, the theoretical implications of these remarks remain: any satisfactory analysis of urban politics, as V. O. Key said of politics in general, must incorporate the "dimension of time," or, to state this in somewhat trendier terms, it must make room for the concept of "conjuncture" as well as the concept of "structure."

In sum, the ungovernability that Yates identifies as the distinctive characteristic of American cities is not invariably characteristic of them, and his analysis of its sources is thus, at the minimum, incomplete. In saying this I do not mean to denigrate his work. *The Ungovernable City* is a book well worth arguing with. It is filled with intelligent and insightful analyses of the politics of urban policy making and administration. Rather than raking over the dying embers of the elitist/pluralist debate once again, or reporting yet some more correlations between the social characteristics of cities and their policy outputs, Yates asks new questions about urban politics and thereby increases our understanding of it.

MARTIN SHEFTER

Cornell University

Comparative Politics

Transition in Spain: From Franco to Democracy. By Victor Alba. Translated by Barbara Lotito. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1978. Pp. vii + 333. $14.95.)

For those unfamiliar with Spanish politics, Victor Alba has written a lively and highly readable account of the major events and personalities of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Spanish political history. The author was a participant on the Republican side of the Civil War and while his political sentiments are clear, Alba does not hesitate to point to the follies, grave mistakes, as well as achievements of the major leaders and groups of that and other periods of Spanish history. But for serious students of Spanish politics, Alba neither adds much to what is already known, nor does he provide a theoretical framework with which to understand the nature and dynamics of regime change and stability to which the case of Spain so readily lends itself.

Despite its title, almost half the book is devoted to the short-lived Second Republic and the Civil War. Here Alba describes well the turbulent events and major personalities of those years. He focuses much-needed attention on the missed opportunities for enhancing the survival and legitimacy of the Republic, and on the ill-conceived actions by significant political actors which helped to bring about its demise. Alba's insights into the breakdown of the Republic are a useful corrective to alternative explanations which view the Civil War as the inevitable outcome of class, religious and regional antagonisms. Yet these insights can be found elsewhere in more detailed and analytical works, such as those by Ricardo de la Cierva and Manuel Ramírez Jiménez in Spanish, and by Juan Linz, Raymond Carr, Hugh Thomas, Stanley Payne and Edward Malefakis in English.

Far less voluminous and adequate are studies of the Franquist regime. And only now is research being done on the ongoing transition from authoritarianism to a competitive democracy. These are the two phenomena referred to in the book's title, and detailed description and analysis of each would have been most useful to the student of Spanish politics. But only a part of the book is devoted to these subjects, and the material that is presented is dealt with in relatively unsystematic fashion. For the Franco era, there is a discussion of the activities of opposition groups, the varying degrees of repression imposed by those in power, the efforts made by Franco to enter into the good graces of other Western countries (successful in the case of the United States, as Alba never fails to point out), and a few of the significant social and economic changes that occurred in the 1950s and 1960s. For the period following Franco's death in 1975, there is a chronological account of the astute measures taken by the monarch Juan Carlos and Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez to install democratic procedures and institutions without precipitating a violent reaction by the Francoist "bunker" or the army.

A major reason for the failings of the book, I strongly suspect, has to do with the nature of the question that Alba attempts to answer in his overview of Spanish political history. Alba argues that, despite their tumultuous history, "Spaniards are a people like any other—neither more cruel nor more irresponsible nor more ungovernable than the people of any other country" (p. vii). Yet the stereotype of Spain held by Spaniards and foreigners alike, he also notes, is of a society different from and out of step with other Western or Christian countries. Alba asks, is Spain really different? "Or is the difference just the product of peculiar social conditions?" (p. viii). This is perhaps too broad and amorphous a question and one which requires, at the very least, a systematic effort to compare Spain with other Western societies. Almost halfway through the book (p. 106), Alba poses a number of more specific questions which point to three areas in which Spain continues to stand out: "Why did the separation of church and state, which was the norm in France, the United States . . . continue to be grounds for constant aggression in Spain? Why did the federation of the different peoples within the Peninsula, which existed as such in Switzerland . . . have to be considered a crime against patriotism in Spain? Why did an agrarian reform which was much more moderate than those after World War I decreed by . . . Rumania, Finland, have to provoke rebellions and inspire protests?" These questions are explicitly comparative, more manageable and more fruitful than the question, "Is Spain different?" Unfortunately, Alba does not answer them. In sum, Alba's book represents only a modest contribution to our understanding of transitions in Spain.

GOLDIE SHABAD

Ohio State University

Juan Domingo Perón: A History. By Robert J. Alexander. (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1979. Pp. xiii + 177. $15.00.)

This is a short book on a very large subject. It reviews the life, times, and death of Juan Domingo Perón, who ruled Argentina from the mid-1940s until 1955, spent the ensuing 18 years in exile, and returned briefly to power in 1973 only to die later that year. As Alexander points out, Perón was a *fenómeno.* His career was characterized to a remarkable extent by paradoxes and contradictions. His first period in power, roughly the decade which ended in 1955, set in motion a series of social, economic, and political changes which are still actively influential in transforming Argentine national life.

Robert J. Alexander is an old Perón-watcher of established credentials. Indeed, his first book on this *fenómeno,* called *The Perón Era,* was published as long ago as 1951. As a writer, Alexander is an authoritative synthesizer. Curiously, this quality of his work underlies both the strengths and the weaknesses of *Juan Domingo Perón: A History.* The book is a short and very readable historical synthesis of Perón's ups and downs. The volume is highly recommended as a relatively painless initiation for young students and new Latin Americanists into the wilds of Argentine politics. Some aspects of the superficial synthesis can be received as merits of the book. For example, the entire pre-Perón history of Argentina is summed up in one brief introductory chapter. Although some historians might protest against this treatment of antecedent considerations, it does not bother me. Also, many of the public events during Perón's time in the international limelight are satisfactorily reported. After all, readers who might wish to pursue such matters in greater depth should have no difficulty in finding other, readily available sources on those questions.

Problems arise, however, when the same once-over-lightly treatment is accorded to new or less well-known materials, some of which might have provided intriguing explanatory insights into the *fenómeno* that was Perón. One of Alexander's more engaging, and probably valid, propositions is that Perón was a bundle of paradoxes and contradictions. This develops the reader's appetite for examination in some depth of this facet of the man, and, indeed, such exploration might well have yielded new and valuable understanding.

However, all of this is aborted, largely through Alexander's subjecting all of his data—new or old, public or private, well known or not, of casual interest or of potentially great significance—to the same extensive synthesizing rather than attempting any intensive probing. It may be in order to note a few illustrations of this problem.

One of the paradoxes of Perón is that, although he is remembered as a vitally political figure, there were long periods in his life when he was essentially non-political and appeared to adjust comfortably to that type of existence. Thus, in his early years he was an apparently apolitical military man, even playing a small but active part in the revolution of 1930, which seems to have left no political mark on him. Again, Perón's marital life is of immense political significance. He was married three times. His second wife, the fabulous María Eva Duarte ("Evita") de Perón, became a monumental political personality and a legend of her time. His third wife, Isobel Martínez de Perón, succeeded him in the presidency upon his death to become the first—and, thus far, the only—woman to be the chief of state of any American nation. Little is known of Perón's first marriage, but Alexander has learned something about it. He finds it to have been happy and entirely non-political, but his superficial account of that episode leaves the reader wondering what new doors might have been unlocked if that clue had been pursued with probity.

Nevertheless, *Juan Domingo Perón: A History* is a useful book, and may even become a basic tool for the induction of a new generation of students into the world of Argentine and Latin-American politics. Among other things, the volume documents the tragedy of *personalismo,* the Argentine conviction that "every 'ism' is a somebody-ism" incapable of functioning without its somebody, in person, at the helm. Argentina probably needed, but was unable to achieve, *peronismo* without Perón. Alexander tells us that this happened, but stops short of seeking the reason why.

GEORGE I. BLANKSTEN

Northwestern University

Nationality Group Survival in Multi-Ethnic States: Shifting Support Patterns in the Soviet Baltic Region. Edited by Edward Allworth. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977. Pp. xiv + 299. $23.95.)

Under what circumstances and by what methods can a small nationality or ethnic group assert itself against an imposed assimilation process in a big authoritarian state? This is the question that, judging by the introductory chapter of Edward Allworth, reflects the primary concern of this symposium. The targets of the study are three tiny Baltic nations: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which in 1940 were annexed by the Soviet Union in agreement with Nazi Germany—an annexation that has not been recognized so far as a part of the USSR by the U.S. and most of the major West European states. Another question raised by the symposium relates to the speculation about what is likely to happen to the USSR if the present assimilation devices should fail to work. Next to the introductory chapter providing the conceptual framework and scope of the volume, there are seven additional chapters and a documentary appendix dealing mainly with selected aspects of the confrontation between the Baltic nations and the Soviet Russian establishment.

The most comprehensive and enlightening article among them is that of Tõnu Parming on "Roots of Nationality Differences." While looking at some historical factors explaining the strengths and weaknesses in Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian national cohesiveness, Parming explores also the impact of modernization on the confrontation of the central authorities in Moscow with the eponimous population of the Baltic republics. He indicates that even though at the initial stage of the Soviet occupation, a rapid economic transformation, as well as mass deportations by Stalin, had the tendency to weaken the resistance against russification (namely, by a large influx of Russian immigrants), in more recent years modernization processes have strengthened the backbone of national self-assertion by providing a renewal of the Baltic elite that, on the whole, proved to be immune to assimilation.

Other essays with some more circumscribed topics dealing, for example, with Baltic historiography, economic and cultural development, the composition and nature of political leadership, seem to substantiate and supplement Parming's findings (see pp. 93, 104–06, 141, 144).

While the symposium is valuable in providing insights into the various aspects of national renewal among the Baltic peoples and into the consequences arising from them, we do encounter some gaps and fragmentary approaches within the range of topics that, according to its conceptual framework, should have been covered. For instance, no reference is made to the nature and extent of diverting the Baltic cadres from their native land to the other parts of the USSR, although the impact of this practice upon national unrest is mentioned (p. 21).

Also, while frequent references are made to the Balts' cultural orientation and identification with Western Europe, particularly with the Scandinavian countries, nothing is said about the traditions of civil liberties and democratic values in the pre-Soviet political experience of the Baltic states. No attention is given to the correlation between the concern for human rights and the concern for national rights.

This omission is puzzling, the more so if we consider that in many instances the national resistance in the Baltic republics and other Soviet republics has been compared and correlated within this work. Besides, the contemporary dissident movement in the USSR has provided many evidences of campaigns, literature, and correspondence in which the efforts toward national self-assertion and the concern for basic human rights were intertwined. Even if the authors of the symposium had possibly considered human rights activities as ineffective evaluation of these efforts, some attention to these issues would have added another important dimension to the studies involved.

As it is, the image of the Baltic states that have been considered (even by some not overfriendly Eastern Europeans) as approximations of political maturity, tolerance and accountability, here emerges unduly distorted. The Baltic nations' defense of their national rights has been given the appearance of an extreme ethnocentrism which, in my judgment, they do not deserve. This impression is accentuated by the two last chapters of the symposium, "Resources of the Ethnically Disenfranchised" by E. M. Lederhendler and "Social Distance among Ethnic Groups" by J. A. Kazlas. The first describes an environment in which the Jewish minority has to work to ascertain its rights, whereas the second deals with the attitudes of the Balts to the members of the other nationalities in the USSR concerning intermarriages, friendships, professional associations, etc. While valuable and informative within their specialized topics, both articles convey a feeling of aloofness and reservation which the Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians manifest to outsiders. These marginal aspects of preferential feelings are not balanced in the work as a whole by other evidences of political behavior.

An analytical concluding chapter might have corrected some obvious notions and omissions, but it is not there. In its present form, the book may serve its purpose as an anthology of selected readings, but it does not provide a realistic account of the topic within the scope intended.

IHOR KAMENETSKY

Central Michigan University

Egypt's Uncertain Revolution Under Nasser and Sadat. By Raymond William Baker. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978. Pp. x + 290. $16.00.)

The merit of this book lies in the lucidness of its writing and the relative comprehensiveness of its coverage of Egyptian political history since 1952. Both serve to make it digestible and a ready source of information to the general reader. What the book has to offer to either the student of comparative politics or the specialist on Egyptian affairs is entirely another matter. The author identifies himself as a "comparativist" but then goes on to say that *he* is not going to "ensnare Egypt in yet another formal and ahistorical taxonomy" (p. viii). This unintentionally revealing confession of ignorance of dynamic theories of comparative politics (e.g., S. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*) is compounded by an incomprehensible effort presumably to present his comparativist credentials. On pages 11–13 are given what are said to be six theoretical propositions underlying the study—concepts like "situational analysis," "meaning-analysis," "market-solution," etc. The interrelationship of these concepts is not indicated, and a sentence such as, "The situational analysis of purposive social action taking place within a society so understood is of necessity a study of social ideas as well," is not very illuminating. But it really doesn't matter, because the propositions do not appear again, even in the conclusion.

But Raymond Baker also eschews an orientalist approach because the volume concerns itself with "recent history." "Orientalism" is, of course, a buzz word in Middle Eastern scholarship, but in its best sense it shows the strength of both sensitivity to historical analysis and nuance of language. Consider, for example, Baker's use of Cromer (the arch-colonialist) as a person who defined Egyptian culture in terms of its "coarseness," "cruelty," and the "lack of harmony" of its music. Egyptians are then said to have undergone "cultural amnesia" at the presumed inspiration of Cromer's remarks. This point of view shows a profound ignorance of Egyptian poetry, religion and music from the 1920s onwards.

Thus far, the book has been described in its positive aspects as comprehensive and suitable for the general reader, but even in this respect there is a major caveat, e.g., the volume has a "stretched" character—it was at first a doctoral dissertation on the Nasser period and was extended to the Sadat period for purposes of publication (192 of its 246 pages deal with the Nasser period). This perhaps explains at least one misleading anomaly. On the first page of chapter 1 (p. 17) an accurate reference is made to the Free Officers and Nasser's Egypt. On p. 246 the next-to-last sentence of the book reads in part: "the role of the Free Officers thus far. . . ." The officer (*zabet*) was indeed the premier figure of Nasser's Egypt. In Sadat's Egypt, however, it is the *civilian* engineer (*muhandis*) who is dominant, not the military officer.

Further evidence of the strained effort to cover the 1952–1977 period is the fact that while the first part, "Ruling Egypt" is chronologically up-to-date, the second part, "Transforming Egypt," is not. The latter portion deals only with the Nasser period in terms of industry, agricultural cooperatives, and rural health care. In addition, this latter section is not only out of date, but also relies more upon the scholarship of O'Brien, Hansen, Waterbury, and too uncritically upon that of Mayfield, than upon original research.

In short, while somewhat adequate for the non-specialist, Baker's book falls short of scholarly originality. The conclusions of the truly original scholars of Egypt (Harik, Dekmejian, Binder, Moore, etc.) are not even acknowledged, not to say challenged, reformulated or supported.

LOUIS J. CANTORI

University of Maryland, Baltimore County

Huadong: The Story of a Chinese People's Commune. By Gordon Bennett, with Ken Kieke and Ken Yoffy. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1978. Pp. ix + 197. $15.00, cloth; $6.95, paper.)

Gordon Bennett et al. seek to make tangible to the non-specialist the reality of rural life in China. It is the story, as nearly as it can be gleaned from travelers' reports, interviews, and documents, of a single people's commune. This volume is part of a larger "outreach" effort by the Asia Society's China Council.

Huadong is crisply organized, having chapters on: the importance of communes, government and politics, the economy, society, culture, and "the 1980s and beyond." Two appendices are provided: one is an outline of Huadong's history, relating local happenings to provincial and national events. The other appendix lists activities according to which commune administrative level is responsible. The volume is sprinkled with good photographs. Because of its clear organization, readable prose, and comprehensive character, this book is appropriate for lay persons, high school pupils, or beginning college students.

Huadong is at its best in providing a sense of variation within the commune (pp. 55, 88, and 108), in addressing the dilemmas of income policy (pp. 96–99), in giving a sympathetic discussion of the impediments to women's equality (pp. 128–37), and in providing an account of the cultural diet of residents (pp. 149–52). Also, the authors describe the mélange of continuity and change evident at Huadong (pp. 30–32), as well as assessing the progress and obstacles in agricultural modernization (pp. 79–82). Political scientists will find the discussion of Huadong's model status interesting (pp. 32–39).

As with most case studies, the reader must determine how far the case is "representative." While the authors make a genuine effort to address this question (pp. 22–26), analysis suggests that Huadong is more deviant than is at first apparent. While the composition of the statistic is unclear, the commune's average family income was said to be "above" $350 U.S. by 1973 (p. 108). With an average household size of five persons (p. 120), the average per capita income presumably was about $70 U.S., or approximately 130 yuan, depending on the exchange rate used. The *1977* national average per capita income (derived from collectives) was 65 yuan (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: People's Republic of China*, 2 July 1979, p. L/14). Second, the data provided in Table 4.1 (p. 138) indicate that a significantly greater percentage of Huadong's population was enrolled in middle school in 1973 than was the case nationally at that time. These facts reflect Huadong's urban proximity, abundant water resources, and the impact of the Overseas Chinese. Huadong, then, is representative of large, coastal, suburban, delta communes, not the more numerous communes in less favored circumstances.

When one assesses the book's explicit premises, recent events raise fundamental questions. One premise is that China's developmental strategy has been "successful" and that one can meaningfully discuss the "Chinese model" (pp. 4, 13). China's present leaders are now reevaluating the whole range of policies we associate with the Maoist developmental model. One's assessment of "success" is a function of one's values. Three decades of Chinese politics have demonstrated that leaders and citizens alike disagree about the values to be pursued. Finally, there has been a recent wave of Chinese media interest in the "Yugoslavian model."

The second premise is that "the collective principle is secure" in China (p. 164). From this confidence flow statements about the likely shape of future policy. "Nor are voices heard today supporting revival of 'responsibility systems' or other policies that would expand the private sector" (p. 164). Increased emphasis on individual responsibility and material incentives is a conspicuous aspect of present Chinese policy.

DAVID M. LAMPTON

Ohio State University

Cuba in the World. Edited by Cole Blasier and Carmelo Mesa-Lago. (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979. Pp. vii + 343. $21.95, cloth; $5.95, paper.)

This is the outcome of a conference on "The Role of Cuba in World Affairs" held in November 1976. Some of the papers were previously published in *Cuban Studies*, and although they have been revised, the Cuban intervention in Ethiopia is only tangentially discussed. The book is organized in two sections: one on politics and the other on economics. As in most books of this type, the articles are uneven in quality. In general, Section 2 is more balanced, and its components have a higher quality than those in the section on politics, especially the contribution by Archibald R. M. Ritter, entitled "The Transferability of Cuba's Revolutionary Development Models." Ritter identifies two models in Cuban revolutionary experience: the basic dynamic model and the emerging socio-economic model of the 1970s. Although space constraints prevent a thorough discussion of the models' applicability to present developing countries, and Ritter's conclusions are rather cautious, this is a suggestive piece of work deserving close attention.

No introduction or epilogue has been written by the editors for the collection. The initial article by Edward M. Gonzalez, "Institutionalization, Political Elites and Foreign Policies," seems to substitute for the missing introduction.

The first thing that strikes the reader is that in an article with such a title there is no discussion of the Minister of Foreign Relations, the party's foreign department, or any other formal center where foreign policy decisions are made. Does this omission imply that policies are settled in the same informal way as before institutionalization? Gonzalez, who seems not to be aware of other, similar work previously published, deals with three elite groups, also called tendencies: the revolutionary-political headed by Fidel; the military, by his brother

Raul; and the pragmatic-economic under the leadership of Carlos Rafael Rodriguez. It is not clear how and where these three groups transact their different tendencies. On Tables 1.1 and 1.4, the Cuban leadership is identified as the members of the Council of State plus three members of the Secretariat. Clearly this is not the place where such transactions occur. The fact that Gonzalez does not try to identify which members of that heterogeneous body belong to each elite group confirms our deduction. But then, where?

The delineation of elite groups is always a thorny question. But the one offered by Gonzalez seems to be particularly vulnerable, especially concerning the pragmatic-economic elite, headed by Rodriguez. "Our Mikoyan," as he is called inside revolutionary circles, was mayor of Cienfuegos in 1933, a militant member of the Communist party since the 1930s, and a member of its Political Bureau since the 1940s, as well as Minister without Portfolio under Batista, 1944. And after 1959, Rodriguez has repeatedly written that during the stage of transition to socialism, politics have top priority over economics. Gonzalez, who overlooks this long and deep commitment to Stalinism, characterizes his group as "the driving force in seeking a new opening with the United States" (p. 19). Why, then, was Rodriqguez appointed by the V Plenum of the party, December, 1977, to take charge of foreign relations, both at party and state levels, precisely when the military intervention in Ethiopia was going full steam ahead? Present Cuban foreign policy is explained by Gonzalez as the outcome of a coalition between the revolutionary-political (Fidel) and the military (Raul) tendencies. The relationship between the brothers is one of the most difficult problems for any one interested in Cuban revolutionary politics. But we know that, at least in the laws and regulations enacted by the government and the party, starting with the First Congress, the role of Raul in the party military organization and the armed forces itself, has been substantially diminished, while Fidel has strengthened his personal control. Why, according to Gonzalez, is the coalition thriving when Fidel is encroaching upon the only domestic supportive resource enjoyed by his brother for two decades? By the way, if the book achieves a second edition, it will be advisable to check Table 1.1, "The Cuban Leadership and Its Major Responsibilities: January, 1976." I am not aware of any resolution by the First Congress extending the life of the Party Commission on Security and Armed Forces, founded in October, 1965.

The contributions by Cole Blasier and Jorge I. Dominguez maintain the high level of scholarship that is usual in these two authors. Although some of the contributions in the section on politics are rather weak, the quality of the rest—plus the fact that, as far as I know, there is no other similar book in the market—make this paperback edition (the only one available to me) an attractive bargain.

ANDRES SUAREZ

University of Florida, Gainesville

The National Movement in Scotland. By Jack Brand. (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978. Pp. ix + 330. $23.75.)

Scottish nationalism, always a popular topic for scholars, has attracted a growing number of academic studies in the last few years. *The National Movement in Scotland* adds to this number another description of twentieth-century nationalism and suggests some explanations for the recent rise in its political strength. The author, a Scotsman by birth and by occupation, has written a collection of essays focusing on the period from the end of the First World War up until the recent past.

The primary focus of the book is historical. In addition to chapters on the political background and the Scottish economy, the book includes essays on the beginnings of the modern movement, on the two nationalist parties that preceded the Scottish National party, and on the history of the latter party. Other chapters discuss the possible historical roles of literary nationalism, the folk song movement, the teaching of Scottish history, the Church of Scotland, the Scottish regiments in the British army, football and the Scottish press in the rise of the SNP. In many of these respects, therefore, this book is very similar to H. J. Hanham's *Scottish Nationalism* (Harvard, 1969).

Jack Brand argues that Britain's "sad economic performance," its imperial decline, and the erosion of the power of the traditional ruling class all are factors in explaining why the Scots turned away from the old institutions, but the explanation as to why they turned to nationalism must lie within Scotland itself. A separate identity has been consistently maintained by the Scots ever since the Union in 1707 and this identity has been supported by the separate church, the separate law, and the separate schools. Nationalism, however, began to have serious political effect only in the late 1960s. Brand argues that a series of events in the twentieth century have caused large numbers of Scottish voters to be persuaded that their primary political identification is with

Scotland rather than with their social class.

This persuasion had less to do with the literary nationalists of the interwar years or the conscious introduction of Scottish history in the schools since 1945 than it did with the folk song movement and the steady support of elements within the Church of Scotland for a political responsibility within Scotland. The folk music used by the SNP is not traditional; the party is not based upon a romanticized view of rural history. Rather the music is manipulated to establish a modern identity. The Church of Scotland has consistently held, over a 30-year period, the view that a good deal of political power should devolve upon Scotland. The view grows out of its general concern for the economic and social state of Scottish society.

Football, the press and even the church, however, have tended to follow rather than to lead the Scottish people in nationalism. According to Brand, perhaps the single most direct factor in the rise of political nationalism was organization. The early party organization was weak, but a great deal of attention was given to this problem after 1960 and this attention is reflected in the increase of the SNP vote from 0.8 percent of the total of 1959 to 30.4 percent in October, 1974.

Of course, since the book was published, the SNP has suffered a resounding defeat at the polls. This is hardly the first time that Scottish nationalism has left scholars in the lurch. The book was published in 1978 and presumably written at least a year before that, so it is not surprising if it fails to take into account the sudden drop in SNP support reported by the polls in the winter and spring of 1979. Nor for that matter should the poor showing at the May election necessarily be taken as indicating the end of the party.

Nevertheless, the book does reveal a relative paucity of data and analysis on the most recent period of Scottish nationalism. The chapter devoted to the present organization of the SNP, for example, lists the number of branches by constituency for 1966. Surely, more recent data are available. Electioneering as such is omitted altogether and that is precisely what the national movement in Scotland has been about during the last decade. Finally, Scottish survey data have become much more available in the last five years. Very little use was made of these. This is all the more surprising since Brand is director of the Strathclyde Area Survey in Glasgow and obviously knows about them.

But it is the author who chooses his topic, not the reviewer. Jack Brand has chosen to write an interesting and thoughtful analysis of why the nationalist movement in Scotland grew the way that it did. It is a contribution to the literature of the field.

CHARLES LEWIS TAYLOR

Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University

The Communist States in the Era of Detente, 1971–1977. Edited by Adam Bromke and Derry Novak. (Oakville, Ontario: Mosaic Press, 1979. Pp. viii + 306. $7.95, paper.)

This volume offers a comprehensive survey of the world's communist states in the 1970s, with special attention to the impact of East-West detente upon both their internal development and their role within the socialist bloc. The individual contributions were originally prepared for a conference at McMaster University in October, 1975, and with a few exceptions, have been updated to approximately mid-1977. Separate chapters deal with the Soviet Union (Vernon V. Aspaturian), China (Klaus K. Pringsheim), the Sino-Soviet Conflict (John W. Strong), Poland (Vincent C. Chrypinski), Czechoslovakia (H. Gordon Skilling), East Germany (John Starrels), Hungary (Charles Gati), Rumania (Gabriel Fischer), Bulgaria (James F. Brown), Yugoslavia (John C. Campbell), Albania (Peter F. Prifti), Mongolia, North Korea, and Vietnam (Paul F. Langer), and Cuba (C. Ian Lumsden). In addition, there are chapters on bloc economic developments (Zbigniew M. Fallenbuchl) and East-West commercial relations (John P. Hardt).

Structured around the common question of the impact of detente, which is viewed as a "multi-layered concept," the individual chapters are remarkably uniform in their systematic coverage of both internal events and bloc relations. This is not to say, of course, that the substantive impact of detente itself is anywhere near so consistent within the heterogeneous bloc structure. Indeed, if there is a single constant permeating all of the diverse essays, it is that the entire question of detente in its "julti-layered" complexity has been comprehended and applied by the states involved in a multitude of subtle and sometimes overt variations informed and given substance as much by their own particular domestic or international needs as by the imperatives of the larger East-West context. In part stemming from the ambiguity of detente itself—and the chapters on the Soviet Union and Sino-Soviet relations do a particularly good job of elucidating the conflicting pro-linkage and compartmentalized biases held by American and Soviet commentators—and in part flowing from the sheer diversity of the socialist nations and their own social, economic, and political needs, the notion of detente has at once contributed either to a broadening of or to further limitations on the tactical flexibility of certain secondary bloc nations. (The former is well illustrated by Rumania, which has capitalized on East-West detente to extend earlier initiatives for broader contacts beyond the bloc, while the latter pattern is evident in Czechoslovakia, where a deep concern for maintaining the conservative status quo has animated both domestic leaders and their Soviet mentors to resist the seductive potential of detente).

One of the most significant observations concerning the impact of Soviet-American detente—and one insufficiently explored in the context of East European and Sino-American ties—is the subtle interpenetration of Soviet and American domestic politics. A product both of the mobilization of a domestic American audience concerned with events within the USSR (and among these must be numbered important potential trade ties in industry and agriculture as well as questions of emigration) and of the growing perception on both sides that each can influence the internal political life of the other, this interpenetration has become an important corollary to the larger issue of detente. Left unexplored, however, is the intriguing question of the limits of such interpenetration and the substantial potential for a "backlash" reaction not only on the part of the USSR, where the rejection of much-desired trade agreements in light of American pressures on emigration policy has already suggested that important substantive parameters exist, but also on the part of the United States, where recent Soviet statements concerning Senate amendments to the SALT II Treaty have been ill received.

Virtually all of the essays also take note of an across-the-board tightening of party controls and a reassertion of the "leading role" of the party, implicitly attributing these measures in large measure to the leadership's concern that detente would seductively loosen the bonds of domestic controls and implant the contagion of Western thought. Certainly this argument is true at least in part; almost universally top party leaders have stressed that detente does not signal any erosion of the competition of ideologies. But most of the essays overlook, or at least de-emphasize, the purely domestic sources of tightened party controls: growing frustration with lagging economic performance and distrust of decentralizing reforms; profound uneasiness about the party's role in a modern society, or, at the least, obvious internal discord between the modernizing and traditional elements of the party; and, in a number of cases, concern with a fast-approaching succession crisis and perhaps even the passage of an entire aging generation of leaders.

It is also regrettable that so little attention has been given to recent developments in ideology within the Soviet Union and the East European communist states. Clearly the emergence of "developed socialism" and the stress placed on the "scientific and technological revolution" have had as great a force in shaping recent events as has detente itself; moreover, the two are closely intertwined, especially to the extent that detente is viewed as providing access to Western technology.

These reservations aside—and also setting aside the poor quality of the photo-reproduction process used by Mosaic—the Bromke and Novak study still makes a positive contribution to the literature, serving as an even-handed and comprehensive updating of the field for both professional and student audiences.

DONALD R. KELLEY

Mississippi State University

Referendums: A Comparative Study of Practice and Theory. Edited by David Butler and Austin Ranney. (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Policy Research, 1978. Pp. 250. $4.75, paper.)

As recently as the 1960s only a handful of American political scientists showed interest in the theory and practice of voting behavior on ballot propositions. The extensive research on voting behavior for candidates was in contrast. In the last decade significant studies focusing on ballot measures began to appear along with panels at professional meetings. But most dealt with individual states. The volume of published comparative state studies remains small.

For these reasons this volume is especially welcome. It is an ambitious and generally successful attempt to bring together the experience of other nations with a modest attempt to compare their experiences. Separate chapters are provided by foreign scholars on nationwide referendums in Switzerland, Australia, France, Scandinavia, Ireland and the United Kingdom. Eugene Lee submits a chapter on California as an example of an American state and Austin Ranney summarizes statewide American usage.

Of great value are the data presented in a large composite table and in specific chapters of all of the propositions submitted in upwards of 80 countries. The dates and percentage outcomes on each proposition are included. The data are in simple figures with no elaborate models or correlations—as such, the materials are easily understood by the general reader. Having these statistics available in a single work provides a base for follow-up studies.

There are several relatively minor problems, some of which are to be expected in a "first" work of this kind. Although each chapter is a contribution, one finds the unevenness which characterizes all anthologies. The space allotted each nation varies from 10 pages for the United Kingdom (by Butler) and 17 pages on Ireland (by Manning), 35 for California, 30 for France, and 27 for Switzerland. Perhaps this is due to the extent of use. Yet if use were the only criterion Switzerland might receive more treatment when one considers that Jean-Francois Aubert accords 14 of his 27 pages to a statistical table of the 297 propositions submitted.

One problem, recognized by the authors, rests in the inherently different types of referendums—direct and indirect initiatives, and constitutional and statutory referendums submitted either by the government or on petition from the electorate. At times these important distinctions are not as clear as they should be. Future research is needed contrasting the different kinds of propositions initiated by the electorate and those which are referred by governments. The volume is not necessarily faulted for this omission, but the political scientist must be wary of lumping all types of propositions together when seeking generalizations.

Although the authors all address some common features, apparently they were free to treat their subjects as they wished. For example, Wright (France) does a particularly good job in handling the motives and purposes of holding referendums. The co-authors in their "summing-up" chapter paraphrase Wright's purposes of referendums as "legitimizing, consolidating, galvanizing, status-enhancing, opportunities-dividing, authority-enlarging, and so on" (p. 223).

The chapters on France and Switzerland are especially useful in pointing out the referendum process as primarily a tool and option of government in France, but very much less so in Switzerland. In Switzerland the people initiate many proposals and this is a useful mechanism for change by the electorate. But even here the government may take the lead in asking the voters to vote "no." Aubert appears enthusiastic about the referendum way of political life and concludes, "Switzerland provided the model on which American and other evangelists for direct democracy based their cases in the 1890s and 1900s. And the Swiss can claim that the original continues to work better than the imitators" (p. 66). (Californians take note!)

Several authors largely ignore the role of parties in referendum elections. Whether this is due to lack of party participation is not clear. Aitkin in his chapter on Australia and Nilson on Scandinavia do the best job on the role of parties. Nilson also devotes the most attention to voting behavior other than turnout.

Considering space limitations, Lee and Ranney cover the picture in American states reasonably well. The table (p. 72) on types of direct legislation, draw from the *Book of the States 1976–77*, contains the latters' error which omits the availability of both the indirect and direct statutory initiative in Washington—the only state using both. Although admittedly difficult to compile, an index would save the reader much time.

Chapter 2, labeled "Theory," is basically an evaluation of the arguments for and against referendums, but there is some conceptualization. There remains room for refined theory of direct legislation.

The well-written but all too brief six-page concluding chapter reviews the most salient findings of the book, summarizes the concerns about the uses of the process and speculates as to whether the device is progressive or conservative. The co-editors conclude "that the referendum is a politically neutral device that generally produces outcomes favored by the current state of public opinion" (p. 224). They end up neither true believers nor opponents. As they say "referendums are here to stay; and they are amost certain to increase in number and importance in the years ahead."

HUGH A. BONE

University of Washington

The Textile Wrangle: Conflict in Japanese-American Relations, 1969–1971. By I. M. Destler, Huaruhiro Fukui, and Hideo Sato. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1979. Pp. 394. $19.50.)

The Textile Wrangle is an extraordinarily detailed and sophisticated account of the Nixon administration's efforts to limit rising imports of Japanese textiles. The episode is intriguing primarily because it produced diplomatic friction and intra-governmental turmoil far out of proportion to its aggregate economic significance. Relying on over 150 confidential interviews and a thorough review of contemporaneous accounts, the authors have produced a definitive record of American and Japanese policy making on the issue. The work is strongest in showing how domestic economic and political structures may confound the diplomacy of interdependence. It is weakest in specifying the case's theoretical significance.

The dispute has its origins in candidate Richard Nixon's 1968 promise to limit textile imports. That position helped him carry Georgia and the Carolinas but was to sour U.S.-Japanese relations for the next three years. The declining Japanese textile industry steadfastly refused to limit exports of wool and synthetic fibers. With well-placed allies in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, it managed from 1969 to 1971 to stymie efforts by Prime Minister Eisaku Sato and the Foreign Ministry to establish "voluntary" export quotas. Likewise, U.S. textile makers rejected all compromises and vetoed efforts to soften the U.S. negotiating position. The result was a stalemate unbroken by nearly continuous negotiations through a variety of official and semi-official channels.

The deadlock lasted until Nixon issued an ultimatum to the Japanese in 1971. Agree to "voluntary" export restraints using a U.S. formula, he said privately, or on October 15 the U.S. will impose import controls under the Trading with the Enemy Act. This blunt tactic worked partly because the context of Japanese policy making had been altered radically by Nixon's surprise visit to China (July 15, 1971) and by the U.S. imposition of a 10 percent surcharge on all imports (August 15). These so-called Nixon shocks impelled Japan's political leadership to repair its tattered alliance with the U.S. At the same time, they stripped Japan's textile industry of its domestic support. The authors argue that these shocks, combined with the decisive threat to Japanese exports, produced the textile agreement.

Destler, Fukui, and Sato conclude that domestic textile interests were dominant in the issue's initiation and resolution, and in the two governments' basic goals (see especially p. 319). But their focus is on intra-governmental processes and their foreign policy implications. Following Allison, Halperin, and Destler's own work on bureaucratic politics, the authors conclude that each government "was deeply divided and these divisions are important in explaining what really mattered about the textile wrangle: not the content of the final agreement, but why the issue lasted so long, generated so much bitterness, and spilled over so much into other U.S.-Japan issues en route to an agreement" (p. 322). That conclusion hinges on the unstated assumption that unifed governments would have favored an amicable alliance. In fact, as the authors show, broad strategic concerns were not an effective counterweight to domestic producer interests.

Two other conclusions seem overdrawn. The authors state that the Nixon administration's "obsession with textiles contributed to the neglect of broader trade and monetary issues which helped bring on the [1971] international economic crisis" (p. 318). They present no evidence for this extraordinary claim, either in terms of senior policy makers' agendas or in terms of the structural dilemmas and policy choices that led to the New Economic Policy. The authors also stress systematic differences between staff and line negotiators. The latter, it is said, failed because they "proved unable to move far enough from the demands of domestic interests to bridge the international gap" (p 325). That conclusion illuminates several features of the negotiations (especially the Commerce Department's role) but it cannot explain the position of line officials in the foreign ministries and embassies. They typically sought accommodation and failed for the same reason staff officials did: they could not deliver essential domestic constituencies. Moreover, the staff/line distinction must emphasize Maurice Stans' line position (as Secretary of Commerce) as the decisive source of his negotiating failures. However, the authors themselves make a more complex and interesting argument in their chronicle of the negotiations. Although Stans did rely on his department for expert advice, his rigid opposition to textile imports was also a personal policy preference, reinforced by his biased perceptions of the Japanese and his specific presidential mandate.

This discussion suggests why bureaucratic accounts of U.S. policy are so problematic. True, even senior officials are confined by their organization roles. But, equally important, they serve at the pleasure of the president an depend on his political support. In addition, they generally enter the bureaucracy laterally, bringing with them elaborated cognitive maps, cognate skills, and interpersonal styles. These not only help explain their policy preferences but also their involvement in specific issues. On the U.S. side (much more than on the Japanese side), the players were determined less by their organizational titles than by their expertise, their willingness to take initiatives, and their designation by the president.

One virtue of this case study is that its rich detail permits such arguments about U.S. and Japanese foreign economic policy making. Unfortunately, it offers few guidelines about the more general meaning of the case or the limits of permissible generalization. Still, *The Textile Wrangle* is a shrewd, solid contribution to the literature on bureaucratic politics and the diplomacy of interdependence. As such, it is a useful adjunct to the authors' more analytic and systematic study, written with Priscilla Clapp, *Managing an Alliance: The Politics of U.S.-Japanese Relations* (Brookings, 1976).

CHARLES LIPSON

University of Chicago

The Communists of Poland: An Historical Outline. By Jan B. de Weydenthal. (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1979. Pp. xviii + 217. $7.95, paper.)

Among the communist parties throughout the world, the Polish Communist party has had, in all probability, the most stormy history since its birth in December 1918. Although its beginning did not differ greatly from that of other parties in Europe, right from the start the Polish party had to labor under severe handicaps which meant that it never really got off the ground and, at least during the interwar period, it had little if any impact on Polish domestic politics. The traditional hatred of Russia further reinforced by a powerful outburst of nationalist feeling so characteristic of new states, the Polish-Soviet War of 1920 which nearly resulted in a Communist seizure of the country, and the well-publicized persecution of the peasants and suppression of religion in the USSR were more than sufficient to destroy whatever appeal the party might have had in the aftermath of the Bolshevik revolution and the growth of radicalism at the end of World War I.

The result of all this was to some extent predictable and it amounted to splits and divisions within the party, again not unlike those experienced by the Soviet and other parties. However, in contrast to the other parties where the various schisms were permitted by Moscow to run their course, for reasons that remain largely obscure even today, Stalin, at that time the undisputed leader of international communist movement, ordered around 1938 a de facto destruction of the Polish party by killing nearly its entire leadership which was summoned to Moscow and executed. To the best of my knowledge this was the sole case of a forced destruction and dissolution of a party in the annals of international communism. In the spring of 1956, as part of the destalinization campaign, the dissolution was formally condemned as erroneous and the executed leaders were duly rehabilitated.

In light of the above, it is hardly surprising that the rebuilding of the party ordered by Stalin during World War II proceeded rather slowly and that both the leadership and the rank and file of the resurrected party could not and would not easily forget the fate of its predecessor. There is little doubt that to a considerable degree this also colored the behavior of the party during the postwar takeover period and during the Stalinist transformation of the late 1940s and early 1950s. While the Polish party, if only for reasons of geography, could not follow the path taken by its Yugoslav counterpart, it tended to be a reluctant imitator of the Soviet model, especially with regard to agricultural collectivization, anti-Church policy, and the application of mass terror. One may hypothesize that the refusal to emulate the Soviet example was also influenced by the rather striking persistence of the traditional political culture that managed to survive despite concerted efforts to eradicate it. Hence, again it is not surprising that with the proclamation of destalinization in 1956, the Polish party was among the first to jettison the Stalinist yoke and to adopt, by and large, its own brand of communism.

One can make the case that the Polish brand of communism survived largely unchanged for the next 20 years or so. It is a peculiar model which in many ways is quite unique in combining some fairly orthodox Marxist-Leninist principles with some rather striking deviations from the accepted norms. Anyone who followed the recent visit of Pope John Paul II to his homeland, who traveled around the Polish countryside or who talked to various dissident groups, cannot help feeling that Communist Poland differs greatly from other countries in the so-called Soviet bloc.

Is all this the achievement of the ruling Communist party? Clearly not, yet at least some of it was owing to the character of the party which for the past two decades barely managed to govern the country and which has never succeeded in acquiring even a modicum of legitimacy. In some ways the present party resembles that of the interwar period, if only because of the lack of cohesion and the presence of rampant factionalism. This, in turn, made the already weak party nearly impotent with the result that among the East European countries Poland has today the reputation of being the most mismanaged society.

How long can this go on is anybody's guess. Although until now the Soviet Union, still the hegemonic power in the region, has pursued the policy of benign neglect vis-à-vis Poland, any further deterioration in Polish domestic situation may necessitate an intervention on the part of Moscow, especially if the present Soviet leadership is succeeded by one less tolerant of the Polish deviation.

This, in a capsule, is the content of this well-written monograph. Altogether de Weydenthal must be congratulated for producing a fine study which was published as part of a series on the "Histories of Ruling Communist Parties" under the aegis of the Hoover Institution. It is clearly a major improvement over Dziewanowski's *Communist Party of Poland,* and as such it was badly needed, if only to analyze the part played by the Polish Communists in the process of the country's political development since the end of World War II.

To conclude, the study makes a valuable contribution to our knowledge of Polish communism. If I am forced to come up with a criticism of the book, it is perhaps the author's failure to engage in some comparative analysis with regard to the other East European parties. This omission, however, is likely to be remedied through the appearance of other national party studies and, it is to be hoped, of a synthetic volume comparing the experiences of the various parties. My appetite has been whetted and I look forward to an early publication of these studies.

ANDRZEJ KORBONSKI

University of California, Los Angeles

West African States: Failure and Promise: A Study in Comparative Politics. Edited by John Dunn. (New York and London: Cambridge University Press, 1978. Pp. viii + 259. $27.50, cloth; $7.95, paper.)

This is a collection of informative, analytical essays about seven West African states. It is introduced and concluded by John Dunn, who poses an important problem. What, he asks, are the right proportions of political voluntarism and social determinism in political analysis?

This formulation may slight another important analytical idea, namely, political determinism. Like most dependency theorists, Dunn believes that social and political conditions in Africa are mainly determined by that region's subordinate position in the world economy. Although he does not overlook the political basis of dominant-class formation, he takes an exceedingly narrow view of the modern African state. He describes it, disdainfully, as an "apparatus" that serves mainly to affectuate domination and exploitation. In his opinion, all West African states are "authoritarian structures . . . by simple inheritance" (p. 212), and mere "patronage systems" that mediate relations between their societies and the world economy.

Dunn's one-sided interpretation of the African state conveys the basic thrust of this book. Plainly stated, these authors cannot cope with the unconventional idea of a dominant class in Africa that might be autonomous, politically creative, and disposed to favor liberal and limited government.

The chapters on Ghana and Nigeria, in particular, do not comprehend the liberal political implications of bourgeois class formation. Richard Rathbone's abstract but judgmental examination of Ghana neglects the long struggle for liberty in that country. Similarly, Gavin Williams and Terisa Turner belittle the restoration of constitutional government in Nigeria and predict its failure. Their lack of appreciation for this bourgeois-led but genuinely popular cause may be related to their disparaging portrayal of Nigerian civil servants (the bulk of the intelligentsia) as "comprador administrators." It is, to be sure, important to analyze the effects of administrative practices that promote the interests of foreign firms at the expense of industrial development. It is equally important to beware of conventional stereotypes about public life in Africa and to recognize the capabilities of the emergent bourgeoisie. The need for this cautionary comment is indicated by the editor's bemused conclusion (p. 212) that Nigeria is virtually "ungovernable"!

The problem of bourgeois class formation—a virtual specter that haunts radical dependency theory—is evident in Bonnie Campbell's economically deterministic class analysis of politics in the Ivory Coast. She infers the class character of the Ivorian state from the interests that appear to be served by public policies. This method yields a penetrating analysis of foreign domination. But the nature of the dominant class, awkwardly described as a "planter-politician group," is too narrowly conceived for its evolution to be realistically appreciated.

Christopher Allen's class analysis of Sierra Leone also falters as a result of his inadequate (conventional dependency) conception of the bourgeoisie. It does, however, include an astute discussion of authoritarianism.

Two chapters in this book are not particularly beholden to dependency theory. Donal B.

Cruise O'Brien contributes a slight but entertaining essay on Senegal that describes, with biting irony, the constitutional allocation of rival ideological positions—liberal, socialist, and communist—to different political parties by that country's schoolmasterish president. Christopher Clapham shows that the "immigrant" elite of Liberia, numbering well under one percent of the population, has managed to forestall potential opposition to its prolonged rule by means of patronage and the propagation of a legitimating belief in its "common African identity" with the vast majority. He suggests, very astutely, that the transformation of this "essentially ethnic-based" oligarchy into "an essentially class-based bourgeoisie" would safeguard the state "in its present form for years to come" (p. 130). His conclusion to the effect that no such transformation has occurred may be too cautious, but it is cogent.

In a distinguished contribution to the literature on Guinea, R. W. Johnson depicts a repressive and tyrannical regime that justifies its actions and policies on the basis of a long-lasting and evidently sincere commitment to socialist ideals. Paradoxically, the regime's survival depends upon revenues that are produced for it by transnational mining corporations and, until recently at least, concessional food aid from the United States. Furthermore, a serious attempt to enforce official economic policies, including the prohibition of private trading and farming, would produce economic collapse.

Despite his candid exposition of these conditions, Johnson's appraisal of the regime is ambivalent: "Guinea is in many respects a nightmarishish place, a police state, but in no other African country can one gain such a strong sense of wholly African self-determination and self-emancipation" (p. 59). If this appraisal is as sound as it is even-handed, it would be necessary to acknowledge the existence of an antagonism between individual dignity and national dignity. It would also be necessary to concede that tyrannical forms of socialism might be consistent with the cause of human freedom. The implications of both propositions are fearful, but not irresistible.

This book will not satisfy those who believe that the form of political organization itself may be a significant determinant of social relations. Undoubtedly, it *will* help to establish dependency theory as the leading paradigm in African studies for the immediate future. Like functionalism and pluralism before it, dependency theory will have its day and pass.

RICHARD L. SKLAR

University of California, Los Angeles

Citizens and Politics: Mass Political Behavior in India. By Samuel J. Eldersveld and Bashiruddin Ahmed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978. Pp. xii + 351. $26.00.)

This is an ambitious book: an extremely carefully done study of mass political socialization and behavior in India. It is also a welcome contribution to the comparative literature on the subject. The approach used and the study's findings have relevance far beyond its geographical confines as the authors indicate by use of roughly comparable data from other countries including the United States.

Citizens and Politics explores the politicization of the Indian masses and the extent of their socialization to democratic values and political involvement. It is based on two national surveys of citizen attitudes and political participation conducted at the time of the 1967 and 1971 elections. As Eldersveld and Ahmed note, the basic question they wish to answer is, "To what extent has the Indian public accepted the norms of political democracy and participated meaningfully in the democratic system?" (p. ix). And further, "What is the character of Indian political development at the mass level?" (p. ix).

The authors develop a model of Indian political development for the interpretation of their data and from which they try to make system-level generalizations about the meaning of individual-level behavior for the polity. This model is based on the assumption that mass socialization and participation was a direct consequence of decisions made by national elites in the early years of India's independence. "They created the critical institutions for democratic decision making in a moment of high purpose and then educated, persuaded, and mobilized the masses into involvement with these modern structures of government" (p. 8). Thus it was the (democratic) values of this elite and its ability to communicate those values to the masses that accounts for their initial support for and participation in the new political system of India. The model does not view the socioeconomic environment as either the initial, primary, nor indispensable prerequisite of Indian political development. The authors feel it was the manner in which citizens were exposed to the new political institutions and their mobilization by political parties that created a political awareness and support for the system.

Using their survey data, the authors then measure the extent to which Indians appear to have accepted democratic norms. They focus on knowledge about politics, levels of political interest, the extent of socialization, the extent of political activity, belief in elections and competitive party systems, support for the ideological goals of the regime and identification with the system (including party identification). They are further interested in the penetration of the "involvement ethic" outside of the urban, westernized sectors of society. Along all of these dimensions, the study dhows India to be a developed polity. As the authors note, "Indian citizens match most Western societies in level of political sophistication and involvement" (p. 287). They state, rather obviously, that this developed polity partakes of both elements of "tradition" and "modernity": a point that hardly bears repeating. Nonetheless, as the authors note, such political development in the short time since 1947 in a nation with so diverse a social environment as India, is nothing less than remarkable.

It is impossible here to address in any detail the work's more specific findings. They are voluminous and linked causally with variables of the political environment and social stratification. Indeed, the sheer volume of data and hypotheses generated makes reading this volume difficult.

There a couple of points missing from the analysis. First, although the authors are probably correct in their assumption that national elite decisions were initially responsible for creating mobilization and support, precisely *how* this worked cannot be explained without reference to the "socio-economic environment" which they reject. It was precisely the ability of the national (Congress) elite to use the social and economic ties of vertical integration that led to their success.

Second, the continuing mobilization, identification and support of the public also owes a great deal to processes of social and economic development and elite attempts to change/manipulate existing institutions. Mobilization and support in particular may be determined by the impact of such change. Increasingly, studies have established this very important link between socioeconomic and political development. To be sure, such analyses often play down the importance of political variables which are stressed here. However, one would hope for a meshing of both for a deeper understanding of all facets of development.

Third, the authors tend toward a dichotomy between "tradition" and "modernity," although one is not sure this is their purpose. However, statements such as: "indeed one is inclined to conclude that 'traditional' and 'modern' influences are merged in the backgrounds and attitudes of many Indians in such a way that is difficult to determine which is of greatest importance" (p. 252), tend to detract from their main thrust.

Having said all that, one must still conclude that this is a very important and worthwhile book for students of politics regardless of their specialties. With very careful methodology and analysis, it transcends the often narrow bounds of a particular geographical focus and addresses issues of importance to the discipline as a whole.

ARUNA NAYYAR MICHIE

Kansas State University

Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State, and Local Capital in Brazil. By Peter Evans. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979. Pp. xviii + 362. $20.00, cloth; $5.95, paper.)

But for the fact that most of them are condemned to write in Portuguese, the contributions of Brazilian social scientists to the analysis of neo-imperialism would be known to a wider audience. Many of them have reacted with bemusement and irritation at the versions of dependency theory propagated by their colleagues to the North.

In this fine book, Peter Evans sets the record straight and extends it. He starts with a model similar to that elaborated by Fernando Henrique Cardoso under the name of "associated dependent development." The economic growth of Brazil and its authoritarian politics are a function of intricate bargains among domestic private industry, multinationals and entrepreneurial state managers. The fundamental commitment of the partners in this coalition is neither political liberty nor social equity. For the multinationals it is profit at a rate greater than they can obtain in their home markets. For Brazilian elite groups, it is the localization of profit and control over the terms of investment: what sectors capital goes into, how much of it is repatriated, and so on. To date, the outcome of this tripartite maneuvering has been aggregate growth and the exclusion of the majority of Brazilians from its benefits.

Evans adds to this perspective by the clarity of his presentation and by his sensitivity to the organizational politics of the *menage à trois.* The first part of the study, especially chapter 1, stands as a model of how to criticize without caricature. The final chapter is an attempt to see how far the Brazilian experience may be diagnostic of other semipheral countries. It is here that Evans, like many of his Brazilian associates, becomes uncomfortable with the world-system framework, which loses its dynamism and lapses into taxonomy unless fleshed out with evidence about how international markets actually condition the political economy of specific nations.

The intervening chapters are the most innovative. They are devoted to case studies of the operations of the tripartite alliance. Evans is engaged in a translation process of a different order from elucidating earlier theories of imperialism and dependency; he is concerned with the translation of world market forces into strategic decisions by multiple interests who, by themselves, cannot dominate the dialectics of accumulation. Presumably hard data tend to be opaque about this sort of coalitional behavior. On the other hand, institutional accounts are so susceptible to bias by way of selection that it is often difficult to recognize what such an approach can*not* prove.

Evans constructs a persuasive argument by lodging both types of materials squarely within his model, and by scrutinizing some apparently deviant cases. A particularly compelling instance of this last device is Evans' chronicle of the rise and demise of an agency which the government established to facilitate the access of the Brazilian poor to basic medicines. The difficulty was not the lack of genuine social concern within the bureaucracy. The noble experiment failed because, by the logic of the tripartite alliance, it was neither economically nor politically profitable.

In addition to its substantive interest, the book is stylishly written and extremely well structured. In a rather desperate attempt to find something wrong, I came across a few typos and the opening sentence of chapter 1 ("Imperialism worried John Hobson") reminiscent of the *New Yorker*'s Letters We Never Finished Reading. But these are slim pickings.

If I have any serious criticisms of this book, they have to do with problems which Evans cannot fairly be held responsible for, since he cannot cover everything. One, which Evans clearly appreciates, is the absence of a discussion of the role of the banking sector, both domestic and transnational. Another is what appears to be his acceptance of the received wisdom that Brazilian elites are for the most part nonideological and, after a fashion, pragmatic. I suspect that their righteous technocracy is fully ideological. Finally, the three elite groups which Evans focuses on are not the only key actors in Brazil, even if they are currently the most powerful. The church, the politicians and the labor leadership have potential importance as the triple alliance grinds down.

PETER MCDONOUGH

University of Michigan

Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict in Industrial Societies: The French and British Experience, 1945–1975. By Gary P. Freeman. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979. Pp. xiv + 362. $20.00.)

A persistent problem in comparative studies is whether the analyst should emphasize broad, system-level comparisons of political phenomena or more specific data that assumes the reader's familiarity with the context of the data. In *Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict in Industrial Societies*, Gary P. Freeman chooses the first option. His synthesis and comparison of how two West European political systems have handled problems of immigrant labor and resultant domestic racial conflict places much familiar information in perspective and calls attention to some neglected aspects of the situation. Since it raises more questions than it answers, however, the study ultimately leaves the reader desiring more precise comparisons on several questions.

The book touches on most of the major topics of immigration politics—the colonial legacy, the economic context of immigration, the character of the migration itself, the evolution of public policy toward immigration since World War II, elite and mass responses to immigration, and the administration of government programs designed to aid immigrants. Since most of the research is based on secondary sources, Freeman's account of British immigration politics, while essentially correct, does not provide many new insights. His analysis of French immigration politics, however, is the best available source in English. An explicit comparative political analysis of immigration is valuable in a field of study which has been dominated by single-country studies, often emphasizing demography or economics rather than politics. Freeman is especially good on the interrelationship between economic and political aspects of immigration. His analysis of the problems that this connection has presented for left-wing parties and movements is one of the strongest parts of the book.

At several points the author notes that his comments are general and speculative, and he specifically states that description and hypothesis-generation rather than explanation and hypothesis-testing are his goals. Nevertheless, more rigor in the analysis would have been welcome. The relative importance of the variables affecting immigration policy is unclear. At times Freeman argues that political factors were more influential than economic and social ones, but by the last chapter this interpretation has been reversed. He rightly specifies the role of citizenship as a key issue of immigration politics, but then never clearly delineates French policy on the granting of citizenship or the proportion of immigrants in France who are citizens versus the proportion who are foreigners. The interpretation of the influence of political culture on policy is also highly questionable. Supposedly immigration evoked "deeper, more fundamental strains in the political system" in Britain because the British were less confident about their political identity in the post-colonial world than the French, who were "essentially secure" about their state and culture (pp. 306–07). Which political system changed its regime in 1958 and was on the verge of another collapse in 1968? A more plausible interpretation is that the British political system is regularly more open to mass-induced conflicts over policy than is the French. The dominance of the executive in the Fifth Republic, together with a persistent majority coalition in the National Assembly, did not allow the immigration issue to emerge in France as early as it did in Britain, despite similar levels of public animosity toward immigrants.

Despite these problems, the book largely fulfills one of its major purposes, explicating mass-elite interaction on the immigration issue in the two countries. It is less successful, however, in accomplishing another major purpose, which is to show how government decision making on immigration relates to general problems of public policy in a time of "crisis" for Western democratic capitalism. It is also unclear as to why the study ends in 1975, especially as glancing references indicate that Freeman recognizes immigration to be a continuing policy problem in Western Europe (see Ronald E. Krane, ed., *International Labor Migration in Europe* [New York: Praeger Special Studies, 1979]).

Yet one cannot be too critical of a work in which the author is so aware of its limitations himself. This book can be recommended to anyone who wants an overview of an important contemporary problem in Western Europe. But it is far from being the last word on the subject.

DONLEY T. STUDLAR

Centre College

Government Secrecy in Democracies. Edited by Itzhak Galnoor. (New York: Harper and Row, 1977. Pp. xviii + 317. $5.95, paper.)

In his introduction to this collection of essays, Carl Friedrich considers secrecy and disclosure to be "conditioned by time, place, and distinct attributes of different political systems" (p. xiv). Trying to reach beyond the particulars of time and place, editor Itzhak Galnoor seeks broadly comparative answers to the question, "What do we know about government secrecy in democracies?"

Six of the essays approach secrecy from a variety of theoretical perspectives. One of them, by Galnoor, provides a framework for a series of studies of government secrecy in ten Western democracies. In it Galnoor tries to develop the idea of an "information marketplace" in which secrecy adds to the value of information as a commodity. Access to data is thus a defining characteristic of market power.

Galnoor examines the political process at the nexus of the public and the private, where selected outsiders, the established lobbies, get privileged access, while less established groups, not recognized as respectable or responsible enough to share government confidences, do not. Mutual interest, not legal tradition or bureaucratic practice, accounts for disclosure. Government, as both consumer and supplier, requires information for policy making, feedback, and political support, and swaps it with well-positioned outsiders. "Regardless of legal provisions," argues Galnoor, "official information is divulged to selected confidants in return for some equivalent and on the basis of mutual interests" (p. 87). Among the most important of those groups are the mass media, which profit by using information to sell advertising: "They also have a vested interest in secrecy because it raises the value of published information."

Law alone cannot account for differences from place to place: "in countries where laws prescribe secrecy, officials find ways to share information, whereas in the few countries where laws prescribe publicity, officials find ways to withhold information" (p. 292). Galnoor includes France, West Germany, Great Britain, and Israel among the former; the U.S., Sweden, Norway, and Denmark among the latter.

No country illustrates better than Israel the limits of legal tradition, political culture, and bureaucratic practice as explanations for secrecy. According to Galnoor, Israeli culture was formed in the crucible of politics underground and the habits of secrecy that it crystallized endure. As a constutional heritage of the British Mandate era, Israel formally adheres to doctrines of cabinet responsibility and crown privilege. Norms of bureaucratic anonymity are reinforced by the politicians' practice of *protekzia,* preferential treatment for and shared confidences with personal associates only. Yet the Israeli press is rife with disclosures, the grapevine laden with rumors.

Using exchange theory, Galnoor accounts for these disclosures in terms of political bargaining. "The cabinet in Israel," he writes, "always leaked mainly because top officials needed to maintain the support of established groups. But in recent years leakage has become the rule rather than an exception" (p. 195). The increased disclosure is a function of the segmentation of Israeli society and the need to broker accommodations among the "established segments" which form part of the communications net. The guiding principles of information flow within these channels are "*selectivity* (of the information passed to each segment) and *exclusion* (keeping this information from outsiders and other segments)" (p. 190).

Galnoor asked contributors of other country studies to focus on the political and administrative dimensions of secrecy as well as the legal ones. Not all did so, but those who did produced the most informative essays. Taken together, these essays flesh out Galnoor's framework.

In Great Britain, Colin Seymour-Ure finds pressures for secrecy in law and custom and counter-pressures for disclosure in the need of Government and Opposition alike for favorable publicity. This need breaches party lines: cabinet rivals want to make their divergent stands known to backbenchers and constituents, and use lobby correspondents to get their message across. In England as in America, most leaks spring from the bridge of the ship of state.

It was once the case that there was more information in the letters to the editor than in the news columns. Seymour-Ure tells of correspondence in *The Times* in 1950 concerning the power of the Crown to refuse a Prime Minister's request to dissolve Parliament and call new elections. Anyone in the right circles could ascertain that the author of an anonymous letter setting out an authoritative view was none other than a former private secretary to the King. "Where do you find the British Constitution?" asked Seymour-Ure. "In *The Times*. Among the letters. Anonymous ones" (p. 175). As the elite has broadened and the government has had to explain itself to a wider public, such items increasingly find their way into the news columns. The tight little island of anonymous *Times* letter writers is no more.

In the United States, Francis Rourke finds two competing traditions: an older one of openness, sustained by Congress, the press, and the courts, and another of postwar origin, promoted by the president and the national security establishment. But Rourke adds some important qualifications to this point. Secrecy, he says, "gives some reporters an opportunity to publish information obtained from inside sources that would be of little value if freely available to the public at large" (p. 123). Then, too, "while the corporate attitude of Congress toward secrecy is one of hostility, individual Congressmen stand to gain a great deal from having privileged access to official information" (p. 125). By the same token, he might have added that Congress as a whole stands to gain a great deal from *avoiding* access to information, and the responsibility it often entails. In sum, as Rourke says, secrecy is a "practice that serves a wealth of interests both inside and outside of government, besides that of executive officials themselves" (p. 126).

In his concluding chapter, Galnoor posits a relationship between internal party discipline and retention of information in closed circles. Yet Sweden, Norway, and Denmark may not fit the pattern. In his analysis of those three countries, Eric Einhorn concludes, "Scandinavian politics is coalition politics. Coalition in representation, administrative structure, and policy interests affect the balance between the need for confidentiality and the right to public information" (p. 264). Having to build parliamentary majorities, often on an issue-by-issue basis, leads to involvement of interest groups and the sharing of information, sometimes through the press. The United States is another case in point. Legislative coalition-building may outweigh internal party discipline in accounting for secrecy or openness.

If, in the end, Galnoor and his colleagues have not reached as far beyond the particulars of time and place as they may have sought to do, their reach has far exceeded that of others before them. It has resulted in a stimulating and fruitful book.

LEON V. SIGAL

Wesleyan University

The Dominican Crisis: The 1965 Constitutionalist Revolt and American Intervention. By Piero Gleijeses. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978. Pp. xiii + 460. $22.50.)

I think it is only fair that I state my own potential interest or bias at the outset. One of the central themes of this new book on the U.S. intervention in the Dominican revolution of 1965 is that this event has been widely misunderstood, thanks to the inadequacy (or worse) of almost all the previous literature about it. The major target of this charge is the allegedly shallow and biased interpretations of "the liberals," among which Piero Gleijeses includes (along with the writings of many others) my own work.

Hence my interest. The reader will no doubt want to take this into account in weighing my overall judgment that this is quite a bad book. The major problems are the following:

1. Despite the emphasis on the inadequacy of the previous literature—and all the more unseemly because of it—the book is unoriginal and derivative in all the main lines of its analysis, usually with insufficient acknowlegment, or none, of the previous work on which it is based. Moreover, the main sources of Gleijeses' interpretations are the very "liberals" (a term nearly always placed in quotes) whose analysis he finds so wanting.

2. On the other hand, where Gleijeses departs from previous analyses he is shallow, unsubtle, and unpersuasive. His assessment is biased by a romanticized view of "mass uprisings" and "people's movements" in general, and of the Castroite left in particular, as well as by a disposition to assert the worst possible interpretation of all aspects of U.S. foreign policy.

3. Most of what *is* now in the book—the detailed discussion of internal Dominican politics—is flawed by an excessive attention to the personalities, in-fighting, and factionalism, especially of various unimportant micro-parties on the far left. In general, his discussion is *so* detailed as to be frequently irrelevant, wearying, and meaningless to all but a tiny handful of specialists.

4. Moreover, his analysis of internal Dominican politics, despite the encyclopedic detail, in the end does not inspire confidence in its overall accuracy and acuity, because of the lack of analytical sophistication and the general tone of sentimentalism and heavy-handed, misplaced irony that pervades the entire book. Far too often, the author's judgments are not based on marshaled evidence and reasoned argumentation, but are mere assertions.

Unfortunately, space limitations prevent full documentation of these serious charges, but let me at least touch on the main points. Consider the main lines of the author's treatment of U.S. policy from the Trujillo era to the present. According to Gleijeses, the United States unreservedly supported the Trujillo regime for 30 years, but when Trujillo's grip on the Dominican Republic began to fade in the late 1950s, it began working for his overthrow, not because of a new devotion to democracy and human rights per se but because of fear of a new Castro in the Caribbean: "It was Castro, not Trujillo, who was Washington's primary target" (p. 34). After the assassination of Trujillo, the United States continued its "quest for anti-Communist stability" (p. 35), still "obsessed by the spectre of another Cuba" (p. 75).

This analysis, of course, is entirely unexceptionable, precisely because it is so familiar to students of American foreign policy in Latin America in general and in the Dominican Republic in particular as to be practically coin of the realm. In an uncited phrase, Gleijeses sums up the policy premise underlying Washington's post-Trujillo maneuvering as follows: "Batista is to Castro as Trujillo is to X." Now that *is* a most felicitious analysis and a pungent way of putting it. Indeed, I liked that precise phrase so much that not only did I invent it myself, but also repeated it in at least three publications going back to 1964.

Elsewhere, though, the analysis is less persuasive. U.S. policy during the post-Trujillo period culminated in an apparent success with the 1962 election of Juan Bosch, who appeared to be in the moderate, democratic but anticommunist tradition of Romulo Betancourt of Venezuela, José Figueres of Costa Rica, and others. But subsequently, according to Gleijeses, the U.S. Abandoned Bosch because he was insufficiently pro-American and anti-communist and, at the least, the U.S. did not oppose his overthrow nine months later. Gleijeses sums this period up: "The months elapsed since Bosch's fall had not fully erased the vision that some held of a 'certain' America: the America that in the name of the Alliance for Progress had allegedly helped defeat the Trujillos and later had allegedly supported the Bosch government. It was an America that had never existed" (p. 221). This passage (which is not even consistent with his own earlier detailed assessment) reveals Gleijeses' general lack of subtlety and tendency to see everything in black and white. The United States *did* do a great deal to defeat the Trujillos: Kennedy's actions against Trujillo and Trujilloism were in fact *partially* motivated by idealism and disgust at Dominican repression, although *raison d'etat* was more important; the U.S. *did* support the Bosch government quite substantially, though not unconditionally; and the U.S. *did* oppose the coup against Bosch, though not in an all-out manner.

Gleijeses' analysis of the U.S. intervention in 1965 follows—one might even say, "parrots"—the standard "liberal" analyses that he nonetheless continually deplores. His central argument is that the U.S. intervened because of an overestimation of the power of the radical left in the pro-Bosch constitutionalist uprising of April, 1965, and in the context of a general policy premise: " 'Never a second Cuba' was the imperative rule of U.S. policy in the Western Hemisphere, a rule accepted by one and all, a basic tenet of the Kennedy legacy, one that nobody challenged" (p. 293). Please note a certain similarity to a work published eight years earlier: "If there were any doubts in Washington as to whether the evidence justified the momentous decision to intervene, they were buried by an overwhelming predisposition throughout the U.S. Government . . . to move hard and fast to ensure that the Cuban scenario would not again be repeated in the hemisphere. . . . The [Cuban] missile crisis . . . had firmly implanted the determination that come what may there would be No Second Cuba" (*Intervention and Negotiation*, Harper, 1970, pp. 31–32).

Most of the author's analysis of the intervention focuses on the first five days of the crisis, and he devotes only one chapter to the next 18 months of the U.S. occupation, the elections of 1966, and the subsequent political history of the Dominican Republic. His general view is that the U.S. installed a compliant, conservative provisional government after the intervention, through this government structured the political process so that the "inevitable consequence" would be the electoral victory of Balaguer over Bosch in the 1966 elections, which though "technically free" were in reality "a painful farce" (p. 299). The intervention and its aftermath was thus a great success, for Balaguer remained in office until 1978, serving the "imperial interests" of the United States. The 1978 elections, in which Balaguer lost to a reformist democrat who then was able to take office only because of firm U.S. warnings to the Dominican military not to overthrow him, does not indicate any change in U.S. imperialism, since "a less corrupt and more reform-minded government" only legitimizes "the pro-American stability" imposed on the Dominican Republic by the United States and Balaguer, and "diffuses the danger" of a "popular explosion" (p. 302). In other words, the United States, all-controlling, favors rightist, repressive regimes, but on the other hand, finds democratic, reformist ones may be even better in terms of its "imperial" interests. Since the author doesn't devote much space to this overall "argument," I won't devote much to rebutting it; I can only state my view that it is oversimplified, unsophisticated, and unsubtle, consistent with the general analytical level of the book as a whole.

A final point on this section. In a number of places Gleijeses castigates "the liberals" who allegedly opposed the intervention solely because they didn't believe there was a real communist threat: "In no way do they state that the United States should have refrained from intervening had the alternative been a second Cuba" (p. 437). Flatly false. This "liberal," among others, in several published works has argued precisely that the real issue in the Dominican intervention was not the exact degree of Communist involvement but the absence of a convincing moral or "national interest" justification for the U.S. intervention *even if* the revolution had "gone communist."

Thus, concerning the half of this book that deals with U.S. foreign policy, what Gleijeses has to say that is accurate is entirely derivative and old hat, whereas what he has to say that is original is unsophisticated and unpersuasive. Whatever strengths—indeed, justification for publication—to be found in the book derive from its treatment of internal Dominican politics. It is true that the author devotes far more attention to this topic than any previous scholar and that he has compendious data on the subject. Nonetheless, as previously indicated, there are very substantial problems here, too.

First, there is excessive detail and focus on bit players of no political or historical significance. The problem is particularly evident in the author's treatment of the various leftist groups whose actions, doctrines, and personalities are catalogued in mind-boggling, wearisome detail. This clearly derives from the author's sympathy with the left, particularly the Castroite groups, though he is sorely disappointed at their alleged ineffectiveness during the revolution and their failure to achieve power. There is a great deal of romanticized revolutionary sentiment underlying the discussion: the "glorious idealism" of the Castroites seeking "national liberation," the brave martyrs" of the far left, "beautiful names, glorious examples for Dominican youth" (p. 300), and the like. Similarly, there is much loose talk about the revolution representing the will of "the masses" and "the people," when in fact only a very small proporiton of the Dominican populace joined the uprising, though undeniably many more sympathized with it. Evidently the vast majority who were inactive, indifferent or opposed, presumably including most of the 55 percent of the electorate who voted for Balaguer, are not part of "the people."

Secondly, there is much inconsistency on the significance of the left during the revolution, an inconsistency that has its roots in Gleijeses' simultaneous desire to castigate U.S. policy as harshly as possible while romanticizing the Castroite left. On the one hand, the author notes that the far left were armed, had "cadres trained in armed struggle and leaders capable of directing it, men schooled in the art of guerrila warfare at the best 'universities' in Cuba and China" (p. 212), and led many of the attacks on the military and police stations during the revolution. On the other hand, in discussing the U.S. intervention, he minimizes the significance of the left within the overall constitutionalist movement, the more to emphasize his contempt for U.S. "paranoia."

His treatment of the position of the Dominican Social Christian party (PRSC) during the revolution is also instructive in this regard. Gleijeses quotes a statement of the PRSC during the revolution which both condemned the U.S. intervention but also warned against "the underhanded, powerful, and well-organized efforts of the far-leftists to control and capitalize on a revolutionary movement of deep democratic roots." The author has nothing but contempt for such an analysis, which he characterizes as "a theme dear to American propaganda . . . the price they had to pay to demonstrate to the American invader their . . . 'impartiality' " (p. 388). In this manner, with little real supporting argument, Gleijeses airily dismisses the possibility that the PRSC assessment was either (1) true or (2) genuinely, if erroneously, believed to be true. This is not uncharacteristic: throughout the book the author waves aside Dominican leaders or parties that had their doubts about the revolution as "lackeys" of their American "masters" (e.g., p. 411 and passim).

Of perhaps lesser significance but still distasteful is the author's tendency toward machismo. He is much taken with those he considers to be physically "brave" and extraordinarily judgmental about those he considers to have been "cowardly" during the revolution: the brave ones were those who rushed into the streets to join "the people," especially if they were unlucky (lucky?) enough to have "died confronting . . . the American aggressor and its Dominican lackeys" (p. 246), the cowardly those who chose not to fight or took refuge in embassies. Such harsh and/or sentimentalist judgments would be of questionable relevance and taste under any circumstances; they are all the more unseemly coming from someone who, because he was not in the country during the revolution, was not in a very good position to make God-like judgments about the on-the-spot decisions of people under extraordinary stress.

Finally, Gleijeses is even more contemptuous and given to gratuitous sarcasm when dealing with the writings of earlier authors on Dominican politics than he is in his discussion of the literature on U.S. policy. For example, in his discussion of the quite minor point about which particular constitutionalist leaders were "in control" of the revolution at what exact moment, he denies that Caamano and Montes Arache were in control, "as Moreno pretends" (pp. 252, 401). *Pretends?* Jose Moreno, unlike Gleijeses, was not only in Santo Domingo during the revolution, but he was also living in the constitutionalist zone, actively worked in behalf of the constitutionalist movement, and later published his Ph.D. dissertation in sociology on the revolution, *Barrios in Arms* (Pittsburgh, 1970). The notion that Moreno, a scholar, a participant-observer, and a full sympathizer with the constitutionalist movement would deliberately mischaracterize the revolution (on a trivial point, no less) is simply absurd.

Unfortunately, there are many such instances of self-serving bad taste and misjudgment throughout the book. As a result of this sort of thing, as well as Gleijeses' lack of originality, obvious partisanship and frequently simplistic analysis, for all its new data, the book cannot be regarded as a major addition to our understanding of either the Dominican revolution or the American response to it.

JEROME SLATER

State University of New York, Buffalo

"Eurocommunism": Implications for East and West. By Roy Godson and Stephen Haseler. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979. Pp. ix + 144. $16.95, cloth; $6.95, paper.)

Eurocommunism by Roy Godson and Stephen Haseler is a fine introductory examination of communism in Southern Europe (Spain, Portugal, Italy, and France) and Great Britain. The book is based on data from a series of background papers written in late 1977 by a half dozen European scholars (Leonard Schapiro, Annie Kriegel, Giuseppe Are, François Bourricaud, Rui Machete, and Eusebio Mujal-Leon) who were commissioned by the authors, under the auspices of the Georgetown University International Labor Program and the National Strategy Information Center.

Eurocommunism is divided into three parts. The first section presents an assessment of the size, power, and influence of the five communist parties selected for the study. The authors evaluate the parties' electoral strength, membership, and position in the trade union movement. In this section, the authors rely heavily on the background papers and other secondary sources. Their presentation is well organized and well written, but they offer little factual information that cannot be found in the *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press) or other recent books in the field.

The book's second part considers the domestic policies of the communist parties. In particular, the authors are concerned with the extent to which the Western European CPs are a threat to the democratic order. They conclude that the communists "have moved nearer to the democratic consensus," but that they "still remain committed to revolutionary goals and (with the exception of the PCE) still basically take the Soviet Union as their model for development" (pp. 91–92).

The final section of the book focuses on the implications of the growth of Western European communism for the international balance between East and West. Despite the Western parties' efforts to detach themselves from Soviet domination, Godson and Haseler argue that the rise to power of communism in Western Europe would be a major setback for the West:

> While there have been some changes in ideology, alliance patterns in domestic politics, and possibly in the case of the Spanish party some rethinking of "democratic centralism," they do not lend to the conclusion that the parties have become parties "like others" in Europe, genuinely participating in and seeking to improve the democratic order. Moreover, given their ideological affinity and the continuing thrust of their foreign policy, they will remain a net advantage to the Soviet Union" (p. 124).

Eurocommunism possesses a number of strengths that recommend it to the general reader. First, it uses a comparative approach in a field in which the majority of books are case studies. The comparisons between communist and noncommunist parties are particularly well done. Second, the book is built on a sound, up-to-date factual base. Finally, it is well written, well organized, and quite accessible to undergraduates.

Unfortunately, the book may disappoint specialists in the field by its lack of breadth and depth. It contains little new factual material and limits itself to only the major communist parties in Southern Europe and the British CP. The book's most serious limitation for the specialist, however, is that it does not address some of the more interesting and more significant questions about Western European communism: Why are the communist parties of France and Italy large and powerful, while the British party is quite weak? Why is the Portuguese CP one of the most Stalinist parties in Europe, while the Spanish party is one of the more liberal? Why have some of the Western European CPs (the Italian, Spanish, and British) evolved toward "Eurocommunism," while others (such as the French) have changed more slowly and reluctantly, and others (the Portuguese) have seemingly not changed at all?

R. NEAL TANNAHILL

Houston, Texas

Innovation in Communist Systems. Edited by Andrew Gyorgy and James A. Kuhlman. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1978. Pp. viii + 224. $17.50.)

We live in an era of change. The immense explosions in science, economic technology, and general knowledge have altered the world in important ways and we have all adjusted to these changes in one way or another.

Political institutions often appear resistant to change, however. As a result, analyses of political change most often tend toward one of two polar extremes: they examine either those systems that seem to resist change in an attempt to preserve the status quo, or those engaged in more consulsive forms of revolutionary upheaval. The middle ground of careful but purposeful political innovation seems lost to most observers.

Andrew Gyorgy and James Kuhlman take a contrary position, and this work is a "first-cut" attempt to examine the problem of change and innovation in communist states. The book consists of 11 articles that grew out of a 1977 conference, and collectively they form an attempt to stake out a middle ground between the traditional antimonies of upheaval and continuity that dominated Soviet and East European studies for so long.

The articles are loosely grouped into three general sections. Part 1 ("Change and Innovative Areas in Political Systems") offers several perspectives on the problem of innovation by focusing on specific groups and pressures in the communist states themselves. The articles in this section deal with change in ethnic groups, in the scientific and technical establishment, and in economic interests, and then relate these changes to the process of innovation in the governmental sphere.

Part 2 ("The Diffusion of Innovation Across Systems") discusses more specific cases and attempts to come to grips with the elusive process of diffusion. The articles in this section focus primarily on innovation in the German and Yugoslav systems.

Part 3 ("The International Environment and Innovation") examines changes generated by the communist states' participation in a larger world order that is also changing rapidly. This section offers analyses that focus on the interrelationship of ideology, economics, and cross-national political processes and examines the linkage between local innovation and international activity.

The collection of articles is remarkable for the ambitiousness of the task the authors have set for themselves, and their willingness to grapple with problems of considerable conceptual difficulty in systems that do not readily lend themselves to this sort of research. The task of demonstrating their views was formidable, and Gyorgy and Kuhlman show great ingenuity in overcoming some of the obstacles in their path.

If there are flaws, they derive from the authors' reluctance to make explicit the difference between change originating in the various political systems themselves, and changes generated in other sectors of the polity. The introduction hints that there was some awareness of this problem at the conference and indicates that one participant—economist Joseph Berliner—took strong exception to the authors' reluctance to examine this difference more fully. Although Berliner's remarks are unfortunately represented only sketchily, the general thrust of his criticism is nonetheless persuasive. It could be argued that most innovation in communist systems has occurred in the *non*-political realm—primarily in economic, scientific, and social areas—and that political innovation in the socialist states has occurred largely in response to changes generated at these other levels. If this is the case, the articles in this collection have neglected a most important aspect of innovation: the ability of communist systems to *accommodate* change generated elsewhere. Most of the authors have instead focused on the process of innovation originating within the political system itself.

The authors have also magnified their conceptual problem somewhat by neglecting the considerable literature on this problem already generated by the study of similar phenomena in non-communist states. An examination of the articles on the diffusion of innovation, for example, does not indicate an awareness of such classic studies in the field by analysts like Jack Walker ("The Diffusion of Innovation Among the American States," *APSR* 63 [1969]: 880–99) and Virginia Gray ("Innovation in the States: A Diffusion Study," *APSR* 67 [1973]: 1174–85).

Nonetheless, the book is both interesting and provocative in spite of these shortcomings. While the title may be somewhat misleading (the book does not touch on the important Sino-Soviet relationship or innovation in any of the Asian communist states) it addresses an important problem that has been long neglected by students of communist politics.

ROY F. GROW

Carleton College

Res Publica: Studien zum Verfassungswesen. Edited by Peter Haungs. (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1977. Pp. 481. DM 90.)

Res Publica is a Festschrift in honor of Dolf Sternberger on the occasion of his seventieth birthday. As editor of *Die Wandlung* and *Die Gegenwart* in the 12 years following World War II and later as a regular contributor to the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Sternberger, a gifted essayist, established himself as one of West Germany's most influential publicists. A humanist whose pen flows with ease in the multiple domains of theology, philosophy, and literature, he is first and foremost a man of letters. But he is also a distinguished political scientist and is to be counted among the early postwar leaders responsible for the renaissance of political science as an academic discipline in the Federal Republic. His work as a political scientist—an appendix includes a selected bibliography of his manifold publications—is broadly concerned with the foundations of political legitimacy, the role of political parties and party systems in representative democracies, and the theory of the mixed constitution.

The 18 articles in this book deal mainly with these topics. Loosely described as constitutional studies (*Studien zum Verfassungswesen*), they are mostly analytical essays exploring some aspect of the modern state (*res publica*), often in the light of Sternberger's own thought. As with most Festschriften, the contributions vary significantly in length, quality, and subject matter, and contribute little that is new to our knowledge of politics. But they are thoughtful, occasionally provocative, and often critical of existing political structures, particularly those of West Germany and other Western democracies.

Several articles focus on party politics and particular political institutions: Juegen Domes examines the governmental crises that have occurred in West Germany since 1949 at both state and federal levels, concluding that while the electoral system and constructive vote of no confidence have brought stability and continuity to West Germany, they have impeded effective political change; Wilhelm Hennis argues that the Federal Republic has evolved from a state based on separation of powers into a technocratic "program state" resulting in the erosion of party democracy; Bernard Vogel takes note of the rising prominence of the *Bundesrat* in German politics and defends its federalistic role as a check on the *Bundestag* and governing coalition; Peter Haungs surveys the literature dealing with political parties in Western democracies and, on the basis of recent party developments in Germany, questions the prevailing view that the highly articulated mass membership party is in decline; Klaus Landfried and Rainer-Olaf Schultze shift the scene to North America where they examine, respectively, the American presidency and the impact of federalism upon the Canadian policy-making process.

Hella Mandt, Hans Maier, and Werner von Simson discuss the problem of freedom and order in their respective treatments of the idea of "fighting democracy" in German constitutionalism, the growing power and scope of the welfare state, and the relationship between politics and values. The idea of the mixed constitution is the subject of examination in Rupert Breitling's essay on the emergence of the idea of democracy in the eighteenth century; Ernst Vollroth and Rolf-Richard Grauhan's respective studies of Montesquieu and Machiavelli; Martin Gralher's interesting analysis of the concepts of moderation (*die Maessigung*) and the middle (*die Mitte*) as developed in classical political philosophy and constitutional theory together with their use as modern campaign slogans; Klaus von Beyme's discussion of the "trade union state"; and Erwin Faul's piece on the problem of legitimacy in the increasingly rationalized and achievement oriented societies of the West. Political legitimacy, also a concern of several articles in this book, is the immediate subject of Franz Nuscheler's study of the social, economic, and political institutions of precolonial black Africa. Finally, Hellmut Wollmann and Gerd-Michael Hellstern write a substantial article on the evaluation of public policy by social scientists. The article discusses the impact of this research and assesses the strengths and weaknesses of various techniques of investigation. American political scientists interested in public policy research might wish to consult the authors' extensive bibliography (about 300 citations).

On the whole, these essays—written mainly by Sternberger's former students and colleagues at Heidelberg University—bear the imprint of Sternberger's influence in two ways: They reflect his basic approach to the discipline of political science by emphasizing its empirical and normative character; they also express his basic conviction, among other things, that a pluralist society nurtured by appropriate constitutional structures and powered by political parties elected by majority rule is the touchstone of a living representative democracy.

DONALD P. KOMMERS

University of Notre Dame

Federalism: Failure and Success. A Comparative Study. By Ursula K. Hicks. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979. Pp. ix + 205. $19.50.)

This is a hard book to review. Among living scholars, Ursula K. Hicks is certainly one of the most knowledgeable and experienced students of government and finance in a variety of institutional and cultural settings. Long-time Oxford University lecturer on public finance, and prolific author of public finance studies in Britain and other Commonwealth countries (one of her early books [1961] being *Federalism and Economic Growth in Underdeveloped Countries*), she would seem to have the necessary credentials to write on the topic she has chosen this time around.

The difficulty is that Hicks sweeps across ten diverse federal systems in six chapters and 145 pages, basing her judgments largely on her own knowledge and experience. In the preface she notes that she has "personally visited all the countries (with the exception of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. . .)" and that everywhere she "naturally sought the assistance of local experts" (p. viii). Even so, and however extensive her own background, she pays little or no attention to the vast (and some of it very good) literature on federalism in those countries. Only in her analysis of Indian federalism do her notes and references suggest that she drew much from the works of others. What we have here, then, is a study which is much more personal than researched. It adds occasional insights, but it is not definitive.

Hicks' ten case studies are divided into different classes of federal systems: attempted federations that never materialized: South Africa, East Africa (Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania); short-lived federations that did not reach maturity: the Caribbean federation, Malaysia and Singapore; one case of "total failure": the Central African Federation; subcontinental federations: India and Pakistan; Nigerian federalism; and the successful federations of Australia and Switzerland. She picked those ten examples, apparently, because she had been there and because in her mind they constituted "fairly simple illustrations" of the points concerning failure and success she wished to establish, not because among them they give the reader a comprehensive or representative understanding of federal systems at work. Hicks thus dismisses the United States and Canada as too "well set federations" to concern her and the Federal Republic of Germany as too young to permit a "balanced and reliable judgment" to be made about it (pp. 14–15). The assumption is therefore that she can make "balanced and reliable" judgments about the ten she chose.

Rather than attempting to review Hicks' specific conclusions as to why the ten federations in her sample succeeded or failed, it is probably more useful to look at her generalizations, set forth in part in the first few pages of the book and in part in her concluding chapter, "Lessons of Experience: Failure and Success." It is her general thesis that "the path of federalism never runs smoothly. Sooner or later all will experience difficult corners or traverses." Some federations "succeed in rounding them safely while others fall over the precipice" (p. 171). Why? One can extract from her discussion what might be called her seven cardinal prerequisites for successful federations:

1. A "completely voluntary and spontaneous" establishment (p. 11).
2. A limited "amount of fission" at the outset (p. 13).
3. The presence of viable "initial endowments, physical and human" (p. 172).
4. The creation of three "appropriate institutions": "a sizeable freely elected Assembly representative of all the units"; an "elected Upper House or Senate of a fixed and limited number, with equal representation" of all the component units; and a "central [or general] government of quite a small number [of what she does not say], capable of taking decisions quickly. . ." (p. 7).
5. The development of constitutional means of dealing with unevenness in wealth or numbers among member units.
6. A degree of flexibility and the possibility of devolution as a means of preserving unity over time.
7. A workable financial arrangement among the component units.

Failure may come, her case studies show, from the violation of one or more of those principles in practice. Failure may also come, she recognizes, from the attitudes and actions of "other countries in a world of fierce national rivalry" (p. 172).

Ursula K. Hicks is basically an economist, so that it is not surprising that she pays a great deal of attention to the seventh principle, in other words, to the fiscal side of federalism in the ten countries. In her conclusions, she notes that the fiscal dimension adds "a new intensity" and strain to federations and constitutes an especially difficult obstacle which the component units must get around on their journey to success (pp. 185–86).

In sum, this book's greatest utility lies in its focus on success and failure. Though the sequential treatment of the ten nations largely belies the subtitle, "A Comparative Study," it will also be useful to those interested in federalism in one or more of the individual nations. The thumbnail sketch which Hicks supplies of the problems each nation has faced or is facing in working within the parameters of federalism may well supplement or point up data derived from other, more detailed and documented studies. Hicks writes in a highly personal, crisp style, and she assumes a good deal of knowledge on the part of the reader. As I have noted, there is little in the way of bibliography, and the index is not usefully designed.

RICHARD H. LEACH

Duke University

Leadership in the Soviet National Republics: A Quantitative Study of Recruitment Policy. By Grey Hodnett. (Oakville, Ontario: Mosaic Press, 1978. Pp. 410. $15.00, cloth; $7.50, paper.)

This book addresses a key issue: how can we explain in a rigorous way patterns of mobility to the top leadership posts in the government and the party hierarchies in the Soviet national republics? Drawing on a wealth of biographic and positional data, Grey Hodnett seeks to answer this question by examining how well a number of factors—such as the tension between central control and ethnic representation, task and bureaucratic specialization, age, class background, and prior career experience—explain the particular location of given political elite and elites in the aggregate in the 14 national republics (the RSFSR is excluded) and his/her ascent to that post over the period 1955–1972. After an exhaustive quantitative analysis, Hodnett concludes that career mobility reflects a complex interaction of factors, the most important of which seems to be task specialization (especially for state posts) and bureaucratic specialization (which is more relevant for the party posts).

The study begins by noting the complexity of the task and the formidable problems involved in developing indicators from a meager data base and a rather impressionistic body of literature. In response to these problems, the author decides deliberately to test a series of "expectations," rather than work from one central hypothesis. Thus, the study is organized according to different aspects of recruitment—such as turnover rates, movement into the first major job, the entire mobility process (up to 26 jobs!), the strategy which aspirants can follow in order to move in certain directions (which could be called job constraints), and the like—and the impact of the aforementioned variables, such as age, ethnicity, and specialization, on these various notions of political mobility. In addition, each chapter includes not just aggregate notions of mobility, but also mobility broken down by position, party versus state posts, and finally, variance within each of these hierarchies by individual position.

The findings reported in this study are indeed numerous. No one variable or even several variables emerge triumphant; the variance of paths to power is in fact striking. Among the most important (read interesting and/or clear-cut—results are the following. First, there do seem to be two different modes of mobility; for party officials, tenure, prior party experience, and career homogeneity seem to be more important than is the case for government leaders. Second, continuity rather than change seems to characterize recruitment patterns both within the 18-year period and over the career-span of the various national leaders—modernization, therefore (and its implication of certain changes in career patterns), often flunks the quantitative test. Third, ethnicity fails to emerge as a particularly potent factor. While party secretaries in charge of organization do tend to be disproportionately Russian, ethnic representation does not seem to follow any evident or particularly logical pattern. In fact, variations in ethnic representation over time do not even seem to respond to discernible shifts in central policy towards ethnic assimilation. Fourth, the variation across republics in terms of who rules and their antecedent positions is marked. Just as republics often seem to have their own modes of recruitment (and these are explained little by ethnic consciousness or proximity to Moscow), so members within the same bureaucracy—for example, the First Secretary versus the Organizational Secretary—seem to diverge in terms of tenure and background characteristics. Finally, the pronounced tendency of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers to be a First Secretary "in waiting" says a great deal about the high potential for conflict at the apex of the various republics.

The strengths of this study are as numerous as its findings. In particular, the complex (indeed, ambitious) design is a welcome relief from previous recruitment studies, which tended to correlate a limited number of background characteristics with current position only, and which dealt with a much more narrow population, inevitably defined by their hierarchy—party versus state—rather than by their job responsibilities *and* their bureaucratic location. In addition, the author's methodological sensitivity is impressive; he repeatedly notes the limitations of his data and his generalizations, explains his statistical decisions carefully, notes negative as well as positive results, and provides the reader with all the tables one needs to draw his/her own conclusions. Thus, it is fair to say that this is an important work, for anyone concerned with the Soviet area or leadership recruitment in general.

My only complaint is that I wish Hodnett could have followed through more on his conception of recruitment as an indicator of republic (and to some extent, central) level politics. It would have been welcome, for example, to see a more expansive conclusion that linked the findings with the policy process in the Soviet republics; for example, the impact of turnover and career experience on levels of conflict and the mix of policy priorities represented within the ruling circles. But that apparently will follow in a companion volume.

VALERIE BUNCE

Northwestern University

Revolutionary Terrorism: The FLN in Algeria, 1954–1962. By Martha Crenshaw Hutchinson. (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1978. Pp. xvi + 178. $10.95.)

This case study of the *Front de Libèration Nationale* (FLN) is rich in information. It is a useful study but its premises and conclusions are not sufficiently developed. More attention should have been given to the politico-historical context in which the FLN was working and to an analysis of the "terrorism" of the French authorities.

One example of the former will have to suffice. In chapter 3 Hutchinson argues that the Toussaint outbreak in 1954, the real beginning of the war, "failed." She believes this because it did not provoke "ideological awareness and sympathy from the Algerian masses" (p. 41). She claims that "the disappointment over the popular response to the Toussaint attacks influenced FLN decision-making" to turn initially to "compliance terrorism" or violence directed at disloyal or compromised members of the subject population to keep the rest of that population 'in line' (p. 43). She presents no evidence to support these views. In fact, earlier Hutchinson gave contrary evidence from Norman Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr. (*Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts*, Markam, 1970, p. 10), to wit: "The only 'act' that rebellion needs desperately from a large proportion of the populace is *non-denunciation. . . .*" This the FLN clearly achieved in the Toussaint attack. Not only did no major Algerian spokesperson denounce the FLN action, but also Messali Hadj, according to Alistair Horne in *A Savage War for Peace* (New York: Macmillan, 1977) rushed to claim credit for it for his rival MNA (*Mouvement National Algèrien*).

This flaw is not serious. Hutchinson's purpose seems to be limited to an analysis of terrorism in terms of "the intentions of the revolutionary leaders, the social groups the acts were meant to affect, the psychological and political reactions they were meant to inspire, and the methods of violence used." She excels at this. Her four conceptual categories of revolutionary terrorism will, no doubt, be helpful to other writers of case studies on terrorism.

Hutchinson rightly suggests that FLN terrorism had much more in common with that of the Vietcong and the "Mau Mau" in Kenya than with other terrorist groups such as the Cypriot EOKA, the Tupamaros of Uruguay, the Zionist Irgun, and the West German Baader-Meinhof gang. All three of the former insurgent groups combined rural guerrilla warfare with their terrorist activities, whereas the others did not.

Occasionally one is frustrated, however, by the author's failure to follow up her own profound insights. For example, in chapter 1, she hovers on the brink of saying that by 1954 the Algerian people no longer considered the colonial government as legitimate (p. 6). She fails to point out, however, the important implications for the ultimate success of the FLN if the government had indeed lost its legitimacy and the impact such a perception probably had on the formulation of FLN strategy and tactics. She virtually acknowledges this in the last chapter when she states that "whereas the French had to win, the FLN only had to avoid losing. . . ." She never adequately explains why this was so.

In order to explain this phenomenon, Hutchinson would have had to describe and analyze something she mysteriously wishes to exclude from this study, French "regime terrorism" (p. xii). Most observers of the Algerian war now agree that the savage French response to Algerian nationalist demonstrations at Sètif and elsewhere in May 1945 was the decisive psychic shock which made the Algerian revolt inevitable. This was "regime terrorism" at its most extreme, but it is not really discussed in this volume except in this mild statement: ". . . This excessive force contributed to the growth of nationalism and of hostility against the French" (p. 5).

One wishes that Hutchinson had written a much longer study incorporating analyses of the terrorism of both sides. Nevertheless, as a study of the FLN itself and of the role of terrorism in violent movements for political change, this book should be widely read and discussed.

PETER R. KNAUSS

University of Illinois, Chicago Circle

Women under Communism. By Barbara Wolfe Jancar. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978. Pp. x + 291. $16.00.)

Women under Communism evaluates the performance of Communist political systems with respect to equality of the sexes. It is a large and important question, given the explicit commitment of Marxist systems to liberating women from, in Marxist terms, the exploitative economic constraints of pre-socialist systems. The systems treated in this study are the Soviet Union (accorded most space) and its Eastern European allies, with the exception of Albania, about which little is known. Similarly, China and Cuba are not analyzed in detail because of lack of data. Excluded are Mongolia, North Korea, the Indochinese Communist and the African Marxist systems.

Key to the success of this enterprise is the working definition of equality. Essentially Jancar intends to compare the Communist systems "as to where each Communist country stands in the process" (p. 5). This process, her conceptualization of equality, involves "ability to make demands upon the government [and] *actual* participation in policy-making" (p. 4; italics in original). She uses three scales with which to measure the performance of the political system: sometimes she adopts the familiar population proportion notion, which produces evidence of inequality almost everywhere. At times, the notion of equality derives from comparisons of males and females within the Communist system under review; and finally in some cases, though infrequently, performance is assessed with reference to the record of the West.

Jancar's considerable effort in providing valuable information and data, both in the text and in lengthy appendices, is undercut by methodological problems of some magnitude. Perhaps most important is the absence of time-series analysis. If the object of the study is to assess system performance, then it would seem that a pre-socialism referent is essential. Or, a time series spanning the years of Communist rule would provide material for analysis of changes in the status of females. Implicitly aware of the problem, Jancar refers often to "trends," as in the following: "Unless leadership commits itself to changing the trend toward sex differentiation in the economy, the trend tends to be self-reinforcing" (p. 28). But in these and other references to trends, no systematic notion of change or dynamics has been adduced and no time series displayed.

If, on the other hand, the author intends to look only at a fixed current point on the status scale, and thus to evaluate Communist performance, there still remains the problem of shifting scales. Communist systems are judged on any of the three scales noted above, and the shifting from one to another for different points produces some confusion in the reader's mind. There is a tendency to adopt the scale which results in the most negative evaluation. It would also be helpful if Jancar reported her field methods more explicitly. In addition to official data, she draws upon interviews with some 100 women in the countries she studied. The interviews were sometimes the product of arranged meetings with officials; sometimes, chance encounters. The testimony is often picturesque and perspicacious, but questions of representativeness persist. This problem is more critical, though, with respect to the testimony of emigrées, about whom we are told virtually nothing.

Jancar is particularly interested in the "dual burden" of women, employed full-time only to come home to largely unshared domestic duties unassisted by the range of modern time-saving appliances we are familiar with in the West. She notes that official campaigns to stem declining birth rates conflict with other official campaigns to extract maximum productivity from the able-bodied female population, and she doubts that entry into the labor force, and into the educational institutions which provide the necessary skills, will result in increased status and equality, because she finds that women tend to be channeled into careers that conform to sex stereotyping, and initiative for political careers is largely lacking. At times Jancar locates the inequities in the failure of the leadership to promote equality; at times, in the more durable and persistent elements of past cultural orientations. She offers in two chapters a discussion of official legislative and socialization policies affecting women. Readers wishing to pursue these topics in greater detail for the Soviet case might consult *Women in Soviet Society* by Gail Lapidus.

Unfortunately, there is a certain inattention to precision and detail which mars the study. For example, Jancar writes, "Some of the most remarkable women in Soviet history are to be found on the dissident side, women like Anna Akhmatova, Marina Tsvetaeva, Bulat Okudzgava [sic], Tatiana Velikonova, Alla Tsvetopolskaia, Maia Ulanovskaia, Larissa Bogoraz, and Natalia Gorbanevskaia, who risked their lives in Red Square to lead a demonstration against the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968" (p. 119).

Marina Tsvetaeva died in 1941; Akhmatova, in 1966; and Bulat Okudzhava is a man.

ELLEN MICKIEWICZ

Michigan State University

Nationalism and Human Rights: Processes of Modernization in the USSR. Edited by Ihor Kanenetsky. (Littleton, Colo.: Libraries Unlimited, 1977. Pp. 246. $15.00.)

Ihor Kamenetsky suggests in his preface that this volume "concentrates on the problems of modernization that have developed in the USSR since the death of Stalin" in order to provide "an evaluation of the nature of liberalization and of the non-conformist groups that [have] emerged" since that time (p. 17). Nowhere in this volume, however, is the relationship between these sets of issues made explicit. Moreover, the task of a careful reader intent on identifying such a relationship on the basis of the essays in this volume is further complicated by the highly idiosyncratic definitions of such central concepts as modernization, human rights, dissent and liberalization which are used in this volume. But a persistent reader is likely to come away with some notion of the relationship between processes of modernization, on the one hand, and the emergence of native elites in the non-Russian republics rather than the emergence of nationalism or human rights movements on the mass level, on the other.

In his preface, Kamenetsky suggests uncritically that in the USSR "one of the by-products of mass education, mass communication, and an increased opportunity to complete higher education or to be involved in more sophisticated research was the emergence of an increasing number of critically minded, better informed, and more self-conscious individuals" (p. 16). Oleh S. Fedyshyn suggests that Khrushchev, intent on modernizing the Soviet economy, required the skills commanded by these individuals in order to achieve his goals. As a consequence, he argues, Khrushchev undertook the liberalization of the late 1950s and early 1960s as a means of mobilizing the efforts of skilled cadres for the tasks of modernization. One result of this effort, he points out, was "a carefully rationed amount of free discussion and criticism. . ." (p. 71). But this greater freedom did not immediately give rise to dissident activity among Soviet intellectuals. Rather, it was the prospect of the loss of those privileges which generated liberal intellectual dissent. In his essay on civil liberties dissent, Peter Vanneman suggests that "only the specter of a Stalinist reaction eventually galvanized the more liberal elements within some groups of specialists into those concerted efforts now identified as the Russian Civil Liberties Movement" (p. 57). Together, these essays suggest that modernization gave rise to elite political dissent in the Soviet Union only indirectly: by creating a set of expectations among Soviet intellectuals of continued, if not increasing, privileges which the post-Khrushchev leadership was unwilling to fulfill.

Other essays in the volume suggest that national dissent, too, has been generated by a sense of deprivation of rights and privileges among skilled elites rather than by the effects of modernization on the masses. Thomas Remeikis' excellent essay on modernization and national identity in the Baltic republics and Yaroslav Bilinsky's essay on politics, purge and dissent in the Ukraine both suggest that modernization and economic development of the non-Russian republics and the resultant creation of local political, cultural and social institutions staffed by native personnel create conditions under which the local elites may be able to resist central Russian control rather effectively and for long periods of time. But as Remeikis points out, "where the provincial elites aspire to expand their sphere of competence and to enhance their role in decision-making" such "decentralist tendencies" may be bureaucratic in nature. Such tendencies, he notes, "can be called nationalistic only in terms of their consequences, but not necessarily in terms of motives of the elites supporting such a course" (p. 127).

Remeikis' own essay and the essays by Bilinsky and Stephen M. Horak suggest that much of the conflict between Moscow and the native leaderships of the non-Russian republics has been bureaucratic in character, but that even such bureaucratic conflicts take on ethnic meaning when central and provincial elites are ethnically differentiated. Michael Rywkin's essay on religion, modern nationalism and political power in Central Asia suggests that decentralist tendencies among the native leaderships of the Central Asian republics are very likely to be both bureaucratic and nationalistic in character. Rywkin observes that "a muslim-based, modern, nationalist spirit is emerging in Soviet Central Asia. It is an unplanned by-product of Soviet nationality policies and a direct result of Soviet socio-economic achievements in the area" (p. 189). Rapid socioeconomic development of the region is creating a network of scientific, cultural and social institutions staffed largely by native personnel. Native participation in the political institutions of the region also is increasing. Rywkin notes that up to now "Moscow has been eager to appease local nationalist feelings by offering selective concessions, most of which are very limited in scope." They involve "no transfer of real power" (pp. 195–96). But these increasing levels of participation by native Central Asian cadres are creating the basis for the emergence of bureaucratic decentralizing tendencies among the native leaderships of the region. Should the central leadership fail to meet their bureaucratic demands, the sense of deprivation resulting from that failure may become linked to the rising Muslim nationalist spirit in Central Asia and give rise to a nationalist dissident movement there.

STEVEN L. BURG

Brandeis University

Resistance in Vichy France: A Study of Ideas and Motivation in the Southern Zone 1940–1942. By H. R. Kedward. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978. Pp. ix + 311. $21.00.)

In a 1974 colloquium on the liberation of France, one of the most important members of the organized French Resistance, Pascal Copeau, remarked that the trouble with most scholarly accounts of the Resistance in France was that systematic description and categorization of resistance structures, if accurate in theory, failed to capture the diversity and spontaneity of resistance reality as he remembered it. One refreshing aspect of *Resistance in Vichy France* is that, unlike authors of some earlier accounts of which Copeau complained, H. R. Kedward recognizes the complexity of the resistance phenomenon and stresses the multiplicity of motivation for resistance activity. His central argument "that the Resistance could never have been a homogeneous, tightly knit group, since the very phenomenon known as The Resistance was developed between 1940 and 1942 by a plurality of groups in a plurality of ways" (p. 247) is well articulated and supported by a convincing body of evidence. Although the specialist will find little new material here, the general reader seeking an understanding of "ideas and motivation in the southern zone 1940–1942" (the book's subtitle) will find no better introduction to the origins of resistance to the Vichy regime in southern France.

Kedward investigates several categories of resisters, including Christian Democrats, Communists, career officers, and refugee groups, to demonstrate his contention that patriotism is a necessary but not sufficient explanation for resistance. This insight and an excellent discussion of the transformation of resistance ideas over time are particularly valuable contributions. Readers may regret that the author does not carry his analysis beyond 1942. One suspects that motivations continued to be diverse in the last two years of the occupation of France, and it is perhaps worth noting that in terms of active participants more people joined the movements after 1942 than before. Kedward's postscript (pp. 284–85) arguing that attention to 1943–44 would lead to an emphasis on military affairs, in contrast to his interest in ideological conflict, is not entirely convincing. As the Vichy regime created the Milice to step up its repression of the Resistance, ideological conflicts, evident in both collaborationist and resistance organizations and literature, remained of considerable importance. It is improbable that the evolution of a resistance "ideology" stopped abruptly in 1942.

Kedward's treatment of the reconstituted Socialist party (C.A.S.) is perhaps the one part of his study subject to substantial criticism. In synthesizing the Socialist viewpoint he writes: "There was nothing here that could be called narrow party politics. . ." (p. 104). The author seems to be unaware of the highly partisan *Socialisme et liberté*, the first clandestine newspaper published by the C.A.S. (first issue, December 1941). The M.U.R.'s directing committee on several occasions sharply condemned *Le Populaire* as "more of a political leaflet than an organ of combat" (quotation from Papers of Alban Vistel, partially consulted by Kedward), and Gaullist agents reported regularly that the Socialist party was at odds with the movements because of this issue of partisanship. Of lesser import the author is also mistaken in writing that Léon Blum "had been in the forefront of those who called for harsh measures against the P.C.F. after the Nazi-Soviet pact" (p. 95). In the Chamber of Deputies Blum spoke out against these repressive decrees, warning that such actions would merely create martyrs and ultimately work against the government's intentions. By contrast to his somewhat flawed consideration of the Socialists, Kedward's treatment of the Communist party is more sympathetic and less colored by emotion than often is the case with resistance literature, although a sophisticated treatment of the *Front National* still awaits some ambitious author.

When discussing sources in his preface, Kedward overstates the difficulties of access to local archives and understates their value to the researcher. Eugène Martres, *Le Cantal de 1939* *à 1945* (doctoral thesis, Université de Clermont, 1974), is one of the best of several local and regional studies that have used such material to good account. The author has also ignored German documents that are of value, particularly the reports of agencies responsible for overseeing compliance with the Armistice. While I suspect that these sources would not have changed the basic contours of Kedward's presentation, they might have enriched some aspects of his account. Notwithstanding these few reservations, *Resistance in Vichy France* is a welcome addition to the literature on the French experience during the Second World War.

JOHN F. SWEETS

University of Kansas

Taiwan's Politics: The Provincial Assemblyman's World. By Arthur J. Lerman. (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1978. Pp. x + 298. $10.00, paper.)

Ideological preconceptions too often have caused political scientists to overlook Taiwan's political system. The island is seen by many as simply another repressive right-wing dictatorship whose importance pales before that of the "real" China. For those who can overcome these preconceptions (and Arthur Lerman is one of them), the study of Taiwan has a lot to offer, because the island's political system, though "closed" in some ways, is surprisingly open in others.

Lerman reports the repressive features of politics in Taiwan without indignation, and the democratic aspects of the island's political system without illusion. He refers frequently to works in comparative political theory, and makes comparisons with other developing or Western political systems when appropriate, realizing that most counties on Taiwan have a good deal in common, politically, with, say, Richard Daley's Cook County machine. Lerman's greatest achievement lies in reconstructing the chain of political groupings which link the individual resident of Taiwan, through a series of patron-client and factional relationships, to local and provincial leaders and elected officials. He explains what the stakes are at various political levels on Taiwan, how the governing elite usually succeeds—but sometimes fails—in controlling elections, and what resources and skills tend to determine election outcomes.

Lerman employs four major approaches to studying politics in Taiwan: (1) "the conceptualization of Taiwan's politics as a confrontation between the mainlander-supported governing elite and the Taiwanese"; (2) "the work of anthropologists, who have shown that the Taiwanese comprise a complex group of people and are not simply a homogeneous mass to be conveniently set off against the governing elite"; (3) an examination of "the effect of economic development on Taiwanese political behavior"; and (4) "most tentatively, psychological theories (really guesses) concerning Chinese political behavior." He concludes by viewing Taiwan's political system as now being "in a fledgling state of democratic development through which many established democratic systems have passed, through which some democratic systems are now passing, and during which many fledgling democratic systems were truncated by power elites that found the characteristics of developing democracies intolerable" (p. 7).

Taiwan's Politics is not without faults. It is based on research essentially completed 6–7 years prior to its publication—though this is probably a commentary more on the vagaries of the publishing marketplace than on the author. It is not always gracefully written. Despite its title, it is neither a comprehensive description of politics in the Republic of China on Taiwan, nor a Donald Matthews-style re-creation of the culture of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly. More accurately, it is a description of politics on Taiwan gleaned principally from interviews conducted during the late 1960s with members of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly. Thus the book includes almost no information (since it is apparently unobtainable) concerning how key national policy decisions are made by members of the Kuomintang elite which rules the island.

Nevertheless, Lerman's is the single most valuable book available dealing with contemporary politics on Taiwan. Beyond this, it is the one volume available which provides the accurate information and knowledgeable analysis necessary to make it possible to integrate Taiwan's significant political experience into comparative theory building. It would be a shame if this book were to be overlooked by theorists of comparative politics who, more than they may suspect, need what it has to offer.

SHELDON APPLETON

Oakland University

The Letters of Sidney and Beatrice Webb: Vol. 1, **Apprenticeships, 1873–1892;** Vol. 2, **Partnership, 1892–1912;** Vol. 3, **Pilgrimage, 1912–1947.** Edited by Norman MacKenzie. (New York and London: Cambridge University Press, 1978. Pp. xx + 453; xv + 405; xxii + 482. $47.50, each; $125.00, the set.)

The publication of these volumes will be welcomed not only by Webb scholars but by a wider circle of students of British political history interested in the tumultuous early decades of the century. The 967 letters here printed, few of them published before, comprise only a small portion of the surviving letters written *by* the Webbs. None of the equally substantial inflow of letters, written *to* the Webbs and preserved in the Passfield Papers at the London School of Economics and elsewhere, are included.

The letters were written over a span of some 85 years, and Norman MacKenzie has had his editorial work cut out for him in having to cover a great deal of historical ground while being limited in the number of items he was able to include. His selections are judiciously made, and the background material and running commentary is balanced, unobtrusive, and informative. MacKenzie has acquitted himself of a number of demanding editorial judgments with distinction. It is apposite that the appearance of the Webb letters coincides with the realization of another LSE-sponsored project, the publication of a microfiche of *The Diary of Beatrice Webb, 1873–1943* (Chadwyck-Healey, Somerset House, 1978). MacKenzie has made extensive use of the diary in preparing his explanatory notes. Its more general availability, along with the letters, as he comments, "suggests a new view of the Webbs as individuals and their role in public affairs."

Curiously, while being the joint authors of some of the dullest books in modern political literature, the Webbs have always seemed endlessly fascinating as biographical figures. In part this is traceable to the wide publicity (encouraged in their own lifetime by the Webbs' self-propaganda) given the storied single-mindedness of their intellectual partnership. And so, easily the most striking of the volumes under review, from the standpoint of "the Webbs as individuals," is the *Apprenticeships, 1873–1892*, which traces the background of the formation of the famous intellectual team. How unlike their origins, temperament, demeanor! Yet their differences—"both of us," Beatrice was to comment, on the occasion of their engagement, "second-rate minds, though curiously combined"—were to prove remarkably complementary. Given to periodic bouts of depressive self-doubt, her nature tinged with an unsatisfied religious yearning, Beatrice was to find the perfect collaborator in the steady and industrious Sidney. He was a born optimist. "I am," the plump, myopic, diminutive product of "the anonymous lower middle class" wrote to Graham Wallas, "a disciple of Mr. Micawber, with a faith in things unseen but about to turn up." And he assured a still-unresolved Beatrice during their courtship that "you shall gain much more than you can lose—I mean in the way of work *actually accomplished.*"

By the time of their first fateful meeting in January 1890, both were at crossroads in their journeys in life. The ambitious Sidney, a star of the fringe debating societies that flourished at the time and a prominent member of the recently-founded Fabian Society, believed in a creed but was stalled in his career, financially dependent on but frustrated by a junior clerkship at the Colonial Office. For her part, the financially independent Beatrice, deeply scarred by an unrequited passion for the debonair Liberal politician Joseph Chamberlain, and haunted by a sense of social guilt born of her privileged status, had by the late 1880s found consolation in the vocation of social investigation—which held out the promise of a redirection of her merely personal feelings towards a kind of generalized humanitarianism. But she had as yet no integrating creed to guide her craft. "It was in my first conversation with you last winter," she confessed to Sidney soon after making his acquaintance, "that it flashed across my mind that I was, or ought to be, a Socialist—if I was true to the conclusion I had already reached." From the date of "this sudden self-revelation" the hitherto divergent travel routes of the unlikely twosome gradually merged as they sought their common destiny on the road to a New Jerusalem of political faith.

Their marriage partnership, however, was hardly from the outset a *fait accompli.* The highlight of this correspondence is the publication for the first time of the remarkable love letters of 1890–92, when the issue of their future together was resolved. They tell the story of how a lovesick Sidney, who called it a version of "Beauty and the Beast," eventually won the hand of an apprehensive Beatrice through sheer dogged persistence (a story forming the basis of Jeanne MacKenzie's *A Victorian Courtship,* London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979). Some of the letters are really very funny; others of the letters are quite touching, as a humbled Sidney, displaying a delicacy and tenderness not usually associated with one whose received reputation has been that of an irretrievably prosaic figure, gently and patiently disarmed Beatrice of her hesitancies. Indeed, if the Fabian tactic of "permeation," so intimately linked with his name, may be said ever to have succeeded, it did so in his courtship of his future wife.

From the beginning, the Webbs' partnership was based on an agreement "that all we do shall be for 'social service' as far as we know how," and it is to this theme—to their role in public affairs—that MacKenzie's selection of two further volumes of letters is largely devoted. The second aptly bears a title reminiscent of Beatrice's posthumous volume of autobiography, *Our Partnership,* for it was in the period dating from their marriage down to the eve of the Great War that "the firm of Webb" flourished and they came to be well-known public figures. Especially in the early years of this phase of their joint career they accomplished much, dominating (with Shaw) the sometimes stormy direction of the Fabian Society, publishing their *History of Trade Unionism* and *Industrial Democracy,* and launching their massive and never to be completed history of local government, while Sidney was simultaneously deeply involved in metropolitan political affairs, chief among these the reorganization of London education. Most importantly, they founded the London School of Economics, the Webbs' greatest legacy. Although himself a person of decided views, radical and socialist, Sidney saw to it that Conservatives, Imperialists, Liberals and churchmen, as well as Socialists, were appointed to the staff, and played a leading role for some years in its gradual growth into a world-renowned center for research in the social sciences and training in administration.

Politically, the Webbs began the period 1892–1912 as practitioners of permeation, abjuring partisan political commitments and working through those, whatever their party affiliation, interested in the goal of "how each department of national life can be raised to its highest possible efficiency." They permeated the Liberal Imperialists during the Boer War and the Conservatives over educational policy. But as the selection of letters illustrates, the Webbs imperfectly understood the appeal of the Independent Labour Party and antagonized the Radicals through their association with the establishment. With the great Liberal electoral victory of 1906, they found themselves politically without influence, and in frustration, turned from permeation to propaganda, using the occasion of Beatrice's service on the Poor Law Commission to prepare a *Minority Report,* and publicizing its sweeping suggestions for the eradication of poverty by means of a national "crusade." It was a foregone conclusion that the majority commissioners, and Lloyd George's subsequent social insurance schemes, would politically carry the day (though later government reforms, beginning in 1929 and culminating in the Beveridge Report, would draw on features of both approaches). As MacKenzie observes, "Their inflexible tactics, which reflected Beatrice's determination to impose her solution at all costs, contrasted with the success of Sidney's efforts in shaping and lobbying through the Education Acts of 1902 and 1903."

The final volume carries the Webb story from their middle years to their final arrival at their political New Jerusalem. Though they grew old, their busy lives remained eventful. For a time Beatrice took a more active role in the Fabian Society, and the Old Gang was pressured from below by a more militant younger generation of socialists. The partners founded the distinguished left-leaning weekly the *New Statesman,* which still survives. They managed several important joint-books, *A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain, The Decay of Capitalist Civilisation* (which signaled their growing disenchantment with the politics of gradualism), and later, *Methods of Social Study.*

The working partnership was effectively eclipsed as Sidney became more actively drawn into the planning of Labour party policy. Following the war, he entered Parliament and served (not especially successfully) in the Cabinets of two Labour Governments—from 1929, as Lord Passfield, although Beatrice insisted on being addressed as plain Mrs. Sidney Webb. As the great powers slid into depression, she doubted "the inevitability of gradualism or even the practicability of gradualism in the transition from a capitalist to an egalitarian civilisation." Following the collapse of the MacDonald government in 1931 Sidney retired from electoral politics, the partnership was revived, they embraced Marxism, and came away from a visit to Russia in 1932 with their new faith confirmed. The culmination of their intellectual pilgrimage came with the publication of their massive and uncritically favorable *Soviet Communism, A New Civilisation.*

In 1938 Sidney suffered a stroke from which he never fully recovered and Beatrice entered and underlined in her diary: *"The End of Our Partnership?"* Yet she was to predecease him in 1943. Sidney lingered on until 1947, surviving to witness the return to power of Labour, and the advent of the Welfare State. Whatever their faults, it had been an extraordinary intellectual and emotional collaboration. "She had brought great gifts of intellect and will-power to the partnership," MacKenzie shrewdly suggests; "she recognised, however, that it was Sidney's undemonstrative but unfailing devotion that had been the cornerstone of all its achievements." When Lloyd George wrote to congratulate the surviving partner on the award of the Order of Merit the year following Beatrice's death, Sidney responded, in the next to last letter of this notable collection: "My one impression is one of vexation at my wife not being included in the presentation. Will you please say that the award has no political significance: 'services to social and political science.' "

GEORGE FEAVER

University of British Columbia

Reflections from Captivity: Phan Boi Chau's "Prison Notes" and Ho Chi Minh's "Prison Diary." Edited by David G. Marr. Translated by Christopher Jenkins, Tran Khanh Tuyet, and Huynh Sanh Thong. (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1978. Pp. x + 113. $12.00, cloth; $5.00, paper.)

All revolutions have heroes who were ex-cons. Many such people, trying to while away the days that seem like months during their frequently solitary, miserable, if not tortuous confinement, have written about their countries' struggles and themselves. Examples from this literary tradition are the two works published in this volume.

Ho Chi Minh is known far and wide and requires no introduction. Phan Boi Chau is less famous outside of Vietnam although inside, David Marr tells the reader in his fine essay, Phan is "revered today as a Vietnamese patriot of the first order." He was among the few people in Vietnam during the first two decades of this century who dedicated their lives, in Phan's words, "to force the French to return the right of independence" to the Vietnamese (p. 31). For this Phan endured personal hardship, was hounded by police inside and outside of Vietnam, and died in 1940 believing he had failed as an organizer and leader of independence.

For 20-odd years prior to his death, Phan was under house arrest in Hue. *Prison Notes,* however, was not written during those years. They were hastily scribbled in 1914 during the first few days of what stretched to three years of imprisonment in China. A warlord opponent of Chinese with whom Phan had wanted to form an anti-imperialist coalition threw him into jail, giving Phan the distinct impression that within days "my head will be chopped off. . . ." Wanting desperately to help other Vietnamese to be better patriots and organizers, he wrote this 50-page autobiography.

Ho Chi Minh apparently scribed his *Diary* without the fears of death that Phan had. But he was afraid to write about his political work and thought. Such words would arouse his captors, Kuomintang police in China, to be even more suspicious of him than they already were. The police had arrested him as a foreigner without proper papers, but eventually realized he was a Viet Minh leader and probably friendly with the Kuomintang's enemy, the Chinese Communist party. Only international politics during those war years saved him from even worse prison conditions and in late 1943 caused him to be released.

Phan's *Notes* has more than Ho's *Diary* to teach about Vietnam's political history and about revolutionary movements. A couple of themes are illustrative. The reader can see Phan becoming a more mature revolutionary as a result of praxis. He gradually discards a youthful belief that the struggle for independence could count on support from the monarchy, "elders," and other Vietnamese in the French government. To his disappointment he had to conclude that, with some exceptions, they were more interested in maintaining their wealth and position by collaborating with the French than they were in liberating Vietnam. Phan also became convinced along with others in the "Association" (the Vietnam Restoration Society), that violence was their only recourse. They then began searching for guns, eventually in 1905 sending Phan to Japan to buy the weapons. But Japan became such an enlightening and exhilarating experience for Phan, opening his eyes to so much that was going on in the world, that he moved beyond thinking that violence should be the only course. Even more important than guns, he concluded, was to get "the youth of Vietnam to wake up and risk their lives in coming abroad to study. In this way we would gain the freedom to develop our intellects and the country would quickly develop skills it needed for the work that lay ahead" (p. 36). Encouraging such study became by 1906 a major focus in his revolutionary work.

A second theme is the ubiquitous police, forever souring the sweet taste of tiny successes. Even though their methods of surveillance were crude compared to the standards of the 1970s, the police in Vietnam, China, Hong Kong, Japan—the places Phan traveled—did have a network and did cause Phan and his colleagues heavy grief. Those guns, for example, that Phan managed to get shipped in 1909 from Japan never made it to Vietnam. The French, in a "wicked assault" on the Association, killed its leaders and learned about the guns concealed in Hong Kong. British police were informed and promptly found ten chests of weapons and ammunition. Even the study-abroad movement was the police's victim, "the target of ten thousand different arrows, carefully aimed and fired. I had never foreseen this problem. Alas!" (p. 37).

Blaming himself for these and other difficulties is another theme in the account. Phan declared at the end of *Notes*, out of desperation, for he feverishly wanted to accomplish more in life, "There is truly no one as stupid as I" (p. 56). "My ability is so feeble, my strength so weak," he wrote; "there are a hundred tasks to do and not a single one accomplished. I am like the wandering soul of Ting Ve who has run out of stones before the sea of anger has been filled. I float through night and day bobbing with the waves. How sorrowful" (p. 37).

Ho's *Diary* is much less revealing about his activities and assessments. It is a collection of quatrain poems he scribbled from time to time during the 14 months he was moved from prison to prison. The poems are pleasingly written (and translated), telling of nature's beauty and the prisons' filth; they also occasionally reveal Ho's insights into human behavior. As a whole, the poems help the leader to see Ho as an individual, but tell little about him as a revolutionary.

To those who can read Vietnamese or French, neither of these works is new; they have long been available in those languages. Even Ho's *Diary* has been previously translated into English. The sponsor of this publication, however, the Translations Project Group in the Association for Asian Studies' Southeast Asia Regional Council, deserves commendation for seeing that Phan's *Notes* are now available to a much broader audience. And the translators and editor for both deserve compliments for their thoroughly readable renditions and most instructive footnotes and commentaries.

BENEDICT J. KERKVLIET

University of Hawaii, Honolulu

The Soviet Union and East Europe into the 1980's: Multidisciplinary Perspectives. Edited by Simon McInnes, William Mcgrath and Peter J. Potichnyj. (Oakville, Ontario: Mosaic Press, 1979. Pp. xi + 340. $7.95, paper.)

This book covers a broad range of topics, stemming initially from a Canadian conference held in 1976. The chapters highlight economic topics, intra-Bloc relations and sociological themes more than typical political science subjects per se. This has advantages and disadvantages. Political institutions and processes as such are given scanty treatment. As a result, one of the book's objectives, that of studying universal problems in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, appears circumscribed. An advantage in this seeming imbalance of topics, however, is that the chapters delve into economic and sociological themes in some depth, from which political consequences are then drawn.

Andras Gollner reveals, as do some of the other authors who also are Canadian political scientists, greater sophistication in the use of economic concepts than does the average American-trained political scientist. Such additional qualification, desirable in all social science disciplines, is especially useful in communist studies. Gollner astutely observes, for example, that we cannot assume that more economic decentralization necessarily brings with it, as a number of communist regimes anticipate, greater economic rationality, efficiency, and improved capital-output ratios. Communist economic "rationality" (the logic of communist ideology) breeds its own style of irrationality. Centralized price fixing, no matter how desirable and necessary in the view of communist administrators, typically sets prices below equilibrium. The producing enterprise, as a consequence, is prevented from establishing rational prices, thereby losing its ability to allocate resources rationally; waste, prolonged inefficiency, and citizen alienation result.

Radoslav Selucky discusses the dilemma of Soviet-type economic systems by noting that economic reforms, if vigorously executed, would add to the underlying nationalistic forces which exert centrifugal and disintegrating pressures within the societies. This is apparent, particularly, in the Soviet Union. Thus, to modernize is to reform conservative and restrictive organizations and practices. Reform, if it is at all significant, however, will result in instability. Consequently, for the sake of regime survival, no serious reforms are permitted. Moreover, detente allows for increased importation of economic innovations from the industrialized West, thus further stalling the immediate necessity for internal economic reforms. A continuous need for detente on the part of Soviet and Eastern European leaders becomes obvious.

Supranational integration, carried out chiefly through the CMEA, is another Soviet-directed effort which attempts to solve problems arising in part from the command economy. The restraining force on this Bloc-wide cooperative scheme continues to be powerful nationalistic tendencies of the Eastern European nations, as amply demonstrated over the past three decades.

As one anticipates of any multi-authored book, the chapters are not of equal quality. The one on "The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the Era of Detente" is superficial in coverage and insignificant in its conclusions. Lenard Cohen's interesting chapter on the rise and fall of political science as a discipline in Yugoslavia poses the predictable dilemma for all Eastern European regimes when they allow too much scientific freedom to the social sciences. Nevertheless, these regimes do profit from useful information produced by some research of this type. The favorite topic of Soviet sociologists which is approved by the regime, for example, is that of "sociological problems of work," as discussed by Alex Smirenko. David Lane's chapter, "Towards a Sociological Model of State Socialist Society" convincingly demonstrates the need for an historical-sociological-cultural analysis of a given nation to assess its communist policies more effectively. Thus, a modern society's functional differentiation and pluralistic interdependence constrains the revolution in that particular society. Of course, this is obvious (e.g., Polish Catholicism), but Lane adds more argument to the hypothesis such as when he points to ideology in these nations as reflecting more of social needs than ideological goals.

This book is a decent scholarly effort at grappling with some important topics in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Because of recognized space limitations, however, the very broad subject is dealt with in a scattered and piecemeal fashion.

RICHARD C. GRIPP

San Diego State University

The British MP: A Socio-economic Study of the House of Commons. By Colin Mellors. (Westmead, Farnborough, England: Saxon House, 1978. Pp. vii + 146. $16.00.)

This short book presents a detailed compilation of statistics on the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of British MPs. As such, it is subject to the several criticisms of this kind of work that are familiar to students of political recruitment and elite behavior. In the opening chapter the author acknowledges the validity of many of these criticisms but maintains that information about social background is valuable for comprehending political recruitment opportunities and representational processes. Although the utility of such data for these purposes is certainly debatable, less open to question are the quality and quantity of information in this study. The reader sufficiently patient to peruse the many, if not always well-organized, tables will find a fascinating and thought-provoking trove of material on the composition of the British House of Commons in the post-World War II period.

Starting with the Parliament elected in the Labour landslide of 1945, Mellors carefully traces changes in the socioeconomic and demographic profile of each successive cohort of MPs, terminating his analysis with the election of October 1974. Collecting information on a total of 1758 members, he focuses on several variables standard for this type of exercise such as age, sex, prior public office experience, education and occupation. The latter two variables are coded in noteworthy detail. To highlight cross-time change, he presents data on new members entering and defeated MPs departing from each successive Parliament separately from those for all MPs enjoying success in a particular election.

Perhaps most interesting is the information assembled concerning occupation and education which documents the progressive "embourgeoisement" of successive waves of freshman Labour MPs. Although the tendency for working-class Labour members to be replaced by middle-class professionals has been noted in previous studies by Guttsman and others, the extent to which "even Labour's strongholds have been wrested from the workers by Labour's new professional men" (p. 77) in the years since 1964 is truly striking. Equally salient, however, is the fact that the embourgeoisement of the PLP has failed to produce a cohort of Labour MPs with socioeconomic characteristics identical to those of the Conservatives. In the latter party, traditional recruitment practices prevail. A preponderance of

Conservative MPs have public school and/or Oxbridge education, the pattern since time immemorial. Also unabated is the recruitment of Tory members with prior occupational experience as barristers, directors of large firms or gentlemen-farmers. As a result, Conservative MPs continue to differ sharply in terms of class origins and present statuses from members of the new Labour "meritocracy."

A conclusion of "embourgeoisement–yes, convergence–no" may not be particularly satisfying for those concerned with the capacity of the Labour party or the British political system as a whole to represent adequately working-class needs and demands. Reviewing the evidence, the author concludes that reforms of the electoral system, the transformation of the House of Lords into an "Industrial Parliament" and the revitalization of local party organizations might do much to prevent British parliamentary politics from degenerating into a confrontation between representatives of the "old" and "new" middle classes. Arguments supporting these reforms are brief and less than convincing.

Perhaps the least satisfying sections of the book are those dealing with women and "amateur" and "professional" MPs. The former documents the continuing paucity of women in Parliament and provides the reader with a familiar set of hypotheses as to why this is the case. Regarding the latter, after operationalizing the concepts amateur and professional in terms of number of years in office, Mellors discusses possible attitudinal and behavioral tendencies of these two types of members, and the institutional consequences of the presence of an increasingly large contingent of professionals. Unlike much of the speculative commentary in other parts of the book, the discussions in these two sections are largely untutored by research findings in the available literature. Thus, the chief function of this material is to make the reader sharply aware of the limitations of relying exclusively on "social background" data for understanding either the recruitment, attitudes and behavior of political elites, or the operation of political institutions.

HAROLD D. CLARKE

University of Windsor

Social Security in Latin America: Pressure Groups, Stratification, and Inequality. By Carmelo Mesa-Lago. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1978. Pp. xix + 351. $19.95.)

Any social scientist who consciously sets out to explore, to understand, and to compare the social security systems of five Latin American nations deserves simultaneously to be encouraged and cautioned. The task of picking one's way through the extraordinarily dense thicket of laws, decrees and rules that have appeared in each Latin American country since independence in the 1820s is enough to make any scholar think twice; to do so for five disparate nations, and then to compare them, borders on audacity.

For instance, simply compiling information on a country's social security laws and organizations might well daunt the scholar, since (as is repeated throughout), no single legislative body regulates the organization of social security in any of the five cases, nor does any compilation of laws and regulations exist in any nation.

Yet Carmelo Mesa-Lago has not only undertaken the job; he has done so thoroughly, rigorously, and usefully. Nor is his study simply descriptive; on the contrary, it is a truly comparative exercise that presents enormous amounts of detail on each country and then compares them vis-à-vis degree, scope, and depth of coverage. Moreover, Mesa-Lago moves social security legislation from the dusty recesses of bureaucratic tedium and quite properly presents it as quintessentially political, capable of reflecting, maintaining, and creating inequalities in the larger society.

Mesa-Lago is quite explicit on this last point: social security has "often been manipulated to gain the electoral support of a particular clientele, to legitimate a spurious political regime, and to satisfy the needs and coopt powerful pressure groups which threaten the status quo" (p. 3), rather than acting as a redistributive mechanism. His case studies (Chile, Uruguay, Argentina, Mexico, and Peru), while revealing that these five countries have differing degrees of inequality (as listed, with Chile having the least to Peru having the most), also demonstrate that none can claim to be politically neutral or socially altruistic.

Instead, social security coverage in Latin America has, according to Mesa-Lago, always faithfully represented the stratification of society. Those with access to power (the military and civilian political elites, the wealthy) gain coverage; those with no access (the peasants, Indians, unorganized urban poor) do not. In addition, "The more powerful the group; the earlier it gains protection, the higher its degree of coverage, the less it has to pay to finance its system, and the better the amount and quality as well as the less stringent its conditions to acquire benefits" (p. 258).

The five case studies offer evidence that inequalities are consistent. That is, Peru in general ranks across a variety of 19 indicators, including the appearance of legislation over time, the scope of coverage, regressiveness of financing, and the amount of benefits. In addition, Mesa-Lago offers a general conclusion guaranteed to depress any reformer bent on resolving these problems: "The combination of extensive coverage, massification of privilege, and regressiveness in financing is a fatal one" (p. 296). By definition, any redistributive policy will require extending coverage. But the newly incorporated sectors, unable to pay as they go, may start to demand state subsidies (the "massification" phenomenon) to obtain benefits equal to those given to the most powerful groups (pp. 15–16). Given the regressive nature of social security and the political problems inherent in changing it, however, the only alternative is increased state spending, leading in turn to vastly increased costs and inflation—unless, of course, a fundamental restructuring of power relationships occurs.

Each country study provides the historical development of social security from independence to the 1970s, an account of the contemporary situation (circa 1970), and a quantitative treatment of inequalities present at that time. And while these studies are each exhaustively detailed, they leave the reader aware that much remains to be done to describe how certain groups preserved their special status, excluded other groups, created alliances and coalitions, and the like.

As can be gathered, the book is most informative, and not just about social security per se. Mesa-Lago's treatment of the social, economic, and political context in which social security evolves forces the reader to recognize the existence of yet another seemingly immovable obstacle in the way of reform in Latin America. The book is short on solutions to the inequalities, and indeed has few prescriptions of any kind. Yet its unqualified demonstration of the realities of the situation at least allows a further comprehension of why Latin American societies show such intransigence.

HENRY DIETZ

University of Texas, Austin

Electoral Dynamics in Britain since 1918. By William L. Miller. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978. Pp. xiv + 242. $18.95.)

What gives this book a special flavor is that William L. Miller distinguishes more carefully than most students of elections—and more successfully—between the dynamics of elections at the level of individuals and the dynamics of elections at the level of constituencies. By and large, students of elections have sought to understand electoral outcomes by analyzing how individuals choose their votes, even though in a parliamentary system such as Britain's the result of an election is strictly an aggregation of constituency results. In focusing on the processes by which constituency voting evolves, Miller demonstrates that processes of electoral choice across British constituencies differ distinctly from parallel processes at the level of individual voters; he develops an interpretation of the social bases of British elections which departs in several ways from the interpretation of Butler and Stokes (*Political Change in Britain*, Macmillan, 1974), an interpretation based on processes at the individual level; and he contributes in important ways to the methodology of contextual analysis.

In the first of these regards, Miller finds, for instance, that constituency election results are quite stable in the short run but evolve through rather large changes over the longer run of ten years or so. By contrast, analysis at the level of individual voters shows considerable instability in the short run, but greater stability in the long run as errant voters return to "home base." Miller resolves this particular paradox by speculating that much of the individual instability may be due to the Liberals' intermittent contestation of seats.

In a similar vein, Miller finds that class polarization is a different thing at the level of constituencies than at the level of individuals. The latter is best measured as the difference between the partisanship of different classes. But class polarization across constituencies involves also the power of the environment to structure social contact which then may affect partisanship. Miller finds in analysis across constituencies that the individual differences have only a rather minor effect, but that class polarization depends strongly on the presence of members of what he calls the "core classes"—those occupations which typify a class, employers on the one hand and semiskilled union workers on the other—who appear to provide polarizing leadership to their neighbors.

As is suggested by the case of class polarization, Miller argues that processes by which social divisions are expressed politically may differ from the level of individuals to the level of constituencies. Perhaps the most important part of his book is his analysis of the evolution of social alignments over the period 1918–1974, in which he obtains results different from those obtained by Butler and Stokes in a cohort analysis across individuals. Most surprisingly, he finds that polarization between Anglicans and Nonconformists, which had reached a nadir in the early 1950s, has been increasing since then and is now about half as great as it was during the 1920s. He finds that class polarization declined from 1918 to 1919 but has been stable since then.

Overall, the book is an extended comparison between processes among constituencies and parallel processes among individuals. The examples above should give some flavor of the sorts of contrast Miller develops. In order to analyze processes at the level of constituencies he has had to develop the method of contextual analysis in imaginative ways, and this is a further contribution of his book. In particular, he develops a regression model which relates individual-level and constituency-level processes neatly to each other; and he develops a technique for graphing simultaneously the vote for three separate parties.

The book makes important points about electoral change, and should be of considerable interest to students either of British politics or of elections generally. Unfortunately, the presentation is such as to discourage many readers. With the exception of a sensitive and lucid historical review in the first chapter, Miller obscures important findings by choppy presentation, by the excessive use of computer acronyms, and by the listing of minor relationships when he should concentrate instead on the few most important relationships. Measures and method are often presented in a tedious detail which would have been better moved back to appendices. Chapter summaries help, but themselves add to the choppiness of the presentation.

However, though the book is a bit difficult to read, it will well repay a modest effort. Miller has advanced our understanding of electoral change as a process which operates across constituencies. And the results of his analysis must lead to several reinterpretations of British electoral history.

W. PHILLIPS SHIVELY

University of Minnesota

Nachtfrost: Erfahrungen auf dem Weg vom realen zum menschlichen Sozialismus. By Zdeněk Mlynář. (Köln: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1978. Pp. 366. DM 34.)

This is an important book. It provides invaluable assistance to all students of Czechoslovak politics, especially those concerned with the Czechoslovak experiment in 1968 with "socialism with a human face," or with Eurocommunism. Zdeněk Mlynář, as a party secretary under A. Dubček, was a leading figure in the Czechoslovak leadership. His subjective but balanced account reveals many new and hitherto unknown features of that Czechoslovak drama.

But this book is more than that. Mlynář is, after L. Trotsky, the second highest official of any ruling Communist party to be allowed to emigrate to the West. He belongs among those few high communist officials (including Trotsky, N. Khrushchev, and M. Djilas) whose personal accounts of experiences in a communist system appeared in the press. Although Mlynář did not play a role comparable to that of Trotsky, Khrushchev, or Djilas, he has first-hand knowledge of Communist party bureaucracies and politics. He is a former *apparatchik* who wrote his Ph.D. thesis (1959) not on Marx or Lenin but on Machiavelli. Very illuminating is his narrative of the power-play within the party apparatus: among senior decision makers, among heads of the Central Committee departments, among various amorphous coalitions and cliques—"personal agencies," working groups, and anonymous party apparatus officials. We learn that the power of even the first secretary is not unlimited. Thus, Czechoslovak First Secretary A. Novotný behaved with respect to a seemingly unimportant official in the apparatus, since he had important connections in Moscow (p. 69).

The significance of coalition politics as a strategy in the power-play of communist systems is well demonstrated in the author's narrative of Novotný's fall in 1967–68, and in a variety of incidents touching Dubček in 1968–69. Although Czechoslovak leaders exhibited a wide range of views from anti-reformist to reformist-radical, these were based not merely on different perceptions of reform. Classification of the Czechoslovak leaders by the media and some analysts into "conservative" and "progressive" camps during and after the crisis is meaningless. What emerges is a picture of coalitions—loose, heterogeneous groups—which are not unified on a definitive political platform but take positions on differing bureaucratic and personal interests (such as simple opportunism and fears about loss of privilege) and on differing evaluations of the power struggle.

Like Trotsky and Djilas, Mlynář was a leading theoretician of his party. As the author of many important party documents and studies, he wrote significant portions of the Action Program, which became the Magna Charta of Dubček reformism. As Mlynář shows, the reformist program was a result of several years of theoretical work by several brain-trusts within the party. One of them, which dealt with political reform, was headed by Mlynář himself. Thus, we see the peaceful revolution of 1968—the Prague Spring—as a natural outcome of the theoretical and practical work of the reformist wing of the Czechoslovak party. The process of democratization or Eurocommunization, was prepared *within* the party, not without. We learn that under Novotný in the mid-1960s there were some high party officials, such as Secretary of the Central Committee V. Koucký, who hoped that reformist developments in the Italian party would provide encouragement for the reformist movement in Czechoslovakia, and that the trends toward reformism in the Communist movement in Eastern and Western Europe would be mutually reinforcing (p. 93). Also, Mlynář's unofficial talks with Soviet officials in Moscow in 1967 convinced him that there were some officials in the USSR who hoped that Czechoslovak reformism would encourage a gradual democratization in the Soviet Union, "often connected with the name of Shelepin" (p. 109)!

The Soviet intervention in August 1968 was, of course, a tremendous setback for all those hopes, not only in Czechoslovakia but also in the USSR. Mlynář's discussion of Soviet behavior toward Dubček's leadership will be extremely useful to all analysts of Soviet foreign policies. Herein lies perhaps the most important contribution of the book. Mlynář shows that there was a prolonged debate in the USSR and Eastern Europe over how to resolve the Czechoslovak crisis. The existence of this debate—argued for by some of us—was denied by many analysts as the work of pure imagination in the black arts of Kremlinology. Soviet negotiations with Dubček during various stages of the crisis were believed by many, including some former Czechoslovak leaders and some U.S. government officials and academicians, to be a ruse designed to create a false sense of security while plans for the intervention were being perfected. Mlynář, who has "inside" information, testifies that the Soviet leadership decided to intervene only after a long period of hesitation and vacillation. As revealed by L. Brezhnev to Mlynář, the Politburo considered military intervention as a viable option in May, but only in a worst-case scenario (pp. 205–06). The political decision to use force was taken only several days before the actual event on August 20, 1968.

Mlynář confirms that there were those in the Soviet and East European leaderships who had long advocated military intervention: the Ukrainian party leader E. Shelest, Soviet generals of the older generation with backgrounds in the conventional forces, and W. Ulbricht and W. Gomulka. There were skeptics toward military intervention as well among Soviet and East European leaders—such as Hungarian leader J. Kádár. But Mlynář gives us new insights into crucial factors in Soviet decision making, particularly the activities of the Czechoslovak "fifth column"—the anti-reformists in Dubček's leadership, the Czechoslovak secret service, and the KGB to bring about the decision to intervene. Mlynář reveals that at least 50 persons who agitated in the streets of Prague in support of the anti-People's Militia campaign shortly before the invasion (activities that served very likely as "proof" to interventionists of the existence in Czechoslovakia of a "counterrevolution") were pro-Soviet members of the Czechoslovak secret service. Such "proof" was necessary, because some Soviet leaders, including Secretary General Brezhnev, were hesitant to invade. This point is made in a unique description of the negotiations in Bratislava, where Mlynář participated (pp. 193–200). Here, in what is perhaps the most revealing episode of the book, Mlynář shows Brezhnev as a skillful politician, broker, and tactician. *Nachtfrost* cites other factors in the Soviet decision to use force in Czechoslovakia: bureaucratic politics and the power struggle in the leadership. This point was hinted at by Brezhnev himself, in November 1968, to the Czechoslovak leaders: "If I had not cast my vote in the Politburo in favor of military intervention . . . perhaps I would not be sitting here" (p. 207).

In discussing Soviet behavior, Mlynář, unlike some other Czechoslovak leaders, does not fail to admit Czechoslovak failures that contributed to the invasion: the reformists' inexperience in foreign policy and their naive ideological outlook, which contrasted with the Machiavellian approach of the Soviet leaders.

In short, this is an extremely valuable book. For the specialist, it provides fresh new insights into the work of Communist bureaucracies as well as an assessment of reform trends in Eastern Europe. For the lay person, it offers a fine memoir written by an intelligent and critical high communist official. One hopes that the book will soon be translated and will gain a deservedly wide audience both within and outside academe in English-speaking countries.

JIRI VALENTA

Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California

Bureaucratic Culture: Citizens and Administrators in Israel. By David Nachmias and David H. Rosenbloom. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978. Pp. 212. $15.95.)

The heavy, clumsy, insensitive hand of government bureaucracy has evoked considerable scholarly concern. However, many of the efforts to answer fundamental questions about the roles played by public bureaucracies and the implications of these roles for democracy, revolutionary change and economic growth have been disappointing. *Bureaucratic Culture* represents such an effort.

David Nachmias and David H. Rosenbloom have written about the perceptions and attitudes of Israeli citizens and administrators towards their public bureaucracy. They are centrally concerned with the implications of these attitudes for a country like Israel that is attempting to establish a stable, integrated and democratic political order. The data base for this study consists of interview responses from 1600 citizens and 630 administrators in Israel. The interviews were conducted from July to September, 1973.

Nachmias and Rosenbloom feel they have made a major theoretical contribution by developing typologies of citizen and administrator orientations toward government bureaucracy. The typology for citizen orientations is based on whether an individual regards the bureaucracy as complicated or uncomplicated and on whether they expect equal or unequal treatment. Someone who expects unequal treatment and regards the bureaucracy as complicated is labeled a "bureautic" (as in "neurotic") and someone who views government as simple and equitable is a "bureauphile." A middle category is named "bureautolerant." Bureaucrats are categorized according to whether they perceive personnel procedures to be ascriptive or achievement-based and whether they claim personal motives that are community-oriented or inner-oriented.

The authors mistake the differences in responses as confirmation of what they call a theory of bureaucratic culture. For example, they classify respondents according to how they answer one question about the complexity of the bureaucracy ("the public bureaucracy is so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on," p. 25) and then note how other questions that relate to the complexity of bureaucracy are answered (e.g., How efficacious are citizen efforts to influence the bureaucracy? Does the bureaucracy have an impact on problems? and Is the bureaucracy efficient?). The analysis identifies different dimensions of the same image and concept. It is not establishing causal relationships.

Sometimes the analysis goes beyond what the data allow. Chapter 3 discusses the respondents' cognitive patterns. There is, however, only data on perceptions. The authors failed to ask questions as to how much the respondents knew or understood about the Israeli bureaucracy and then measure the accuracy of the responses. Instead, Nachmias and Rosenbloom treat as cognitive data responses to questions like: "Thinking about the country's important institutions, about how much effect do you think the following institutions have on your daily life?" (p. 67).

Another example of where the analysis goes beyond the data is the authors' conclusion that the differences in responses between bureaucrats of different ranks is evidence of conflict and problems within the bureaucracy (p. 69). There is no evidence to link these perceptions to behavior; and to infer conflict, the authors should look at patterns within agencies, not the civil service as a whole.

The data and the discussion of representative bureaucracy are potentially useful. The data appear to show that Asian-African citizens of Israel have a lower sense of their political efficacy and a lower evaluation of the public bureaucracy than do European and Israeli-born citizens. While these differences are also evident among bureaucrats, being a member of the bureaucracy seems to have a homogenizing effect. Unfortunately, the discussion never gets beyond a superficial level and at times the analysis is misleading. As often happens, attitudes expressed in a questionnaire or interview are regarded as evidence of behavioral patterns. In addition, there is no clear distinction between a general anti-government sentiment and a gripe specifically against the bureaucracy.

To identify the implications of their findings for Israel's future, the authors claim that they are going to rely on the political development literature of the 1960s. Fortunately, they merely summaarize that literature and then forget it. The authors draw heavily upon participatory bureaucracy experiments in the United States to suggest changes. The Israeli reader must be frustrated because the discussion concentrates on U.S. experiences and says precious little about how the techniques and concepts of participatory bureaucracy might be applied in the Israeli setting. Those familiar with representative bureaucracy, organization development, citizen participation in administration and other forms of participatory bureaucracy are disappointed that the discussion is not more complete and that some of the major limitations and problems are not presented.

In short, this is a book fraught with difficulties. The analytical framework is flawed, the data is limited, the analysis is superficial and sometimes misleading, and the conclusions are not fully developed. It contributes little to a field that desperately needs good work.

DENNIS L. DRESANG

University of Wisconsin, Madison

Controversy: The Politics of Technical Decisions. Edited by Dorothy Nelkin. (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1979. Pp. 256. $16.00, cloth; $7.95, paper.)

There are no heroes in this book. But there are plenty of villains. Because space precludes a comprehensive enumeration, the following are but a few examples. First we have the Canadian Ministry of Transport, a federal agency established in 1936 "to rationalize transportation policy" in Canada. One of the ministry's more notable accomplishments toward this end was, Jerome Milch notes, to pour great amounts of money into the Gander Airport in Newfoundland in the 1950s, "just before the introduction to jet aircraft made non-stop trans-Atlantic flying possible" (p. 27).

Milch goes on to give us the details of another of the ministry's activities: a seven-year (1968–1975) attempt to bull through an ill-conceived plan for a new airport to serve metropolitan Toronto. The result was a controversy characterized by mutual cynicism and ill feeling on the part of Ministry technocrats and an impressive array of opponents and, in Milch's opinion, significant corrosion of the Canadian democratic process.

Next come the technocrats of New York State Electric and Gas Corporation (NYSE & G) with plans to build a nuclear power plant on the shore of Lake Cayuga. Dorothy Nelkin is astringent in assessing the company's half-decade (1967–1973) effort to deal with criticisms of the proposal: "Most of the company's presentations were defensive, seeking to reassure the public without refuting specific criticisms.... Faced with attacks from scientists and citizen's groups, NYSE & G management's main response was that the charges were 'premature' " (p. 60). All in all, Nelkin's account of NYSE & G's behavior is a discouraging story of another institution destroying its own legitimacy in the eyes of many citizens.

The theme returns in Susan Fallows' review of part of the complex history of the dispute over radioactive waste disposal. It is a history in light of which the present confusion and apprehension of the public—including the non-expert technical public—is hardly surprising. For years the responsible agency of the (American, this time) federal government confused dogmatic assertion with programmatic achievement, refuting critics "by simply claiming that a safe, proven method for waste management did exist" (p. 94).

The Food and Drug Administration's multi-year resistance to the contention that a widely used animal feed supplement might be carcinogenic is the next illustration of incompetent handling of a technical controversy: "The policy makers used scientific uncertainty to choose interpretations which supported their own preferences" (p. 118). In this controversy, the FDA's policy preferences were suspiciously congruent with the financial interests of farmers (who were the FDA's "clientele") using the chemical additive.

We return to the private sector for the next imbroglio. Faced with mounting concern about the occupational hazards of vinyl chloride, the chemical industry resorted, among other things, to predictions about the "dire consequences of stringent standards.... Throughout the controversy industry sought to downplay the dangers of exposure to workers, minimize the environmental effects, and resist promulgation of standards which would require considerable investment" (p. 133). Once again, the case study—this one written by Michael Brown—is a record of systematic institutional mal-performance that constitutes an important partial response to the now-common complaints of business executives about lack of public trust in them.

The same is true of Judith Reppy's account of the Ford Motor Company's opposition to the automobile air bag. Now, this is a gadget that I have personally long regarded with some suspicion. Yet Ford's stubborn resistance to it seems, at the very least, to have been only loosely correlated with the real technical uncertainty about the air bag's effectiveness and reliability. Moreover, it is pretty clear that the effect of the company's behavior was to enhance, not reduce, the public's confusion.

The FDA returns for an encore in James Petersen's and Gerald Harkle's partial account of the laetrile controversy. In fairness, the laetrile business is obviously an empirical and emotional tangle that would try the competence of the most wisely managed regulatory agency. But the FDA, supported by the medical community, appears to have attempted to manage the controversy principally "by invoking an ideology of expertise" (p. 174). The result again was to enhance rather than reduce confusion, frustration, and distrust.

In her thoughtful introductory essay, Dorothy Nelkin observes that "participation as an ideology in American society is increasing in importance even as technical complexity acts to limit effective political choice" (p. 14). The marvelous collection of case studies that she has assembled raises some truly disturbing questions about both the causes and effects of this development.

Again and again we see responsible public and private sector officials oblivious to the fact that ostensibly technical debates involve "political choices from among competing social values" (p. 14). We see systematic failure to recognize, much less respond effectively and responsibly to "the ultimate and ubiquitous question: Who should control crucial policy choices?" (p. 14).

Nelkin's anthology does not tell us where these failures are leading our political and economic system. But it does give those of us who were already worried much to think about. I hope that the cases in this book are widely read and discussed by business and government executives as well as students. For the book is a vivid and troubling demonstration that our economic and political leaders need the insights that such discussions promise.

I. C. Bupp

Harvard Business School

Military Politics in Nigeria: Economic Development and Political Stability. By Theophilus Olatunde Odetola. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1978. Pp. xxvi + 179. $14.95.)

Scholars who have made strong arguments that military governments are unable to perform as well as civilian governments are not going to like this book. Odetola examines the Nigerian situation, compares the multiparty system with that of the military government period and concludes that the "military government has emerged as a direct consequence of the crises of authority and legitimacy, and they are holding the fort (however temporarily) better than a democratic party system based on a western model would have performed at this time." These conclusions contradict many studies both descriptive and empirical, which attempt to show the negative impact of the military on the economy, on the political system, and on the general development of political institutions. What makes this study particularly challenging and, it might be added, authoritative, is the author's integration of empirical data with descriptive assessments, and an analytical judgment based on intimate knowledge of the country.

Odetola uses military-bureaucratic and party-bureaucratic models as a comparative framework. He makes it clear that his focus is on Nigeria, with no pretenses about developing a universal theory applicable to all military systems in developing areas. Applying the two models, Odetola examines the levels of political development and stability, concluding that the military government performed better than the civilian government in Nigeria. Strengthening the central government and reducing the power of regional separatists, the military government has been able to "take greater control of strategic areas of policy and to show greater ability to manage national affairs." Under the party system, the author contends that the regimes became "all but separate states."

In examining resource allocation and the economic structure of power, Odetola concludes that the military government has also performed better than the multiparty system. Strengthening the federal system has given the government power to allocate resources in a more equitable way and to stimulate development without fearing ethnic politics and jealousies. According to Odetola, under the civilian system "economic and political institutions had completely degenerated and were incapable of further sustaining effective rule." The military has fostered greater economic independence and has been able to preserve vital sources of foreign investments. While these observations do not capture the scope and depth of the study, they do indicate the general thrust and dimensions of the author's assessment. Supported by empirical examination of such things as levels of instability and economic growth, Odetola has presented a persuasive argument about the positive role being played by the military government in Nigeria. Simultaneously, he provides evidence indicating the ineffectiveness of party rule during Nigeria's first years of independence.

There are some weaknesses in the treatment, stemming primarily from the incompleteness of the theoretical framework and the lack of critical study of the military's own weaknesses as rulers. There appears to be only an indirect linkage between the theoretical framework and the organization of the book. The problem is that Odetola does not spell out clearly the major elements in the military-bureaucratic model. His case could have been strengthened by more attention to the application of the specifics of the comparative model to the substance of the material in the book.

Odetola also neglects to discuss seriously the problems of military rule. It is necessary to examine the impact of military rule and political pressures on the military institution itself and the concept of military professionalism. The last few pages of the book do touch upon these matters, but do not pursue them seriously.

The material for the book is limited primarily to the 1973–1974 period of General Gowon's rule. As most are aware, much has taken place in Nigeria since that time. While Odetola does attempt to update his work with a postscript, too little attention is given to the impact of Nigerian oil on the domestic economy and politics. In this respect, an excellent study is *Soldiers and Oil: The Political Transformation of Nigeria*, edited by Keith Panter-Brick (Frank Cass, 1978).

Odetola's study effectively challenges the notion of a civilian-military dichotomy. The Nigerian case shows that there is little justification for making arbitrary distinctions between the civilian and military ruling elite. The author shows that military leadership can provide effective rule and can stimulate economic development and the growth of political institutions—at least in the Nigerian case. This book is an excellent addition to the existing literature on African political systems in general and to the study of the African military in particular. It is a major contribution to restoring a sense of balance to assessments of military performance in African systems.

SAM C. SARKESIAN

Loyola University, Chicago

The Future of Brazil. Edited by William H. Overholt. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1978. Pp. xxii + 289. $19.50.)

A volume purporting to analyze the future prospects of a rapidly emerging country, but written just on the eve of the most important political developments of the past decade and a half, requires a caution to the prospective reader. For although the basic perspective of this collaborative volume is sound, much of the "future" with which the authors are concerned is by now already history. The current transition to democracy actually began soon after the cut-off date of this work. Thus, for example, the solid treatment of Brazilian politics by Riordan Roett terminates under the shadow of the dramatic application of authoritarian powers by then President Ernesto Geisel in April 1977. Since that time, however, the regime has itself undertaken a carefully designed process of dismantling the structures of arbitrary authority and has engineered the establishment of a viable party system and complementary mediating institutions which would permit the orderly resumption of competitive political life. The exceptional powers of the post-1964 military administrations were phased out in late 1978; João Figueiredo, a retired general who succeeded to the presidency in March 1979, has already guided a broad amnesty bill through a reinvigorated Congress and is moving ahead toward reform of the party and electoral system, while civilian candidates are already emerging for the presidential succession of 1984–1985. In the economic and social spheres, trends under the new government are most often essentially in the direction of what the authors found lacking as of 1976–1977, so that, thoughtfully and critically read, this book does help explain the background of more recent developments.

William Overholt, who organized this volume as part of his work at Herman Kahn's Hudson Institute, has drawn upon the contributions of his coauthors for synthesis into a nearly 50-page "overview" which replaces the usual brief introductory essay of most such symposia. He duly underscores the importance of Brazil's contemporary experience and strikes a note of justifiable optimism for the future. For in his assessment:

> Since 1967 Brazil has been one of the developing world's greatest success stories. It has maintained social peace, avoided disastrous conflicts with its neighbors, achieved a substantial degree of independence from the whims of the rich countries, and above all has achieved one of history's highest rates of economic growth. These achievements have carried with them costs and risks, most notably authoritarian politics, social inequality, and a new dependence on foreign credits, but they are solid achievements nonetheless. The great questions are whether the achievements can be sustained

> and whether the costs and risks will ultimately make the achievements seem empty (p. 1).

While admitting "pitfalls and problems" along the way, he concludes that:

> an economy dynamic in every sector, an international policy oriented to development rather than hegemony, an administrative system firmly based on merit, a society peculiarly immune to internecine violence, and a widespread but flexible commitment to the goal of representative government, justify much of the confidence Brazilians express as they confront their problems (p. 46).

By and large the substantial expertise of the several coauthors is reflected in their chapters. Weakest beyond a doubt is William Ascher's short essay on "Brazil's Future Foreign Relations" (pp. 49–70). Indeed, greater depth on this subject is woven into Roett's treatment of "The Political Future of Brazil" (pp. 71–102). With respect to this essay, however, the reader must bear in mind that the Brazilian military have launched upon a process of extracting themselves from responsibility for governing not foreseen by the author. Douglas Graham more than pulls his weight in assessing the "Structural Legacies and Future Prospects" of Brazil's economy (pp. 103–47) albeit essentially from a perspective of early 1977. Quite informative but perhaps more dated is Sylvia Hewlett's lengthy paper on "The State and Brazilian Economic Development: The Contemporary Reality and Prospects for the Future" (pp. 149–210). Hewlett's frequent references to 1977 in the future tense at least alert the reader to the fact that the impact of political factors upon economic performance may well by now be rather different than as in her analysis. The final two chapters—one by the editor on Brazil's foreign debt position and one by Keith Rosenn concerning treatment of foreign investment—are clearly directed toward business people and are quite technical in nature. The analysis is quite sound, but the reader might wish to bear in mind that by the end of 1978 both the figures for foreign debt and cumulative foreign investment were much higher than those cited by the authors ($43.5 billion as compared to $30 billion in the first instance and up some 50 percent to $13.5 billion in the latter case).

RONALD M. SCHNEIDER

Queens College,
City University of New York

The Cultural Limits of Revolutionary Politics: Change and Continuity in Socialist Czechoslovakia. By David W. Paul. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979. Pp. x + 361. $18.50.)

This book is more than a mere addition to the rather substantial amount of literature concerned with the politics of postwar Czechoslovakia (G. Golan, V. V. Kusín, H. G. Skilling et al.). As the title indicates, the author aimed at coping with the exciting, yet demanding, unquantifiable phenomena of political culture, factors substantially affecting the intended course of societal transformation under the communist management. Despite the violent rupture of traditional norms "Revolutionary societies often *seem* to be changing more than they actually are" (p. 1). Past experience is the tool the citizenry employs in interpreting contemporary reality. Despite the regime's claim about the "new socialist man," the citizen remains in part a product of the pre-revolutionary past (p. 130).

D. W. Paul asserts that the political culture of Czechoslovakia has been conditioned by national insecurity and external pressures. He points to the ambivalence of the Czech national character—insecurity and soul-searching on the one hand and messianism with a touch of arrogance on the other. The significant differences between the historical experience of the Czechs (advanced, industrialized, surviving under the rather benign Austrian rule) and of the Slovaks (backward, rural, exposed to Magyar chauvinism) is stressed in a great detail, as are pluralistic tendencies in the society (Ch. 5), problems of national identity (Ch. 6) and the tradition of political nonviolence (Ch. 8).

Some readers may consider the author's attention to detail and/or to a single source of reference excessive (e.g., p. 201, concerning strategies of early twentieth-century Slovak political parties, and six pages, p. 160 f., devoted to one book—Pavel Machonin, ed., *Československa Společnost*). However, D. W. Paul deserves considerable praise for the number of primary and secondary sources he has explored, for his copious footnotes, for his substantial explanatory comments, and for the flawless accuracy of his spelling of Slavic terms, complete with all the tricky diacritic marks. In all, this is a handsome book, a welcome contribution to the literature of comparative communism and political cultures.

A point of criticism may be raised regarding the book's structure. Similar and even identical themes reappear in more than one chapter. On the other hand, chapter 3, entitled "The Communist Tradition: From Subculture to Ruling Elite" (pp. 78–129) starts with elaboration on different subjects, and ends with the subchapter entitled "The Nature of the Soviet Empire." Not everybody will agree with Paul's assertion that the communist reformers in 1968, "self-confident of their abilities and basking in a false sense of security, discovered too late that the ultimate arbiter of their policies . . . was the Soviet Politburo" (p. 55). Even if Dubček and his team do not deserve laurels for supreme statesmanship, imbeciles they were not (*vide* recent writings by the Vienna-based former insider Zdeněk Mlynář).

Paul's characterization of the Good Soldier Švejk, the alleged incarnation of the Czech national character, is hardly accurate. According to Paul, instead of fighting an oppressive and absurd world, Švejk chooses to ridicule it (p. 257). On the contrary: Švejkism involves a *pretense* of dumbness as a form of survival and resistance, at times a truly effective one.

The most careful editorial assistance, it seems, cannot be careful enough. A factual error slipped by on page 57: Communist leader Antonín Novotný did not spend the war years in exile but in a Nazi concentration camp (as correctly noted on p. 323, n. 6).

Whereas the author uses sources as recent as 1977, the bulk of the material on which he bases his analysis of contemporary Czechoslovakia stems from the early seventies. Creeping obsolescence is inevitable. Thus the movement around Charter 77 was not suppressed in 1977 (p. 26) but has grown; by 1979 the ranks of its signatories have augmented fivefold; numerous position papers were issued (including a report on a nuclear plant accident in Czechoslovakia); and overall it has received great attention in the country and abroad. The prominent writer Milan Kundera (p. 46) went to exile. New important themes have appeared on the Czechoslovak scene, notably, the "new social contract"—tranquility as a reward for docility (the best analysis so far presented was by the dramatist Václav Havel in an open letter to Gustáv Husák), deterioration of the relation between the Czechs and the Slovaks, and the emergence of the "alternate, respectively parallel activity," the second culture. These developments are worthy of scholarly interest.

In conclusion, D. W. Paul offers several well-formulated propositions with regard to the political culture in general and the Czechoslovak case in particular.

Otto Ulč

State University of New York, Binghamton

Patterns of Japanese Policymaking: Experiences from Higher Education. By T. J. Pempel. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1978. Pp. xiii + 248. $16.00.)

Since Japanese higher education was "democratized," along with a host of other social and political institutions, during the postwar Allied occupation of the country, a number of significant changes have taken place both in its structure and practices. The most visible and in many ways important in the long run among these changes have been the shift of administrative control from faculty conferences to the central government bureaucracy at national universities, the dramatic expansion of student enrollments, accompanied by a steady deterioration in the quality of education, at major private universities, and the emergence of specialized institutions of technical and vocational education at the tertiary level, partially at the expense of the earlier emphasis on humanistic liberal arts education. These changes have resulted, however, from government policies formulated and implemented in quite different ways. To explain why the relevant policies evolved so differently and with what outcomes is one of T. J. Pempel's two main purposes. The other purpose is to identify logical patterns in the three types of policymaking processes and construct "intermediate-level" models of public policy making in an advanced industrial society.

In his efforts to accomplish the dual objectives, Pempel traces in detail the evolution of government policies in the three issue areas and identifies a distinct pattern in each area: policy making by camp conflict, incrementalism and pressure group politics. These patterns are distinct in terms of three functional variables, namely, the degrees of the affect, scope and divisibility of the particular issue, and two structural variables, namely, the relevant legal requirements governing the policymaking process and the mobilizational capability of the major actor groups involved. Thus the issue of administrative control was characterized by high affect, broad scope and indivisibility, its resolution calling for legislative actions in which the entrenched and polarized political camps were directly engaged in periodic and often violent confrontations. In contrast, the policy of enrollment expansion was characterized by low affect, broad but diffuse scope and nearly infinite divisibility; it was attained nearly exclusively by bureaucratic devices, notably the non-enforcement of chartering and accreditation standards, without provoking the mobilization of any specific political groups. The case of specialization and technical education fell between these two polar types.

The book makes several important contributions to the study of policy making in contemporary Japan. First, it deals with an enormously important but long-neglected subject. Particularly interesting to a student of Japanese politics are the brief but illuminating comments on the role and behavior of the nation's educational bureaucracy and the various formal and informal policy instruments frequently employed by it. Second, it provides a concise but comprehensive history of higher education in modern Japan. This is the most sophisticated and informative piece of writing found in either the English or the Japanese language in this respect. Third, it presents a set of explicit and provocative, if less than entirely convincing, generalizations about the nature of policy making in postwar Japan and, by implication, in any advanced industrial society. The book thus has great relevance beyond the specific Japanese context.

To construct empirical models of general applicability in political science is, however, a difficult task fraught with the risks of rapid obsolescence and definitional problems. That the book shows marks of such problems should surprise nobody, but it will be fair to point out at least a few of them. The "camp conflict" model has been made obsolescent to some extent, as the author himself implies, by the breakdown of the once-monolithic camps of the Right and the Left and the emergence of a multiparty pattern in Japanese party politics. The distinction between the "incrementalist" and "pressure group" models is not as evident as Pempel suggests: his own analysis shows that the enrollment expansion has resulted largely from the subtle pressures exerted by private university administrators and served big business interests in the same sense as did the promotion of specialized technical education. Ambiguities about the meanings of certain key terms becloud some of his otherwise persuasive conclusions, notably "policy" as it is used in reference to a series of ad hoc bureaucratic actions leading to enrollment expansion, "class" to refer to income-level categories, and the "open" versus "closed" process of policy making used as a criterion of "democracy" in the concluding chapter.

The book thus offers an informative and provocative study of policy making in Japanese higher education with a set of models of somewhat problematic validity. Along with its shorter version found in *Policymaking in Contemporary Japan* (Cornell, 1977), which was edited by the same author, the book is a welcome addition to the growing literature on Japanese policy making in particular and comparative policy studies in general.

HARUHIRO FUKUI

University of California, Santa Barbara

The Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction. By Gianfranco Poggi. (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1978. Pp. xiii + 175. $10.95.)

"The first duty of an iconoclast," writes Gianfranco Poggi in his preface, "is to know his icons." On that principle, Poggi turns away from the critique of state power and toward the analysis of the changing formal structure of modern states. An initial comparison of politics-as-allocation à la David Easton with politics-as-coercion à la Carl Schmitt makes it seem for a moment that the book will concentrate on the relations of different sorts of states to dominant classes and interests, but that illusion soon disappears. Although Poggi does discuss the place of major classes within various kinds of state, even that discussion takes second place to the treatment of institutional structure. *The Development of the Modern State* is a typological primer for the principal systems of rule which have appeared in Western countries since the Middle Ages. Most of the book goes into descriptions of four large types: the feudal system of rule, the Standestaat (the state joining a ruler with a set of power-holding estates and other corporate bodies), the absolutist system of rule, and the nineteenth-century constitutional state. Poggi's presentation of these types is competent, lucid, and admirably concise; the reader who wants to know the chief institutional features of each type need look no farther. His didactic skill has its drawbacks, to be sure: the portrayals remind me of painting-by-numbers: the obligatory comparison of Louis XIV and Frederick the Great, the inevitable reference to the twentieth-century expansion of state bureaucracies, and so on. The typological approach draws attention away from the processes by which one type supplanted another, not to mention the historical continuities across types one can discover in a Spain, a Germany, or a Great Britain. Ultimately, we get a useful but idealized static analysis of each type's internal structure.

The analysis is only thinly historical in the sense that it spends little time asking such questions as why the European seventeenth century should have produced a certain type of state, and the European nineteenth century another. On the whole, Poggi brushes causal analysis—historical or not—aside. He is more concerned with *what* than *how*, more concerned with *how* than *why*. That is, of course, his right; but it has some unfortunate consequences. The book contains almost nothing on the way war-making shaped state structures, precious little on the central place of fund-raising and its various modalities, only passing references to the class bases of different systems of rule. Since, in the experience Poggi is reviewing, preparations for war were the largest, costliest and most influential activities most states ever carried on, since the raising of taxes and other revenues created more bureaucracy than any other governmental task, and since accounts such as that of Barrington Moore put the class base at the heart of explanations of variation from one sort of state to another, the excision of these topics leaves a curiously truncated explanation of the state. Let's be clear, then, about what we don't have, and greatful for what we do have. We don't have a sustained account of how and why national states came to be the dominant organizations in the Western world, or of how and why one dominant form of state succeeded another. We do have a compact, accessible description of the chief features of the major historical types, and a sketch of some connections among those features. We have, in short, a useful working-up of four significant cases—grist for the old mill of comparative politics.

Charles Tilly

University of Michigan

Perspectives for Change in Communist Societies. Edited by Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979. Pp. xii + 194. $16.75.)

The majority of Western analyses of communist political systems published during the 1950s and early 1960s were based on the assumptions of the totalitarian model developed originally in the works of Sigmund Neumann, Hannah Arendt, and Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski. During the past decade, however, ever since the publication of *Change in Communist Systems*, edited by Chalmers Johnson, these assumptions have been challenged and concepts such as "change," "modernization," "political development," and "political innovation" have come to dominate a substantial portion of the work dealing with communist political systems. The most recent contribution to this literature is *Perspectives for Change in Communist Societies*, which includes a number of articles originally presented at the 1976 annual meetings of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies supplemented by several additional case studies. It represents a welcome contribution to our understanding of the factors that both stimulate and restrict change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

The volume begins with a broad theoretical assessment by the editor of "Aspects of Political Change." After discussing the types, scope, direction and stimuli of change in communist systems, Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone contends that most of the pressures for change in the Soviet Union challenge the leading role of the communist party. She concludes that insofar as change has occurred in communist political systems, it has not affected the primary role of the party and that "the system is basically incapable of adapting to a democratic-type challenge" (p. 24). However, only in those countries with aspects of a democratic political culture—Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland—has this resulted in an immediate threat to political stability.

In a perceptive chapter on "Marxism-Leninism: Systemic Legitimacy and Political Culture," Carl A. Linden maintains that the Soviet party-state has failed to develop a viable culture—either political, literary, artistic, or philosophical. As the system moves ever further from the period of revolutionary upheaval, this failure presents a more serious problem, for the culture that has evolved in the USSR has generally challenged the ideocratic system of the party-state.

Sidney Ploss, in "The Leading Role of the Party: Is There a Change?" concludes that the relationship between the Communist party and the rest of society in the Soviet Union has been characterized primarily by continuity—in spite of a number of reforms in the system created by Stalin.

In a discussion of "Imperatives of Economic Reform and Communist Political Systems," John P. Hardt maintains that although effective introduction of Western technology in communist systems requires a restructuring of the managerial system, the Soviets have not yet shown a willingness to innovate—even though the Hungarians and Poles have permitted the development of Western technology-management enclaves that are substantially independent from party and economic bureaucratic controls.

Arpad Abonyi and Ivan J. Sylvain examine "The Impact of CMEA Integration on Social Change in Eastern Europe: The Case of Hungary's New Economic Mechanism." They conclude that the regional integration strategy of the Soviet Union embodied in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance has required Hungary to modify and virtually eliminate the major elements of the New Economic Mechanism.

The one communist state in which substantial political change has occurred over the course of the past quarter-century is Yugoslavia. In "Participation, Change, and Stability: Yugoslavia in Comparative Perspective," Gary K. Bertsch outlines the types of changes that have occurred within the Yugoslav system, but concludes that they do not yet comprise basic structural changes that might permit us to speak of a change in the system—i.e., "The party leadership has not relinquished ultimate control of the information and coercion variables. . ." (p. 137).

Probably the most innovative of the presentations in this book is Jan T. Gross' "Thirty Years of Crisis Management in Poland." Gross argues that the Communist party in Poland has failed to manage conflict and that this failure stems largely from its inability to generate adequate information concerning social preferences. There is no hope, he concludes, "for effective conflict management in Poland unless the opposition becomes, to some degree, institutionalized" (p. 164).

In the final contribution on "Ethnicity and Change in the Soviet Union" Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone examines the significance of ethnicity for change and potential conflict in the Soviet Union. In spite of efforts by the party to eliminate the importance of ethnic and national characteristics, their significance for the future of the Soviet system has in fact increased, she concludes. Unless the Soviet leadership allows some evolution of the political system, growing ethnic pressures "may eventually lead to an explosion. Latent separatism may also come to the fore in case of a major international upheaval" (p. 186).

The major argument of most of the contributions to *Perspectives for Change in Communist Societies* is that although some changes have occurred in the communist political systems, they have not touched on the fundamental nature of the party-state system created by Lenin and "perfected" by Stalin. The fact that socioeconomic developments have resulted in substantial modifications in the societies of these countries—including pressures for participation—means that the stability of the existing authoritarian systems may be increasingly challenged.

Although Rakowska-Harmstone and her associates provide many insights into the process of change in European communist states, most of them fail to relate their discussion to the substantial literature relevant to their areas of concern. In addition, the book lacks either an introduction or conclusion that synthesizes the material and highlights questions for further research. Still, *Perspectives for Change in Communist Societies* is an important new book that adds significantly to the ongoing discussion of the nature of communist societies.

ROGER E. KANET

University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

Scandinavian Political Studies, Volume 12/77. Edited by Stein Rokkan. (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1978. Pp. 288. $18.50.)

This is the final volume of the series published annually by the political science associations of the five Nordic countries. Since 1966 these volumes have presented some of the best current research in Scandinavia to a global professional audience. While earlier volumes divided their attention between theoretical and empirical articles, concise analyses of contemporary Scandinavian politics, and, usually, a bibliography, this final volume focuses on the growth and development of the political science profession between 1960 and 1975. Accordingly, it will be of considerable interest to a limited readership.

Part 1 summarizes the growth of the political science profession in each of the five Nordic countries since 1960. Each country's professional development is treated by a single native author. There has been considerable national variation in the origins and early period of professional development with a strong tendency toward confluence since the late 1960s. Sweden has the longest tradition of a separate political science profession, but as in Finland, a modern political science field first appeared in the interwar period. In Norway political science research had been carried out in the law faculties before World War II, but a separate profession was established after the war. In Denmark, the origins were similar, but a distinct discipline originated in the late 1950s, while in Iceland the establishment of political science occurred a decade later. In each of the countries, the 1960s was a "boom" decade with rapidly increasing student enrollments, faculty positions, and degrees awarded. Most of the degree recipients found employment in education with a smaller number taking positions in the civil service and journalism. Although national variations again became important in the 1970s, the rate of expansion slowed considerably except in the case of Iceland. Each of the essays devotes considerable attention to the organization of political studies within the national university system. The earlier tendency for individual departments to specialize within a subfield has gradually given way to a broader organization as departments expanded. American readers must remember that Scandinavian universities traditionally commence their studies at a more advanced level than North American schools. Even in Sweden, where the traditional university entrance exams have been replaced by a more open system, most of the instruction occurs at the "graduate" level.

The second part of the volume focuses more specifically on the trends of political research in the Nordic countries between 1960 and 1975. Again there are some differences from other national political research systems because of the greater academic heterogeneity of Scandinavian departments. Each department has its own instructors in political science, economics, sociology, and history, and this necessarily reflects on the research products. In the earlier part of the period considered here, it is possible to generalize about both the methodological and substantive focus of Scandinavian political research. The earlier research was highly behavioristic, reflecting the broader Western trend during the early 1960s. Greater methodological variety became evident in the late 1960s with Marxist and critical approaches gaining greater favor. Unfortunately, several of the authors, particularly Peter Nannestad in his review of the Danish experience, note the poor communications and interaction between the Marxist-oriented researchers and the rest of the profession. This observation does not, however, seek to lay blame. It is possible to identify areas where Scandinavian research has been especially intensive and strong. Electoral and voter studies, inspired by American and British examples give a fairly complete picture for the elections held since 1960 (and in some cases earlier). In international relations the security policy and foreign policy concerns of these small states has been highlighted and attempts have been made to develop some theory of small state behavior. A newer trend of the 1970s has been the rise of policy analysis and institutional behavior.

The expansion in the quantity of research is especially impressive. In each case national social science research council have provided funds for individual and collective projects. (Parenthetically one must add that Scandinavian political scientists have striven to maintain close contact with foreign colleagues.) Foreign study, exchange research and teaching positions, and vigorous participation at international conferences has brought their work to the attention of many. Much of their work has either been published originally in English (or less frequently in French and German), while summarizing articles make much of the remainder accessible to foreign colleagues. The volume demonstrates this in an extensive cumulative bibliography which reproduces many of the items originally noted in earlier volumes of *Scandinavian Political Studies* as well as additional items.

The cumulative bibliography will be of considerable value to two groups: those investigating the Scandinavian countries and those seeking the studies conducted by Scandinavian political scientists. The titles of items appearing in the Scandinavian languages are translated into English. While that may not improve access for those lacking the necessary language skills, it does facilitate foreign research and international contacts. It is hard to generalize about the vast scope of 15 years of Nordic political research. Nearly every conceivable topic has been treated by Scandinavian political scientists. There are, however, some surprising variations in the intensity of the effort. The United States has been touched very lightly by Scandinavian researchers except as part of more general international relations research. Domestic American institutions are rarely treated. Has the size and presumed quality of American political science deterred our Scandinavian colleagues? If so, the record of monumental contributions to the understanding of American politics made by foreign colleagues should encourage our Scandinavian friends to venture forth. The strength of our profession in the Nordic countries is amply demonstrated by this useful concluding volume. The end of the series is more technical than real; in 1978 *Scandinavian Political Studies* became a quarterly journal.

ERIC S. EINHORN

University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Political Order: Rewards, Punishments and Political Stability. By Uriel Rosenthal. (Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1978. Pp. xi + 286. Dfl. 57.00; $27.00.)

Uriel Rosenthal's study on political order has joined those within our discipline who have attempted to bring some meaning and coherence to the very nebulous but crucial concept of "political stability." This concept of stability—or "political order" in Rosenthal's terms—has in the past meant all things as various people in the profession (this reviewer included) offered a plethora of theoretical overviews, operational definitions and/or empirical measures. The previous research has presented index after index describing the degree or amount of stability that selected polities evidence as well as analyses of the factors which could possibly explain the observed differences in stability levels.

Employing a reward-punishment theoretical framework of political order, Rosenthal analyzes six of the major and most often used operational definitions of stability. These are then related to the prospects of long-run political stability, stagnation, the threat of destabilization, and to short-run political stability. The six "notions" of political order reviewed are: (1) the absence of structural change or, in a positive sense, the ability of a political system to adapt to a changing environment without undergoing basic or drastic structural alterations—persistence of pattern would be a more descriptive term; (2) rulebound politics or the overwhelming observance of known universalistic regularities; (3) legitimacy—the political system is perceived as right and proper by most of the population and thus, conversely, there is very little anti-system feelings; (4) institutionalized politics, described by Rosenthal to be the slow integration of expectations within an existing pattern of norms and values as well as the conscious act of institution-building; (5) the limitation of violence—the absence of domestic civil conflict, violent behavior and the prevalence of peaceful and eufunctional methods to manage change; and (6) the longevity (some would say stubbornness) of chief executives and specific governments—this involves both the absolute quantity *and* the qualitative nature of political succession and elite turnover.

The contribution of this monograph is *not* with new empirical analyses or data. Rather, whatever merit or service to the profession it may offer derives from the author's wide-ranging review and attempted integration of the previous literature on political stability. Rosenthal has obviously read an immense amount in preparing his book and I cannot think of a single scholar involved with "stability" who has not been reviewed. It is no small feat to summarize the views of approximately 90 people and to show the interrelationships, inconsistencies and tensions among them.

I do, however, have some reservations about the overall usefulness of the book. To begin with, the monograph is not written for the uninitiated or for those unfamiliar with the literature. It is quite difficult for the novice to gain a full understanding of the previous literature since (1) one cannot do justice to scholarly arguments in a few short paragraphs and (2) a single author's view is too often divided across separate sections of the present book. A full understanding of the rich detail of the literature is only hinted at but not delivered. The book appears to be written for the 90-or-so scholars who have more than a surface knowledge of the literature but Rosenthal really does not tell us much that we don't already know (or should know).

A second reservation I have about the book—and this concerns both those among us who try to make a living by writing about political stability as well as first-year graduate students—involves the use of language. The book is written in a style of English which has become all-too-frequent from European scholars (Rosenthal is at Erasmus University in Rotterdam): the jargon of the discipline is overwhelming. In an entirely different context, the *Times* of London has called this dialect "techno-English"—it does rule out ambiguity but it is not a book one will wish to read while commuting.

But, for those who are prepared to make the effort, *Political Order* does present in one volume a scholarly overview of political stability. Rosenthal rightly recognizes that political stability is a multifaceted societal attribute and that to have any understanding of the concept, one must shy away from mono-measures and employ a multivariate approach.

LEON HURWITZ

Cleveland State University

Labyrinths of Power: Political Recruitment in Twentieth-Century Mexico. By Peter H. Smith. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979. Pp. xvi + 384. $25.00, cloth; $9.75, paper.)

Peter Smith has created a pioneering analysis of Mexico's twentieth-century elite. Using data on 6,302 political leaders, and a computer, he attempts to answer several basic questions about the acquisition and retention of political power in Mexico. Smith asks: "Who governs? Who has access to power, and what are the social conditions of rule?" (p. 3). He also studies the patterns of political careers and attempts to resolve an old debate concerning how members of the post-revolutionary elite may differ from their counterparts prior to 1910. Smith also attempts to ascertain the basis of Mexican political behavior. He asks: "If you don't attain high office by amassing a popular vote, . . . or by ascending the military hierarchy, . . . then how do you do it?" (p. 4). The transformation of political elite members is his primary concern. Smith's conceptual predisposition is to take elite composition as the dependent variable, while political and economic factors constitute independent variables.

Smith defines the Mexican elite, for purposes of analysis, as those holding high office in government, congress, cabinet, ruling party, government-controlled or government-supported economic entities, as well as governors and ambassadors (to name the major officials included). The period under scrutiny is 1900–1971. Chapter 10 constitutes a case study of the 1971–76 period—an example of crisis management. Many of his comparisons are made by means of "cohorts": the pre-revolutionary (1900–1910) (N=610), the revolutionary (1917–1940) (N=2,289), and the post-revolutionary (1946–1971) (N=2,008).

Smith's findings confirm, in part, what Mexican specialists have suspected all along: the political elite has always come mainly from the middle class. Moreover, "its hegemony has been increasing over time" (p. 10). The fundamental determinants of elite composition seem to derive from socioeconomic rather than political criteria. The revolution separated the political and economic elites. In fact, *"the Revolution redistributed political power among relatively dispossessed segments of the . . . middle class"* (p. 102). Social background has never provided guarantees of political success in Mexico. Offices above the Chamber of Deputies level, however, do correlate with higher social origin. Entrance to the elite, it appears, has been based largely on ascription, while "upward mobility within the elite may have been based on achievement" (p. 132). Moreover, the route to advancement "has remained breadth of experience, not narrow specialization" (p. 156). But an element of uncertainty and surprise has continued within a tutelary regime, in conformity with Linz's model of an authoritarian system. Mexico's "no re-election" law adds to the uncertainty. The rules of advancement are clearer today, however, than in earlier periods.

As previous authors have observed, the new industrialists do not move into political positions. Smith reasons that the "lower-class goals," oft-stated by revolutionaries, were not fulfilled because the middle-class governments since Carranza in 1917 have never abandoned their basic commitment to capitalism. As a result, only a fragmentary cooptation of the "lower class" has occurred. Members of the elite are predominantly urban, middle-class, university-trained and professional—increasingly lawyers and economists. Most important, the upper levels of power have become dominated by "lifelong bureaucrats who have gradually worked their way up through the national government hierarchy" (p. 186). One stays in government by moving up. This places officeholders at the mercy of their superiors. Smith finds that elite circulation has not conformed to Pareto's system, which requires more "lower-class" incorporation in order to guarantee institutional stability.

Considerable centralization has occurred. In fact, "power has come to reside in a monolithic presidential *system* rather than in the person of an omnipotent individual" (p. 187). The ruling party, the PRI, has created an authoritarian system rather than "institutionalizing" the revolution. Smith concludes that Mexico does not have a "power elite," yet Mexico does reveal *"overlapping cliques"*—but these do not bring entrepreneurs and politicians into contact. Mexico appears to have a fragmented power structure, therefore, dominated by two competitive elites, often publicly at odds. The PRI advocates "growth and change within a *capitalist framework,"* yet the governing elite does not do so on behalf of a *"capitalist class"* (p. 215). Officeholders identify with the state only, perhaps as a result of the formation of full-time careers in politics.

Like previous authors, Smith finds the sectoral system—Popular, Labor and Peasant—which functions within the PRI to be subordinated to the interests of the middle class. And he concludes: "As befits a corporate state, lower-class people to not represent themselves" (p. 240).

Twenty-two fundamental rules of the game for the successful officeholder are propounded in chapter 9—both for aspiring and for retiring politicians. He demonstrates that Mexican political behavior is entirely rational, and capable of adaptation. At last, we have, through the medium of Smith's work, a thorough and satisfactory explanation of that peculiar corporate political system that is Mexican. And, moreover, that explanation is based upon a prodigious quantitative effort, unlike all previous attempts.

HAROLD SIMS

University of Pittsburgh

The French Stake in Algeria, 1945–1962. By Tony Smith. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1978. Pp. 199. $15.00.)

Why did France cling so tenaciously and brutally to Algeria even after most of the other parts of its empire had broken away or had been cast loose? For Tony Smith the answer lies in something he calls the "Colonial Consensus," an articulated rendering of the "collective conscience of the French political elite." He gives primacy to this phenomenon over those of strategic or economic interest in explaining the determination of the Fourth and Fifth Republics not to concede. "The major stake the French had in Algeria was a certain image of themselves in the world. . ." (p. 127). "At the heart of the colonial consensus [was] the conviction that French decadence was responsible for the loss of overseas empire. And so the colonies must be held, for to acquiesce in the termination of empire, especially in the loss of Algeria, would be the final symptom of a national loss of virility which had haunted the French political mind since the defeat of 1870" (p. 172).

Not only did this mystique count for more than material interests in the maintenance of empire, but also, as Smith sees it, it was a principal cause rather than effect of the disintegration of the Fourth Republic (p. 23). In one of the more original sections of the book, Smith convincingly demonstrates that de Gaulle was both apostle and propagator of the colonial consensus that weakened the order he was to supplant. In 1946/47 the General repeatedly adopted stances on Indochina and Algeria that equated empire to national greatness. In October 1947, speaking in Algiers, de Gaulle warned, "In letting our cause be threatened upon this shore of the Mediterranean, it is the entire national edifice which risks dislocation." Smith concludes, "Any analysis which credits de Gaulle with saving republican government in France in 1958 from a fascistic military menace must surely balance its praise against his responsibility, and that of his supporters, for the perilous course on which he fixed the Fourth Republic" (p. 49).

There is, it seems to me, a major flaw in Smith's argument. It lies in the very difficulty of separating material interests from the national mystique, either analytically or emotionally. Time and again the passages he cites to give the flavor and substance of the colonial consensus hold implicit geopolitical preoccupations. The maintenance of empire and the preservation of national virility are not aspects of a game of honor that could be played equally well in some other arena. Edouard Herriot addressed the National Assembly in August 1946: "There is no frozen land near the poles, there is no burning Pacific Island where some nation has not planted its flag. Where will there remain a place for France? . . . The problem . . . is, for our country, . . . a question of life or death" (p. 62). Is this symbolism or the apprehensions of leaders fearful that France will be deprived of leverage in the global game?

With respect to Algeria, Smith encounters the same problem and in my opinion greatly underweights the material incentives to the perpetuation of French control. He pays little attention to de Gaulle's preoccupation with Saharan oil as a vital resource that could provide France considerable advantage within the EEC and, most important, a means to free France from U.S. strategic dominance. Instead, Smith treats oil as one among several material concerns, none of which was of paramount importance: "A broad view of the motivations behind the French decision to remain in Algeria surely would not give inordinate importance to the lure of the Sahara's national resources" (p. 160). In the same year, 1958, de Gaulle held France to its violent course in Algeria while loftily and decisively severing all links with Guinea. One cannot help thinking that petroleum fueled the colonial consensus more effectively than bauxite.

Tony Smith does not sustain his argument as convincingly as he might, but he does provide a concise, insightful, well-written analysis of the close intertwining of the symbolism of national grandeus, *insaisissable*, as it were, and the geopolitical interests inherent in the maneuvers of any aspirant to great-power status. The colonial consensus distorted the definition of those interests so that they became untenable and indefensible.

JOHN WATERBURY

Princeton University

Ombudsmen Compared. By Frank Stacey. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978. Pp. x + 256. $26.00.)

Perhaps a more accurate title for this book would have been "Several Other Ombudsmen Compared with the United Kingdom's Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration (PCA)." While it examines 11 offices in 6 different countries, nearly half the book is devoted to the PCA and to the related offices of the Health Service Commissioner and the Local Commissioners for Administration. Moreover, the PCA provides the primary point of reference for discussions of the remaining offices in Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Canada and France, in chapters that range in length from as few as 8 pages (the Norwegian Ombudsman for Administration) to as many as 30 pages (the French Médiateur).

Although the title of Frank Stacey's book may be somewhat misleading, it is a logical extension of his earlier study, *The British Ombudsman*, published in 1971. In the present volume he uses other ombudsman offices essentially as a context in which to locate the experience of the PCA, and as a source of standards against which the mandate and performance of the PCA can be gauged. Some broader comparisons are made among the several offices he examines, but they are not developed within a systematic conceptual framework.

Once it is understood that Stacey did not write quite the book that the title suggests, his study can be appreciated for what it is. The portraits of individual offices vary in breadth and depth, but never fail to convey a clear outline of their essential characteristics, illuminated by illustrative cases. The thematic threads running through the several chapters reveal a sure sense of what is important, even though in a given chapter one or more of them may be dropped. And from the perspective of comparative experience, the cumulative case for increasing the accessibility, powers, and jurisdiction of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration is overwhelming.

As Stacey points out in a brief concluding chapter, only two of the countries he surveyed deny complainants direct access to their ombudsmen (France and the United Kingdom, where complaints must be transmitted through members of Parliament or local councillors), and only one limits the office to investigating complaints that individuals have suffered injustice "in consequence of maladministration"—again, the United Kingdom. These two restrictions have demonstrably resulted in a much lower volume of complaints, have apparently contributed to lower public awareness of the office (though the evidence in support of this point is impressionistic), and may have impeded the pursuit of grievances suffered by socially and educationally disadvantaged individuals. These significant limitations on the complaint-handling function performed by the PCA are compounded by a "formidable list" of areas of government from which the office is excluded, of which the "least justifiable" involve personnel matters in the civil service and the armed forces. Finally, despite the thoroughness of their investigations, the fact that the PCA and Health Commissioner are the only national ombudsman offices staffed exclusively by civil servants on loan from their parent departments may raise some doubts regarding the fairness of their findings.

There are four potential audiences for *Ombudsmen Compared:* (1) lay readers, whose understanding of the concept in action will be greatly enhanced, and who should be especially grateful for the author's lucid prose; (2) policy makers throughout the world who are considering the establishment of ombudsman offices; (3) policy makers in the United Kingdom who may be moved by its evidence to implement proposed changes in the accessibility, powers, and jurisdiction of the PCA and Health Commissioner, and (4) knowledgeable analysts of the impact of ombudsman offices. Only the last of these are likely to be disappointed, as they will find some data that are provided consistently, but in a form that often impedes and sometimes defies comparison, and other data that are provided in a variable or fragmentary fashion. The variability undoubtedly reflects Stacey's dependence upon published reports for statistical information, and the fragmentary treatment of such important variables as the quality of agency responses to the ombudsman's findings may be attributed to the difficulty of obtaining and appraising that information from any source. Also, some important considerations are introduced in the individual chapters and then neglected in the conclusion—for example, the impact of different personalities on the performance of an office that has experienced no formal change in its mandate.

Ombudsmen Compared is Frank Stacey's valedictory: he died as the manuscript reached the point of copy-editing. His wife and colleagues deserve our thanks for seeing it through to publication, for Stacey's appreciation of the strengths and limitations of different embodiments of this burgeoning institution is always sensible, and often penetrating.

JOHN E. MOORE

University of California, Santa Barbara

Industrielle Gesellschaft und politisches System: Beiträge zur politischen Sozialgeschichte. Edited by Dirk Stegmann, Bernd-Jürgen Wendt, and Peter-Christian Witt. (Bonn: Verlag Neue Gesellschaft GmbH, 1978. Pp. xiv + 464. DM 28.)

Fritz Fischer, the Hamburg scholar whose researches have reopened and recast old questions about the responsibility of the German Imperial government for World War I, has probably become the best known of post-World War II German historians. His two major works, appearing in English as *Germany's Aims in the First World War* (1961/1967) and *War of Illusions: German Politics from 1911 to 1914* (1969/1975), have brought renewed international respect for German scholarship. Within West Germany itself, Fischer has ceased to be regarded as a pariah who "befouls his own nest" and his works are increasingly accepted as models of critical scholarship, however much one might differ with this or that specific contention. This *Festschrift,* presented to him on his seventieth birthday, is ample testimony to his impact.

The 25 contributions cover a considerable range. The three editors see a unifying theme in "the question whether, and to what degree, industrial-economic development and political-social systems with their norms, are dependent upon one another" (p. vi). The essays are grouped into six topic areas, ranging from "historiography and methodology" to "the crisis of bourgeois society after World War I." They deal with various aspects of nineteenth- and twentieth-century European history, primarily—but by no means exclusively—with Germany. Only one, John C. G. Röhl's analysis of Kaiser Wilhelm's "war council" of December 8, 1912, enters directly into the controversies which have surrounded Fischer's major works. Of the 25 authors, five teach in Great Britain, two in France, one (Gerald Feldman) in the United States, and the rest in the Federal Republic of Germany.

The appended list of Fischer's published works and the names of his doctoral students and their dissertations—some 102 of them, 1948–1977—shows the range of his scholarship and the quality of his leadership. Among his students are two of the three editors, Stegmann and Witt, and six of the other contributors, including two scholars well known to Americans, Helmut Böhme and Imanuel Geiss.

Space limitations forbid critical discussion of each of the essays, but four may be singled out for special mention. Hans-Ulrich Wehler's "Vorüberlegungen zu einer moderen deutschen Gesellschaftsgeschichte" begins like a ponderous piece of teutonic theory-building, but ends up as a cogent argument seeking to combine the strengths of the political theories of Marx and Max Weber. A translation—or, better yet, a complete rewrite for an American audience—would be very welcome. Ulrich Nocken's "Corporatism and Pluralism in Modern German History" (published here in English) presents distinctions between "societal corporatism" and "state corporatism" which may have applicability not only to Weimar Germany, but to America in the 1980s, facing as it does problems controlling big business, big labor, and international cartels. Günter Moltmann's "Nordamerikanische 'Frontier' und deutsche Auswanderung—soziale Sicherheitsventile im 19. Jahrhundert" presents an interesting new twist to the Turner thesis. And Jürgen Kocka's "Bildung, soziale Schichtung und soziale Mobilität im Deutschen Kaiserreich am Beispiel der gewerblich-technichen Ausbildung" demonstrates how increased educational opportunities in a modernizing society can, under certain circumstances, inhibit rather than increase social mobility.

In spite of the inherent variety of the essays, there are certain common elements. Many of them are based on original archival research, including important materials from East German archives extending into the late 1920s, material once written off as closed by Westerners. In the luxuriant footnotes the works of U.S. scholars appear frequently—as do those of Europeans of many geographical and ideological loci. The neologisms of contemporary German historiography catch one's eye: buried within a German paragraph are such nuggets as "Lobbyismus," "Push- und Pullfaktoren," "Spät-Starter," and "Manager-Kapitalismus." The fact that of the 25 essays two are in French and two are in English is in itself unblushing testimony to the open orientation of current West German scholarship.

Few Americans, one suspects, will read the volume cover to cover. But by the same token there are even fewer students of the political consequences of modernization who would not benefit from doing so. The *Festschrift* provides significant contributions to contemporary scholarship and a fitting monument to the individual it honors.

GORDON R. MORK

Purdue University

The French Communist Party in Transition: PCF-CPSU Relations and the Challenge to Soviet Authority. By Annette Eisenberg Stiefbold. (New York: Praeger, 1977. Pp. ix + 155. $17.50.)

The recent shifts and changes of the Western European communist parties has been a subject of passionage debate among academics and intellectuals. Only a year or two ago many viewed Eurocommunism not only as a dramatic change in the basic ideological tenets of Marxism-Leninism but even more as the first step in the establishment, at least potentially, of a new power base free from the Soviet domination that was so characteristic during the years of Stalin. The objectives of this concise and clear book, however, are relatively modest and, aside from value judgments that are often presented by inference, extremely well documented and persuasive. Stiefbold's objective is to show that the French Communist party, has made since 1968 a consistent effort to shake itself loose from Soviet controls and from its blind ideological allegiance to the fatherland of socialism.

"The year 1968" the author begins, "marked a watershed in relations between the French Communist party . . . and the Communist party of the Soviet Union." Thus she points out "that the independent line heralded at the 22nd PCF party Congress in 1976 was forged in the crucible of 1968" (p. 1). 1968, the reader should keep in mind, does not refer only to the May-June uprisings of students and workers, but primarily to the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact countries.

Stiefbold produces solid evidence in support of this thesis and one of the most valuable parts of her account is the constant juxtaposition of French Communist policy declarations, resolutions and even acts with the Soviet caveats, admonitions and reprimands. The carefully cited pronouncements by both sides makes the book a valuable source. In the first chapter she analyzes both the reactions of the Soviet Union and the French Communist party to the May-June uprising and the criticisms of the French Communist party to the invasion of Czechoslovakia. A second chapter presents an overview of disagreements (mostly tactical) on the coming to power of nonruling Communist parties. The third chapter on the "Transitional Stage" relates primarily to the French Communist party advocacy of "advanced democracy" and its commitment (at least verbally) to civil and political liberties together with the abandonment of the Leninist imperative of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The fourth and shortest chapter gives an indication of how the French Communists perceive the socialist state while the fifth deals with the crucial antinomy between national party autonomy and independence on the one hand and the requirements of proletarian internationalism advanced by the Soviets. The last and sixth chapter gives us an account of Franco-Soviet state to state relations in the years since General de Gaulle indicating a Soviet preference for him and his successors.

Having gone over Stiefbold's presentation and painstaking citations, I am not quite convinced that the Communist party of France has abandoned its primary allegiance to the Soviet Union. The author herself indicates on a number of occasions the reluctance of the French Communist leaders to embark upon a genuine critical examination of the Soviet ways for fear that this will lead to "anti-Sovietism"—a crime far worse than un-Americanism was in the days of McCarthy. Second, the "democratic" assertions in favoring pluralism and alternation of government have always been associated with many and important qualifications. Third, the abandonment of the principle of the dictatorship of the proletariat was orchestrated at a time when the elections of 1979 were approaching with the Communist expecting to capture the vote of many leftists and infiltrate the Socialist party. It is not really surprising (even though we have the benefit of hindsight) that in the last weeks before the election the Communist party of France scuttled the ship that had been so carefully launched to lead to victory. The reason: the party had lost the chances of a strong electoral support and had confused many of its hard-line followers. The 23rd party congress held in 1979 singles out the Socialist for their duplicity and equivocations. It may prove the watershed that will lead the Communist party back to the tenets of Leninism!

There are other reasons to be skeptical. The French Communist party has not as yet taken any decisive step in opposing *any* aspect of Soviet foreign policy. The citadel of socialism continues to remain immune and internationalism under the ultimate aegis of the Soviet Union the cornerstone of a socialist and peaceful world. The Soviets define internationalism to be synonymous with all and everything that will advance the interests of the Soviet political, economic and military system. For the sake of this kind of internationalism nonruling communist parties anywhere in the world are both expandable and a useful instrument to advance the cause of Soviet power.

I am presenting my disagreements only to underline what I have already pointed out. This is a fine and scholarly account and only analysis in depth will lay my own criticisms to rest. The book, no matter how valuable, is in essence an excellent report and lacks precisely the analysis in depth that is required.

ROY C. MACRIDIS

Brandeis University

Elites in French Society: The Politics of Survival. By Ezra N. Suleiman. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978. Pp. xiii + 299. $20.00, cloth; $9.75, paper.)

The president of the French Republic today is a graduate of the Ecole Polytechnique and of the Ecole Nationale d'Administration (ENA) as well as being an Inspecteur des Finances, and he appointed as his first prime minister (Jacques Chirac) a graduate of ENA and a member of the Cours des Comptes. Most members of the brain trust around François Mitterrand, leader of the opposition Socialist party, are also graduates of ENA and other *grandes écoles.* Thus seems to be confirmed the common wisdom among the French that the country is really governed by the *grands corps,* who dominate the state apparatus and the top management of the private sector as well. Little is known about the *grands corps,* and for good reason. Their members are exceedingly discreet. All students of the French political system are therefore indebted to Ezra Suleiman for throwing a powerful beam of light into this murky area. He has produced the finest study in any language on the *grands corps,* and on the institutions that train them. His book is henceforth indispensable for anyone interested in decision making in France.

The total elite Suleiman is concerned with numbers between three and four thousand people. The most important of the *grands corps* are the Conseil d'Etat, Inspection des Finances, Cours des Comptes, Corps des Mines, and the Corps des Ponts et Chaussées. Each corps has about 300 members, except for Ponts et Chaussées, which boasts close to 2,000 members. The *grands corps* are loose structures with hardly any administration; they are held together mainly through an informal network of personal contacts. The distinctive feature of the French elite is that it is trained by the state itself in special schools that feed recruits directly into the *grands corps.* Once inducted, the new recruits may either make their way up the ladder within a corps in a traditional function, or use the corps as a launching pad for brilliant careers in general administration, politics, or increasingly in the private sector.

Suleiman correctly points out that the position of the elite is strengthened by the two-track system of higher education. Some foreign readers may be shocked to learn that the French universities have always been looked down upon by the elite, and are widely considered now (as in the past) a disaster area. Completely independent of the chaotic and devalued universities are the *grandes écoles*—Ecole Polytechnique, Ecole des Mines, Ecole des Ponts et Chaussées, Ecole Normale, and Ecole Nationale d'Administration, along with other engineering institutes and business schools of somewhat lesser status. Suleiman demolishes a number of myths in his analysis of the special schools—for example, that their training somehow equips students for their future responsibilities. Course work, especially at Polytechnique and Mines (the two schools he examines most closely) is generally unrelated to the later tasks of graduates as administrators, bankers, and top-level managers. Essentially, the *graudes écoles* take motivated, ambitious, and in many cases brilliant students, give them a narrow technical training, develop their powers of eloquence (perhaps the single most important quality of members of the elite), instill a sense of self-confidence and mission, and then turn them loose on a variety of tasks.

In addition to telling a marvelous tale of intrigue and power—especially about the rivalry among the *grands corps* as they seek to extend their influence into and colonize sectors of the economy—Suleiman also purports to clarify a large theoretical problem, and here the book is less successful. Drawing upon Mosca, Pareto, Schumpeter, Weber, and Durkheim, he poses the problem: why do some elites endure and others die? His theme is that the elite institutions have been able to change and adapt to new circumstances in the face of a democratic upsurge.

But there is a methodological difficulty. Mosca, Weber and the others were concerned with elites broadly defined; Suleiman deliberately concentrates on organizations—those institutions with restrictive entrance requirements that grant lifelong membership in a corps. Excluded from his definition of elite are trade union leaders, business people, politicians, and anyone else active on the political scene who is not a graduate of a *grande école.* The empirical data is too narrow to support grand theoretical conclusions about the rise and fall of elites, as distinguished from educational institutions and administrative structures. Nor has the author demonstrated that the *grands corps* constitute a unified governing elite, with a common organizational outlook. Close study of policy making shows rather that the bureaucracy is riven by political conflict and tension. Shifting alliances of bureaucrats, politicians, and interest groups compete with one another on most questions of policy.

Even if we cannot accept the contention that the *grands corps* are a governing and "tentacular" elite, there is no doubt that its members wield considerable power. Democratization cannot be accomplished, Suleiman asserts, merely by opening up recruitment to working-class and lower-income groups. Instead, his recommendation is to restrict leaves of absence that members of the *grands corps* are now permitted to take. Thus, recruitment into top posts of both public and private sectors would be radically altered, and the *grands corps* would be returned to their "rightful and honorable place in the state apparatus." This policy proposal, in my opinion, is below the level of sophistication of the analysis that precedes it. For historical reasons best explained by Durkheim, the French republicans have always sought to create an elite on the basis of the principle not of heredity or wealth, but rather of merit as determined through competitive and fair examinations. The traditional universities have not been able to furnish or train the elite required by the republic, nor is there any prospect that they will be able to do so in the foreseeable future. Hence, the task has devolved upon the *grandes écoles*. The meritocracy of the republic has admirable qualities, as well as serious defects. It is unrealistic to expect the French to dispense with the services of this tested and effective meritocracy.

How to democratize and better train the elite? Suleiman barely touches upon the proposal by Marc Bloch and of numerous reformers past and present: to require passage through the university of all students, with the *grandes écoles* designated as institutions of advanced training (much like medical, law, and business schools in the United States). Only then will it be possible to replenish the elite, reform and modernize its education, and reconstruct that immensely wasteful social institution—the French University. But to quarrel with Suleiman on this point would obscure the impressive contribution he has made to our understanding of French elites and their training institutions.

BERNARD E. BROWN

City University of New York,
Graduate Center and Lehman College

The Supreme Soviet: Politics and the Legislative Process in the Soviet Political System. By Peter Vanneman. (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1977. Pp. xii + 256. $11.75.)

Two questions interest analysts of the Soviet polity regarding the national legislature—the Supreme Soviet. In which direction is it moving, and at what pace? There is a tendency to assume that minute reforms in the USSR promise sizeable future gains. Do piecemeal economic improvements signal heightened economic rationality? Do dissident voices augur well for a relaxation of political oppression? Does widened trade with capitalist nations reduce Soviet paranoia toward the West? Is the Soviet "parliament" becoming more democratic?

Peter Vanneman, in his careful and thoughtful study, sees in a changing Supreme Soviet the possibility for subtle and gradual transformation of the Soviet political system. Thus since 1955 the Supreme Soviet has held more and longer sessions; there are more deputies and more commissions (legislative committees); more laws are passed; deputies have become energetic ombudsmen for their constituents; greater publicity is given the Supreme Soviet and, most noteworthy, high party officials have become active participants in its organizations and activities. The commissions increasingly review draft decrees of the Council of Ministers, and the former have acquired the right to "control" the Procuracy. The commissions review economic plans, investigate administrative actions, hear complaints and receive suggestions from technical specialists as well as average citizens, and they draft some legislation. Throughout his study, however, Vanneman cautiously does not claim too much independence for the Supreme Soviet and he offers occasional caveats regarding democratic trends. While acknowledging the speculative nature of his predictions, he concludes that the Supreme Soviet serves a valuable role in the Soviet political system by legitimizing, socializing, investigating, monitoring, codifying, and by partially accommodating pluralistic interests, thereby aiding system maintenance. Vanneman elaborates the organizational structures, examines the representational nature of elections and deputies, and explains the inner workings of the Supreme Soviet. Accordingly, this book constitutes a valuable source of information on the legislative process.

Given the strictures within which the organizations of the Soviet polity operate, Vanneman's list of Supreme Soviet accomplishments is worth recording when applied to a legislature widely known for its impotence. One test of Vanneman's expectations for the Supreme Soviet (none of his sources goes beyond the early 1970s; most of them are pre-1970) is to look at changes decreed for the Supreme Soviet by the new Soviet constitution adopted in 1977. In this constitution deputies are authorized to address inquiries to heads of agencies formed by the Supreme Soviet. To the list of powers of the Supreme Soviet's guiding Presidium, are added those to ensure conformity between the national constitution and laws and the constitutions and laws of the union republics. The Presidium now ratifies border changes between union republics and it confers citizenship, withdraws same, and grants political asylum. Finally, recommendations of the Supreme Soviet's commissions must be considered by state institutions and follow-up reports from these institutions back to the commissions are required. Thus, the new constitution follows a trend toward the small, incremental changes anticipated by Vanneman's study.

Granted, since at least the mid-1960s the Supreme Soviet has exhibited an occasional hint of life, if not vitality. But is this development more permanent than ephemeral, more substantial than superficial? Vanneman's book indicates an affirmative response. One might agree that the Supreme Soviet is ever more important to the successful, functioning of the Soviet political system. One might conclude, also, that the enlarged, more active, more participatory Supreme Soviet is now an increasingly efficient tool of the party leadership. Nowhere in the list of broadened Supreme Soviet powers is there more than the slightest suggestion that this institution is any more independent from the CPSU. The constitutional changes noted above are small beer. Voting in the Supreme Soviet commissions and in the general sessions continues (as always) unanimously to support the decisions and the policies of the party leaders. There are no suggestions being offered in the Soviet Union for any substantial movement toward a genuine parliamentary system. Whatever increased vigor is revealed by the Supreme Soviet in the past decade and a half, it continues as the prototype of a rubber-stamp legislature in pursuit of its main assignment, to legitimize the rule of the CPSU hierarchy.

RICHARD C. GRIPP

San Diego State University

Participation and Political Equality: A Seven-Nation Comparison. By Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie, and Jae-On Kim. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978. Pp. xxi + 394. $19.95.)

This book is the culminating publication of the Cross-National Project in Participation that was spawned over a decade ago by Almond and Verba's *The Civic Culture*. An appendix lists previous publications derived from this large-scale research program. These include 10 comparative works and numerous studies of each of the seven countries surveyed; therefore the data, collected between 1966 and 1971, will be familiar, in broad outline at least, to students of political behavior. In this volume, however, the authors are concerned less with elaborating the interrelations among several "modes" of participation than with addressing the substantive question that has animated their lengthy and complex project—the equality of political access and influence within each of the political systems studied.

Participation and Political Equality follows the approach of *The Civic Culture* in relying on the survey of a cross section of the citizenry as its method of collecting evidence. In this case, the countries studied were the United States, Austria, the Netherlands, Japan, India, Yugoslavia, and Nigeria, and there is a careful description of the samples and the difficulties in obtaining representativeness in some countries. Indeed, among the main strengths of this book are the care with which the problems of achieving comparability among such diverse countries are discussed, the insistence on the use of multiple tests for central hypotheses, and the clear exposition of the logical basis of analysis and inference. Thus, while *Political Participation and Equality* lacks the originality and reach of its intellectual progenitor, the statistical analysis it contains is both more advanced and more judiciously interpreted. These strengths are especially well displayed in a chapter that explains why women participate less than men.

The central "puzzle" explored by Verba, Nie, and Kim is why the relationship between socioeconomic status and political participation is strong in some countries but not in others. Optimistically committed to the principle that participation matters, the authors believe that this variation in the social composition of the participant population results in differences in the "outputs" of the polity. But the difficult task of demonstrating this is left to a brief and ultimately unconvincing concluding chapter; at the end of the book the proposition remains plausible but unconfirmed that those at the lower end of the social stratification system are better off when more of them participate in politics. The body of *Participation and Political Equality* unravels the determinants for the cross-national differences in the relationship between the individual's socioeconomic status (measured by education and family income) and the level of political activity. The tendency for people with higher levels of income and education to be more active is strongest in the United States, Yugoslavia, and India and weakest in Japan and Austria, with the Netherlands and Nigeria falling in between.

In explaining what attenuates the relationship between status and participation, Verba, Nie and Kim employ two crucial analytical distinctions: (1) between individual propensities for and institutional constraints on participation, and (2) between "easy" activities like voting and "difficult" ones like campaigning or cooperating with others to solve local problems. They argue that institutions may have an independent effect on participation rates by deliberately mobilizing activity, raising the level of political awareness, or providing opportunities for activity that develop skills and expectations that stimulate activity. They hypothesize that the activities of political parties and voluntary associations are likely to have their greatest effect on those lacking the "personal" motivation or skills for participation that education and economic resources provide. The impact of institutions on participation is also likely to be greatest in relation to "easy" activities like voting. The overall pattern of political activity within a country registers the interaction between the individual and institutional influence on participation. For example, where the institutional system is weak, the participation rates of affiliated and unaffiliated citizens should be similar; at the other extreme, where the institutional system is "dominant" virtually everyone who is affiliated votes, regardless of their socioeconomic status, while the unaffiliated "lock themselves out" of participation, presumably because they find no party attractive enough to identify with and because such an identification is a prerequisite for participation.

Methodically, yet in impressively brief compass, chapters 6, 7, and 8 marshal the statistical evidence bearing on these hypotheses. These data substantially confirm the authors' arguments about the micro-level relationships. In all countries institutional affiliation boosts the rate of political activity, and its effect is uniformly greater in relation to voting than campaigning or communal activity. This is not to say that a strong institutional system completely overrides the influence of socioeconomic resources. In all countries among people with an institutional affiliation there is a positive effect of socioeconomic status on participation; in Austria, Japan, and the Netherlands, however, there is no significant difference in participation between the haves and have-nots who lack party or organizational ties. The United States comes closest to exemplifying a "weak institutional system," while the Netherlands appears closest to a dominant system (p. 101). There almost all the affiliated and virtually none of the unaffiliated participate.

The consistency of these findings notwithstanding, they do not bear directly on the proposition that institutions equalize political access across socioeconomic levels. To show this would require that there is a higher level of institutional affiliation among the countries where the status-participation relationship is weak and that this greater level of institutional involvement is due to a relatively higher level of affiliation among the have-nots. The data on these key points are not always supportive. For example, the proportion of strongly affiliated is greater within the United States than in the Netherlands or Japan (p. 109). Similarly, 21 percent of the American respondents were both in the lower third of the socioeconomic resource distribution *and* either strongly or moderately affiliated; in Austria the equivalent group comprised 19 percent of the sample.

Variation in the level of institutional affiliation fails to account for the cross-national differences in the relationship between status and participation. What turns out to be more important is the specific nature of that affiliation (there are more party *members* in Austria and the Netherlands, as opposed to mere identifiers), as well as factors unique to a particular country, such as the voting registration requirements in the United States and the high level of social cohesion in Japan. More important still, however, is the particular pattern of social and political cleavages within a society. Where groups are sharply divided over the main political issues in a country *and* have close institutional ties, "interference" with the relationship between socioeconomic status and participation is at a maximum. Verba, Nie and Kim corroborate the earlier work by Lipset and Rokkan, Campbell and Valen, and DiPalma in explaining the contrast between the United States and European nations by the absence in America of clearly articulated conflict across social groups that are closely linked to particular parties and voluntary associations. In other words, the lower classes participate more where class conflict is intense and socialist parties exist.

Despite the value of such replications and the wealth of data contained in this book, two important flaws must be pointed out. One is the failure of Verba, Nie, and Kim to provide systematic information on the nature of the interactions between citizens and the institutions which are presumably so important in motivating people to participate. There are a number of interesting speculations about the mobilizing and educative functions of these institutions, but the question of how frequently or effectively they are performed is not addressed. A second problem, in my opinion, at least, is the reliance on standard scores as the basis for making comparisons. This means that an apparent difference in the relationships between a given variable and participation across countries may merely reflect differences in the variance of raw scores. In addition, because of the badly skewed distributions of many of the "difficult" participation measures, presenting the results in standard score terms is misleading in the sense that what appears to be a large difference in standard deviation units may refer to statistically insignificant differences in proportions of very small groups of actual respondents. Where one is concerned with the consequences of participation, the sheer amount of participation within a large group rather than how much its members participate relative to those of other groups is critical. And the problem is compounded by the fact that points along the standardized socioeconomic resource level scale are hard to link to concrete social categories.

Large-scale cross-national surveys belong to the halcyon days of the boom in social science research and it is unlikely that a project of this magnitude will be funded again. *Participation and Political Equality* furnishes important cross-national generalizations about the determinants of individual political activity. Regrettably, it is less successful in classifying the ways in which individual and contextual influences on mass behavior combine to produce systemic outcomes. But perhaps this achievement is beyond the capacity of the survey method.

JACK CITRIN

University of California, Berkeley

Japan as Number One: Lessons for America. By Ezra F. Vogel. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979. Pp. xi + 272. $12.50.)

It is not easy to give Ezra Vogel's new work a fair review. As the title implies, it is about the Japanese, who in his view are number one, and therefore worth emulating. But the book is not intended to be an objective, balanced appraisal of recent developments in Japan. The author states,

> Since my message departs from conventional wisdom about matters of great importance, it is vulnerable to criticism. Some will say that I have seen Japan only through rose-colored glasses . . . that I underestimate the difficulty of borrowing from a different culture, and that my faith in America is wanting. I hope the reader will conclude that I make no effort to conceal Japan's difficulties, but the aim of this work is not to present a rounded, balanced, picture of how Japanese society works and how the individual is shaped. Its purpose is to describe selected aspects of the Japanese national system that are so effective that they contain lessons for America (pp. ix–x).

In line with these objectives, Vogel devotes much of the book to recounting Japanese successes in the pursuit of knowledge, government administration, politics, corporate life, education, welfare, and crime control. He has marshaled an impressive amount of up-to-date information and argues his case with eloquence. In various places and particularly in the concluding chapter, Vogel does take up some of the negative aspects of Japanese culture, such as hostility toward individuality, creativity and deviant behavior, excessive nationalism, and the inability to get things done when a minority strongly opposes the majority. "The Japanese," writes Vogel, "have achieved success at a considerable price, the price of strong pressure toward conformity and consensus, sometimes at the expense of the deviant, the opposition, the little man, the outsider. These are excesses that Americans who may wish to copy Japanese patterns will have to consider seriously and devise ways to avoid" (p. 244).

Here, I believe, lies a dilemma. Avoiding pressure for a conformity and consensus would undercut a key factor in Japan's success. A recurring theme in Vogel's account is the importance of the group. "If any single factor explains Japan's success, it is the group-directed quest for knowledge" (p. 27). "The group to which an individual owes his primary loyalty is the basic building block for aggregating interests" (p. 101). "In the view of most Japanese, their style of democracy rests on the ability of groups to retain sufficient power over their members to maintain solidarity and ensure that agreements are honored, since both the higher aggregation of interests and the distribution of fair shares is accomplished through group solidarity" (p. 128). Thus it would appear that group solidarity, consensus, conformity, group welfare, group loyalty are the very features that explain Japan's successes. And the question is whether Americans would be willing to pay the price. If not, then is it possible for America to take Japan as its model?

Perhaps it would be useful to develop this point in more detail with respect to politics.

Vogel rightly gives high marks to the Japanese bureaucracy. He describes how the top career civil servants are educated in the best universities, are chosen on the basis of competitive examinations, are given intensive training after recruitment, and enjoy high social prestige. The bureaucracy has "the security, the ability, and an ethos that enable it to concentrate on what is good for the nation as a whole" (p. 59). Moreover, the prime minister "works closely with the bureaucracy and enunciates what various ministries advise him to. In short, the bureaucracy is granted the prestige and authority necessary to sustain high group morale and achieve a high level of performance" (p. 61). Finally, he notes, again quite correctly, that the Japanese parliament is weak compared to the American Congress, and "most of the legislation is in fact drafted by bureaucrats rather than by Diet members" (p. 55).

Undoubtedly Japan's dedicated and influential bureaucrats have significantly contributed to Japanese successes in various fields, but it is hard to believe that such a system can serve as a model for American political reform. The American Congress would certainly resist any attempt to reduce its power to legislate, and, whatever its advantages, the American public would very likely regard the elevation of the federal bureaucracy to a position comparable to that occupied by its Japanese counterpart as too high a price to pay.

Thus, I am skeptical that Japan provides many lessons for America. Rather, the chief value of the book, I believe, is to be found in his argument that Americans are reluctant to acknowledge that we are no longer competitive and that we seek excuses in such explanations as the Japanese can undersell us because they are dumping goods here, they are subsidized by their government, and Japanese workers get low wages. Those who read Vogel's book will get a clearer picture of why the Japanese do so well in international economic competition.

NOBUTAKA IKE

Stanford University

Lenin's Legacy: The Story of the CPSU. By Robert G. Wesson. (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1978. Pp. xvii + 318. $7.50, paper.)

This readable narrative is the third in a projected set of Hoover Institution histories of the ruling communist parties. Unlike the ground-breaking study by Leonard Schapiro (*The Communist Party of the Soviet Union,* rev. ed., Vintage, 1971), this is the fruit of synthesis rather than primary research. "This work offers no new discoveries," as Wesson himself states (p. x). But it is one of the first histories to devote a chapter to the Brezhnev era.

Chapter 1, "The Russian Discontent," provides a brief but engrossing interpretation of the issues which Russia's backwardness posed for the intelligentsia, and the ambivalence of the regime's responses in trying to borrow Western ways without subverting itself: a theme that rightly crops up throughout the book. Wesson's approach, not fully worked out yet, essentially combines three interpretations of Russian authoritarian traditions: authoritarian imperatives of backwardness (such as in Theodore von Laue's *Why Lenin? Why Stalin?,* (Lippincott, 1971), the carry-over of Russian despotism into Bolshevism and communism (such as in Bertram Wolfe's *Three Who Made a Revolution,* Dell, 1964) and the possibilities of a dictatorship of and within the party opened up by Lenin's russification of Marxism, despite his rethinking at the end of his life (such as considered by Leonard Schapiro in his abovementioned history).

But chapter 3 states in passing that the Bolshevik triumph was not inevitable, "nothing was inevitable" (p. 75). More than one sentence is needed to explain this and fit it convincingly into the strongly determinist framework of Wesson's analysis.

Wesson summarizes Stalin's rise to power in chapter 4 and in chapter 5 skillfully presents the essence of Stalinism's impact. But without careful review of the existing explanations of the blood purges, he reduces them merely to the "supreme example of the corruption of power" (p. 159). Had Wesson systematically developed his own ideas laid out in his introduction and chapter 1, he might have interpreted the purges, too, as the outcome of a combination of personality, situation, tradition and political organization.

What accounts for Lenin's authority in the party? Lenin, Wesson says, "was hardly what has come to be called charismatic." But what precisely "has come to be called charismatic?" (p. 95). Later, Wesson says that "Lenin had ruled by his authority as maker of the revolution and by his personality and oratorical ability" (p. 132). By any scholarly definition of charisma, from Max Weber's through Leonard Schapiro's and Robert C. Tucker's ("The Theory of Charismatic Leadership, *Daedalus,* 97 [Summer 1968] and introduction to his *Lenin Anthology* (Norton, 1975), Lenin's authority as Wesson describes it was charismatic.

Factual errors could easily have been avoided through more careful editing than was lavished on this edition. Thus, for example, Vera Zasulich did not murder the police chief of St. Petersburg, but wounded its governor (Trepov) (p. 10). Marx did not teach that "the bourgeoisie was . . . evil" (p. 12). Lenin had at least a quarter, not "little (or no) Russian ancestry" (p. 16). Trotsky did *not* read Lenin's anti-Stalinist "testament" on May 22, 1924, but sat pridefully silent during and after the reading. Murder victim Solomon Mikhoels was not "of the NKVD" but a talented actor and producer (p. 174). Wesson should present more evidence to convince us that Stalin was reasonable, and friendly with Trotsky as late as 1922. Wesson provides only his own speculation as evidence for his intriguing theory that German subsidies to the Bolsheviks influenced Lenin's policies and his support of the peace of Brest Litovsk (p. 62).

Wesson captures well the self-protective "stability of cadres" and stagnation of a privileged bureaucratic elite and its gerontocrats under the cautious unifier, Leonid Brezhnev. He foresees possible "long-repressed tensions and contradictions" in the post-Brezhnev transition. But given Wesson's stress on party unity and its imperatives, one may well ask what are the sources of such "tensions and contradictions" (p. 270). The talk of unity and of the prevention of research and thinking on social problems is too pat to enable the reader to understand such predictions. Either they or Wesson's monolithic model are incorrect.

Finally, space does not allow detailed consideration of Wesson's prefatory contrast of Western moral ideals with Russian traditions of "cruelty and deceit" and autocracy. "By the moral standards of the Western world," Wesson writes, "the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has been by no means pretty" (p. x). One could no less state that moral standards are not lacking in the Russian tradition by which to condemn what happened to Bolshevism. On a broader plane, Wesson's account of the party's loss of purpose, crisis of function raises questions for us as to whether what may be an incipient political and developmental crisis in the USSR is not part of a wider crisis of confidence, values and leadership—of authority if you will, in many industrialized countries, both East and West.

Wesson's conciseness and breezy style should make his latest book useful as a student text or introduction for general readers, alongside Robert McNeal's excellent *Bolshevik Tradition: Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev* (Prentice-Hall, 1975), in a second, and better-edited edition, interpretatively more solid and free of numerous questionable factual statements that detract from the first edition's usability as a text.

PETER H. JUVILER

Barnard College, Columbia University

Argentina in the Postwar Era: Politics and Economic Policy Making in a Divided Society. By Gary W. Wynia. (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1978. Pp. x + 289. $15.00, cloth; $6.95, paper.)

This is a well-organized, insightful study of the substance of economic policy and the process of economic policy making in a society which depends upon the export of primary products to finance development. Gary Wynia analyzes the reasons why a variety of economic policies have typically failed to reach their objectives, and concludes that a flawed policy-making process and a malevolent view of state power combine to alienate policy makers from the citizens whose cooperation is a prerequisite of effective policy implementation.

The first of the book's four parts concentrates upon the initial Perón era. An introduction serves to underscore the extent to which the Peronists' early economic policies were conditioned by an extraordinarily fragile economy over which international commodity markets exercised considerable autonomous control. The Peronists employed only slightly modified policy-making institutions and practices to face the dilemmas raised by this inheritance, despite the fact that their progressive policy objectives differed substantially from those of earlier governments. Although the Argentine structure of privilege was altered by the limited incorporation of the urban working class, the lodestar of Argentine economic policy remained the international commodity market. After the nation's war earnings were expended, the Peronists adopted the more traditional objectives emphasizing price stability.

Part 2 focuses upon the democracies of the anti-Peronist interregnum. Constrained by an unusually severe balance of payments crisis, the early loss of support from the Peronists, and the incessant meddling of the military, Arturo Frondizi never had the opportunity to implement his policy of importing capital to construct essential industries; instead, Argentina imported an IMF stabilization program, which failed to improve the nation's payments situation despite its costs—a 25.8 percent decline in the real income of industrial workers in 1959 and the inevitable alienation of the Argentine working class.

Arturo Illia discarded Frondizi's policies in favor of the earlier Peronist objectives. But when the public sector deficit became unmanageable and led to a collapse of the nation's capital markets, Illia could not command labor support in his effort to halt the wage-price spiral. Like Frondizi, Illia found the hostility of organized labor to be his most intractable political problem.

Part 3 is devoted to the analysis of economic policy during two types of military regimes. The Aramburu government was essentially a transitional phenomenon, expropriating state power only long enough to purge the political system of undesirable participants. The Onganía government was one which came to stay. In the view of Onganía's advisors, Argentina required a friendly investment climate to encourage multinational enterprises to supply the capital Argentina lacked in order to industrialize. The Onganía policy defied traditional labels, combining the conventional wage controls to slow inflation with a relatively liberal credit expansion to avoid recession. Income was not redistributed in either direction, yet wages were held steady for two years and in 1969 inflation was reduced to only 7.6 percent. But the 1969 *cordobazo* led to the ouster of Finance Minister Krieger Vasena, which in turn undermined investor confidence in the government and led to Onganía's removal.

Part 4 is a brief discussion of the policies of the Peronist Restoration. The actual policy objectives are of minor significance, given the brevity of Juan Perón's rule and the incompetence of his successor. What is important was the indication that private sector representatives of labor and capital would be asked to participate in making public policy. Unlike previous governments, the Peronists proposed a Social Contract, in which bargaining and formal agreement were to replace command and coercion. The goal of the Social Contract was to reduce the opposition which inevitably accompanied policies imposed upon citizens without their consent. Perón's ill health and his failure to name a responsible successor precluded the possibility of our knowing if the Social Contract could have survived with strong leadership.

Dominating Wynia's analysis is a single theme: the isolation of postwar policy makers from the citizens of the country and their interest groups. Regardless of who is president or what presidential objectives might be, the economic policy-making process remains seriously flawed because of the closed nature of decision making. After being created in quiet deliberations, policies are announced to the population at large, and implemented as aggressively as public resistance will permit. This practice of isolation might yield positive results, argues Wynia, were it not that the Argentine state has "always been viewed as an instrument employed by narrow, partisan interests to gain advantage for themselves" (p. 253). Thus each president is invariably viewed by the public as a partisan in a highly competitive political system. Citizens are therefore unwilling to shoulder the burden of overcoming an economic crisis, since if they are asked to bear any part of it they automatically assume it is more than their fair share.

The way out? One might argue with Wynia's implication that Argentines are unusual in viewing the state as an instrument of partisan interests, but it is difficult to fault his conclusion regarding the circle of economic crisis, political conflict, and policy failure which characterizes export-oriented, industrializing nations. Some of these nations may find that they possess a valuable commodity; others may experience a revolutionary transformation, giving up altogether on domestic demand and international commodity markets as methods of allocating scarce resources. But as Wynia suggests in his concluding paragraph, these escapes will probably be few. Most such nations will probably adopt the Argentine response, limping along from crisis to crisis, government to government for the indefinite future.

LARS SCHOULTZ

University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

International Politics

Money and Power: Banks and the World Monetary System. By Jonathan David Aronson. (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1978. Pp. 224. $14.00, cloth; $6.95, paper.)

Banks are where the money is, said Willie Sutton when asked why he robbed so many. The money is still there and in sums far larger than Willie could have dreamed. On that ground alone one would expect banks to be powerful political actors, but are they?

Jonathan Aronson attempts to determine "whether bank behavior exerts pressure on government decision makers to adopt policies or take decisions which they do not favor" (p. 16). He distinguishes direct, intentional control over public policy from the indirect influence banks could acquire by behaving in ways which limit the policy choices available to government.

Aronson finds surprisingly little evidence of direct bank influence. Bankers are ineffective lobbyists; they are frequently divided among themselves on the issues, and their efforts are greeted with deep suspicion in Congress and the executive branch. In cases involving exchange regulations from 1963 to 1974 Aronson finds that U.S. banks seldom got their way with the Federal Reserve Board or Treasury.

Bank influence appears somewhat greater when the effect of banks' competitive behavior on public policy decisions is considered. Aronson finds that: (1) circumvention of exchange regulations by banks forced policy adjustments by the U.S. government, but did not always yield the policies preferred by banks; (2) exchange trading by banks affected the timing and magnitude of foreign exchange crises from 1967 through 1973, but did not determine government decisions on exchange rate policy; (3) hyper-competitive behavior by banks in short-term capital markets prevented government officials from returning to a fixed exchange rate system in February 1973 and thereafter, but did not determine the final shape of international monetary reform; and (4) bank loans to developing countries which desperately need to borrow could yield influence for banks, but banks are dependent upon the profitable lending opportunities developing countries provide. In short, bank activities do reduce the options available to government decision makers, but do not determine choices among the remaining options.

According to Aronson, the most significant impact of banks on the system occurred from mid-1973 through mid-1974. The advent of generalized floating of exchange rates in March 1973 made exchange trading riskier. Large banks reacted cautiously, but smaller banks increased their speculative position-taking in hope of higher profits. Extremely volatile markets resulted, but central banks and the largest commercial banks were hesitant to oppose the speculative waves kicked up by risks of smaller (European) banks. The collapse of Bankhaus Herstatt of Cologne on June 26, 1974, brought the crisis to a peak. Central banks intervened in the market and large banks reduced their credit lines to smaller banks. Market stability was gradually restored. Banks were compelled to adopt prudent trading practices and governments were forced to abandon "free-floating" rates and to intervene in the exchange markets.

Although some details of the cases Aronson examines are open to question (he relies too often on comments made in single interviews), the pattern is indisputable. What banks do in pursuit of profit has consequences for public policy which neither bankers nor government officials readily anticipate. Banks aggressively exploiting profit opportunities can unexpectedly destabilize markets, thereby creating system management problems for governments and central banks. Aronson's wide-ranging study of international banking between 1958 and 1977 suggests that most of the opportunities for destabilizing competitive behavior by banks were fostered by inappropriate government policies. Governments changed the competitive environment in ways which stimulated market developments they did not foresee and could not control. Governments clung to ineffective monetary and exchange rate policies when their ineffectiveness had become obvious to market participants. Public policy lagged behind, reacting belatedly to private competition.

International banking both benefits and suffers from intense competition. As Aronson notes, the conflict between free international money markets, especially the Eurocurrency markets, and national monetary and bank regulatory policies grows steadily more severe. Aronson's book is an excellent account of the interdependence of banks and governments and a warning that better ways to manage the world's money are urgently needed.

ROBERT W. RUSSELL

U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs

Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East: An Israeli Perspective. By Shlomo Aronson. (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979. Pp. xi + 448. $18.95.)

This is a rich and subtle book that stands out in at least two ways in the vast literature on the Arab-Israel conflict. Firstly, it successfully interweaves into a complex but integrated whole several levels of analysis: domestic, national, regional (i.e., inter-Arab), and superpower (including, in the U.S. case, the impact of other foreign policy problems and domestic politics). Secondly, it illuminates with exceptional clarity the role of domestic Israeli forces–ideology, society, politics, leadership; among recent books perhaps only Nadav Safran's *Israel: The Embattled Ally* (Harvard, 1978) is comparable in this respect.

As an Israeli scholar with extensive journalistic experience, Aronson combines the proximity of the latter with the analytic tools of the former. He has a feel for Israeli life that only continued close contact could provide (with good use of interviews), but also makes full use of primary sources and is sensitive to larger issues. Aronson is especially strong on motivational and perceptual factors, and on strategies of bargaining in conflict. For example, he demonstrates throughout the book how the tension between ideological postulates and objective constraints has influenced behavior on both sides. He also stresses the tendency of both sides to take the other's ideological statements as policy and to fail to see the domestic sources of the other's public position.

Aronson begins with a long chapter on Ben-Gurion that contrasts considerably with the standard view of that statesman. Ben-Gurion, he stresses, was a minimalist, opposing Israeli rule over a substantial number of Arabs, seeking to lower the profile of the conflict, and pursuing nuclear deterrence in place of a "territorial" defense policy. However, by adopting a misleading public posture of "activist" defense, Ben-Gurion in fact prepared the ground for policies he opposed.

The heart of the book is a detailed chronological analysis of the post-1967 period (extended in an epilogue to cover the Sadat visit of November, 1977). Though occasionally threatening to lose itself in detail, the account never actually does so, but manages to return to the larger themes. In one such case–an analysis of Kissinger's diplomatic method (pp. 201–04)–the integration of academic concepts ("the structural-functionalist variant of positivist-evolutionary thinking") is not entirely successful. By and large, however, the book provides a number of illuminating insights.

As I have indicated, it is the understanding of the Israeli perspective that will be of greatest value to most readers. Aronson is exceptionally good in explaining the sources, domestic and foreign, of otherwise "inexplicable" Israeli positions, even when he himself is clearly not in agreement with the policy. He shows, for example, why the structure of the post-1967 situation has favored the "hawks" in Isarel's internal debates. He demonstrates the crucial importance of the decline of the Ben-Gurion system of governance and of Zionist pioneering ideology, and how "Gush Emunim" has profited from the resulting spiritual and social vacuum.

A second substantive contribution of note is Aronson's treatment of the nuclear weapons issue. Previously considered too delicate for public debate in Israel, this subject has also been unduly neglected in strategic analyses of the conflict generally. Aronson here integrates the looming reality of Israel's nuclear option, as well as one can with available sources, into the diplomatic and military maneuverings. The result is a clearer understanding of many moves, including perhaps the Syrian failure to exploit its initial successes in the 1973 war.

Aronson is not explicitly prescriptive, but his analysis does have some arresting implications for past and future policies in the conflict. It is clear that he views with sympathy the Ben-Gurion approach of lowering the conflict's profile, avoiding rule over Arabs, and relying on nuclear deterrence rather than territorial buffers for defense. Consequently, the 1967 war, which destroyed Ben Gurion's postulates, can be seen as a tragedy for Israel as well as the Arabs–a view I happen to share. Territorial withdrawal, in this view, remains the key to successful diplomacy. The reliance on nuclear deterrence is, on the other hand, a position that many otherwise in agreement will not share.

In sum, this is a rewarding book for readers at any level of expertise on the Middle East. Given the complexity of Aronson's analytical task, it is not easy reading. But to the neophyte it offers an excellent introduction to both domestic and interactive aspects of the conflict, while the expert will find much food for thought in its nuanced pages.

ALAN DOWTY

University of Notre Dame

American Multinationals and American Interests. By C. Fred Bergsten, Thomas Horst, and Theodore Moran. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1978. Pp. xiii + 535. $18.95, cloth; $8.95, paper.)

This book should, and probably will, be read by more than the scholars and policy makers interested in the multinational corporation. Many will want to follow the authors' efforts to resolve the central paradox they pose. Multinationals have *no* "single preponderant net impact of any kind" on the American nor on the international economy, nor even on the foreign policy goals of the United States (p. 482). Yet "active leadership" to create new international rules and arrangements for the multinational enterprise "should be a priority policy objective of this country" (p. 495).

Bergsten, Horst, and Moran claim that the two "economic" (international differences in the return on capital; oligopoly-product cycle) and the four "political" models (imperialist; mercantilist; sovereignty-at-bay; and global reach) of foreign direct investment each have such significant weaknesses that a new approach is needed. This new approach assesses the impact of direct foreign investment by asking "what would have happened otherwise?" Questions of impact are significant not only for their analytical interest, but also because the United States has no coherent policy toward direct foreign investment. Yet a laissez-faire position would only approach being appropriate if such investment were conducted in a purely competitive, thus comparative advantage-inducing, environment and if other states also adopted a policy of laissez-faire (pp. 21–22, 311).

Herein lies the significance of part 2 of this study where Bergsten, Horst, and Moran assess the economic models in the course examining the multinational corporations "economic" impact. Testing the multinationals' role in American exports, imports and the balance of payments, they succinctly and clearly summarize a wide range of the literature on the traditional, economic perspective on capital export, the labor position (direct foreign investment replaces exports) and the MNC position (direct foreign investment promotes exports). They examine an equally wide range of case studies. Using newly assembled data, they correlate export and import performance with levels of direct foreign investment and other characteristics of production such as level of technology, intensity of machinery use, and levels of unionization. The authors conclude that since the relation between export-import performance and direct foreign investment is largely haphazard, such investment can be either export-promoting or export-displacing, depending on the particular incentives that the firm faces. The only general tendency they find fits the product-cycle studies: initial investments promote exports of U.S.-developed products, later and larger investments in a more standardized product displace U.S. exports. The results of export impact indicate, they argue, that neither the pro-multinational corporation nor the pro-labor position is sustained, that thus neither generally restrictive nor generally promotional stances should be taken toward direct foreign investment. Methodologically similar investigations take up the multinational corporation's direct impact on labor, indirect impact on the international monetary and trade systems, and the influence U.S. tax policy has on the corporation's choice of where to invest.

In each case the impact is heterogeneous and, on balance, neutral between home and foreign investment. None of these conclusions supports labor's criticisms of the multinational corporation. On the other hand, the authors also discover that multinationalization per se promotes concentration in industries by raising profits and that multinationals investing in raw material extraction become hostages to the host countries. In order to protect large, sunken investments in mines, plantations, oil fields, the firms promote host country interests even when they run counter to those of the home country. None of these assessments supports the claims that the multinationals make for themselves.

Bergsten, Horst, and Moran ground this heterogeneous impact and behavior in an economic model of direct foreign investment which focuses on the individual enterprise and combines both oligopoly dynamics and the market-directed pursuit of differential returns on capital. Multinational firms both consciously shape and are shaped by their economic environment—an environment determined by the particular interests and capabilities of the individual firms, by host country policies, and by home country policies. The net preponderantly neutral impact of the firms is thus a temporary, contingent product of a dynamic equilibrium between three sets of actors. But this preponderance of neutrality is not as stable as it might be were the firms near-perfect competitors, responding solely to comparative advantage, and were governments global welfare-maximizers through free investment. Since oligopolies can shift both where they produce and where they register their income, the interaction of firm, host, and home becomes especially unstable as each seeks to control the international distribution of income and production. Thus a policy toward direct foreign investment is a priority for America.

Policies designed to promote American interests therefore have to take into account the countervailing power of the firms and of influential governments, primarily First World governments, that are the homes and hosts for the overwhelmingly preponderance of global direct foreign investment. Third World governments, they argue, gain on balance from direct foreign investment and will seek to entice and harness it but their share as host to global foreign investment is small. Other First World governments should be the managing partners in a scheme of international cooperation. This scheme should promote neutrality between home and foreign investment to "maximize global economic welfare by maximizing the scope for foreign investment to respond to market forces" (p. 493). By these cooperative means, investment wars produced by attempts at maximizing short-run national advantage in beggar-thy-neighbor competition can be avoided, and runaway multinationals can be curtailed. Until the U.S. with its predominant interest in global multinational enterprise can organize such an international scheme of harmonized policies, it should independently pursue national measures with the same global goals in mind. These include revising the current tax incentives that draw direct foreign investment into tax havens; permitting an "escape clause" to limit specific investments harmful to U.S. interests; and encouraging a shift from equity to non-equity investment in countries producing raw materials in order to remove equity investment hostages while increasing supplies and thus reducing host country commodity power.

The new political model emerges in part 3. They summarize the "four conventional schools of thought": the largely Marxist, neoimperialist model; the nationalist, neomercantilist model (Robert Gilpin); the liberal sovereignty-at-bay model (Raymond Vernon); and the populist, global reach model (Richard Barnet and Ronald Mueller). The first two, they argue, share the perspective that the U.S. government and the multinationals have attempted to regulate and have often succeeded in dominating the world political economy. The neoimperialists see this dominance reflecting the interests of the American business class; the neomercantilists see a broader, national interest at the root of American policy. Contrarily, the latter two models portray the multinational corporation as an independent actor dominating both home (including U.S.) and host governments. But Vernon's sovereignty-at-bay approach holds this to be largely beneficial; Barnet and Mueller's global reach, largely harmful. Bergsten, Horst, and Moran point out the weaknesses in each of these "political models" and call for their replacement by their "new setting" (p. 335). This new setting lies in the increased bargaining power of host countries vis-à-vis multinationals and home countries that brings a consequent need for the U.S. to actively promote its own interests. But their observation is not a model in the same sense in which Marxist imperialism or neomercantilism are models. These latter posit systematic relations and theories of change within the economy, between state and society, and among states and societies. As fundamentally, many would question the division between economic and political models. Both the Marxist imperialist and mercantilist "political" models have direct economic model concomitants not captured by any of the perspectives the authors discussed in part 2. More specifically, neither structural Marxists nor neomercantilists will find the authors' strictures against their models conclusive. Marxists would want to examine the domestic and foreign impact not just of the multinational corporation but also of capitalism, including macroeconomic policy, on the distribution of income and power. Similarly, mercantilists will not be awed by the preponderantly neutral impact of the multinational firm on exports, imports and the balance of payments. The alternative they would want to see examined would be the long-run impact of investment redirected from overseas toward domestic growth. Thus, the "new setting" falls somewhat short of the authors' claims to be a replacement of or traditional "political" models of direct foreign investment.

There is one respect in which this work goes beyond what they claim. And here, I think, its largest significance may be discovered. Bergsten, Horst, and Moran have not replaced the four traditional models, but they have provided the pieces from which a distinctive liberal theory of the political economy of direct foreign investment may be constructed. For liberals who do not regard Hobbes, Locke, Smith, Palmerston, Schumpeter or Wilson as purveyors of a simple perception of world harmony, this work will come as a relief. Bergsten, Horst and Moran retain comparative advantage as an ideal (though dissociating it from perfect harmony); they build their political economy on an economics of the individual firm (or consumer) and on a politics of the state whose proper role is to implement a determinant public interest (p. 342). Conflicts are explained not solely as a consequence of psychic or purely "political" aberrations but also of inevitable concentrations of economic resources and power that states will rationally seek to harness. To the purer, liberal-economic harmony of the sovereignty-at-bay school and to the populist liberal perspective of the global-reach school, the authors have added the building blocks for a third face of liberalism, a neo-Whiggish analysis of power and economic conflict joined to a vision of progress and material harmony.

MICHAEL DOYLE

Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University

A Balance Sheet of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin: Evaluation and Documentation. By Honoré M. Catudal, Jr. (Berlin: Berlin Verlag, 1978. Pp. 303. DM 32, paper.)

More than three decades since the conclusion of World War II, Berlin remains a focus of division between East and West. Once a symbol of cold war tensions between the four Allied powers, the city can still claim to be the center of discord in an era of uneasy detente between the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and the United States, Great Britain and France, on the other. Yet, since the conclusion on September 3, 1971 of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, dealing especially with transit traffic between West Germany and West Berlin, a perceptible easing of the situation for the population has taken place.

Honoré Catudal has written two books on the Quadripartite Agreement. The first, *The Diplomacy of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin* (1978), concerned itself chiefly with the intensive series of negotiations among the Allied powers leading up to the agreement. The second, the volume under review, focuses on events that have taken place since the agreement went into effect in June 1972. The author, who is one of the few American scholars well qualified to write on developments in Berlin, has meticulously studied the available literature and has interviewed numerous Western officials who provided him with valuable information, although he could not gain access to the Soviet negotiators or to the still-classified diplomatic records.

Catudal's information gathered from these officials has added some spice to a rather pedestrian account of the numerous developments that occurred from 1972 to 1977 in Berlin. The primary weakness of the book is that the evaluation of these developments, promised in the subtitle, is hardly to be found. What we get instead of analysis is a synoptic, factual and descriptive 138-page account, interspersed by valuable maps but less valuable photographs (more suitable for a college textbook), of a divided Berlin subject to continuing improvements and stalemates. In brief chapters, Catudal chronicles this schizophrenic development in relation to freedom of movement on various access routes (highways, railways, air, canals) between West Berlin and the Federal Republic, and to travel, telephonic and mail communication between West Berlin and East Berlin, as well as the German Democratic Republic.

Catudal then deals with West German attempts to shore up a political presence in West Berlin, with Berlin's expanding European role, and with its complex status in German and foreign treaties. He points out that the political situation regarding Berlin remains in flux because the divided city is not only governed by separate municipal authorities, but is also subject to decisions reached by West German and East German authorities as well as by the four Allied powers. He touches on the ups and downs of detente among the latter, which in turn had a spillover effect on the course of events in Berlin.

For instance, Soviet and East German officials for years have sought to change the status of East Berlin and eliminate its four-power status. In summer 1979 (since the book was written), East German leaders fully incorporated the city's parliamentary delegates into the GDR parliament, which, according to Western diplomats, was a serious violation of the 1971 agreement. Conversely, Communist authorities, occasionally backed by West Allied governments, have opposed moves by the Bonn government to incorporate the western sectors of Berlin more fully into the Federal Republic. Despite these problems, the author concludes his narrative on an upbeat tone. He notes that on balance the effects of the agreement on West Berliners particularly have been most positive.

The second and longest part of the volume provides important documentation on the Berlin situation. A chronology of events from 1943 to 1978 is followed by texts of diplomatic protocols, communiqués, the accord itself, and other documents, as well as tables on the volume of intra-Berlin traffic and that between West Berlin and both Germanys.

GERARD BRAUNTHAL

University of Massachusetts, Amherst

What Are Human Rights? By Maurice Cranston. (New York: Taplinger Publishing Co., Inc., 1973. Pp. 170. $4.95, paper.)

Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter of the United Nations, pledge all members to take joint and separate action to promote "universal respect for and observance of human rights without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." Those words were composed in 1945, and perhaps it is cause for some optimism that a generation later, the worldwide concern for human rights cuts across the differences among political and economic systems. Nevertheless, there is a paradox in these words of the United Nations Charter. If nations A and B pledge themselves "to take joint and separate action" to promote value C, we should not be surprised to find A and B promoting different objectives. When one country seeks to promote human rights, it may focus its efforts upon different values—different rights—than those acknowledged as worthy of promotion by others. After all, the United Nations declaration of human rights—in its 30 various standards—covers an enormously broad range of political, social and economic rights. The question of which rights deserve primary attention is a matter of judgment, reinforced by history and experience.

A problem of relative importance, depending upon historical experience, pervades the debate about extension of rights which are dependent upon administrative services. Civil liberties and the rights of civic equality can mostly be enforced by judicial action, e.g., declaring offensive laws null and void, where judicial review prevails, or elsewhere, by interpreting administrative decrees by reference to *ultra vires* action or other standards of the rule of law. By contrast, social and economic rights require legislative, administrative and executive planning to make and enforce new rules. Maurice Cranston has seized upon this institutional difference in the implementation of the older and newer rights as the basis for attacking the latter.

Cranston argues that the newer social and economic rights are not "authentic human rights" because "it would be totally impossible to translate them in the same way into positive rights by analogous political and legal action." This view says that welfare claims should not be viewed as human rights because they cannot be enforced by courts. In terms of American experience, this argument, made by a British scholar, does not square with the result in the right-to-counsel cases where, e.g., the U.S. Supreme Court converted an eighteenth-century civil liberty (the right to retained counsel) into a twentieth-century welfare right (the right to free counsel) by requiring legal services for the poor in all criminal cases in which the defendant is accused of a jailable offense (*Gideon* v. *Wainwright*, 1963; *Argersinger* v. *Hamlin*, 1972).

Cranston's Lockean eighteenth-century reference points to the contrary, today our views of rights are not simply shaped by the experience of claimants, plaintiffs, and defendants in courts. Indeed, in the industrially developed liberal democracies, as elsewhere, the most frequent, and perhaps the most important, contact between the average citizen and the government is not with the criminal magistrate (an experience which prompts us to weigh due process rights heavily). Increasingly the significant encounter is with the state establishment in the form of the health insurance administrator, the public assistance social worker, the social insurance official, or the family assistance inspector. The social needs of industrial democracies have generated diverse new welfare rights which, to an unprecedented degree, have multiplied citizen interaction with service agents of government. The effort to see human rights in the context of human behavior and the policy-making process—with obvious implications in terms of the need to enlist social science research—is the message ignored by Cranston. In his pursuit of justifications for human rights, he is attentive to empirical reference points: enforcement and remedies. But in so delineating the scope of human rights, he too lightly dismisses social rights and the service agents of government who administer them. To do otherwise, in his view, "is to push all talk of human rights out of the clear realm of the morally compelling into the twilight world of utopian aspiration" (p. 68).

Maurice Cranston's *What Are Human Rights?* offers a classic statement of Western legal liberalism. As such, it is an important addition to the slim list of human rights treatises now available in paperback. Moreover, this is a convenient book to assign beginning students of the philosophy and politics of human rights because it includes appropriate documentary appendices. These are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Appendix A); The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (Appendix B); and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Appendix C). The book makes a clear and coherent statement of the normative boundaries of human rights in terms which cannot be overlooked in any serious debate over the meaning of human rights in contemporary world politics.

RICHARD PIERRE CLAUDE

University of Maryland, College Park

The Lost Peace: America's Search for a Negotiated Settlement of the Vietnam War. By Allan E. Goodman. (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1978. Pp. xviii + 298. $22.50.)

Allan Goodman's incisive account of 11 years' search by United States administrations for an accommodation in Vietnam substantially enhances our knowledge of the largely secret negotiations which took place in pursuit of this goal. It does not address the value questions that the U.S. involvement in Vietnam raised, nor does it fully assess the military strategy pursued, nor the impact of the U.S. behavior on the region or on future policy. Rather, it provides an immaculate report of what the various U.S. negotiators thought they were doing and how the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (the DRV) responded.

Goodman's narrative rests upon a remarkable series of interviews (all off the record) with U.S. decision makers, dispersed as widely as the Oval Office and the Embassy in Saigon. This primary data is salted by occasional references to U.S. intelligence reports and South Vietnamese observers. The author, who recalls his own observations at various points, casts himself more as a narrator than a detached or comprehensive historian. The larger context of world politics, or domestic American politics, or the battlefield, is virtually absent. A third of the book consists of key documents and chronologies. A foreword by Ambassador William H. Sullivan (a key source), contrasts the ambiguous U.S. objectives and tactics with the simple, consistent, zealous dedication of the Lao Dong party to its goal—"the conquest of Indochina."

Previous accounts of the negotiations for a cease-fire in Vietnam by Tad Szulc in the Summer 1974 issue of *Foreign Policy*, and by Gareth Porter in *A Peace Denied* (Indiana, 1975) are quick to draw judgments, e.g., the regrettable redundancy of the Christmas bombing of 1972, the brilliance combined with the self-deception and secretiveness of Henry Kissinger (Szulc), or the consistently purposive and reasonable behavior of the DRV (Porter). Goodman, on the other hand, is surprisingly disengaged from assessments either of Americans or of the other side. The motive behind North Vietnamese behavior he takes as given—to win the war. The major tensions of his narrative then grow out of the question: who was acting perceptively, the cynical Lyndon Johnson or the bombing pause advocates; the self-inspired Henry Kissinger or his more cautious staff and skeptical president; the secretive American negotiators or the insecure South Vietnamese regimes; the U.S. military advocates of victory or the political leaders? The strategy and tactics adopted by the U.S. are amply interpreted in terms of bureaucratic and personality conflicts, but the pressures exerted by public opinion, the press, and electoral politics are scarcely developed. The thinking of the North Vietnamese is unknowable, and appears, if at all, in simplified form in their propaganda broadcasts or secret instructions to cadres. If there is a final judgment to be found in this single-minded study of negotiation dynamics it is that the American "incremental" military strategy and "conciliatory" negotiating strategy "with an adversary who, from the outset, equated restraint with weakness, and to whom compromise was inconceivable" (p. 180) obscured the costs and likely benefits of what was going to prove to be America's futile investment in Vietnam.

The book has its share of revelations, from the initiatives undertaken by President Kennedy in 1962 to get talks started with the DRV, to the dismay of Henry Kissinger's staff over his haste to strike a bargain with Le Duc Tho in October, 1972. Goodman outlines Kissinger's expectations that the "less-fire" that he negotiated would become a durable cease-fire and a political settlement. This suggests, however, the need for even more analysis of "what went wrong" than Goodman's final chapter offers. The cynicism with which the U.S. negotiators anticipated land-grabbing to continue after the cease-fire-in-place, and the thorough military provisioning of Thieu's army, set the stage for continuing war, yet the balance shifted far sooner than anticipated. Both the American Congress and the army of South Vietnam failed to live up to Kissinger's assumptions.

Some of Goodman's interpretations, garnered from American officials, may fuel controversy, e.g., whether the Christmas bombing was "the most successful U.S. operation of the war" (Goodman), rather than a political and military failure (Porter), and whether the Provisional Revolutionary Government encouraged Thieu's land-grabbing after the cease-fire in order to over-extend his forces. Goodman's interpretation of the breakdown of negotiations in December 1972 seems insensitive to Hanoi's natural reaction to Kissinger's additional demands derived from finally informing Thieu of Washington's bargain with the DRV for the withdrawal of American forces and POWs. The resort to bombing Hanoi to end the DRV's "stalling"—which threatened to delay a settlement beyond Nixon's re-inauguration—is a decision in need of still further analysis.

In sum, this book provides the most thorough insight available into the decisions underlying the negotiations with the DRV. It clearly suggests the futility of attempting to win through negotiation what has not been won by battle. Yet it also provides the grist for further analysis of alternative negotiating scenarios.

MACALISTER BROWN

Williams College

Scientists and World Order: The Uses of Technical Knowledge in International Organizations. By Ernest B. Haas, Mary Pat Williams, and Don Babai. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978. Pp. x + 368. $17.50.)

For many centuries social philosophers of various ideological persuasions have argued that world order was desirable—even imperative—for moral and philosophical reasons. In the twentieth century their ranks have been augmented by those who have argued that a scientific world view implies reasons for believing international order necessary, indeed, that science itself can provide objective solutions to such global problems as overpopulation, environmental decay, and economic underdevelopment which can only be realized through concerted international action. Scientists from various disciplines have been preeminent among those advancing such views.

At the same time that this conviction has emerged there has been a rapid growth in the number of scientists employed in both technical and policy-making positions in international organizations. The concurrence of these two developments naturally has given rise to the speculation—for many, the hope—that there is arising an "invisible college" (to use H. G. Wells' term) of technical experts working through international organizations toward the creation of a rational world order, despite the continued existence of the traditional nation-state system. The recent rise of interest in "transnational" politics has lent additional strength to such speculation.

The purpose of the authors of *Scientists and World Order*, the senior of whom, Ernest B. Haas, has long been associated with "functionalist" theories of world politics, is to examine some of the evidence which might bear on the hypothesis that there exists a body of technical experts who are—in a sense, behind the scenes—consciously and successfully working toward the scientific solution of global problems. Their aims are limited, in that they seek not to answer the vast question of the extent to which science is having an impact on the international system or measuring the role of science in changing the pattern of international cooperation, but simply seek to shed light on two questions: "What do scientists involved with international organization believe about the relationship between specialized knowledge and collective action for the achievement of economic, social and political goals?" and "Is there evidence that international science and technology programs have become more comprehensive and more ambitious in linking specialized knowledge to expanding economic, social and political goals?" (pp. 8–9).

The basic data examined in this study consist of extended interviews with 146 prominent scientists, engineers, and science program administrators in international organizations, working primarily in the fields of scientific development in industrialized societies, environmental management, and economic development. Interview data is analyzed to determine the respondents' views toward the relation of science and world order, the extent to which these views condition their operational activities, and how far these activities are contributing to a more scientifically organized world. Several "cuts" are taken at the data, manipulating it in terms of various categories and variables, and classifying respondents in terms of their views, backgrounds, and work roles. Brief historical sketches of various areas of international cooperation are presented in order to situate the respondents' views of what they are doing and why, and to present a basis for the authors' appraisals of the meanings of the respondents' activities, which sometimes differ from those of the respondents themselves.

The general conclusions of the study are that scientists working in international organizations are not—and do not see themselves as—a new breed of philosopher-kings, but are skeptical about world order itself and the possible role of science in providing the basis for comprehensive global planning. At the same time, the authors themselves conclude that the respondents are speaking prose without knowing it, and that a learning process is inevitably taking place in which more and more comprehensive, coordinated, and scientifically based international cooperation is emerging. Eventually, they assert in their concluding words, "Biological laws will become social laws" (p. 355).

Scientists and World Order is a useful and at times fascinating book which provides ammunition for both believers and skeptics regarding the possibility of a science-based world order. It is a pioneering study in the empirical examination of the issues with which it deals, and while its methodological and probative claims are modest, the data gathered are clearly and completely presented and handled in a sophisticated and ingenious fashion—sometimes perhaps overly so. *Scientists and World Order* constitutes a fine example of the merger of clear normative interests with careful descriptive research, and deserves an audience not only among professionals concerned with international politics but among concerned citizens of the planet Earth as well.

VICTOR FERKISS

Georgetown University

Soviet Foreign Policy: Its social and economic conditions. Edited by Egbert Jahn. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978. Pp. 160. $16.95.)

This is a collection of six short essays, most of which criticize Soviet society and foreign policy from a Marxist perspective. The authors, all European scholars, agree (with a few exceptions) on several basic premises: that Soviet foreign policy serves the purposes of imperialism better than socialism; that detente is the product of the USSR's social structure which is neither capitalist nor socialist; and that Soviet society is governed by an authoritarian bureaucracy.

The central paradox which these essays try to come to grips with is this: how can a non-capitalist society produce a foreign policy similar to capitalism? They also attempt to answer the question: if the Soviet Union is not a capitalist society, then what is it? Notwithstanding a shared ideological predisposition, these writers come to a variety of different conclusions. Egbert Jahn in an introductory essay contends that the Soviet Union is a hybrid between capitalism and socialism, though he acknowledges that this does not tell us very much. The most systematic models are developed by Hillel Ticktin and Antonio Carlo. Both describe the Soviet system as a bureaucratic regime which is forced to pursue detente with the West because of domestic economic failure. To Ticktin Soviet bureaucrats attempt to apply market incentives in a non-market economy, and the result is an unworkable contradiction forcing the Soviet Union to turn to the West for food, technology and quality consumer goods. Carlo's indictment is even harsher. He sees peaceful coexistence as a form of collusion between imperialism and the ruling Soviet elite. Trade with the West is undertaken to alleviate Moscow's economic problems, though it can never substitute for genuine socialist incentives which, he contends, do not now exist in the USSR. Rainer Rotemundt and Ursula Schmiederer reject the Ticktin-Carlo thesis that domestic economic failure is the cause of detente. Internal conditions alone cannot explain Soviet foreign policy if for no other reason than the fact that economic difficulties have always plagued Soviet society. They, along with Ekkehart Krippendorff, look to the international system for the roots of detente. They see Soviet foreign policy conditioned by the capitalist world market. To Krippendorff Soviet policy is a defensive response to capitalist domination of the world market and the threat of imperialist war. Rotermundt and Schmiederer argue that the international environment forces the Soviet Union to "take the form of a national state," and since all states behave in essentially the same manner, there is a fundamental compatibility between the Soviet Union and any capitalist state.

The last essay in this volume differs markedly from the others in that it focuses upon a narrow scope of foreign policy, namely, the Soviet decision to upgrade the Warsaw Treaty Organization in 1960 at the same time that it was substantially reducing its level of military personnel. Jutta and Stephan Tiedtke offer evidence (another point of difference with the others) that these two policies were interconnected and caused basically by a domestic shortage of labor in the Soviet Union and the need for additional financial resources to overcome the failures of the Seven-Year Plan (1959–1965). The upgrading of the Warsaw Pact Organization was a compensation for the troop reductions at home.

The major flaw in this collection is the lack of substance. Much of the writing offers conceptualization without the benefit of empirical evidence. Soviet foreign policy, like that of all great powers, is a product of a multiplicity of factors, some internal, others external. One cannot understand Soviet post-Stalin foreign policy without some analysis of the structure of the international system (the decline of bipolarity), of the global balance of power (the Sino-Soviet rift), and the development of nuclear weapons (strategic deterrence and nuclear parity), none of which is examined in this volume. The result is exposition which is often scholastic and unidimensional. The effort is further impeded by a literary style in several essays that is ponderous and convoluted. Some of the essays were apparently written originally in German. They may be the victims of bad translations.

JOSEPH L. NOGEE

University of Houston

Soviet Bargaining Behavior: The Nuclear Test Ban Case. By Christer Jönsson. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979. Pp. 266. $13.50.)

Christer Jönsson's examination of Soviet bargaining behavior in reaching agreement on the nuclear test ban demonstrates once again that case studies of Soviet foreign policy, unfortunately all too rare, contribute significantly to our understanding of the Soviet policy process. Such studies, which require enormous labor, are inaccessible to most readers, both general and specialized, if they must accompany the writer every step of the way in the dreary task of refining low-grade ore. Jönsson handles his evidence gracefully and cogently, bringing forward enough data to make his points without burying the reader under a mass of undigested data.

The book is divided into three related parts. In the first section Jönsson deals with the accepted wisdom on Soviet negotiating behavior, i.e., essentially the studies of Philip E. Mosely and Nathan Leites, and shows that it is largely irrelevant to the test ban negotiations between 1958 and 1963. The second part of the book deals with bargaining between the USSR and China on the whole range of foreign policy issues and on the nuclear test ban in particular. The third subject is the political struggle within the Soviet Union over the correct policy to be adopted by the USSR regarding the United States and with particular reference to the test ban agreement.

The irrelevance of the Mosely-Leites approach, written in the late forties and early fifties, is conclusively demonstrated in Jönsson's examination of the test ban negotiations between 1957 and 1963. But testing the Mosely-Leites approach at a later time begs the question of a radical change in the Soviet Union in the intervening years. Most students believe that after Stalin's death, the Soviet leaders reassessed their position vis-à-vis the United States and operated on the assumption that the balance of forces had shifted in favor of the Soviet Union for many reasons, one of which, the Soviet acquisition of nuclear weapons, was of major importance.

Until 1947 agreements were reached between the USSR and its capitalist adversaries, most notably on treaties with Germany's allies and an unnegotiated, tacit and enduring agreement on Germany. Afterwards until 1953 there was remarkably little interaction between the USSR and its opponents but a great deal of shouting and self-justification. The Mosely-Leites model was more appropriate to that period than to the one that followed, in which crises and agreements were interspersed. The careful analysis of the test ban negotiations throws into bold relief how the style of Soviet diplomacy altered to serve new purposes.

More could have been made of the parallels between Jönsson's stage two of the test ban negotiations, the period between May 1, 1960 and the missile crisis of October 1962, and the 1947–1953 period. In both periods the USSR had little expectation of reaching useful agreements with the United States. Although much else had changed, this feature common to both periods explains some of the Soviet reversion to an image of the United States as a monolithic opponent.

In the section on the effect of relations with China, the author tests the hypothesis that Soviet negotiating behavior was a function of Chinese influence, being conciliatory when Chinese influence was low and non-conciliatory when Chinese influence was high. He finds that Chinese influence was weak throughout the whole negotiations, although he demonstrates that China was always opposed to a test ban agreement for the best of reasons—that no testing meant no Chinese nuclear weapons. China, like Russia in an earlier period, had no interest in an agreement that would fix its inferiority, when time could only improve China's relative position. Soviet leaders might disagree on how to deal with the United States, but they probably all agreed that Soviet interests, not Chinese, would be determining. Since the United States recognized a rival Chinese authority, the People's Republic of China could see no benefits in any Soviet negotiations with the United States. The political leaders in the Soviet Union who were opposed to Khrushchev's policies toward the United States shared the Chinese view that accommodation with the United States was a mistake. (This even extended to Khrushchev's concession in withdrawing the missiles from Cuba.) But their preferences derived from their view of Soviet, not Chinese, necessities.

The last section of the book discusses the internal bargaining, that is, the political struggle within the USSR on the test ban agreement. Jönsson basically accepts the topography of the political battle drawn by his predecessors, but the additional source material he employs yields a picture with finer lines and greater clarity. A valuable book for any student of Soviet foreign policy.

HERBERT S. DINERSTEIN

Johns Hopkins University

Theory and Reality in World Politics. By Carey B. Joynt and Percy E. Corbett. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1978. Pp. ix + 147. $10.95.)

Too many books on morality and foreign policy fall into one or the other category that bear the imprint of yea- or nay-sayers. Writers are rather self-consciously for or against morality in international politics. A notable exception was Charles De Visscher's *Theory and Reality in International Law* translated from the French by Percy E. Corbett. The reader who turns to the present work by two estimable American theorists in the hope that it will match De Visscher's high standards is likely to be disappointed. It falls considerably short of De Visscher's *Theory* while at the same time offering a spirited defense of theory, of the relevance of ethics, the significance of the historical dimension, the deficiencies of system theories and the ultimate reconciliation of the historical and the behavioral approaches. Both the limitations and the contributions of this latest work on *Theory and Reality* deserve attention.

The favorite indoor pastime of some writers on ethics is pummeling those who throw a spotlight on the limits of morality in foreign policy. One might have thought that recent difficulties in formulating and sustaining a coherent policy of human rights would have prompted scholars, as distinct from crusaders, to probe more deeply to clear away the underbrush, to look critically at American tendencies toward preachments and proclamations put forth as much for domestic as international consumption. Americans should be reminded that not all calls for morality serve the cause of morality, not every defense is convincing. Justifications of ethical approaches that rest on the proposition that the American people expect their leaders to be outspokenly moral may invite hypocrisy as when American policy makers issue somber warnings against Soviet intervention in Iran following more than 20 years of intensive involvement by the United States in that troubled land. A further test of the quality of a treatise on morality and politics is its invocation of concepts of moral reasoning and practical morality such as proximate morality and prudence. The Joynt-Corbett volume draws on these unifying and historic principles far more sparingly than do the classics on morality by Reinhold Niebuhr, Herbert Butterfield or John Courtney Murray. When the author of the chapter on "Ethics and International Relations" writes of "mingling morals and prudence," he overlooks the fact that prudence for Edmund Burke had its own moral content. (A reviewer may be forgiven for asking if one source of weakness here may not be the search for a common denominator in a joint volume in which consistent trends of thought are more difficult to trace than in a work by a single author.)

The merit of *Theory and Reality*, its limitations notwithstanding, is the importance of the subjects addressed and the lively arguments put forward in discussing them. The authors take up the cudgels against political realists, critics of international law, systems theorists and unreconstructed skeptics who doubt that mankind stands on the threshhold of a brave new world. If progress toward a world polity has been slower than utopian writers have prophesied, historical movements toward this end are more far-reaching than critics have allowed. Having asserted, "For the first time in history clearly demonstrable common interests have emerged which are shared by all humanity" (p. 6)–interests being identified as "survival"–the spokesman for this view (who the reviewer-detective suspects may be Corbett) continues: "The major difference between the present and the past is that now the greatest ethical question of all has been raised . . . 'How ought men to live?' " This reference apparently is to questions of world population and the environment and the need for cooperative policies leading to a new world order. It is one thing to perceive such problems, along with the threat of thermonuclear destruction, as posing ultimate and moral questions. A far more compelling need is to chart concretely and in detail the social, political and diplomatic routes by which these questions can be confronted. With all its concern for rival theories and schools of thought contending in the marketplace of ideas and the echoing of calls for the transcending of national sovereignty, this admirable little book of some eight well-written essays tells us more about ennobling ideals than stubborn realities, about where the world ought to be than how it can get there. Having failed in mapping the way to the promised land, it has nonetheless succeeded in guiding students of international relations back to the great issues of ethics and law, justice and history, force and strategy, systems and power and theory and practice—a worthy goal by any standard.

KENNETH W. THOMPSON

University of Virginia

America and Western Europe: Problems and Prospects. Edited by Karl Kaiser and Hans-Peter Schwarz. (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1977. Pp. 447. $13.50.)

Two distinguished editors present a weighty volume of some 22 articles, the product of a conference in November 1977. Together these articles address the same fundamental question: is some coordinated American-West European foreign policy compatible with today's evolution of domestic and foreign politics? Kaiser and Schwartz keep no one in suspense: "A concerted policy for the industrial democracies not only offers the only sensible answer to the challenge of the present and the future, but . . . also has the chance of succeeding" (p. 14).

The articles are organized into five sections: cultural and elite relations, the economic system, security, structural problems, and conclusions. Twenty-two serious essays, with their subtleties and qualifications, obviously cannot each be adequately reviewed in so short a space. Only a few points may be made in passing.

The economics section opens with Norbert Kloten and Wilhelm Rall speculating rather gloomily on the prospects for free market economies. Andrew Schonfield is more optimistic. Even if the state's intervention in securing long-range goals has grown increasingly necessary, unwarranted state pretensions to omnicompetence have been deflated and a wide return to market principles is likely in public services. William Diebold and Raymond Vernon present a similarly untidy vision of the international economic system—multilayered, diverse, and somewhat fragmented. As Vernon notes, short of an improbable extension of supranational political authority, management of this difficult environment depends upon limited pragmatic arrangements among state and private actors, whose power to disrupt is qualified by vulnerability.

In the security section, Hans-Peter Schwarz sees European states weaker, more threatened, and even more dependent upon America. The alternatives—detente, pluralism, or federation—have all proved chimerical. Klaus Ritter sees East-West relations progressing, and Russia improving domestically, if the Soviets, adequately contained by Western strength, can be engaged in responsibly managing the world order. William Griffith gives a measured and tentative assessment of "Eurocommunism."

The structural section assesses prospects for "trilateral" world management. Wilhelm Grewe sees Japan progressively drawn in. Henry Owen predicts cooperation must either advance or decline. François Duchêne, Martin Hillenbrand, and Pierre Hassner focus on Europe. Duchêne sees coinciding domestic and international tensions exacerbated by the Third World's growing industrial success and predictable Soviet manipulation. A flexible and nuanced Western strategy toward the Third World should seek to fragment and co-opt. A more assertive Europe would improve transatlantic cooperation. Hillenbrand scores a certain domineering petulance in recent American relations with Europe and Hassner notes how the Atlantic Alliance is an essential cover for Europe's "snake pit" of unstable bilateral relationships.

In his concluding essay, Schwarz gives a clear-sighted conservative view of the future. The world, he argues, is now more unstable than at any time since the forties. If Western Europe's states turn toward nationalistic socialism and economic autonomy, management will collapse and German restlessness revive. Toward the Third World, Schwarz suggests, in effect, a certain intellectual rearmament. "Development" is power politics. Radical calls for global redistribution are not unlike nineteenth-century domestic revolutionary formulas. In the end, real progress came through a pragmatic conservatism that avoided apocalyptic confrontations between rich and poor by fostering a more plural distribution of power and prosperity.

Kaiser's conclusion sees Western democracy threatened by its own domestic economic and social problems. For Europe, the EC and not NATO provides the essential organized bond of solidarity for coping with these problems as well as playing a responsible global role. In America's own interest, European solidarity should be encouraged and manipulative bilateral relationships rigorously eschewed.

The volume's overriding tone is heroic reasonableness, strongly laced with pessimism. If they had been writing two years later, with Iran, oil, recession, unemployment, and inflation on the agenda, the authors might have been still more pessimistic. While the collective management of interdependence may be the world's best hope, it may not prove much of a hope at all. Whether future crises will tighten the trilateral nexus or drive it further apart seems more problematic than ever. Under the circumstances, the volume might have seemed more adequate to the historical drama had it added an occasional rebellious perspective—a random Marxist, protectionist, or "revisionist"—if only to remind the reader that the world has other triangles. Within the transatlantic ambit, moreover, the situation seems to have shifted somewhat over two years. The United States seems less strong, and Europe's states and their Community less weak. Deteriorating U.S.-Soviet relations have given the Europeans more space than in Kissinger's immediate aftermath. America's self-indulgence in energy and monetary policy has undermined its authority. The SALT debate and presidential elections seem likely to immobilize American "leadership" for some time to come. Meanwhile, Giscard d'Estaing's new strength, and now Margaret Thatcher's victory, have helped revive European conservative morale. A more cohesive Europe seems almost more assertive in global affairs. It is not difficult, of course, to consider Europe's strength ephemeral. In any event, it need not portend a breakdown in transatlantic cooperation. For the optimist, it may be the beginning of the long-overdue recasting of the postwar alliance. And despite ritual protestations of weakness, the tough realism of some of the European political essays suggests that Europe is well on its way to developing its own geopolitical voice.

DAVID P. CALLEO

Johns Hopkins University

Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy. By Stephen D. Krasner. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978. Pp. xiii + 402. $20.00, cloth; $5.95, paper.)

This is an ambitious, important and even courageous book. In it, Stephen Krasner attempts nothing less than to construct what he calls a "statist" theory of foreign policy, and to test it in a domain long found to be advantageous by the left, namely, the encouragement and protection of foreign raw materials investments by a major imperial power, in this case, the United States. Krasner's theoretical effort in the realm of foreign policy is nicely complemented by the recent revival of realist theory of international politics (Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, Columbia, 1977; Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Addison, Wesley, 1979; and Martin Wight, *Power Politics*, edited by Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad, Leicester, 1978), as well as by at least the partial return to the realist Mother Church of some who, at the beginning of the 1970s, were among the major advocates of alternative perspectives (for example, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Power and Interdependence*, Little, Brown, 1977).

Krasner's argument, in brief, is as follows. He begins by positing a distinction between "state" and "society," with the state consisting of "a set of roles and institutions having peculiar drives, compulsions, and aims of their own that are separate and distinct from the interests of any particular societal group" (p. 10). As Krasner sees it, his major adversaries are interest-group liberals and Marxists, who, on very different grounds to be sure, seek to deny the autonomy of the state and assume that it reflects particularistic societal pressures or interests. In contrast, in Krasner's scheme the state pursues material and ideological goals that are termed the national interest. As it strives to advance the national interest, the state may confront internal and external resistance, that is, resistance from its own society and from other states. The stuff of foreign policy is to maneuver the ship of state through these obstacles, keeping it as close as possible to its charted course.

In the domain of foreign raw materials investments, Krasner finds that the United States has pursued three sets of objectives, in this order of precedence: (1) to promote broad foreign policy goals, (2) to insure security of supply, and (3) to increase competition in order to achieve lower prices. Because these objectives are pursued consistently, and since the ranking among them also remains constant over time, Krasner takes them to reflect the national *interest. The particularistic interests, on the* other hand, are the desires of private corporate actors to gain the support of the state in promoting investments abroad and, more frequently, in protecting those investments already in place against nationalization. Who does what, when, where, how, and to whom? And which approach best explains the outcomes, the liberal, Marxist or statist?

Krasner raises these questions in the context of some 15 detailed case studies, with anecdotal evidence drawn in from numerous other instances of government intervention and non-intervention. The cases cover the entire twentieth century—as Krasner puts it, "the beginning and end of a period when private corporations structured international markets for unprocessed commodities" (p. 7). And they include some of the highly visible ones from recent years, including Iran in 1953, Guatemala the following year, and the overthrow of Allende in 1973.

Krasner concludes that neither interest-group liberalism nor "instrumental" Marxism (that variety of Marxist analysis which, in his account, assumes the state to be a simple reflection of specific capitalist class interests) offers an adequate rendering of *whether* the United States intervened in any given case and, if it did, what *form* its intervention took—diplomatic protest, economic sanctions, covert participation in an assassination attempt or coup, or sending in the Marines. He finds cases in which the government wanted to promote foreign raw materials investments but private industry was uninterested, and many more in which the private sector sought assistance but the U.S. government refused or made only token representations. He even finds cases of the government using private corporations—ITT in Chile being his major example—to pursue more general foreign policy objectives. Thus, the statist interpretation, Krasner contends, clearly is superior to these two alternatives, for the state seems to have had an agenda of its own.

However, as he points out, it is much more difficult to assess the relative merits of the statist model and a second variety of Marxism, what Krasner calls "structural" Marxism—which also attributes some degree of autonomy to the state, and in which the major task of the state is to maintain the viability of the capitalist system as a whole, a task that may well put it at odds with specific capitalists doing their particularistic thing:

> Here the argument that a statist paradigm is more powerful rests upon two examples. The first is the effort of the American government to buy Aramco during the Second World War. A violation of the basic norm of capitalism—private property—in a situation in which there was neither immediate pressure from the working class nor a clearly demonstrable long-term need cannot fit easily with a structural Marxist interpretation (p. 333).

This is a weak reed, though, because it was an attempt by the executive branch which was not supported by Congress and therefore did not succeed; besides, it occurred in the middle of the World War, and some allowances have to be made in any model for such "exogenous variables" and acts of God. "The second set of empirical cases that support a statist perspective are drawn from instances where the United States was prepared to use force. After 1945 all of these were clearly associated with the goal of preventing communist regimes from assuming or holding power" (p. 333). This fact is taken to be supportive of a statist interpretation for two reasons. First, because these are ideological objectives that cannot be related directly to any material "base" in capitalism. Second, the cases display a shocking absence of means-ends calculations, with ideological goals becoming ends in themselves. "Only the state, viewed as an autonomous institution, can make such goals the primary objectives of policy" (p. 346). Vietnam was the apogee of the pursuit of such goals, and it "weakened the social fabric of the United States itself. Central decision-makers did not act in the prudential and calculating way that one would expect from a structural Marxist approach" (p. 346), but their behavior "is compatible with a statist view that sees the state as capable of defining its own autonomous goals" (p. 333). Thus, overall, the statist perspective is said to constitute the most effective explanatory model.

Quite apart from its important theoretical purpose, this book contains some fascinating case histories that demonstrate convincingly the complexity of the relationship between the U.S. government and American private raw materials investors abroad. Krasner has made a fundamental empirical contribution to an area of inquiry in which conclusions in the past have been swayed too often by predisposition rather than evidence. However, I find the theoretical argument Krasner advances to be less than convincing.

As the sociologist Gianfranco Poggi recently stated before commencing his macro-historical study of the modern state, "The first duty of an iconoclast is to know his icons" (*The Development of the Modern State*, Stanford, 1978, p. x). Krasner doesn't do his icons justice. What he shows (and says) at great length is that the state is not simply the "handmaiden," as he puts it at one point, of specific private interests; that the jingling of the bell by any particular corporate concern has not often brought the Marines ashore or even always upset the U.S. government. But who argues otherwise? Interest group liberals? As I understand it, interest group liberals see state action as being the resultant of intergroup competition. But there are no groups in Krasner's analysis. There are only single corporations or, in some cases, a handful of corporations, making demands, taking actions, or ignoring the entreaties of the government. However powerful they may be, they do not constitute the totality of social groups in society, so that looking at their behavior alone is no test of interest group liberalism. What about the Marxists? Don't they argue that the state is the handmaiden of specific class interests? "Yes, but. . ." is the answer—with the "but" being more important than the "yes." Two problems here. First, there are no classes either in Krasner's analysis, so it is hard to test a class-based model. Second, the crude form of economism and mechanical materialism that Krasner labels "instrumental" Marxism, while it exists, has been repudiated virtually by every major Marxist theorist including Marx himself, who felt compelled to comment, in a famous phrase, that if this be Marxism then he was no Marxist.

But the real contest is with "structural" Marxism. As we saw, the superiority of the statist approach over it is said to rest on two factors: (1) the United States has intervened most forcefully when ideological objectives were at stake, and these cannot be directly related to any material base of capitalism; and (2) state behavior in these cases exhibited non-logical dimensions and even undermined domestic stability, both of which are taken to be incompatible with a Marxist perspective. What, then, are these ideological objectives? Stated in the negative, they are anti-communism, or opposition to any "psychological advance for the Marxist idea" (p. 312, citing a CIA memorandum on Chile). Krasner acknowledges that the success of the Marxist idea is unlikely to do capitalism much good in the long run. So he turns to the positive expression of these ideological objectives, which he takes to be the dominance—"the totalitarian hold," as he approvingly paraphrases Louis Hartz—of the Lockean world view in American public life. "Covert or overt force was used only when policy-makers saw [this] vision threatened" (p. 335). Now, students of political theory will be surprised to learn that Lockean liberalism is devoid of material content; most have tended to believe, correctly, that at its essence is a certain conception of the structure of property rights, and that its prescriptions concerning the proper organization of the state stem from the overriding objective of securing and defending this structure of property rights against all comers—including its own state. So Krasner simply is wrong to say that the Lockean world view bears no relation to any material base in capitalism; the structure of property rights is both material and basic. What is more, reading of the "totalitarian hold" that the Lockean vision has on American public life is like nothing so much as reading Gramsci's hegemonic theory of the bourgeois state! Thus, far from refuting "structural" Marxism, Krasner gives it quite a boost. With the second reason for preferring statism, that the pursuit of these ideological objectives exhibits non-logical elements like the absence of means-ends calculations, Krasner becomes disingenuous. He shifts onto Marxist shoulders *precisely* that burden of proof which has always been demanded of realists, while in his version of realism means-ends calculations apparently are unnecessary and the state can destroy its own society in the name of the national interest.

What of the third icon, the statist paradigm itself? Here the argument reaches a frustrating impasse because Krasner employs a highly restrictive conception of the state—once he settles on one. In fewer than ten pages (pp. 61–70), Krasner shifts his meaning of the concept of the state several times: the state is the structure of power and authority in society; the state is the government; the state is the executive branch of the government—on p. 63 he even has the "state" engaged in a struggle with the "legislature." The most common textual usage in the book is that the state in the social formation of the United States is the executive branch, specifically the White House and the State Department, and sometimes others. (In the case study of international petroleum from 1973–76, no mention is made even of the U.S. Treasury, despite Secretary Simon's repeated insistence that market forces would prevail and work in our favor, so that no other form of action was required.) Ironically, one of the major criticisms that has always been made of the interest group liberalism model is that it offers no conception of the state apart from the formal institutions of government; one is tempted, therefore, to call Krasner's equation of the state with *parts* of a *single branch* of the government a form of ultraliberalism! More to the point, Krasner draws too heavily on the Machiavellian roots of statism and not enough on the side of the German Historical School. As a result, his is the statism of the Prince, not of the totality of institutionalized coercion in society as the constitutive component of political order. The Prince is a poor surrogate for the complex modern state.

In sum, it isn't clear that Krasner's theoretical edifice will stand, or even what sort of theoretical edifice it is. His arguments often come perilously close to dissolving into the very alternative perspectives he seeks to supplant, or to prove unable to carry their burden.

A number of other troublesome aspects of the book might be noted: the national interest is defined in such a way that anything goes, so long as it is done consistently and continuously; the United States is depicted as having a "weak" state (and a "strong" society), but weakness is defined in such a way that any *status quo* state, one that is happy with the existing order of things and even one that refuses to change it when pressured to do so, *ipso facto* has to be considered as being weak; and the most interesting story, of how it came to pass that the norms governing foreign raw materials investments have changed so radically over the course of the twentieth century, is alluded to but not told.

The empirical materials in the book are rich and useful. Together with the highly provocative nature of the theoretical discussion, they provide the basis for what is likely to become a lively debate indeed.

JOHN GERARD RUGGIE

Columbia University

Bargaining in International Conflicts. By Charles Lockhart. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979. Pp. viii + 205. $12.50.)

The subject of bargaining in international conflicts is undeniably important and, in his book of that title, Charles Lockhart has presented us with a lucid and insightful discussion of the role of perceptions, decision making, and interstate interaction during periods of severe international conflict. The book has its origins in Glenn H. Snyder's Crisis Bargaining Project at the State University of New York at Buffalo where Lockhart was a graduate assistant during the years 1968–1971. As such, *Bargaining in International Conflicts* overlaps, substantively and methodologically, with Snyder's and Paul Diesing's *Conflict Among Nations* (Princeton, 1977). For this reason, many scholars of international politics may not find much new in this little book, but Lockhart's well-organized and carefully presented theoretical discourse merits wide reading by students in the field.

The opening two chapters of the book offer a brief overview of formal models of bargaining, largely drawn from economics and administrative theory, and of laboratory experiments in bargaining, mainly based upon the work of social psychologists. Lockhart concludes that formal models and bargaining experiments give us some clues or fragmentary information, but that they are largely inadequate for understanding bargaining in the context of severe international conflicts. His preference is to use history as a guide for selecting among intuitively plausible, yet often contradictory, notions posited in the international politics literature. What makes Lockhart's essay stand out from the many other works that have pursued this course is the appealing conceptual framework that he uses to organize his theorizing.

In chapters 3 and 4 of his book, Lockhart identifies a set of processes and situational factors that impinge upon interstate bargaining. He sees three processes as central. The first is information interpretation, an activity undertaken by individuals and organizations to discover the nature of the situation that they confront. The scope of this activity is constrained by limitations on human perceptual capabilities, limitations that result in selective attention to and interpretation of information based on personal ideology, domestic role, and national perspective. The second process is decision making, characterized by the need for group decisions upon independent, and often conflicting, interests and objectives. The third process is strategy search. This entails finding a solution for managing the conflict that is acceptable to both important domestic interest groups and foreign adversaries. Whether or not these processes will lead to the achievement of national objectives depends upon certain situational factors, most importantly, the ability of countries to marshal capabilities in support of their objectives. The key to success is the resourcefulness of political leaders in recognizing available options and in mobilizing and applying capabilities appropriate to the specific conflict at hand. Influence strategies must be carefully selected, and the timing of influence attempts is crucial to the success of bargaining in severe international conflicts. These are not novel ideas; what makes their presentation valuable, particularly for classroom use, is the concise and orderly way in which Lockhart has organized them.

Lockhart suggests that the evolution of conflict episodes or bargaining situations can be conceived in terms of four phases: intolerable violation, resistance, confrontation, and accommodation. These are the same phases posited by Snyder and Diesing in their book, and it might be noted that these authors cite an early work of Lockhart's as the source of their phase model. Lockhart concludes his book by employing what he calls an "analytic chronology," a theoretical discussion of conflict escalation supported by historical examples, to illustrate how these four phases of conflict episodes are characterized by patterns of information interpretation, decision foci, strategy search, resourcefulness, and strategy dilemmas. This heuristic device allows the author to tie together theoretical discussions from the previous chapters and serves as a vehicle for policy prescription. Lockhart concludes that "the actions of parties to international conflicts follow patterns that can be anticipated by the statesman and can therefore be used as guidelines for the appropriateness of his own actions" (p. 179).

Bargaining in International Conflicts is an exercise in theorizing, upon which policy prescription may be based. The conceptual framework that guides the theorizing is presented without obfuscation; Lockhart's writing style is clear and direct and the book is short and to the point. What is written seems eminently reasonable, and some very interesting hypotheses are posited. What the book does not offer, and Lockhart recognizes this, is a model of interstate bargaining that is sufficiently specific to be tested and invalidated. Lockhart has drawn upon common sense, extant literature, and historical example; the validity of his theoretical arguments and, concomitantly, the appropriateness of his policy prescriptions await systematic empirical testing. Model building and empirical testing were not the purposes of this book; they would be, however, logical next steps toward a more complete understanding of bargaining in severe international conflicts.

CHARLES S. GOCHMAN

University of Pittsburgh

Systems Theory and Regional Integration: The "Market Model" of International Politics. By James P. O'Leary. (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1978. Pp. iv + 270. $9.75, paper.)

This book is a critical analysis of functionalist and neo-functionalist integration theories, the influence on these theories exerted by prominent system theorists, especially Talcott Parsons and David Easton, and an effort to identify the theoretical underpinnings and often implicit assumptions upon which these integration and systems theories are based. In particular, the question is raised whether these schools of thought reflect the influence of a "liberal" or a "holistic" paradigm of international relations.

After an extensive discussion of economic theories on the domestic and international level beginning with Adam Smith and including the role of the state (chapters 2 and 3), James O'Leary concludes in chapter 4 that for Parsons, Easton, and the neofunctionalists Haas and Lindberg, the central fact of system evolution is "man as a rational economic consumer making demands upon a reactive state in a model of political life heavily influenced by the model of 'market' relations" (p. 197). Thus the polity looks very much like the economy, processing and supplying output to satisfy inputs of demands. For functionalists and neofunctionalists, O'Leary asserts, integration is the inevitable outcome of individual actors pursuing their own perceptions of self-interest. It is the individual and his wants and needs, which represent the cutting edge of system change leading from the nation to the "region" state, and not the needs of the "state" *in abstracto*. Functional and neofunctional integration theory therefore share with classical and neoclassical liberal economic theory the enshrinement of atomized individuals as the leading actors in the system of action under scrutiny and is consumerist-oriented. Moreover, according to O'Leary, neofunctionalists have tended to agree with Parsons and Easton not only that economic groups are the primary agents of stable successful evolution, but also that the specifically Parsonian formulation of the "economistic evolutionary model" is most applicable to regional integration processes (pp. 144–45).

To foster the expansion logic of sector integration, economic groups pursuing economic objectives are recognized as being most influential. Cultural, security, and military cooperation are ranked below economically oriented tasks in terms of their integrative potential. However, in the author's view, it is *procedural* consensus on how to maximize welfare, not the content of these welfare aspirations themselves, which constitute the essence of forward movement in integration, according to neo-functionalist theory. And "because proceduralism creates its own order, the Parsonian hypothesis that the most functional form of system evolution proceeds from 'adaptive' to 'normative' is readily adapted to international system evolution without any prior resolution of the security dilemma of states" (p. 145). Indeed, according to O'Leary, the stress on adaptation in rationalistic allocation theories of politics runs "as a crucial connective fiber from Parsons through Easton to the functionalist and neofunctionalist models" (p. 215). If these models actually reflected reality, then the responsive states may become the captive of certain interests which stand to profit most from the successful integration experiment, while at the same time these states may fall into a socially undesirable drift. As a consequence, O'Leary claims that functionalism and neofunctionalism offer only partial analyses of the problem of integration and that the larger normative question of the content of "political will" and the prerequisites in terms of societal consensus and cohesion to successful regional integration should be explored.

One may well argue that this book is flogging a dead horse. After all, Ernst Haas, discussing the obsolescence of integration theory in 1975, said, "The theories we have developed for describing, explaining, and predicting regional integration . . . have a tendency not to predict the events which come about, and not to explain very convincingly why events . . . did come about in fact" (*The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory*, Berkeley, 1975, p. 1). However, the book is valuable because it identifies the links between systems theory and the two strands of functionalism as well as the basic economic theories that appear to underlie systems and functionalist theories. On the other hand, some of O'Leary's charges about functionalisms such as the presumed automaticity of the integration process and the narrow range of procedurally constrained conflicts allowed by neofunctionalist theory, may have been warranted 10 years ago (pp. 161, 147, 216), but ignore the changes in theory made by Schmitter, Nye, and others in the late 1960s and early 70s. Indeed, the political dimension of integration theory has been much more recognized by neofunctionalists during these years than O'Leary's volume suggests.

The book has a few flaws that need to be mentioned: extensive quotations on nearly every page, repetitiveness which could have been avoided through a sharper focus on the study's main concerns, and a more clear-cut organization of the materials presented. Unfortunately, few concrete suggestions are made to improve integration theory which is clearly in disarray and needs new conceptualizations and perhaps new sets of pertinent variables if it is to be salvaged. Nevertheless, the book is a challenging work worthy to be read by those interested in regional integrative and system transformation.

WERNER J. FELD

University of New Orleans

Offense and Defense in the International System. By George H. Quester. (New York: John Wiley, 1977. Pp. xii + 219. $7.25, paper.)

George Quester has written an interesting and useful complement to the more traditional structural treatments of international politics. Beginning with the earliest extensively recorded systems of the Greek city-states and the Roman Empire, Quester traces alternating periods of the ascendancy of military offense or defense in the international system until the present nuclear stalemate.

A superior defense generally is associated with the balance of power, whereas controlling offensive strategies tend to result in hierarchical or imperial systems. The Greek city-states and feudal satrapies, for example, conformed largely to balance-of-power principles under conditions of strong defensive redoubts. On the other hand, the Roman Empire or the brief American hegemony in this century emerged under conditions of the possession of offensive weapons and organization against which there was little possibility of effective defense.

This emphasis on questions of offense and defense leads to some interesting and unconventional speculations. For example, given the relative utility of defensive measures in the interwar period, was it really so foolish of the French to have built the Maginot line or for that matter, the Germans, the Siegfried line, especially given the utility of the latter series of fortifications in hindering the Allied advance late in World War II? Perhaps the French simply did not sufficiently emphasize their defensive fortifications in not building them along the Belgian frontier as well. As another illustration, given the Maoist interpretation of guerrilla warfare as primarily a means for the population to defend itself, was American policy correct in adamantly opposing Chinese Communism as mainly interested in the export of world revolution via guerrilla warfare? Perhaps a more realistic and therefore more benign view might have prevented considerable agony in Vietnam and elsewhere.

Quester is best when he discusses the historical conditions of offense and defense in various systems, but is less clear when he applies the same categories to more contemporary illustrations. Perhaps the reasons for the clarity and oft-times superiority of his treatments of the earlier periods are to be found in the historical remoteness of these periods and the highly realistic circumstance of a uniform weapons technology existing throughout a given time span (e.g., the crossbow having been used for several hundred years). We are much closer to contemporaneous events and therefore are constrained to see more of the trees than the forest; technology also has been rapidly changing, thus making events appear to be more complex and likely actually to be more complex in the interaction between offense and defense.

It is this unique interactive quality (e.g., 1973 Mideast War) which throws up barriers to easy characterization. An offensive break-through can be followed immediately by a successful defense as in the German conquest of eastern France followed by the successful French defense on the Marne. Perhaps no distinctive controlling offensive or defensive technology governed the period immediately prior to World War I, and the offense-defense dichotomy breaks down in its predictive power in the instance of an extraordinarily complex sequence of political events of which World War I was mainly a consequence. Other difficulties intrude in the classification of different kinds of modern weaponry as in the aphorism "the best defense against a tank is another tank." This is especially true for nuclear weapons serving as deterrents in their substitution for adequate defenses, but also having an extreme offensive capability as in a successful first strike.

Nonetheless, Quester is aware of these difficulties, and his distinctions on the whole have utility; the entire enterprise of providing a limited "cut" into international history leads to many interesting insights. I recommend this book to any scholar concerned with the relationship between military and political history of international systems. It would be especially useful as an adjunct text in upper-division and beginning graduate courses.

MANUS I. MIDLARSKY

University of Colorado, Boulder

Foreign Policy and Economic Dependence. By Neil R. Richardson. (Austin and London: University of Texas Press, 1978. Pp. xii + 214. $12.95.)

This book is a pleasure to read, primarily because it is informative and well written, and because it makes a strong contribution to the emerging literature on dependence and interdependence (though not *dependencia*).

The intellectual center of the book lies in its clear formulation and empirical evaluation of arguments concerning the relationship between economic dependence and foreign policy compliance. The core hypothesis, around which several important variants are organized, is that the dependence of weak countries upon strong ones leads to opportunities for political influence by the dominant country. Richardson tests his ideas on a set of countries which were dependent on the United States from 1950 to 1973. His measure of foreign policy compliance is based on voting agreement with the U.S. on salient issues in the United Nations General Assembly.

Though it is hard to do justice to an important book in a brief review, I would summarize my reactions as follows. At the level of argument the book is clear, coherent, well positioned in the literature, and general. Its research design, with one exception (the threshold for the identification of dependencies), leaves ample room for a sound test of the major hypotheses. Measurement procedures are public and formulated so as to attempt (not always successfully) to capture faithfully the major concepts of the theory. Finally, the data analysis is superb in several ways. Since the theory is explicit up to the form of the relationship, the equations written for the data analysis are not mechanical translations into linear, additive regressions but have to carefully model the verbal theory. Also, the data analysis is carried out sensitively with the author taking great care to take negative results into account, think them through, and reformulate the argument in general—rather than ad-hoc—terms. "Outliers" or "deviant cases" are not merely written off, ignored, or "brought back into the fold" by statistical legerdemain. Instead, Richardson ponders over them and scrutinizes the evidence carefully, thus allowing anomalous results to push his own theorizing forward. Finally, although the author provides a focused assessment of particular ideas, he does not act as if the variables incorporated in his ideas are the only ones operating in the "real" world. Accordingly, he searches out the impact of alternate explanations.

I do have several criticisms of the book but think these should not obscure my overall positive reaction. The criticisms are not minor; rather, they are quite fundamental and call for Herculean solutions. But for this very reason it would be unfair to expect these solutions to occur all in one book. The criticisms are threefold: First, despite Richardson's claim (pp. 14–15), this book says very little, if anything, about *dependencia* theory. True, the concept of vulnerability is present in dependencia theory but it surfaces in a particular way—not as an external reliance of one nation-state on another but rather as a transnational fusion of class interests. This whole "internal anatomy" of dependency, by which domestic groups are structured so as to insert themselves into the global system, is not addressed in this book. "Dependence" thus reduces to external reliance of states on one another.

A second limitation of the book is that it bases its empirical foundation, though not all of its theorizing, on an aggregate nation-state approach. That is, every sectoral dependence in one country is added to all others so that a final dependence score of *i* on *j* can be derived. Furthermore, the three basic modes or forms of dependence—trade, aid, and investment—are added together. There are of course strong assumptions underlying this aggregate approach, assumptions about the integrity of the state's decision-making apparatus, the homogeneity of sectoral dependencies, the additivity of them, the ability to draw linkages among distinct sectoral dependencies, to trade them off against one another, and for dependencies in one country to "cancel out" dependencies in another. More importantly on political grounds, the aggregate approach assumes (implicitly or explicitly) that the state can effectively mobilize and funnel the separate sectoral reliances and translate these into unified political capital.

The conversion process is most certainly a variable, i.e., some states are likely to be more efficient in converting the inputs (sectoral dependencies) into outputs (political influence). In this regard, the weak state-strong state literature would have given the author conceptual leverage.

A final criticism concerns the measurement of dependence. A comprehensive measure of dependence should be based upon at least three things: size, intensity, and vulnerability. We want to know how much of a reliance one state has on another, how intense that reliance is (i.e., the need for each unit supplied) and the cost of shifting to an alternate supplier or good. The measure employed by Richardson is based only on the size of a weak country's reliance on the U.S.

The book does produce results, though the patterns cannot be summarized here. But the book is worth reading both because of the way it approaches a problem and the substantive conclusions it produces. Richardson's care in interpreting the evidence leaves many questions unanswered, but significant progress has been made.

JAMES A. CAPORASO

University of Denver

The Military and Security in the Third World: Domestic and International Impacts. Edited by Sheldon W. Simon. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979. Pp. xviii + 348. $22.50.)

The major premise—and supposedly unifying theme—of this book by Sheldon W. Simon is that the "conventional wisdom" of performance differences between the military and civilian governors in the developing areas should no longer be accepted so patently. It is also argued that a "mix" of civilian and military actors is to be found in countries of the Third World considered as militarily ruled, and that this is the best formula for creating political stability, social order, and economic growth. Had such a paradigm been followed by each author for each country or region, the investigation of this thesis might have produced some interesting and important points. As a sharply defined and cohesive presentation of an often-debated theme, this collection of essays could have been a major contribution to the literature. While the collection fails to reach this goal, some individual chapters, nonetheless, are informative.

In the opening two provocative essays, Sam Sarkesian provides his notion of the general similarities and differences in theorizing about African and Latin American military performance. Citing the "sophistication" of Latin societies generally, Sarkesian indicates that Latin American military forces are more professional, adept at handling modern weaponry, and more oriented toward external missions. The implication is that the obverse is true of African societies. While the basic notion of this dichotomy may be acceptable, the underlying contention that African militaries seize power because of tribalism, however, is incomplete and tacitly biased. Greater significance should be given to factors such as a country's industrial development and social milieu; that is, countries such as Paraguay, El Salvador, or Bolivia are industrially or socially quite different from Cuba or Brazil, and their military missions, attitudes, and performance will necessarily be dissimilar. Conversely, an African who has spent much of his life as an expatriate doubtless has achieved a level of sophistication readily matching any Latin's. In other words, to regard tribalism as a major cause of a retardation in the sophistication of African military groups is inadequate. However, one cannot deny the importance of tribal loyalties upon the consolidation of power in a post-coup environment simply because of trust level possible in relying on "one's own."

Harold Maynard, writing on Indonesian and Philippine military elites, establishes what civil-military theorists have maintained for some time: (1) that Third World officers believe their primary role is domestic repression rather than external defense—since, at least in Indonesia and the Philippines, no external threat is perceived or planned for; (2) that such officers are hostile to politicians, party politics, radicals, and, of course, communists; (3) that their thinking on such matters is simplistic; and (4) that they feel it is the duty of the military to lead their nation out of the current "crisis" in the direction of development. The Indonesians claim, surprisingly, that only a "small minority" of officers engage in speculation and both military samples from Maynard's research allege that politicians are motivated by "personal" interests while theirs are patriotic and institutional. Maynard is relatively uncritical toward his subjects and fails to make a very amply justified prediction: that after Marcos the military will completely dominate the Philippine people and continue the giveaway of that nation's resources, as in Indonesia, to the transnationals. The Philippine regime, we can predict, will be more pro-American than the Indonesian praetorians are.

A very different type of military role is delineated by W. Raymond Duncan in his chapter on Cuba. On the basis of interviews with exiles and analysis of germane perceptions of pre-Revolutionary Cuban *pensadores,* Duncan contrasts new with old values and norms concerning the individual, family, work, and nation. He clearly helps us fathom the dynamic underpinning of any successful mobilizational process and goes on to show how the armed forces have been constructively used not only for physical infrastructural projects but also for socializing a new generation into a national and community-oriented work ethic which will yield self-respect for a people who are finally acquiring a prestigious position among developing nations. Duncan nevertheless devotes too little attention to how the armed forces have performed this function and its effectiveness is not assessed. It is clear from other sources, however, that this has been a secondary mission for the FAR, which was required by the weakness of civilian organizations. As the latter have been strengthened during the seventies, the FAR have been properly curtailed in the non-military areas. This has not occurred in the Philippines and Indonesia even though, according to Maynard's interviewees, the martial function remains the primary and truly "military" mission. As revolutionary Cuba develops and these oppressed countries stagnate, the anti-militaristic wisdom of Vagts will once again be reaffirmed. Viva Fidel!

Stephen Walker, in a somewhat different vein, employs a variety of models to explain international interaction of Third World governments. His first concern is an interest in the applicability of general foreign policy models to the behavior exhibited by these governments—based on a slide rule of "domestic disorder." Second, he is curious about performance characteristics of civilian and military regimes, using, particularly, Harold Lasswell's garrison state model. The "military mind" is the center of Walker's third interest, as it relates to foreign policy behavior, accepting various cultural and regional eccentricities as infringing upon military "norms." Walker has devised a series of research propositions to explain general regime behavior. Variables such as arms imports, possession of modern, variegated, and/or offensive military capability, engagement in international conflict, and the acquisition and maintenance of weaponry are juggled about to test several hypotheses, which he labels regional, historico-regime, historico-domestic order, military mind, and stimulus. In the most quantitative chapter of the collection, Walker then constructs a matrix for the data analysis of his hypotheses for 78 countries. For example, an important determinant of a country's reliance upon arms transfers is national "war-proneness," that is, involvement in interstate wars. But to assert that international conflict behavior "conforms" very strongly to a simple stimulus-response relationship suggests, first, again, an overloaded, biased approach. Also, it suggests some strange "break" in the chain: in order for one actor to respond, another must offer stimuli. However, if all actors are engaging in such conflict, one may legitimately ask, what causes the stimuli? Walker has knit himself deeply into his matrix, with little room for analysis and explanation—only regression.

Gavin Boyd, on Chinese external security policy, contends that the "purge" of Maoist elements from the higher echelons of collective leadership has not yet abated; however, some oldtimers are retaining their positions. Nonetheless, this less-than-pacific unified environment of the major leadership group is not severely hampering foreign policy decision, as the international environment is generally yet so propitious for Chinese initiatives. Boyd suggests that the Maoist elements may yet reemerge powerful and their "strategy" would be to intensify the animosity toward the Soviet Union, with less attention paid to relations with the United States, as a gesture of "proud disdain for foreign expertise." The maintenance of influence of the non-Maoists focuses less attention on hostilities with Russia and more on burgeoning relations with East and Southeast Asia.

Sheldon Simon outlines the four roles of Chinese security policy: (1) as a member of the Soviet bloc, beginning in 1949, "leaning 'to one side' in international politics"; (2) a bulwark of fundamental socialism against revisionism in the communist movement; (3) a Third World country, allying with its brothers against neocolonialism and the big powers; and (4) a growing world power, as evidenced by its United Nations role. In placing the United States and the Soviet Union together as imperialist powers, China felt freer to deal more effectively with its Southeast Asian neighbors. Simon outlines, in another chapter, the modus vivendi that the ASEAN countries wish to arrange with Indochina. The non-communist nations look inward for security: development of national legitimacy through greater and more equitable economic performance, with more political participation of minority ethnic groups. The precarious balance between communist and non-communist states is exemplified by the halting, yet onward, movement of the Mekong Delta program for Indochina and Thailand. The major premise of Southeast Asian security is the willingness of states to put aside political and military differences and intensify cooperative economic programs!

As we stated at the outset, the collection fails to achieve any thematic coherence. Area experts may find some of the sections interesting and useful (other chapters include Middle Eastern and Latin American overviews), but even as an introductory reader to the role of the military in developing nations, there is much lacking in this disjointed assemblage of papers. Some focus upon domestic civil-military relations while those in the latter portion of the "book" deal with external and regional interstate problems.

ELLEN STERN

Syracuse University

MILES D. WOLPIN

State University of New York, Potsdam

The Soviet Union and Postwar Japan: Escalating Challenge and Response. By Rodger Swearingen. (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1978. Pp. xxv + 340. $14.95.)

In view of the importance of the subject, it is surprising that until now no comprehensive treatment of Soviet-Japanese relations has been available. Rodger Swearingen's book is a first of its kind and should be welcomed by specialists and general readers alike.

The book is intended to provide an "analysis of the changing element of Soviet-Japanese relations, ideological, political, cultural, diplomatic, economic, and strategic, from 1945 to 1978." The author identifies four additional purposes of the volume:

1. "to add research depth and original documentation in several important areas" in existing literature;
2. "to make available in English the essence of selected publications" in Japanese and Russian;
3. "to represent succinctly the divergent viewpoints and conclusions of other scholars"; and
4. "to provide the full text or summaries in English translation of the 34 bilateral treaties signed between Japan and the Soviet Union, 1956 through 1977."

Swearingen is successful in meeting these objectives, although in varying degrees.

The book appears to be more of a combination of reference book and series of essays on selected topics rather than a systematic study. It is packed with interesting facts, perceptive commentaries and interpretations. It is lucid, colorful writing—indeed, enjoyable reading.

I found several chapters of the volume particularly enlightening. Swearingen's comments on Soviet strategy and tactics in occupied Japan, especially the role of the Soviet representative on the Allied Council for Japan, and the Soviet indoctrination of Japanese prisoners of war are two such cases. An informative chapter on Japan's participation in Siberian development is followed by a survey of "diplomatic and strategic dimensions," covering such topics as the Peking-Moscow-Tokyo interrelationship, fisheries, the Northern Territories, Japan's rearmaments, and the "military imbalance" in East Asia. A sketchy treatment of Japanese public opinion and the press is given, along with a useful commentary on the evolution of the policies of the Japanese Communist party.

Swearingen's coverage of the subject is not particularly comprehensive with respect to both the period and the topics chosen. It is painted with a broad brush. Swearingen himself writes that his attempt to cover a wide range of dimensions of Soviet-Japanese relations "necessarily precluded attention to many relevant aspects, imposes depth and length constraints, and sadly limits inclusion of much otherwise desirable detail." One might question of particular aspects for discussion, his decision on length and depth of such discussions, but it is also indicative of the paucity of analytic studies available to him.

Swearingen gives a brief one-page discussion of the Japanese-China treaty of peace and amity and its anti-hegemony clause. But the Soviet-Japanese relations for several years preceding the final conclusion of the treaty in 1978 cannot be adequately explained without examining how the issue of anti-hegemony affected the development of mutual policies between the Soviet Union and Japan. Equally scant attention is paid to how the evolving U.S.-China relations affected Soviet policy toward Japan. There is a brief three-page discussion of the May 1977 Fisheries Agreement with the contents of the agreement summarized. However, no mention is made as to how this fisheries issue was integrally intertwined with the territorial dispute and how deeply the fisheries negotiations affected overall Soviet-Japanese relations, not only during the period of negotiation but also during the subsequent years.

The author describes growing Japanese awareness of the Soviet military threat and goes on to identify some of the external setting factors shaping Japanese perception. A better-rounded analysis would have called for some attention to internal developments in Japan, including trends in inter- and intra-party politics. With regard to the Northern Territorial issue, considerations affecting Soviet refusal to relinquish the four islands are identified. However, a similar discussion is missing concerning Japan's complex motivations for insisting on their claim. In view of the important and pervasive influence which this issue has exerted on the Soviet-Japanese relations, an analysis of Japanese motivations would have added meaning to this work.

Political and diplomatic interactions between the two countries on a peace treaty for the period 1973–1978 was treated within the span of two pages. There is no discussion of the Soviet call for a treaty of good neighborly relations and cooperation with Japan. Although the details of the Soviet draft treaty were not made public until February 1978, the Soviet government had for some years been pressuring Japan on the issue. Soviet diplomatic efforts continue to this date, with greater intensity particularly since the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Amity in 1978.

What I have said concerning the topics or aspects of the subject to which the author paid scant attention are not to be considered criticisms of the volume as a whole. They represent a somewhat different allocation of emphasis than I would have attached to such issues. Students of Soviet and Japanese affairs are greatly indebted to Swearingen for the monumental task he undertook in assembling and synthesizing so many interesting facts and interpretations, and for his keen and significant insights into the subject.

YOUNG C. KIM

George Washington University

The Capitalist World-Economy: Essays by Immanuel Wallerstein. (New York and London: Cambridge University Press, 1979. Pp. xiv + 305. $36.00, cloth; $9.95, paper.)

Immanuel Wallerstein's work, particularly *The Modern World System*, has had a major impact on the study of international relations and comparative politics. But the publication of *The Capitalist World-Economy* will do little to enhance the author's reputation. For here is a collection of essays—the majority simply reprints—which offer nothing new in reply to his critics and which are often repetitive and ill written.

The essays comprise the theoretical foundation for Wallerstein's larger project (an enterprise with which I have the greatest sympathy) of which *The Modern World System* is the first installment. His main thesis is that we can understand the politics and society of any country solely in the context of the development of world capitalism. "Stage theories" of the evolution of self-contained nation-states are, in this view, fruitless since class, ethnicity and politics are refracted through the particular country's place in the world economy (Chs. 1, 10–14). All societies since the sixteenth century have been parts of the world capitalist system, though their relative positions within it change with the passage of time. At any point, each society is part of the core (advanced capitalist nations with strong states), the periphery (underdeveloped countries with weak states), or the semi-periphery (countries that lie somewhere between periphery and core) (Ch. 1). Each society's development at any specific moment is located at the intersection of three sets of "antimonies" that characterize the world capitalist system: between an economy that is international and polities which are circumscribed by relatively unchanging national boundaries; between supply and chronically insufficient long-run demand; between the bourgeoisie and its nemesis, a growing wage-earning class (pp. 272–73). World socialism emerges when these contradictions no longer can be resolved within a capitalist framework, i.e., when (1) expansion halts because there are no more subsistence economic sectors for capital to conquer, (2) world-wide proletarianized labor becomes politicized and attacks the global bourgeoisie, (3) transfers of wealth among the ruling classes in order to ensure greater political stability via the construction of welfare states divide and politically debilitate the bourgeoisie (pp. 129–30, 159–63, 278–79).

Authors such as Theda Skocpol in *American Journal of Sociology* 82 [1977], Robert Brenner in *New Left Review* 104 [1977] and Peter Gourevitch in *Comparative Politics* 10 [1978], have strongly criticized Wallerstein's arguments. Yet in a book where we should find a rejoinder to these critics we find no such thing. So, with Gourevitch, for instance, we are still left wondering what states fall into which of the three developmental categories at which particular phases of history—especially in stage two between 1650 and 1730 (pp. 26–27)—and whether, despite Wallerstein's efforts to clarify the issue in chapters 5 and 6, the semi-periphery is not a residual category into which one dumps cases which are simply neither core nor periphery. His vagueness over the semi-periphery is especially disturbing given the importance he assigns it in the transition to socialism (pp. 117–18).

Wallerstein's discussion of core states is equally troublesome. They are strong, he tells us, because they can manipulate the market to their advantage, and the reason they can manipulate the market is because they are strong (pp. 19–21, 61, 159, 291). This is simply a circular argument. Furthermore, Wallerstein fails to tell us what exactly constitutes state strength. More than this, he leads us to believe that members of the pre-capitalist elite, apparently free of any bourgeois pressure, chose capitalism in order to buttress their political dominance. It was this "creative leap of imagination," not class struggle, which led to the eventual domination of the capitalist mode of production (p. 161). It is not surprising, therefore, that he ends up with a definition of capitalism (p. 15) pitched at the level of exchange and not of productive relations, a definition that Brenner rightly labels as "neo-Smithian."

Worst of all, Wallerstein's global view in the end swamps any sense of the reasons and intentions of the political actors themselves. It is a world of the final, inevitable struggle of bourgeois versus proletarian, of inexorable progress to socialism, a prospect that seems to rob us of both political choice and political activity (see pp. 136, 149, 162). Contemporary Marxists have been at pains to rescue the Left from such a view, partly because it is intellectually wrong, but also because it encourages an unwarranted political passivity.

Although this is a disappointing book, I look forward to the publication of a genuine—and better edited—rethinking of his theoretical positions. (Wallerstein's short, and very thin, introductory essay on the philosophy of the social sciences in this volume is no substitute.) Thus the reader might be saved from churning through too many repetitious glosses on what remains Wallerstein's basic argument in "The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System" (Ch. 1). Thus one might be saved from the too-frequent appearance of such tortured prose as: "To the argument that classes existed *an sich* whether or not, at given points of time, they were *für sich*, various psychologists insisted that the only meaningful construct was a so-called 'subjective' one" (pp. 283–84).

PETER COCKS

State University of New York, Albany

The Middle East in the Coming Decade: From Wellhead to Well-being? By John Waterbury and Ragaei El Mallakh. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978. Pp. xii + 219. $5.95, paper.)

It is tempting to judge any book analyzing trends in Middle Eastern politics and economics for the 1980s by whether or not the authors anticipated the unusual twists of the late 1970s. In particular, did the authors foresee the fall of the Shah, the temporary removal of Iran from the oil equation, the resurgence of Islam, and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty? While it is probably unfair to expect specific accurate prophesy from a serious study of long-term trends, and while some of John Waterbury's and El Mallakh's discussion is already outdated, this book does rather well both in identifying danger signs for people like the Shah, and in providing in-depth discussion of complex regional conflicts. For this reason, it makes an excellent background text and basic reference.

The book's strength is the focused analysis of Middle Eastern sub-regions, i.e., North Africa, Fertile Crescent, Persian Gulf, etc., the interconnections of these sub-regions, and their relations to the industrialized world. Basically there are two extended essays: Waterbury's incisive explanation of why "Middle Eastern states will fail in the 1980s to develop a cohesive, cooperative, regional development strategy or a collective bargaining position in relation to the North"; and El Mallakh's more optimistic but somewhat less convincing prediction of inter-Arab coordination based on the reality of vastly increasing oil revenue. Each essay reveals valuable information, ranging from the politics and economics of OPEC decisions and their relation (often obscured in Western thinking) to OECD decisions, as seen through the eyes of El Mallakh the economist, to the complex, free-wheeling competition for foreign markets, investment, resources, and regional Saharan hegemony between Algeria and Morocco, as described by the political scientist Waterbury. Waterbury concludes that in case after case, Egypt, the Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Algeria and other countries in the region look primarily to parochial national interests in guiding policy, and sometimes even benefit from continued regional discord.

Neither Waterbury nor El Mallakh anticipated the Egyptian-Israeli rapprochement, and its implications for renewed Saudi-Egyptian hostility. But the separate peace reflects Waterbury's basic presumption that Sadat follows an "Egypt first" policy. Events can break and trends can be reversed rapidly in the Middle East—as when the Shah pulled the rug from under the Iraqi-Kurdish rebellion—but such conclusions as the following (by Waterbury) seem likely to hold up:

> The unstable mix of fierce piety and pragmatic socioeconomic radicalism that may be the wave of the future is currently represented by Muhammar al-Qaddafi. No regime is immune to it.... This threat to the status quo is far more real than anything from the left.

One weakness of the book is the short shrift given to certain topics crucial for the region's future. Waterbury glosses over the political tug-of-war surrounding and within the Palestinian movements. A few of El Mallakh's chapters on the prospect for economic growth are sketchy, especially on the economic and political upheaval likely because of rapid growth, population pressure, and corruption. Insights such as those concerning common interests among conservative regimes lose impact because possible counterarguments, centering on Arab-Iranian hostility or possible regime changes, are not fully discussed. Neither is Israel's possible future economic role in the region discussed, an unfortunate exclusion since Israel may compete with Egypt for the export of services and technology if the "rejection front" can be broken.

Ten years is a short time in Middle Eastern terms. Just ten years ago Israeli leaders maintained that Egyptian leaders could not be trusted since they "say one thing to the Western press and another thing to their own citizens." And today, in the days of an Egyptian-Israeli treaty, Israeli leaders describe Arafat in similar terms. Perhaps in ten years Israelis and Palestinians will be making deals. Reviewing prospects for the coming decade, Waterbury and El Mallakh have taken contrasting views of present trends; they could profitably have considered more fully the conditions which might reverse those trends as well.

FREDERIC S. PEARSON

University of Missouri, St. Louis

Quaker Experiences in International Conciliation. By C. H. Mike Yarrow. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978. Pp. xxvii + 308. $10.00.)

This book is a valuable addition to the literature of non-governmental activities in transnational relations. Too few are the case studies of international voluntary bodies—the world-level equivalent of public-interest groups. We need to formulate hypotheses about the entire spectrum of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the measure of their usefulness and effectiveness in international and transnational decision making. Mike Yarrow points out that Quakers are very reluctant to organize, so technically the international conciliation reported in his study was not conducted by an NGO but rather in two cases by Quaker ad-hoc teams and in the third case by a succession of Quaker International Affairs Representatives (QIAR).

From the large number of possibilities of conciliation in the post-1945 period, Quaker "concern" (a Quaker term for subjective interest of someone who "because of past experience or deep sensitivity feels involved and responsive to the particular human need" (p. 262), was shown in relatively few, and Yarrow chose three as representative samples: relations between East and West Germany, the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, and the Nigerian Civil War. Interestingly, these ad-hoc teams received support from a great number of Quaker organizations of the theoretically unorganized Society of Friends. Of the many Quaker organizations mentioned, only one, the Friends World Committee for Consultation, is a proper NGO, in consultative status with the UN ECOSOC since 1948.

After the Second World War, the Quakers conducted international programs directed at the elites or potential elites of the world. International Student Seminars and International Work Camps brought together future leaders. The Washington International Affairs Seminars gathered together participants from the American government, the world press, and foreign diplomats. The Conferences for Diplomats were conducted for young foreign service officers from all countries, providing contacts for later conciliation efforts and QIARs. Informal contacts with United Nations delegates were achieved through the Quaker office at the United Nations.

Although Quaker conciliation was conducted without any rules, Yarrow's analysis breaks it down to five stages: listening; communicating the perceptions of one side to the other; analyzing the situation without suggestions; making proposals if appropriate; and getting the representatives of both sides to confer directly. Various techniques were used by the team members. By role playing, they hoped to anticipate the moves and countermoves of each side. To be impartial would imply that the team members had no feelings one way or the other, so a "balanced partiality" was developed and practiced where team members put themselves in the shoes of each side alternatively, thus becoming more sensitive to all individuals and groups (p. 265).

A problem with which all analysts of NGOs wrestle is that of effectiveness. Yarrow uses as a measure, as others of us have, the extent to which representatives of NGOs (or in this case the Quakers) are received by high officials. The various QIARs working between the two Berlins, the teams in the Nigerian Civil War and in the Indo-Pakistani war had continuous access to and contact with the highest officials, an indication that these leaders felt the efforts useful to them. Yarrow looks critically at these cases and makes suggestions for increasing the effectiveness of Quaker conciliation. He feels that Quakers could learn theoretical techniques of conciliation without hindering the Spirit's propensity to list where it would.

Yarrow makes it clear that not all cases of conflict provide an opportunity or a "concern" for Quaker efforts. What surprised me, though, was his position—apparently a Quaker one (but no one has *the* Quaker one)—that at times confrontation is more necessary than conciliation (p. 282). If conciliation would lead to a continuation of injustice, then confrontation is preferable to conciliation. If structural violence exists in the social institutions, then "one must be a revolutionary before one can be a pacifist" (p. 289). It is sad to contemplate that Yarrow and others find no hope of conciliation in Southern Africa. If the Quakers have given up on conciliation, who is left to believe in it?

One role of public-service NGOs not mentioned by Yarrow is that of norm-creation. Although pacifism is a far-from-accepted norm, some Quaker values (e.g., conscientious objection), because of centuries of constant reiteration have finally become accepted in some countries, giving the possibility and hope that further Quaker values may be. If Quakers give up in seemingly impossible situations, such as Southern Africa, future norm-creation comes in doubt. In fact, in citing a quotation about Joseph Sturge, head of the Quaker mission to the Czar just prior to the Crimean War (surely an impossible situation), Yarrow seems to contradict his confrontation thesis: "Humanity does not progress to great perfection merely or chiefly by achieved success, but rather by moral effort put forth and repeated again and again in the midst of apparent failure" (p. 298).

The primary disappointment of this book is the lack of a bibliography to aid the scholars studying humanistic NGOs; presumably the publisher wanted to save money. The work of the author, however, is an important contribution to understanding international and transnational relations, peace studies, and the pacific settlement of disputes.

DARRIL HUDSON

California State University, Hayward

Statement of Ownership, Management and Circulation

Required by Act of October 23, 1962:
Section 4369, Title 39, United States Code

1. **Date of Filing:** October 1, 1979

2. **Title of Publication:** The American Political Science Review

3. **Frequency of Issue:** Quarterly in March, June, September, December

4. **Location of Known Office of Publication:**
Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15260

5. **Location of the Headquarters or General Business Offices of the Publishers:**
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

6. **Names and Addresses of Publisher and Managing Editor:**
Publisher: American Political Science Association,
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

Managing Editor: Charles O. Jones,
Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15260

7. **Owner:**
American Political Science Association, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

8. **Known Bondholders, Mortgagees, etc.:** None

9. The purpose, function and nonprofit status of this organization and the exempt status for federal income tax purposes have not changed during the preceding 12 months.

10. **Extent and Nature of Circulation:**

	Average No. Copies Each Issue During Preceding 12 Months	Actual No. Copies Single Issue Nearest to Filing Date
A. Total Number Copies printed	14,500	14,500
B. Paid Circulation		
1. Sales	75	75
2. Mail Subscriptions	12,290	12,290
C. Total Paid Circulation	12,365	12,365
D. Free Distribution by Mail, Carrier or Other Means	223	223
E. Total Distribution (C + D)	12,588	12,588
F. Office Use, Left-Over, Unaccounted, Spoiled after Printing	1,912	1,912
G. Total	14,500	14,500

St. Martin's Press

Governing the American Democracy

THOMAS R. DYE, *Florida State University*, LEE SEIFERT GREENE, *University of Tennessee*, and GEORGE S. PARTHEMOS, *University of Georgia*

Carefully integrating theory and practice, *Governing the American Democracy* is an exceptionally balanced and evenhanded text for the introductory course in American government. The authors present a wealth of historical and topical material, often anecdotal, in a smooth-flowing and highly readable narrative. Throughout the text they develop two unifying themes: one, that American democracy, while challenged by serious social and political problems during the course of its existence, has shown enduring flexibility in meeting them and working out solutions; two, that Americans have an important role in and responsibility for their government. Conflict and controversy are treated as realities and givens in American political life, but the authors demonstrate how our democratic system has balanced majority vs. minority, central government vs. state authority, and individual freedom vs. rights of others. An Instructor's Manual is available.

February 650 pp.; tables, charts, photographs cloth $14.95

The Road to the White House

The Politics of Presidential Elections

STEPHEN J. WAYNE, *George Washington University*

The Road to the White House takes the reader behind the scenes to examine the strategy and tactics of gaining the American Presidency. Solidly researched, lucidly presented, and full of lively examples from recent campaigns, it is a complete guide to the nomination and election process: the electoral college system, campaign finance, parties and coalitions, delegate selection, the conventions, campaign organization and strategy, the use and influence of the media, the election itself, and the problems that face the elected President after the election.

November 1979 286 pp. paper $5.95

Democracy for the Few

Third Edition

MICHAEL PARENTI, *Institute for Policy Studies*

Democracy for the Few has been widely praised by instructors of American government for its success in stimulating student interest and lively class discussion. The Third Edition retains the exceptionally lucid and penetrating critical analysis of all the institutions of American politics — Congress, the Presidency, the Supreme Court, the federal bureaucracy, the media, parties, and interest groups. Michael Parenti has fully updated his many illustrative examples and incorporates new material on foreign policy, nuclear power, pollution, the environment, law and order, the CIA, and Supreme Court decisions.

February 350 pp. paper $6.95

Bureaucratic Government, USA

DAVID NACHMIAS, *University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee*, and DAVID H. ROSENBLOOM, *Maxwell School, Syracuse University*

Designed especially for use in the introductory American government course, *Bureaucratic Government, USA* analyzes the bureaucratization of contemporary American politics, starting from the premise that there is a serious tension between the needs of democratic government and bureaucratic government. It stresses the extent to which the various branches of the federal government have become bureaucratically organized, behave bureaucratically, and have witnessed a devolution of political power into the hands of permanent and semipermanent career staffs. The authors also consider the effects of these changes on political parties and the roles of interest groups and citizens in an increasingly bureaucratic society.

January 270 pp. paper $6.95

To request a complimentary examination copy, please write (specifying course, present text, and approximate enrollment) to:

St. Martin's Press P.O. Box 5352 New York, N.Y. 10017

St. Martin's Press

Presidential Politics

Readings on Nominations and Elections

edited by JAMES I. LENGLE, *Georgetown University,* and BYRON E. SHAFER, *Russell Sage Foundation*

More than forty selections from both academic and popular sources focus on the strategies and roles of all the participants in presidential politics—candidates, activists, and voters—and on the institutional and political factors which affect their success. Beginning with recent reforms in the presidential nomination process, delegate selection, and campaign finance, the readings cover the entire election cycle, from the end of one contest to the start of the next. Selection authors include Austin Ranney, Philip E. Converse, David S. Broder, Theodore H. White, Timothy J. Crouse, and W. Hamilton Jordan. The editors provide a general introduction as well as part introductions explaining the framework of the chapters and supplying background information.

March 500 pp. paper $8.95

European Politics

Political Economy and Policy Making in Western Democracies

ROBERT A. ISAAK, *The Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies, Bologna Center*

Distinguished by the coherence and stylistic consistency of single authorship, *European Politics* introduces the student to comparative politics systematically, focusing on political economy and bargaining power. It compares the four major European countries—West Germany, France, England, and Italy—with the Common Market, according to the same categories: political culture, social and political institutions, political economy bargaining patterns, domestic and foreign policy, and international constraints and opportunities. *European Politics* is distinctive for its emphasis on the contemporary conflict between productivity and redistribution. A selected bibliography concludes the text.

January 320 pp. paper $6.95

The World of Politics

A Concise Introduction

JAMES F. BARNES and MARSHALL CARTER, both of *Ohio University,* and MAX J. SKIDMORE, *Southwest Missouri State University*

The World of Politics offers a brief introduction to the basic concepts and problems of politics. Focusing on the establishment and maintenance of communities of all sizes and types, from neighborhood to nation-state, it provides a comparative perspective as it draws examples from all parts of the world. The text is organized in two parts: *The Principles of Politics,* covering the nature of communities, political culture and socialization, political change, communal bonds, and principles of government; and *The Practice of Politics,* treating organization, representation and leadership, participation, conflict management, administration, and the global community. The authors have provided a glossary of basic terms and suggested readings for each chapter.

February 200 pp. paper $5.95

The Elements of Social Scientific Thinking

Second Edition

KENNETH R. HOOVER, *University of Wisconsin, Parkside*

Brief, clear, and engagingly informal, *The Elements of Social Scientific Thinking* was adopted for courses in almost every social science discipline in its first edition. The second edition continues to show students how to be conscious of their own thought processes and how to achieve the order and clarity that social scientific thinking requires. Using examples that are pointed and witty, it addresses a number of fundamental questions: Where do concepts come from? What is a variable? Why bother with scientific thinking? How is a hypothesis different from other sentences about reality, and how is it similar? For the second edition the author treats the roles of theory in a separate section and has added a new section on the morality of social science.

February 164 pp. paper $4.95

Managing State and Local Government

Cases and Readings

edited by FREDERICK S. LANE,
City University of New York

Managing State and Local Government, the first case book in public administration to focus on state and local issues, is a comprehensive and up-to-date text for teaching the concepts and skills of public management in the 1980s. Students first read about the concepts and processes involved in public management and then in nearly twenty cases and games are asked to actually work at public administration. Extensively class-tested, the book covers the full range of management topics, including organizational behavior and structure, employee relations, budgeting, planning, policy implementation and analysis, program evaluation, productivity improvement, and cutback management. It spans the entire field of public services and policy: human services, criminal justice, health care, transportation, recreation, education, environmental protection and sanitation. An Instructor's Manual is available.

February 450 pp. paper $8.95

Managing Human Resources

An Introduction to
Public Personnel Administration

N. JOSEPH CAYER,
Texas Tech University

Managing Human Resources explores public personnel administration as a product of its political environment and evaluates the consequences upon personnel of such contemporary forces as equal opportunity/affirmative action, labor relations, productivity improvement, public criticism, and tax revolt. It devotes particular attention to intergovernmental relations, labor relations, and personnel systems management. At the end of each chapter Professor Cayer offers suggested readings and case studies and/or exercises, to give students the opportunity to apply what they have learned to a situation commonly faced by public officials with personnel responsibility.

March 350 pp. cloth $15.95

The Practice of Policy Evaluation

edited by DAVID NACHMIAS,
University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee

The Practice of policy Evaluation is a comprehensive and timely collection of twenty-one evaluation studies, some appearing here for the first time. It covers major and controversial policy issues—income maintenance, human resources development, equality of educational opportunity, equal employment and economic opportunity, housing and community development, law enforcement and criminal justice, health care, energy and transportation—and explicates current conceptual frameworks and methodological practices in the field. It includes impact, process, and cost-effectiveness evaluations and illustrates both quantitative and qualitative methodologies.

March 350 pp. paper $7.95

The Politics of Policy Implementation

ROBERT T. NAKAMURA and
FRANK SMALLWOOD,
both of *Dartmouth College*

Professors Nakamura and Smallwood take an innovative and integrated approach to the growing policy studies literature. They provide a new conceptual overview of the policy process by analyzing the different political environments which determine how policy is made, implemented, and evaluated, and they illustrate the various linkages that leaders can use to tie together these different environments. Spanning The New Deal era to the Carter administration, the text draws examples from a wide range of public policy areas—employment programs, urban programs, education, transportation, immigration, science and technology, civil rights, and medical services.

February 200 pp. paper $6.95

To request a complimentary examination copy, please write (specifying course, present text, and approximate enrollment) to:

St. Martin's Press P.O. Box 5352 New York, N.Y. 10017

REAL CHOICES FOR 1980

Addison-Wesley offers you dynamic texts in political science and government

POINTS OF VIEW: READINGS IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Robert DiClerico and Allan Hammock, both of West Virginia University

This refreshing alternative to standard readers offers clearly written and organized articles on the major topics of American government. The authors include two (in some cases, four) selections, each representing opposing viewpoints on the particular issue. Readable and informative, **Points of View** will sensitize students to the merits of different perspectives and give them a deeper, clearer understanding of the issues.

(02990) 1980 paper Available Now

AMERICAN POLITICS: DIRECTIONS OF CHANGE, DYNAMICS OF CHOICE

Richard E. Morgan, John C. Donovan, and Christian P. Potholm
all of Bowdoin College

A lively introduction to American politics that captures the spirit, drama, and challenge of the governmental process. The authors contribute a wealth of actual political experience to their scholarship which gives the book a unique combination of theory and practicality. The innovative Choice/Change framework is used throughout to explore political decision making and its consequences and the constant evolution of our political system.

(01434) 1979 National, State, and Local Edition (01437)
Instructor's Manual (01435) Study Guide (01436)

POVERTY AMID PLENTY: A POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

Harrell R. Rodgers, Jr., University of Houston

This straightforward, readable book discusses the dimensions, causes, and consequences of poverty in America and offers suggestions—in terms of policy alternatives—for possible remedies. Based on hundreds of published and unpublished reports by various agencies of the federal government and on considerable scholarly research, the text will bring an added dimension to courses in public policy, American government, and other areas.

(06471) paper 1979

For complimentary copy consideration, write to Abigail Winslow at Addison-Wesley Publishing Company. Be sure to mention course title, enrollment, and text now in use.

Social Science & Humanities Division
Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc.
Reading, Massachusetts 01867

Public Entrepreneurship

Toward a Theory of Bureaucratic Political Power

BY EUGENE LEWIS

By looking at the organizational lives of Hyman Rickover, J. Edgar Hoover, and Robert Moses, the author develops a theory of politics that more adequately accounts for the role of public organizations in American political life.

288 pages $22.50

The Great Debates, Carter vs. Ford, 1976

EDITED BY SIDNEY KRAUS

Investigates the 1976 presidential debates' impact on the electorate and measures their effect on voting decisions. Provides verbatim transcripts of all four meetings, including the Mondale-Dole face-off. ". . . well written and informative. . . . Recommended." —*Library Journal*

568 pages cloth $29.95 paper $19.50

(Also available: *The Great Debates, Kennedy vs. Nixon, 1960*, paper $5.95, cloth $17.50)

East European Integration and East-West Trade

EDITED BY PAUL MARER AND JOHN MICHAEL MONTIAS

Establishes a comprehensive, up-to-date, and balanced Western perspective on foreign trade in the centrally planned economies of Eastern Europe. The essays, by leading authorities in the fields of international trade, economics, and East European affairs, are analytical and theoretical in approach.

416 pages $22.50

Available at bookstores or send $1.50 postage and handling for first book, 25¢ for each additional book, to order from publisher.

INDIANA UNIVERSITY PRESS
10th & Morton Streets, Bloomington, Indiana 47405

American Government. What it does. How it works. Where it stands.

Harper & Row texts help students find the answers.

AMERICAN DEMOCRACY IN WORLD PERSPECTIVE *Fifth Edition*

WILLIAM EBENSTEIN, C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, HENRY A. TURNER, DEAN MANN, & PETER MERKL

This new edition compares the U.S. government with other democratic and nondemocratic governments to help students grasp the distinctive features of our system. Reorganized for greater accessibility, this totally revised edition includes a completely new chapter on metropolitan politics as well as the latest coverage on such topics as the effects of the Bakke Decision, new methods of financing political campaigns, and public policy formation. Instructor's Manual. February 1980. 608 pages (tentative). ISBN 0-06-041861-3.

AMERICAN POLITICS

Understanding What Counts

REO M. CHRISTENSON

Written by a political scientist with a journalism background, this text provides observations and insights that help students grasp the integral features of the American political system. Taking an issues approach, it covers all topics critical to an understanding of American government; examines politicians in a more constructive light than do most Americans; and shows a greater concern than usual for the ethical dimensions of politics. Paper. Instructor's Manual. February 1980. 320 pages (tentative). ISBN 0-06-041259-3.

TO GOVERN AMERICA

Politics, Power, and Policy Making

ROGER HILSMAN

Employing his extensive academic and professional experience, the author gives students a working perspective on government based on the three p's—politics, power, and policy. His text focuses on policy making as a political process and then shows who exercises power at each level of the process. The "proximate policy makers," the "second ring," and the electorate all receive expert coverage. Also included are analyses of political appointees, the national security, bureaucracies, and other important issues. Instructor's Manual. Test Bank. 1978. 594 pages. ISBN 0-06-042838-4. Supplement: The Constitution of the United States.

Harper & Row
New York • San Francisco

To request examination copies, write to Suite 5D (809), Harper & Row, 10 East 53d St., New York, N.Y. 10022. Please include course title, enrollment, and present text.

PUBLICATIONS FROM THE UNITED NATIONS

YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS 1976
The only annual publication of the United Nations to give, in a compact volume, an objective perspective of the whole work of the Organization. Offering a thorough treatment of the developments in the political, economic, social, legal and administrative fields, it summarizes the annual activities of the intergovernmental agencies as well.
Sales No. E.78.I.1 Clothbound $42.00

UNITED NATIONS JURIDICAL YEARBOOK 1977
Documents with legislative texts and treaty materials the legal decisions, recommendations and reports of the United Nations and related intergovernmental organizations. Indexed with bibliography.
Sales No. E.79.V.1 Clothbound $17.00

REPORT OF THE WORLD CONFERENCE TO COMBAT RACISM AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION. Geneva, 14-25 August 1978
Sales No. E.79.XIV.2 $10.00

AN INTERNATIONAL LAW ANALYSIS OF THE MAJOR UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS CONCERNING THE PALESTINE QUESTION
Sales No. E.79.I.19 $6.00

DISARMAMENT: A PERIODIC REVIEW BY THE UNITED NATIONS, Vol. II, No. 1
Sales No. E.79.IX.1 $3.50

OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

32nd Session. Supplement No. 23. Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Volume IV. $18.00

34th Session. Supplement No. 24. Report of the United Nations Council for Namibia. Volume. II. $6.00

34th Session. Supplement No. 18. Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. $11.00

34th Session. Supplement No. 44. Report of the Preparatory Committee for the New International Development Strategy. $8.00

34th Session. Supplement No. 42. Report of the Disarmament Commission. $2.00

34th Session. Supplement No. 41. Report of the Special Committee on Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Non-Use of Force in International Relations. $6.00

34th Session. Supplement No. 33. Report of the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization. $11.00

UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS
Room A-3315
New York, N.Y. 10017

UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS
Palais des Nations
1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland

Indispensable sourcebooks from Wiley— Your key to good government

300 Experts explain how to do more with less

PRODUCTIVITY IMPROVEMENT HANDBOOK FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

George J. Washnis, National Academy of Public Administration

Based on a major Federally funded project, this authoritative manual spells out—*for the first time ever*—the proven tools and techniques enabling state and local governments to evaluate and improve their productivity. It makes invaluable supplemental reading for college courses, and belongs on the desktop of everyone even remotely concerned with upgrading governmental productivity—policymakers, officials, educators, and students alike.

- Encompasses virtually every area of government—from police to building maintenance to human services
- Pools the expertise of 300 government practitioners and specialists
- 1500 pages, over 200 Project Briefs
- Practical guidance on both long-range and day-to-day problems

The *Productivity Improvement Handbook* offers an unprecedented insider's look at the state-of-the-art of governmental productivity, making available a large body of expertise and information useful at many levels—city, county, state, or independent agency. This mammoth resource is destined to play an instrumental role in the growing movement for governmental productivity sweeping the nation.
April 1980 $49.95 (tent.)

Just Published

AMERICA'S GOVERNMENTS

A Fact Book of Census Data on the Organization, Finances, and Employment of Federal, State, and Local Governments

Compiled by Richard P. Nathan & Mary M. Nathan

Now the vital characteristics of the 80,000 federal, state, and local governments can be determined and compared at a glance.

This one-of-its-kind sourcebook brings together the most up-to-date and useful information from a large variety of Census Bureau documents—most of them not obtainable at your public or academic library. Essential data on the organization, finances, employment, and history of each government profiled are illuminated by interpretive commentaries and a wealth of tables, charts, and graphs.

Get the big picture as well as the detailed facts you need—with this handy reference for educators, students, policymakers, lobbyists, and writers.
1979 332 pp. $19.95

Available at your bookstore or write to John Storojev, Dept. 0-7517

WILEY-INTERSCIENCE
a division of John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
605 Third Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10016
In Canada: 22 Worcester Road, Rexdale, Ontario
Prices subject to change without notice.
092 0-7517

Germany and the United States

A "Special Relationship"?

Hans W. Gatzke

With a Foreword by Edwin O. Reischauer

In this first modern overview of German history and Germany's constantly shifting relations with her neighbors and with the United States, Gatzke offers fresh insights into such issues as: Germany's unification under Bismarck, the "war guilt" question, Weimar, Hitler's reign, West Germany's democratization, East Germany's dependency, and prospects for the future.

He also examines Germany's "special relationship" with the United States and reaches surprising conclusions. *American Foreign Policy Library*
$17.50

Sociobiology

The Abridged Edition

Edward O. Wilson

"It is impossible to leave Wilson's book without having one's sense of life permanently and dramatically widened."—Fred Hapgood, *Atlantic*
Belknap 96 illus., by Sarah Landry 384 pp.
$18.50 cloth; $9.95 paper

Marx on the Choice between Socialism and Communism

Stanley Moore

Moore examines the arguments Marx offers to support his claim that a society which has abolished exploitation but not exchange is in some sense inferior to a society which has abolished both. He concludes that Marx's major arguments rely on moral and philosophical principles from Feuerbach or Hegel, and that Marx's ideal of communism is incompatible with his materialistic approach to history. $12.50

Democracy and Distrust

A Theory of Judicial Review

John Hart Ely

"The single most important contribution to the American theory of judicial review written in this century."—Henry P. Monaghan, Cornell Law School

"A fresh and bold look at one of our oldest national mysteries, the justification for judicial power in a democracy."—Anthony Lewis, *New York Times*
$15.00

Suffer the Future

Policy Choices in Southern Africa

Robert I. Rotberg

Will southern Africa explode in a bloody race war? Or is there hope for a peaceful resolution? This timely book is a balanced account of the realistic alternatives by a knowledgeable insider.
$15.00

The Industrialization of Soviet Russia

R. W. Davies

Volume I, The Socialist Offensive

The Collectivization of Soviet Agriculture, 1929–1930

576 pages $35.00

Volume 2, The Soviet Collective Farm, 1929–1930

256 pages $18.50

This sweeping and incisive series will demonstrate how, during the crucial period from 1929–1937, the most rapid and broadest industrial development in modern times was undertaken in the USSR. Nowhere in the literature on the Soviet Union in English or Russian does such a comprehensive study exist. These volumes form a masterful historical and economic work that will interest scholars in Soviet studies, modernization, and economic planning.

Struve

Liberal on the Right, 1905–1944

Richard Pipes

This volume completes the biography of Peter Struve (1870–1944) one of the most remarkable and influential Russian intellectuals of this century. In writing about Struve, Richard Pipes turns biography into history as he lays bare the souls of the Russian intellectuals—their irresponsibility, unwillingness to compromise, and intolerance. *Russian Research Center Studies, 80*
illustrated 552 pp. $32.50



Courtesy Pressens
Bild AB, Stockholm

Harvard University Press
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

New from The Free Press

FRIEND AND FOE IN THE U.S. SENATE

ROSS K. BAKER

Baker, a political scientist who has served on the staffs of three U.S. Senators, offers a revealing look at friendships and hostilities among members of the U.S. Senate. Candid interviews with past and incumbent Senators provide a unique glimpse of their human side and an intimate view of what Senators think of each other and how these opinions influence their political behavior.

Order #90129 *356 pages* *$12.50*

BUILDING THE FUTURE ORDER

The Search for Peace in an Interdependent World

KURT WALDHEIM

Foreword by Brian Urquhart
Edited by Robert L. Schiffer

This thought-provoking collection of speeches, given by Kurt Waldheim during his eight years as Secretary-General of the United Nations, provides an overview of both the nature of the U.N.'s work and the role of the Secretary-General. Waldheim speaks honestly and forcefully on the major international issues of the seventies, and is forthright in facing up to the U.N.'s critics, offering constructive approaches to the problems to be faced if we are to master the future.

Order #93367 *224 pages* *$12.95*

POLITICAL PARTIES

A Cross-National Survey

KENNETH JANDA

A reference work of international scope and significance, this unique book presents the results of the first systematic, comprehensive, and empirically-based study of political parties throughout the world. The result of over thirteen years of research, this monumental work examines 158 parties operating in 53 countries, and "scores" them on the basis of more than 100 variables, including governmental status, social support, issue and goal orientation, and coherence.

Order #91621 *704 pages* *$100.00*

OLD FOLKS AT HOME

ALVIN RABUSHKA & BRUCE JACOBS

This provocative book offers a dramatic rebuttal to common notions about the elderly—notions that are leading us to tragically wasteful public programs. Rabushka and Jacobs show that most of America's aged are *not* ill-housed, frail, or poor—rather they seek an independent, dignified life. "A significant contribution to the ongoing national dialogue about the well-being of our aging population."—Cyril R. Brickfield, Executive Director, American Association of Retired Persons.

Order #92567 *200 pages* *$10.95*

WESTERN EUROPEAN PARTY SYSTEMS

Trends and Prospects

Edited by PETER H. MERKL

This collection of original essays by nineteen leading scholars fills a major gap in political literature by providing an in-depth, country-by-country analysis of the politics of Western Europe. Merkl combines single-country descriptions and comparative essays with research reports on parties, party systems, and current anti-party trends. This book is certain to become the standard work in the area.

Order #92006 *640 pages* *$39.95*

SOCIAL SECURITY AND PENSIONS IN TRANSITION

Understanding the American Retirement System

BRUNO STEIN

In the first comprehensive look at the entire American retirement system, Stein traces the history of income maintenance programs, examines the ramifications of Social Security for the economy, and proposes practical alternatives for dealing with the ever-changing role of Social Security. "An extremely timely book... [Stein] presents issues fairly, but doesn't shrink from taking a position.... A most welcome contribution."—Victor R. Fuchs, author of *Who Shall Live?*

Order #93085 *320 pages* *$14.95*

Order from:
THE FREE PRESS
A Division of
Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc.
200D BROWN STREET
RIVERSIDE, NEW JERSEY 08370

New Viewpoints on the Effectiveness of Our Political Systems

AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES

DAVID H. EVERSON,
Sangamon State University

In this election year, many people are wondering about the future of America's political parties. This insightful evaluation of the traditional two-party system looks at some of the problems that threaten our political party structure and examines the major changes that have occurred in the presidential nomination process and the nationalization of two-party competition. The author describes likely developments and emphasizes the need for a more responsible electorate.
Diagrams, Index.
February 1980, 256 pp.
Hardcover ISBN: 531-05414-4 $15.00
Paperback ISBN: 531-05628-7 $7.95

CRIMINAL JUSTICE: Issues and Ironies

Second Edition

ABRAHAM S. BLUMBERG,
University of Missouri, Kansas City

As crime rates soar and prison populations swell, our criminal justice system is coming under close scrutiny. In this thoroughly revised and expanded edition of a book that has become a landmark in its field, Blumberg offers constructive criticism about all phases of the criminal justice system: the police decision to arrest, the prosecutor's decision to charge, the decision-making at every stage of trial up to the imposition of sentence, probation and parole, and the process of appellate review and plea bargaining. As the author writes in the preface, "The criminal justice system is a valid research universe for examining a society's strengths and weaknesses. . ." 432 pp.
Hardcover ISBN: 531-05407-1 $15.00
Paperback ISBN: 531-05618-X $9.95

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

HAROLD W. CHASE, ROBERT T. HOLT & JOHN E. TURNER, all of the University of Minnesota

The arms race. . . the energy crunch. . . the pollution of our environment. . . Can America's political institutions meet these and other challenges of the future? To answer this question, the authors pinpoint problem areas in current American politics and analyze what can be learned from other countries' experiences in order to improve U.S. political institutions. 208 pp.
Hardcover ISBN: 531-05406-3 $12.95
Paperback ISBN: 531-05617-1 $6.95

CITIES IN TRANSITION: Social Changes and Institutional Responses in Urban Development

PETER R. GLUCK and RICHARD J. MEISTER, both of the University of Michigan, Flint

A sociological and historical examination of the forces that have affected the ability of governmental institutions to manage the problems created by urbanization, problems which have led to what is now referred to as the "urban crisis."
256 pp.
Hardcover ISBN: 531-05409-8 $15.00
Paperback ISBN: 531-05623-6 $6.95

For more information or to order books, write to:
Dept. NK
New Viewpoints:
A Division of
Franklin Watts, Inc.
730 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10019

LibertyPress
LibertyClassics



Free and Unequal

By Roger J. Williams

"A distinguished biochemist, who has long been concerned with the importance of science for human welfare, assails the widespread acceptance of what he calls the 'assembly-line doctrine' that people are fundamentally alike . . . Dr. Williams mobilizes evidence for the heritability–and thus the fundamental variability–not only of bodily traits but of physiological and psychological differences as well . . . The author then explores the significance of these differences. He shows how freedom itself depends on them, for freedom would be unimportant if we were all alike"–*Saturday Review*. "Eminently humane and he makes his principal points powerfully"—Ashley Montagu in the *New York Times*. Hardcover $8.00, Paperback $3.50.

We pay postage, but require prepayment, on orders from individuals. Please allow four to six weeks for delivery. To order this book, or for a copy of our catalog, write:
Liberty*Press*/Liberty*Classics*
7440 North Shadeland, Dept. 443
Indianapolis, Indiana 46250

New for 1980

Coming Attractions from CQ PRESS

Mass Media and American Politics

by Doris A. Graber

What do mass media do? What impact do they have on politics and political behavior? Are they molders or reflectors of public opinion? This timely and provocative text addresses these questions and more in **Mass Media and American Politics**. Ideal for courses on Politics and Media, Public Opinion, and Government and Mass Communications.

Spring 1980. Approx. 300 pages. $6.95.

Financing Politics: Money, Elections and Political Reform

Second Edition

by Herbert E. Alexander

Revised to include campaign spending in the 1976 and 1978 elections, this informative text examines the levels, sources and expenditures of campaign funds. Includes coverage of political action committees. Perfect for courses on Political Parties or Campaigns and Elections.

Spring 1980. Approx. 275 pages. $6.95.

Invitation to Struggle: Congress, the President and Foreign Policy

by Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. and Pat M. Holt

This unique collaboration between a political scientist and a 27-year veteran of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff examines the complicated relationship between Congress and the president in creating foreign policy. Indispensable for courses on American Foreign Policy, Defense Policy and Congress.

Spring 1980. Approx. 260 pages. $6.95.

For examination copies, send course information on letterhead stationery to:

Ms. Patricia A. Silver
Congressional Quarterly, Inc.
1414 22nd Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037

THE NATIONAL INTEREST AND THE HUMAN INTEREST

AN ANALYSIS OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
Robert Johansen
In an effort to determine the extent to which the U.S. contributes to the creation of a preferred system of world order, Robert Johansen considers the country's performance against a framework of four major global values: peace, economic well-being, social justice, and ecological balance. He examines each of these values in the context of a different case study: the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, a quarter-century of economic aid to India, human rights in U.S. relations with Chile, and the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference, respectively.
Center of International Studies, Princeton University
Cloth, $32.50. Paper, $6.95

Princeton University Press Princeton, New Jersey 08540

HOOVER

THE THIRD CENTURY
America as a Post-Industrial Society

Seymour Martin Lipset, editor

Publication 203 468 pages
$14.95 cloth ISBN: 0-8179-7031-2

The Third Century is a collection of sixteen original chapters by some of the country's leading sociologists and political scientists who analyze basic social trends in areas of their expertise.

Three years in the making, *The Third Century* constitutes one of the most comprehensive efforts to interpret the direction of American institutions and sub-groups.

HOOVER INSTITUTION PRESS
Dept. A 8001 • Stanford University • Stanford, California 94305
(When ordering, please include $1.50 postage.)



"Mark Pogrebin and Burton Atkins have selected more than a score of interesting, important papers which should prove invaluable to the serious student of discretionary justice."

Donal E. J. MacNamara
John Jay College of Criminal Justice

The Invisible Justice System: Discretion and the Law

Edited by Burton M. Atkins and Mark R. Pogrebin

A special topic reader that studies in depth the advantages and disadvantages associated with the exercise of discretion by police, prosecutors, judges, and corrections personnel.
Contributing authors include John Kaplan, Sanford Kadish, American Friends Service Committee, Donald Newman, Joseph Goldstein and Kenneth Culp Davis. **1978 hardbound 404 pages $14.95**

Anderson Publishing Co. CJ Division
646 Main Street Cincinnati, Ohio 45201

IDEOLOGICAL COALITIONS IN CONGRESS

by Jerrold E. Schneider
(University of Delaware)



"It seems to me a notable and indeed, brilliant contribution to the subject, and I can only wish for it as wide publication and notice as possible. It is really a distinguished piece of work."
—James MacGregor Burns

"The author has done a major labor of love, and the supporting data displayed are of considerable interest. I would expect it to land among the four or five major works on the Congress that would be routinely cited among students of legislative behavior for some years to come."
—Philip E. Converse

"Schneider has produced what may be regarded as the definitive work on the existence of ideological coalitions in Congress in the 1970s."
—Choice, July, August 1979

To order Jerrold E. Schneider's, IDEOLOGICAL COALITIONS IN CONGRESS, $22.50, use this coupon. . . . Orders must be prepaid; we then pay postage and handling. Mail orders directly to Greenwood Press, 51 Riverside Avenue, Westport CT 06880 or use our toll-free, 24 hour number for placing credit card orders: 1-800-257-7850 (In New Jersey, 1-800-322-8650).
Enclose check or money order or complete the credit card information below: ☐ Master Charge ☐ Visa ☐ American Express

Card Number ________ Exp. Date ________
Signature ________
Name ________
Address ________
City/State/Zip ________

Greenwood Press, Inc. 51 Riverside Avenue, Westport, CT 06880

UNDERSTANDING AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

Robert Weissberg

University of Illinois

Emphasizes the *analysis* of the American political process

By using key questions to structure its examination of American government through citizen involvement, institutions, and public policy, this new text helps students move from the facts to their significance, from memorization to analysis. Each of the 19 chapters contains three or four questions which organize what would otherwise be masses of unrelated facts into coherent responses to important political issues.

Even federal bureaucracy is understandable and exciting

As an example of this unique teaching approach, Weissberg's chapter on bureaucracy—judged outstanding by reviewers—centers on these questions:

- What is the federal bureaucracy?
- Why has it grown so large and ensnarled us in so much red tape?
- Is the federal bureaucracy effective?
- Does the existence of large-scale bureaucracy pose a threat to democratic government?

The questions appear as a preview to each chapter, form the main chapter subdivisions, and are reformulated in the chapter summary.

To make Weissberg work in your classes

- Mini-case studies (e.g., a pig on Social Security; how a government agency defines "exit") add concrete, often humorous reality.
- An extensive running glossary, in-depth questions for further discussion, and annotated bibliographies aid student learning.
- An *Instructor's Manual* points out how each chapter differs from other texts and why, gives chapter-by-chapter aids to teaching, and includes a kit of commonly-encountered government documents.
- A *Test Bank* contains 1200 objective questions, arranged by chapter.

ISBN 0-03-044016-5, 1980, cloth, 625 pages

VOTE FOR
WEISSBERG
1980

New candidates for 1980—from Holt

PARTIES, POLITICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY IN AMERICA
Third Edition

WILLIAM J. KEEFE, *University of Pittsburgh*

Paying special attention to the ways political parties have changed in recent years, this book offers a wide-ranging, up-to-date analysis of the American party system, and also covers the theory of responsible party government.

ISBN 0-03-054116-6, 1980, paper, 224 pages

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY SINCE WORLD WAR II
Eighth Edition

JOHN SPANIER, *University of Florida*

Updated to include the first Carter years, this classic text is organized around the interplay of two themes—the international balance of power and America's national style (our perceptions, roles, and behavior with respect to the world).

ISBN 0-03-054081-X, 1980, paper, 320 pages

Add depth to your American Government course

INSIDE THE SYSTEM
Fourth Edition

Edited by CHARLES PETERS and NICHOLAS LEMANN, *The Washington Monthly*

With 23 of its 29 articles (originally published in *The Washington Monthly*) new to this edition, this refreshingly iconoclastic book pictures American government as it really is.

ISBN 0-03-045101-9, 1979, paper, 304 pages

THE CULTURE OF BUREAUCRACY

Edited by CHARLES PETERS, *The Washington Monthly*, and MICHAEL NELSON, *Vanderbilt University*

35 hard-hitting articles, originally published in *The Washington Monthly*, bring your students the *experience* of bureaucracy by stressing its human as well as organizational dimensions.

ISBN 0-03-044216-8, 1979, paper, 288 pages

Corwin & Peltason's UNDERSTANDING THE CONSTITUTION

J. W. PELTASON, *American Council on Education*

This well-known, short, up-to-date guide takes your students directly to the central foundation of our system of government.

ISBN 0-03-045091-8, 1979, paper, 288 pages

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL DICTIONARY
Fifth Edition

JACK C. PLANO, *Western Michigan University*, and MILTON GREENBERG, *Roosevelt University*

Arranged into 18 topical chapters, this book's 1200 entries have been thoroughly updated and cross-referenced. Each contains a paragraph of definition or description and a paragraph of significance.

ISBN 0-03-045096-9, 1979, paper, 544 pages

For complimentary copies, please send course title and approximate enrollment to:
JAMES L. RYDER
HOLT, RINEHART AND WINSTON
383 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK, NY 10017

Look to the future—with Wiley trend setters

YOUR AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
Norman C. Thomas, *University of Cincinnati*, & C. Frederick Stoerker, *The City University of New York*
(0 471 03031-7) 1980
approx. 600 pp. $14.95 (tent.)

PRESIDENTIAL POWER
The Politics of Leadership from FDR to Carter
Richard E. Neustadt, *Harvard University*
(0 471 05988-9) 1980
286 pp. $7.95

THE PRESIDENTIAL CONTEST
Richard A. Watson, *University of Missouri-Columbia*
(0 471 05642-1) 1980
159 pp. $4.95

CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
Lawrence C. Dodd & Richard Schott, *both of the University of Texas, Austin*
(0 471 21741-7) 1979
364 pp. $8.95

STATISTICAL INQUIRY
For the Political, Social, and Policy Sciences
George Watson & Dickinson McGaw, *both of Arizona State University*
(0 471 02087-7) 1980
410 pp. $16.95

To be considered for examination copies, write to Rick Leyh, Dept. 7492. Please include course name, enrollment, and title of present text.

HOW AMERICA IS RULED
Denis G. Sullivan, Richard Winters & Robert Nakamura, *Dartmouth College*
(0 471 83554-4) 1980
approx. 450 pp. $11.95

AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION
Its Origin, Content and Impact, 2nd Ed.
Robert Erikson/Norman Luttbeg/Kent Tedin, *University of Houston* and *Texas A&M*
(0 471 03139-9) 1980
337 pp. $8.50 (tent.)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING, 2nd Ed.
Joel Grossman, *University of Wisconsin*, & Richard Wells, *University of Oklahoma*
(0 471 32849-9) 1980
1550 pp. $23.95 (tent.)
(case supplement will be available for this text)

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
A Policymaker Focus, 2nd Ed.
Robert L. Wendzel, *University of Maine*
(0 471 05261-2) 1980
266 pp. $8.95

POWER AND POLITICS IN CALIFORNIA
John Culver/John Syer, *California Polytechnic State University*
(0 471 04866-6) 1980
approx 224 pp. $6.95 (tent.)

JOHN WILEY & SONS, Inc.
605 Third Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10016
In Canada: 22 Worcester Road, Rexdale, Ontario
Prices subject to change without notice.

0-7492

CHICAGO

Since 1891, Publishers of Scholarly Books and Journals

Life Chances

Approaches to Social and Political Theory
Ralf Dahrendorf

Dahrendorf argues that the concept of life chances—the options that individuals in society face and the linkages which enable them to make their choices—should be a key concept for the understanding of social change.

Cloth 192 pages $15.00 Available

Alexis de Tocqueville

On Democracy, Revolution and Society
Edited by John Stone and Stephen Mennell

This collection is the first to include excerpts from Tocqueville's two acknowledged masterpieces, *Democracy in America* and *The Ancien Régime and the French Revolution,* as well as excerpts from his extensive correspondence, notebooks, the *Recollections,* and the government reports and newspaper articles that he wrote while a member of France's Chamber of Deputies.

Heritage of Sociology series, edited by Morris Janowitz
Cloth 400 pages $25.00 April

The Organization of Interests

Incentives and the Internal Dynamics of Political Interest Groups
Terry M. Moe

"This is a well-reasoned, well-written, balanced, and useful book. It provides new insights about the relationship between the behavior and internal politics of interest groups and their need for support, new empirical evidence on what motivates individuals to join a common-interest organization, and a new perspective on the intellectual history of the subject."—Mancur Olson, University of Maryland

Cloth 296 pages $21.00 Available

Political Philosophy and the Issues of Politics

Joseph Cropsey

This work, by one of the leading representatives of a powerful, humanistic tradition in political philosophy, consists of some twenty papers written over the past quarter-century. The ideas and arguments extending throughout the papers converge on a concrete political theme—the polity of the United States.

Paper 344 pages $7.50 Available

The University of Chicago Press
Chicago 60637

CHICAGO

Since 1891, Publishers of Scholarly Books and Journals

The Limits of Politics

Collective Goods and Political Change in Postindustrial Societies

Roger Benjamin

"Benjamin's work represents a genuine advance in theoretical argument and thus has the distinct prospect of being the pioneering work that provides a new paradigmatic thrust for a new generation of scholarship in the field of comparative politics, economic theory, and political theory."—Vincent Ostrom, Indiana University

Cloth 160 pages $16.00 March

John Locke

Economist and Social Scientist

Karen Iversen Vaughn

"I welcome this new appraisal of Locke's work from the perspective of a modern political economist. The influence of Locke's ideas on the philosophical foundations of the American political system is universally acknowledged. The essential linkage of these ideas with the implied 'economic constitution' complementary to the political structure is not widely appreciated, even by scholars. Karen Vaughn's book will do much to put this right."
—James Buchanan, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University

Cloth 192 pages $14.50 March

The Soviet System of Government

Fifth Edition, Revised

John N. Hazard

Hazard assesses the practical functions of Soviet government and the Soviet Union's direction as a world power in light of the fundamental changes called for by the new Soviet Constitution of 1977. In addition to reproducing the new constitution in its official translation, the fifth edition examines the new law of the Council of Ministers, the updated Communist party rules, and, for the first time, excerpts from the hard-to-find English translation of the Communist party program of 1961.

Paper 288 pages $5.50 Available
Also available in cloth.

Japan

The Intellectual Foundations of Modern Japanese Politics

Tetsuo Najita

Najita elucidates the political dynamics of the past two hundred years of Japanese history by focusing on the interplay of idealism and bureaucratism within the context of Japan's modern revolution, the Meiji Revolution.

Paper 160 pages $4.95 March

The University of Chicago Press

Chicago 60637

CHICAGO

Since 1891, Publishers of Scholarly Books and Journals

Machine Politics in Transition

Party and Community in Chicago
Thomas M. Guterbock

For three years, Thomas M. Guterbock participated in the daily activities of the Regular Democratic Organization in one North Side Chicago ward in order to discover how political machines win the support of the urban electorate. Guterbock's data provides convincing evidence that the most widely accepted notions of how political machines work are no longer correct.

Cloth 352 pages $20.00 March

Polish-American Politics in Chicago, 1888–1940

Edward R. Kantowicz

"This book demands the attention of anyone interested in ethnic politics."—*Mid-America*

"High points of the book include a treatment of developing social and political institutions in Polish-Catholic Chicago . . . and an intriguing analysis of *Polonia's* search for symbolic victories rather than more tangible political benefits. The author's description of 'Changing Polonia' is good, concise writing."—Eugene J. Watts, *Journal of American History*

Paper 272 pages $5.50 Available

Boss Cox's Cincinnati

Urban Politics in the Progressive Era
Zane L. Miller

"Miller has produced an absorbing, informative work. Our understanding of contemporary urban problems would be considerably enriched if a comparable history existed of every major city."—William V. Shannon, *New York Times Book Review*

Paper 318 pages $6.95 March

The Gray Lobby

Henry J. Pratt

"The book is a fascinating addition to the literature on the history of social welfare policy in the U.S."—*Political Science Quarterly*

Paper 264 pages $5.95 Available

The University of Chicago Press
Chicago 60637

Liberty*Press*
Liberty*Classics*



Gustave Le Bon
The Man and His Works

A presentation with introduction, first translations into English, and edited extracts from Le Bon's major works by Alice Widener. The founder of social psychology, Le Bon (1841-1931) predicted the worldwide advance of socialism and almost all its now-apparent social, political and economic consequences. The extracts are from Le Bon's *The Crowd, Psychological Laws of the Evolution of Peoples, The Psychology of Socialism, The Evolution of Matter, Opinions and Beliefs, The Psychology of Revolutions,* and *Aphorisms of Modern Times.* Hardcover $8.00, Paperback $3.50.

We pay postage, but require prepayment, on orders from individuals. Please allow four to six weeks for delivery. To order this book, or for a copy of our catalog, write:
Liberty*Press*/Liberty*Classics*
7440 North Shadeland, Dept. 441
Indianapolis, Indiana 46250

ORGANIZATION STUDIES

An international multidisciplinary journal devoted to the study of organizations, organization, organizing and the organized in, of and between societies

A New Quarterly

Organization Studies aims to provide a more internationally based forum than has previously existed for ideas and research, and for the exchange of personal experiences, in the study of organization and the organized. The scope of Organization Studies will be broadly rather than narrowly conceived across the diversity of social science approaches and paradigms. It will range from the theoretical, even the speculative, to relevant contemporary problems and empirical research reports.

Editor-in-Chief David J. Hickson, Univ. of Bradford

Managing Editor Karen Tkach, The Hague

Editorial Board F. Agersnap, Copenhagen Sch. of Econ. and Social Science; M.Aiken, Univ. of Wisconsin; G. Benguigui, Univ. of Paris; M. Crozier, Cent. for the Socio. of Organizations, Paris; J. Eldridge, Univ. of Glasgow; F. Ferraresi, Univ. of Turin; J. Hage, Univ. of Maryland; F. Hegner; Int'l Inst. of Manag. and Admin., Berlin/Univ. of Bielefeld; B. Hinings, Univ. of Birmingham; G. Hofstede, Europ. Inst. for Adv. Studies in Management, Brussels/Int'l Inst. for App. Systems Analysis, Austria; J. de Kervasdoué, Polytechnical Sch., Paris; A. Kieser, Univ. of Mannheim; C. Lammers, Univ. of Leyden; R. Mayntz, Univ. of Cologne; J. Olsen, Univ. of Bergen; V. Rus, Univ. of Ljubljana; B. Stymne, Stockholm Sch. of Econ.; H. Thierry, Univ. of Amsterdam; J.-C. Thoenig, INSEAD, Fontainebleau

Subscription rates
Per volume of four issues
Libraries and institutions DM 88.–/US$ 45.00
Individuals DM 48.–/US$ 25.00

The first issue will be published in January 1980

Published in collaboration with the
European Group for Organizational Studies (EGOS) by
WALTER DE GRUYTER · BERLIN · NEW YORK

Verlag Walter de Gruyter & Co, Genthiner Strasse 13, D-1000 Berlin 30
Walter de Gruyter, Inc. 200 Saw Mill River Road, Hawthorne, N.Y. 10532

Karl W. Deutsch

Politics and Government: How People Decide Their Fate
Third Edition
Karl W. Deutsch, Harvard University
With contributions by **Roy M. Hofheinz, Edwin O. Reischauer,** and **Van R. Whiting, Jr.**
About 608 pages / Instructor's Manual
Just published

Karl Deutsch provides an authoritative, comprehensive introduction to the study of politics and government.

Still devoting half the text to basic political science concepts, in the new edition Deutsch expands the Part II discussions of government and society in selected countries. There's a new chapter on Japan, just-released statistics incorporated into the chapter on China, and new summary studies of seven Third World nations.

Analytic and empirical, the comparative discussions show students both the importance of history and culture and the usefulness of modern behavioral and quantitative research for understanding politics.

The Third Edition features new topics such as fascism as an ideology, terrorism, neoconservatism in the United States, and the women's movement.

Judicious editing has simplified the reading level while maintaining the conceptual integrity.

For adoption consideration, request an examination copy from your regional Houghton Mifflin office.

Houghton Mifflin

Dallas, TX 75234 / Geneva, IL 60134 / Hopewell, NJ 08525
Palo Alto, CA 94304 / Boston, MA 02107

Rubbish Theory

The Creation and Destruction of Value

MICHAEL THOMPSON. "This is a pioneering and original work that is certain to cause a great deal of comment."—Aaron Wildavsky, *Professor of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley.* Just as to understand poverty, we must study the very rich, so to understand value, we must study rubbish. Michael Thompson maintains that the study of rubbish enables us to understand value, and the process whereby it is created and destroyed. The book shows how the application of Catastrophe Theory—the theory of forms, their creation and destruction—might illuminate our changing assessment of value.

1979 244 pp.; 46 line figs. $24.00

United Nations Peacekeeping

1946-1967 Documents and Commentary

Volume III: Africa

ROSALYN HIGGINS, Professor of International Law, University of Kent. This is the third of four volumes of Documents and Commentary on United Nations peacekeeping operations, in which all UN forces and Military Observer Groups are studied. This volume is devoted entirely to the UN operation in the Congo. The author has provided commentaries on each action, analyzing the significance of the events, and has included a brief essay explaining the historical background and the path by which the UN came to be involved. (UN Peacekeeping)

April 1980 400 pp.; 2 maps $78.00

On Justice

J.R. LUCAS, Fellow of Merton College, Oxford. The aim of this book is to give a single coherent account of the concept of justice and to show why justice is important. Justice enables the individual to accept the decisions of society and to be identified with them, even though contrary to his wishes or his interests. The author uses the Theory of Games to reveal the rationale of justice, and to distinguish the theory developed in this book from those given by the utilitarians and by John Rawls.

1980 280 pp.; 7 line drawings $22.50

Devolution

VERNON BOGDANOR, Fellow and Tutor in Politics, Brasenose College, Oxford. This book deals with the history of proposals for devolution, giving special attention to the issue of Irish Home Rule which so racked British politics from 1886 to 1914. It also considers the relevance to the debate of the experience of Northern Ireland, which possessed its own Parliament from 1921 to 1972. But the main part of the book examines the growing demand for devolution in contemporary politics, and the effects which recent legislation will have upon the structure of government in Britain. The problems of Scotland, Wales, and the English regions are also discussed.

1979 192 pp. cloth $14.95 paper $8.95

The Social and Political Thought of Leon Trotsky

BARUCH KNEI-PAZ. "Knei-Paz has immersed himself in the vast corpus of Trotsky's writings, published and unpublished, and produced a long and erudite analysis of every aspect of his thought."—*The New York Times Book Review.* First published in 1978 (cloth $29.50), this book is now available in paper.

1980 656 pp. paper $19.95

The Origins of Zionism

DAVID VITAL. "With Vital's contribution it may be said that Zionist historiography has come of age."—*History.* Now available in paper.

1980 408 pp.; 8 pp. illus.; 2 maps paper $12.95

Prices and publication dates subject to change.

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

SINCE 1478

Publishers of Fine Books for Five Centuries

200 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016

NEW FROM HARPER & ROW

Political Sociology Tom Bottomore

In this long-awaited volume, noted British sociologist Tom Bottomore presents a wide-ranging examination of political sociology, or political science, from the viewpoints of competing schools of social theory. He confronts the different paradigms with each other and shows them in the context of an historical process that embraces not only the progress of the science itself, but also the transformation of its external environment as a result of economic, political, and cultural changes.

hardcover, $10.00
paperback CN751, $3.95

POWER IT'S FORMS, BASES, AND USES DENNIS H. WRONG

Dennis Wrong offers a penetrating analysis of the elusive concept of power in social theory. He discusses a typology of diverse forms of power —authority, force, manipulation, etc.—then shows how the various forms blend and interact in real life. Exploring the concept of power, he shows how it can be used to examine the central issues of political sociology. In an important final chapter, he deals with power as a goal, and examines the roots in human nature of striving for power as a motive.

paperback CN702, $6.95

At your bookstore or from

Harper & Row
10 E. 53d St., New York 10022

Knowledge and experience...



America's Democracy

The Ideal and the Reality

Fred R. Harris, University of New Mexico
Available Now, 688 pages, illustrated, hardbound
With Instructor's Manual and Study Guide

in a stimulating and highly readable text for your introductory American government course. With:

- Thorough coverage of fundamental processes, institutions, and issues
- Focus on how government functions and why it functions as it does
- Positive emphasis on citizen participation
- Up-to-date, broad-ranging discussions of minority groups
- Topics seldom found in competing texts, including chapters on democracy and capitalism and political socialization
- High-interest material plus "How to . . ." manuals and eighteen issues-oriented Viewpoints
- Complete study aids, including bibliographies and comprehensive Glossary
- Handsome illustration program
- Invaluable supplements for you and your students

For further information write
Jennifer Toms, Department SA
1900 East Lake Avenue
Glenview, Illinois 60025

Scott, Foresman and Company

from F.E. PEACOCK PUBLISHERS, INC.

RECENT

THE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF POLITICS
By **Monte Palmer** and **William R. Thompson,** Florida State University

This book provides a coherent analysis of the diverse approaches to the comparative analysis of politics. It assesses the problems, advantages, and disadvantages of each of the approaches discussed. The authors then indicate how they might be applied to the explanation and prediction of political behavior and events.

It is suitable for undergraduate courses in comparative politics and/or comparative governments.
1978 / 317 pages / $11.50 cloth

INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
By **Robert D. Cantor,** Temple University

Presents the student with a clear and insightful picture of the international political arena and its relationship to domestic politics. The text is heavily illustrated.
1976 / 323 pages / $11.50 cloth

NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AND POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES
Edited by **Randall B. Ripley** and **Grace A. Franklin,** The Ohio State University

This book intended for courses in American Government, is organized to include the topics ordinarily discussed in that course. The readings offer insight into governmental institutions, the national policy process, and the substance of new policy areas.
1977 / 353 pages / $7.95 paper

F.E. PEACOCK PUBLISHERS, INC./ITASCA, IL 60143

from F.E. PEACOCK PUBLISHERS, INC.

NEW

DILEMMAS OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT: An Introduction to the Politics of the Developing Areas, Second Edition
By **Monte Palmer,** Florida State University

The second edition seeks to provide students with a critical introduction to diverse approaches to political development. It describes the difficult social, economic, and cultural milieu within which political leaders of developing states must operate.

The new edition, reflects increased availability of data. While the structure and framework of the first edition have been retained, new materials have been added in the areas of violence and dependency.
1980 / c.250 pages / c.$6.95 paper

TRENDS IN AMERICAN ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR
By **David B. Hill** and **Norman R. Luttbeg,** Texas A & M University

This book examines trends in the behavior and attitudes of the American electorate from 1952 to the present. Referring to the research of others, as well as their own, the authors trace changes in three trend areas: 1) partisanship or loyalty to party choice, 2) voter participation, 3) trust in political leaders and institutions.

Using data collected by the Survey Research Center/Center for Political Studies, the authors examine the scope of change in each area and attempt to identify any interrelationships among trends. Unlike many political scientists who have examined these data, the authors conclude that stability rather than change best describes the behavior of the electorate from 1952 to the present. The book challenges many commonly held beliefs about how the trend areas might be related. Despite the fact that the authors' conclusions are at variance with some advanced by other political analysts, the approach of the book is non-dogmatic. The conclusions of major researchers are considered in a complete historical review of electoral studies.
1980 / c.150 pages / c.$4.95 paper

F.E. PEACOCK PUBLISHERS, INC./ITASCA, IL 60143

THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR IN THE NEAR EAST

GREAT POWER CONFLICT AND DIPLOMACY IN IRAN, TURKEY, AND GREECE

Bruce R. Kuniholm

"This is definitely a significant contribution to the field. The principal significance lies in the integration of the long history and politics of the three countries and a detailed study of the specific events of the years 1945-1947. The regional emphasis also provides a valuable backdrop for understanding events since 1947. This study should be of broad interest. . . . The scholarship is careful and accurate."—*Gaddis Smith, Yale University*

Cloth, $27.50. Limited Paperback Edition, $10.50

PALESTINIAN SOCIETY AND POLITICS

Joel S. Migdal

Despite all the literature on the Arab-Israeli conflict in recent years, the contributors to this volume believe that a richer, more complex view of the interplay between Palestinian society and politics is necessary. Relying principally on archival sources and interviews, and using a variety of methodologies and analytic perspectives, these scholars focus on the changing nature of the Arab population in Palestine and the leadership to which that population looks. *Written under the auspices of the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University* Cloth, $20.00. Paperback, $6.95

BUREAUCRATIC REFORM IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

THE SUBLIME PORTE, 1789-1922

Carter V. Findley

Carter Findley studies the first independent, non-western attempt to modernize traditional administrative institutions in his examination of the most important bureaucratic organization in the late Ottoman Empire, the Sublime Porte. ". . . The most serious attempt to provide insights on the problems involving the modernization process of bureaucracies in Middle Eastern states. It is a remarkable path-breaking study of a very complex subject."—*Halil Inalcik, University of Chicago*

Princeton Studies on the Near East. Illus. $25.00

Write for our Asia/Africa/Middle East Studies Catalogue.

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

Princeton, New Jersey 08540

HOUGHTON MIFFLIN UPDATE:

Practicing Texas Politics
Fourth Edition

Eugene W. Jones, Angelo State University
Joe E. Ericson, Stephen F. Austin State University
Lyle C. Brown, Baylor University
Robert S. Trotter, Jr., El Centro College
About 576 pages / paper / Instructor's Manual
Study Guide by **Lyle C. Brown** and **Sidney E. Young**
Just published

The Fourth Edition of a highly successful text and reader, unmatched for concise coverage, variety of opinion, and reader interest. The authors examine Texas politics as it is at the start of the 1980s. About 90% of the readings are new.

Public Administration: Concepts and Cases, Second Edition

Richard J. Stillman, II
California State College, Bakersfield
About 432 pages / paper / Just published

To enable students to understand the relation between the theory and practice of public administration, Stillman systematically integrates important writings in the discipline's subfields with contemporary case studies. The Second Edition includes four new chapters: intergovernmental relations, policy analysis, government reorganization, and legislative oversight.

Global Politics

James Lee Ray, University of New Mexico
416 pages / Instructor's Manual / 1979

Ray's introduction to international relations focuses on three areas: post World War I history, scientific analysis, and the future.

Latin American Politics and Development

Howard J. Wiarda and **Harvey F. Kline**
Both of University of Massachusetts, Amherst
560 pages / 1979

A comprehensive study of Latin American politics embracing each country on the continent, isthmus, and in the Caribbean, with special emphasis on Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Cuba.

American Government: Policy and Process
Third Edition

Robert L. Morlan, University of Redlands
474 pages / paper / Instructor's Manual / 1979

In a highly readable style, Morlan concisely yet fully describes how the contemporary American political system works. Includes numerous case studies.

Conflict and Order: An Introduction to International Relations

Forest L. Grieves, University of Montana
409 pages / Instructor's Manual / 1977

Government and Leaders: An Approach to Comparative Politics

Edward Feit, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, et al.
552 pages / 1978

Before the Law: An Introduction to the Legal Process
Second Edition

John Bonsignore
University of Massachusetts, Amherst, et al.
545 pages / paper / 1979

For adoption consideration, request examination copies from your regional Houghton Mifflin office.

Houghton Mifflin

Dallas, TX 75234 / Geneva, IL 60134
Hopewell, NJ 08525 / Palo Alto, CA 94304
Boston, MA 02107

CHATHAM HOUSE

WITHER THE STATE?

POLITICS AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISE IN THREE COUNTRIES

IRA SHARKANSKY

A fascinating study of the growth of governmental institutions on the margins of the state in Australia, Israel, and the United States that is most appropriate for use in comparative courses in public policy and administration.

0-934540-00-4 $7.95 *paper* 0-934540-01-2 $9.95 *cloth*

ESSAYS IN PUBLIC FINANCE AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

STATE AND LOCAL PERSPECTIVES

EDITED BY JOHN E. PETERSEN AND CATHERINE L. SPAIN

Presents a reassessment of the appropriate and feasible roles of state and local governments as providers of services, as well as reevaluation of alternative methods of financing those services.

0-934540-03-9 $8.95 *paper*

PUBLIC POLICY

ISSUES, ANALYSIS, AND IDEOLOGY

EDITED BY ELLEN F. PAUL AND PHILIP A. RUSSO

Miami University

Diverse analyses of six policy issues that face the country: energy and the environment; welfare policy; national health policy; regulatory policy; equality and social justice; and, planning.

0-934540-04-7 $7.95 *paper*

COMPARATIVE POLITICS

INTRODUCTION TO THE POLITICS OF BRITAIN, FRANCE, GERMANY, AND THE SOVIET UNION

DAN N. JACOBS, DAVID P. CONRADT, B. GUY PETERS, AND WILLIAM SAFRAN

A major text for courses in comparative politics that includes cross-system analyses, it is scheduled for publication in late fall. Reserve your copy now!

0-934540-05-5 $9.95 *paper (tentative)*

PUBLISHERS, INC.

DO PARTIES MAKE A DIFFERENCE?

RICHARD ROSE, *University of Strathclyde*

A brilliant analysis of the past twenty years of public policy in Great Britain which tests adversary and consensus models of party government. It contains an innovative study of the effect that parties have upon the management of the economy and is appropriate for courses in British politics as well as comparative political parties.

0-934540-08-x $8.95 *paper*

MANAGING FISCAL STRESS

THE CRISIS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

EDITED BY CHARLES H. LEVINE, *University of Maryland*

Provides in-depth analyses of the causes and consequences of financial stress, and offers solutions for managers charged with the responsibility for maintaining fiscal solvency and adequate and equitable services.

0-934540-02-1 $9.95 *paper*

THE NO-RISK SOCIETY

YAIR AHARONI, *Tel-Aviv University*

A seminal work on the interplay between risk and productivity in both the private and public sectors, it will be widely used in courses in political economy and public policy.

0-934540-06-3 $8.95 *paper* 0-934540-07-1 $15.95 *cloth*

Chatham House Publishers proudly announces a new series of books in American politics, public policy, and public administration.

CHANGE IN AMERICAN POLITICS

EDITED BY AARON WILDAVSKY

University of California, Berkeley

For further information, contact: **Edward Artinian**, publisher,
CHATHAM HOUSE PUBLISHERS, INC.
Box One, Chatham, New Jersey 07928 TELEPHONE (201) 635-2059

HOOVER



Publication 228
ISBN: 0-8179-7281-1
915 pages
$20.00 cloth

THE UNITED STATES IN THE 1980s

Edited by
Peter Duignan *and* Alvin Rabushka

***Foreword by* W. Glenn Campbell**

"Thirty-two experts address major domestic and foreign policy questions that face the United States in the 1980s. . . . The authors analyze the central issues, describe the policy options open to the country, and recommend specific courses of action to deal with or mitigate the problems confronting the United States. Their findings offer a comprehensive statement for the United States to govern itself more effectively and to restore faith in the United States as the leader of the free world."

***—from the foreword by* W. Glenn Campbell**
Director, Hoover Institution

HOOVER INSTITUTION PRESS
Dept. A 7930 • Stanford University • Stanford, California 94305

(When ordering please include $1.50 postage)

ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Now in paperback


THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY
A Study of Order in World Politics
Hedley Bull
THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY Hedley Bull

"A masterful analysis of the problem of international order in contemporary society and the feasibility of alternative models."
—*Foreign Affairs*

"Bull has written that rarest of books; it is not the last, but the first word on its subject."
—*Political Science Quarterly*

THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY by Hedley Bull

$6.50 at better bookstores or direct from:
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS
136 South Broadway, Irvington, New York 10533

CAMBRIDGE

Comrades and Christians

Religion and Political Struggle in Communist Italy

David I. Kertzer

Kertzer draws on a year of participant-observation research conducted in a working-class quarter of Bologna in his study of the popular bases of Communist influence in Italy. He focuses on the struggle between the Catholic Church and the Communist Party for the people's allegiance, bringing out the implications of the situation for local-level tactics of the Church and Party, and showing how the people divide their allegiances between the competing claims of the two institutions.

Hardcover $24.95 Paper $6.95

The Politics of Grandeur

Ideological Aspects of de Gaulle's Foreign Policy

Philip G. Cerny

This book explores the link between de Gaulle's foreign and domestic policies through an examination of his political aims, style, and cultural context, by looking at French policy toward the Atlantic Alliance, and by assessing the impact of his foreign policy on domestic politics. Dr. Cerny suggests that de Gaulle's overriding aim was to establish a modern, effective state by strengthening national identification over and above the traditional divisions of French politics. $29.50

The Tragedy of Enlightenment

An Essay on the Frankfurt School

Paul Connerton

Connerton's work conveys an overall sense of the continuities and discontinuities in the concerns of the School, whose core members included Marcuse, Horkheimer, Adorno and, more recently, Jürgen Habermas. Connerton shows how the experience of Fascism shaped their interpretation of modern society as a whole and sets the work of these representative figures in the context of German intellectual history. *Cambridge Studies in the History and Theory of Politics* Hardcover $24.95 Paper $7.95

Natural Rights Theories

Their Origin and Development

Richard Tuck $24.50

Crisis and Legitimacy

The Administrative Process and American Government

James O. Freedman *Now in Paperback* $8.95

Supplying War

Logistics from Wallerstein to Patton

Martin van Creveld *Now in Paperback* $8.95

Cambridge University Press
32 East 57th Street, New York, N.Y. 10022

Money in Congressional Elections

Gary C. Jacobson

Here is a candid and revealing discussion of how money operates in the electoral politics of Congress. Based upon a wealth of data from the congressional elections of the 1970s, Jacobson draws important—and surprising—conclusions about the extent to which campaign spending determines success at the polls. Given the growing controversy over recent and proposed changes to the campaign finance laws, and especially in the light of the 1980 elections, this book is particularly significant.

"The most important book on campaign finance since Alex Heard's *Costs of Democracy* came out in 1960."—David R. Mayhew $15.00

Sweden: The Middle Way on Trial

Marquis W. Childs

Marquis Childs, a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist and author of the now-classic *Sweden: The Middle Way* takes another look at Sweden—forty years later—to see how well the "middle way" is faring in the 1970s. The Swedes, he finds, are grappling now with new problems, and the choices that must be made—about the costs of social welfare, about the distribution of wealth, and about developing nuclear power—are the choices that face the United States and other postindustrial states as well. Illus. $12.95

Human Rights and World Public Order

The Basic Policies of an International Law of Human Dignity

Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell, and Lung-chu Chen

"This is an immense work of scholarly excellence, perhaps the outstanding volume to date in the McDougal series that has been published by Yale. It is the most important work on human rights in the international law literature."—Richard Falk $45.00

Arrow's Theorem: The Paradox of Social Choice

A Case Study in the Philosophy of Economics

Alfred F. MacKay

"A deep and very subtle analysis of a first-class problem. It is careful, sensitive, and just in dealing with its main target: Kenneth Arrow's celebrated theorem. This theorem has generated a brilliantly technical literature over a period of nearly three decades. But none of the previous commentaries really did anything to dispel the sense of mystery and surprise in the theorem. Here, for the first time, I find a way to really *understand* the mystery, and I am grateful to MacKay for having taught it to me." —Douglas W. Rae, Yale University $14.50

Now available in paper

Democracy in Plural Societies

A Comparative Exploration

Arend Lijphart

"Here, once again, Arend Lijphart is directing our attention to matters which will surely engage much of the attention of students of comparative politics in the next decade." —G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *American Political Science Review* Cloth $18.50 Paper $5.95

Protest at Selma

Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Voting Rights Act of 1965

David J. Garrow

"An excellent fusion of important theoretical constructs with careful and thoughtful empirical analysis. . . . Useful for a variety of courses, e.g., political analysis, conflict resolution, and black politics."—*Choice*

Winner of the 1979 Chastain Award presented by the Southern Political Science Association
Illus. Cloth $20.00 Paper $5.95

Yale

Yale University Press
New Haven and London

THE SOCIAL SYSTEM
OF THE PLANET EARTH

*by Kenneth B. Boulding, University of Colorado,
Elise Boulding, Dartmouth College, and Guy M. Burgess,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology*

Innovative! Engaging! A unique interdisciplinary treatment of the world social system. A science fiction framework postulates the appearance of an extraterrestrial visitor who seeks knowledge of the Earth. Students get involved in organizing a research institute to gather and interpret data on population dynamics, history, religion, science, economics, social stratification, distribution of wealth, the international system, and more for this visitor.
AVAILABLE NOW (00207) paper 1980
Instructor's Manual *(00208)*

For complimentary copy consideration, write to Abigail Winslow. Be sure to mention course title, enrollment, and text now in use.

Social Science & Humanities Division
Addison-Wesley Publishing Company
Reading, Massachusetts 01867

CHANGING YOUR ADDRESS?

If you are planning a move, please fill in the form below and return it to the American Political Science Association, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. Address changes should be received at the Association by the 5th of the month to be included in the monthly update of the Association mailing list.

NAME____

OLD ADDRESS___________________________________

________________________________ **Zip**__________

NEW ADDRESS___________________________________

________________________________ **Zip**__________

NEW From Winthrop
Available for the Spring Semester–

Contemporary Political Ideologies: Movements and Regimes

Roy C. Macridis, Brandeis University

A comprehensive overview of major modern political ideologies, this lucid text traces the evolution of Democracy, Communism, and the Totalitarian Right from latency to actualization. Strong emphasis is placed on the role of the theoretical formulations that shape political forces and movements, regimes and institutions. Through Professor Macridis' presentation, students come to understand the dynamics of politics- change, revolution, evolution, policy-making, and authority structures.

Paper 304 pages 1980

The Logic of International Relations—Third Edition

Steven J. Rosen, senior research analyst, and
Walter S. Jones, University of Maryland

In what is rapidly becoming a standard text in International Relations, Professors Rosen and Jones present the specific points of view of major actors on the global scene. Its unique method of perceptual analysis allows students to view major global issues through the eyes of individual nations. The new Third Edition includes original analyses of Eurocommunism, international trade and exchange agreements, and relations among nuclear powers. Instructor's Manual available.

Paper 528 pages 1980

The American Political System: A Radical Approach—Second Edition

Edward S. Greenberg, University of Colorado

Professor Greenberg's text is the first to combine a Marxist approach to the study of American political life with a modern textbook learning format. As an introductory core text or as a supplement, it is remarkable for its straightforward, comprehensible presentation, its logical consistency, and its substantive treatment of political economics. The Second Edition represents a thorough revision of the first, with expanded coverage of institutional topics. Instructor's Manual available.

Paper 496 pages 1980

For further information, or to order
examination copies, please write
to Sara Black, Dept. 780

WINTHROP PUBLISHERS, INC.
17 Dunster St., Cambridge, Mass. 02138

The 1980 Political Forecast:

Democracy Under Pressure

An Introduction to the American Political System

Third Edition

MILTON C. CUMMINGS, Jr.
The Johns Hopkins University
DAVID WISE, author and political analyst

This leading introduction to American government provides a critical yet balanced examination of our political system—its achievements as well as its shortcomings—written in a style that is at once readable, authoritative, and thought-provoking. More than 50 boxed inserts (brief quotations from contemporary political science literature, news and committee reports, and political figures) provide pointed commentary on the text discussion, and a lavish illustration program of some 375 photographs, cartoons, graphs, and tables depicts the themes and events discussed throughout. **"The Third Edition is an informative, up-to-date, and readable account of our political system—a worthy successor to the first two editions. This is as fine an American government textbook as there is."**
Robert W. Langran, Villanova University

716 pages
Study Guide, Test Booklet with Lecture and Discussion Topics and Learning Objectives

The Fourth Edition of *Democracy Under Pressure* will be published in March 1981, and will incorporate an extensive analysis of the November 1980 election.



INDIA

Government and Politics in a Developing Nation

Third Edition

ROBERT L. HARDGRAVE, Jr.
University of Texas, Austin

This brief elementary textbook introduces students to the problems of political and economic development through a careful consideration of the political structure and processes of modern India. The Third Edition has been thoroughly revised to reflect recent events in India as well as the current position of India on the international scene. Topics treated in depth include the establishment of the Janata government, the state assembly elections of August 1979, the parliamentary elections of January 1980 and the return to power of Indira Gandhi, and India's recent economic progress.

Paperbound. 256 pages (probable)
Publication: April 1980

HARCOURT BRACE JOVANOVICH, INC.
New York • San Diego • Chicago • San Francisco • Atlanta

HBJ is the frontrunner



Public Opinion in American Politics

W. LANCE BENNETT
University of Washington

A thoughtful study of the impact of public opinion on American politics, this book gives major attention to such increasingly important topics as public opinion and the mass media, political symbolism and propaganda, and public opinion and political culture. The author provides a theoretical framework within which to consider how issues come to the attention of the public, what happens to issues as they proceed through the political system, and why public policy is more likely to shape public opinion than to be shaped by it. Concrete as well as theoretical, the book not only presents the major debates in the field but provides sound guidance in how to approach and examine these issues.

Paperbound. 448 pages
Just published

GOVERNING AMERICA
An Introduction

ROBERT SHERRILL, author and noted political journalist, in consultation with
JAMES DAVID BARBER, Duke University
BENJAMIN I. PAGE, University of Chicago
VIRGINIA W. JOYNER

Award-winning author Robert Sherrill *involves* beginning students in this fast-paced, concrete survey of the American political system. *Governing America* offers thorough, well-documented coverage of all aspects of government—from constitutional foundations through up-to-date analyses based on recent findings of political scientists. In addition, the book has a bright and appealing two-color design, richly illustrated with cartoons, charts, tables, and photographs. **"In course evaluations, my students gave very high marks to Governing America. It aroused their interest and was the kind of book they wanted to read."**
D. S. Roberts, Sr., University of Dubuque

654 pages
Study Guide, Test Booklet with Learning Objectives and Lecture and Discussion Topics

HBJ

HARCOURT BRACE JOVANOVICH, INC.
New York • San Diego • Chicago • San Francisco • Atlanta

PRAEGER BOOKS

...sheds light on the causes and meanings of political events...

MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICS

edited by RICHARD W. WILSON and GORDON J. SCHOCHET,
Rutgers University
Available now! *ca. 400 pp. ISBN 0-03-052146-7 $24.95*

"A very thorough treatment...well written...highly recommended."- Choice

PRIVACY, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY

DAVID M. O'BRIEN, University of Virginia
Foreword by Professor C. Herman Pritchett
278 pp. 1979 LC 79-14131 ISBN 0-03-050406-6 $21.95

...in-depth coverage of current Soviet politics and policy...

SOVIET POLITICS IN THE BREZHNEV ERA

edited by DONALD R. KELLEY, Mississippi State University
Available now! *ca. 325 pp. LC 79-24741 ISBN 0-03-046626-1 $21.95*
Text Edition: ISBN 0-03-046621-0 $9.95

---

more from Praeger...

WHY GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS FAIL

Improving Policy Implementation
JAMES S. LARSON, Drake University
130 pp. March 1980 LC 79-26917 ISBN 0-03-053956-0 ca. $18.95

PARTY RENEWAL IN AMERICA

Theory and Practice
edited by GERALD M. POMPER, Rutgers University
ca. 235 pp. April 1980 LC 79-25184 ISBN 0-03-052991-3 ca. $19.95

PRAEGER
Praeger Publishers, CBS Educational and Professional Publishing, A Division of
CBS, Inc., 521 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017

New Books for the Political Scientist

The Jury: Its Role in American Society
Rita J. Simon, University of Illinois
176 pp. ISBN 0-669-02086-9 $18.95

Government Requirements of Small Business
Roland J. Cole and **Philip D. Tegeler,**
Battelle Human Affairs Research Center
192. pp ISBN 0-669-03307-3 $18.95

Nuclear Power and Legal Advocacy
The Environmentalists and the Courts
Constance Ewing Cook, Albion College
176 pp. ISBN 0-669-03441-x $17.95

Political Development and Social Change in Libya
Omar I. El Fathaly,
Arab Development Institute,
and **Monte Palmer**
The Florida State University
240 pp. ISBN 0-669-01427-3 $21.95

U.S. International Aviation Policy
Nawal K. Taneja,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Foreword by **Alan S. Boyd**
192 pp. ISBN 0-669-03320-0 $20.95

Policy Implementation in the Federal System
National Goals and Local Implementors
Carl E. Van Horn, Rutgers University
192 pp. ISBN 0-669-02435-x $18.95

Taking the Fifth
The Supreme Court and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
Mark Berger, University of Missouri
304 pp. ISBN 0-669-02339-6 $23.95

Regulating the Professions
A Public-Policy Symposium
edited by **Roger D. Blair** and
Stephen Rubin, University of Florida
336 pp. ISBN 0-669-03094-5 $27.95

Citizen Participation in the Public Schools
Robert H. Salisbury,
Washington University
240 pp. ISBN 0-669-03198-4 $23.95

Constitutions, Taxation, and Land Policy: Volume I
Abstracts of Federal and State Constitutional Constraints on the Power of Taxation Relating to Land-Planning Policy
Michael M. Bernard, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy
Foreword by **Arlo Woolery**
176 pp. ISBN 0-669-02822-1 $16.95

Constitutions, Taxation, and Land Policy: Volume II
Discussion and Analysis of Federal and State Constitutional Constraints on the Use of Taxation as an Instrument of Land-Planning Policy
ISBN 0-669-03462-2
Available Spring 1980

Women and Educational Leadership
edited by **Sari Knopp Biklen,**
The Education Designs Group, and
Marilyn Brannigan, Syracuse University
288 pp. ISBN 0-669-03216-6 $22.95

The American Prosecutor: A Search for Identity
Joan E. Jacoby, Bureau of Social Science Research, Inc.
336 pp. ISBN 0-669-03291-3 $28.95

American Security Policy and Policy-Making
The Dilemmas of Using and Controlling Military Force
edited by **Robert Harkavy,**
The Pennsylvania State University, and
Edward A. Kolodziej, University of Illinois
A Policy Studies Organization Book
ISBN 0-669-01998-4
Available Spring 1980

HEATH
Lexington Books
D. C. Heath and Company
125 Spring Street
Lexington, MA 02173
(617) 862-6650 (212) 924-6460
Call our toll-free number
(800) 428-9292

Lexington Books

Please write for our full catalog.

From North Carolina

Holding Fast the Inner Lines
Democracy, Nationalism, and the Committee on Public Information
Stephen L. Vaughn
"Will supersede all past work on the Committee on Public Information."
—Arthur Link
Supplementary Volume to *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson*
$21.00

Prejudice and the Old Politics
The Presidential Election of 1928
Allan J. Lichtman
"Provides a fresh approach and an exquisite blend of political theory, quantitative analysis, and historical interpretation."
—*Library Journal*
$20.00

The Making of Tocqueville's Democracy in America
James T. Schleifer
"A masterful job that will long stand as an essential guide for every student of Tocqueville."—Edmund S. Morgan
$26.00

A Theory of Political Decision Modes
Intraparty Decision Making in Switzerland
Jürg Steiner and Robert H. Dorff
"A work of great rigor and imaginativeness."—Gabriel A. Almond
$19.50

Strategic Implications of the All-Volunteer Force
The Conventional Defense of Central Europe
Kenneth J. Coffey
"Clearly the best treatment of the complex issues involved in the end of conscription and the emergence of the new all-volunteer force."—Morris Janowitz
$15.00 cloth, $9.00 paper
Studies on Armed Forces and Society

Rolling Thunder
Understanding Policy and Program Failure
James Clay Thompson
"An honest inside account of the failure of one of the most ambitious bombing campaigns of the Vietnam War that also makes clear why the American military inevitably repeats its failures."
—Seymour M. Hersh
$14.00 cloth, $6.50 paper

The University of North Carolina Press
Post Office Box 2288
Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27514

DECISIONS IN CRISIS

Israel 1967 and 1973

Michael Brecher

"A landmark in the literature on international crisis. In illuminating the perceptions and behavior of a particular state in crisis, Brecher has also made a major contribution to the fields of foreign policy, decision-making, and the broad dynamics of conflict and war. *Decisions in Crisis* will be required reading for all persons interested in international relations and contemporary world problems." —*Robert C. North*

"A major achievement." —*Ernst B. Haas*
$24.95

THE ROAD

Indian Tribes and Political Liberty

Russel Lawrence Barsh and James Youngblood Henderson

Congress and the courts have felt free to act without principle or consistency in matters affecting Indian tribes, Barsh and Henderson argue, partly because the political status of tribes has been regarded as unique. The authors rethink the problem of the political and legal identity of tribes in the broad context of American federalism. *The Road* traces the equivocal application of ideas of political liberty and self-government to tribes since Colonial times. And it offers a practical program for securing limited tribal autonomy according to long-standing Constitutional principles.
$14.95

TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY, ISLAM, AND REBELLION

A Study of Indonesian Political Behavior

Karl D. Jackson

Jackson's analysis of the Dar'ul Islam rebellion in West Java takes the uprising as a laboratory for examining rarely tested theories of peasant political behavior, interviewing participants themselves, and in the process undermining many assumptions about peasant rebellion. His major finding is that political integration in a society such as that of West Java depends primarily on the system of traditional authority relations that animates village social life and connects each village with the outer world.
$20.00

THE LAST PHASE OF THE EAST ASIAN WORLD ORDER

Korea, Japan, and the Chinese Empire, 1860-1882

Key-Hiuk Kim

Kim examines the process by which China, Japan, and Korea altered their traditional conduct of relations with one another in response to the intrusion of the Western powers in East Asia. His account questions numerous interpretations of the historical record that have enjoyed general acceptance.
$20.00

At bookstores
University of California Press
Berkeley 94720

Economic Impact Analysis
Methodology and Applications

Saul Pleeter, editor
A practical discussion of the attributes and applications of the various models available for use for economic impact analysis, as well as actual examples of analyses done by some of the leading practitioners in the field.

1980, cloth, 224 pp.
$19.95/Dfl. 45.00

New from Martinus Nijhoff Publishing

Welfare Economics and Social Choice Theory

Allan M. Feldman
"Is a particular economic or voting mechanism good or bad for society?" Feldman's book examines this question by exploring the major topics of welfare economics and social choice theory.

1980, cloth, 256 pp.,
$26.00 / Dfl. 60.00
(paper $12.00)

Administered Politics
Elite Political Culture in Sweden

Thomas J. Anton
The dilemma of how reformist policies can be reconciled with the presumed conservatism of public bureaucrats is explored in this study of the Swedish political elite.

1980, cloth, 203 pp.,
$19.95 / Dfl. 43.90

Multinationals in Canada
Theory, Performance, and Economic Impact

Alan M. Rugman
The new theory of internalization is here applied to a case study of multinational enterprises operating in Canada. Rugman finds no evidence of excess profits after adjusting for risk, and is critical of regulations and controls placed on multinationals which reduce their efficiency.

1980, cloth, 208 pp.,
$18.95 / Dfl. 42.50



World Communism at the Crossroads
Military Ascendancy, Political Economy, and Human Welfare

Steven S. Rosefielde
This collection of essays documents the newly attained military ascendancy of the Communist bloc, and attempts to analyze the aspects of communist political economy which have made this achievement possible, and to assess how the issue of human welfare fits into the tapestry of communist development.

1980, cloth, 336 pp.,
$19.95 / Dfl. 45.00

To order, or to request a free catalog, please write to:

Martinus Nijhoff Publishing
Suite 44A
160 Old Derby St.
Hingham, MA 02043

Orders from outside North America should be sent to:

Martinus Nijhoff Publishers BV
Lange Voorhout 9-11
P.O. Box 566
2501 CN The Hague
The Netherlands

Individual orders must be prepaid.
Prices are subject to change.

Little, Brown's Comparative Politics List Is Beyond Compare. . .

NEW **COMPARATIVE POLITICS TODAY: A WORLD VIEW,** Second Edition
Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., General Editors; Frederick C. Barghoorn, Lewis J. Edinger, Henry W. Ehrmann, Charles W. Gossett, Richard Rose, Robert E. Scott, and James R. Townsend
Cloth/c. 656 pages/$15.95 tentative/Instructor's Manual
This popular introductory text compares and evaluates the politics of modern nations using a representative range of country studies. Its thoroughly updated Second Edition includes a wealth of timely new material.

NEW **THE CIVIC CULTURE REVISITED,** edited by Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba
Paper/c. 432 pages/$7.95 tentative
This retrospective evaluation of the authors' 1963 work, THE CIVIC CULTURE, includes chapters by nine political scientists as well as introductory and concluding essays by the original authors.

NEW **POLITICS IN ENGLAND,** Third Edition, by Richard Rose
Paper/c. 448 pages/$7.95 tentative
Updated to include the 1979 elections and England's prospects for the 1980's, this analysis of contemporary British politics remains cogent and readable.

NEW **POLITICS IN CHINA,** Second Edition, by James R. Townsend
Paper/c. 400 pages/$7.95 tentative
This survey of Chinese political history now covers events through the spring of 1979, with a new periodization of history, a new assessment of the Maoist model, and a stronger emphasis on the international context of Chinese politics.

POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, by James A. Bill and Carl Leiden
Paper/418 pages/$7.95/1979

COMPARING LEGISLATURES, by Gerhard Loewenberg and Samuel C. Patterson
Paper/344 pages/$7.95/1979

COLLEGE DIVISION
LITTLE, BROWN AND COMPANY
34 Beacon Street, Boston, Massachusetts 02106

This Is The New
American Government Text
Everyone's Talking About


Robert L. Lineberry
Government in America
People, Politics and Policy

Robert L. Lineberry's **GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA: PEOPLE, POLITICS AND POLICY** offers thorough, balanced coverage of political behavior, processes, and institutions in a unique and timely manner. By focusing on three significant policy arenas — equality, the economy, and energy/environment — Lineberry provides students with a useful, integrative framework for study.

Be sure to see this book.

cloth/c. 624 pages/$15.95 tentative
Study Guide and complimentary Instructor's Manual also available

Not To Mention...

NEW **POLITICS AND POLICY IN STATES AND COMMUNITIES,** by John J. Harrigan
★ Cloth/c. 512 pages/$13.95 tentative/Instructor's Manual
This new text for state and local government courses covers political institutions, key public policy areas, and the politics of policy making and implementation.

THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN CITIES: PRIVATE POWER AND PUBLIC POLICY, by Dennis R. Judd. Paper/402 pages/$9.95/1979
This unusual book covers traditional topics in urban politics and explores how the public and private sectors work together in allocating urban resources.

NEW **PARTY POLITICS IN AMERICA,** Fourth Edition, by Frank J. Sorauf
★ Cloth/c. 464 pages/$14.95 tentative/Instructor's Manual
The Fourth Edition of this popular and comprehensive survey of the American party system includes new discussions of parties in the 19th century and the contemporary issue of party decline.

NEW **AMERICAN PARTIES IN DECLINE,** by William J. Crotty and Gary Jacobson
★ Paper/c. 200 pages/$4.95 tentative/available in April
This brief paperback offers a thought-provoking analysis of party decline and its implications for our political system in changing social and political times.

COLLEGE DIVISION
LITTLE, BROWN AND COMPANY
34 Beacon Street, Boston, Massachusetts 02106

★

As Well As...

NEW **PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: THE PEOPLE'S BUSINESS,** by J. D. Williams
Cloth/c. 576 pages/$14.95 tentative/Instructor's Manual
This lively text covers traditional topics in public administration while emphasizing that a successful manager must understand *people* as well as organizational and administrative principles.

NEW **THE STATE OF THE PRESIDENCY,** Second Edition, by Thomas E. Cronin
Paper/c. 416 pages/$7.95 tentative
In the Second Edition of his brilliant appraisal of the Presidency, Cronin includes timely new material and two new chapters on the presidential selection process and presidential leadership.

THE BASICS OF AMERICAN POLITICS, Second Edition, by Gary Wasserman
Paper/268 pages/$7.95/Instructor's Manual/1979
This concise introduction to American national politics explains concepts clearly to students with no prior background; brief case studies enliven the presentation.

BEHIND THE SCENES IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: PERSONALITIES AND POLITICS, Second Edition, by Peter Woll. Paper/335 pages/$7.95/Instructor's Manual/1979
This well-liked American Government reader probes the impact of the personal style of political leaders on the political process and public policy; its twenty-one popular selections are by best-selling authors.

And Last But Not Least...

SPEAKING TRUTH TO POWER: THE ART AND CRAFT OF POLICY ANALYSIS, by Aaron Wildavsky. Cloth/431 pages/$14.95/1979
This provocative book explores the "art and craft" of policy analysis through a lucid discussion of public policies: their underlying logic, their effectiveness, and their future.

THE POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS, Third Edition, by Aaron Wildavsky
Paper/311 pages/$6.95/1979
The latest edition of this acknowledged classic goes beyond the mere mechanics of budgeting by analyzing the *politics* of budgeting; two new chapters cover zero-based budgeting and the latest congressional reforms.

REASON IN LAW, by Lief H. Carter. Paper/258 pages/$6.95/1979
In this readable treatment of legal thinking, the author develops criteria for evaluating the quality of legal reasoning, emphasizing throughout the creative and discretionary nature of legal choices.

JUDGES AND JUSTICES: THE FEDERAL APPELLATE JUDICIARY, by John R. Schmidhauser
Paper/248 pages/$6.95/1979
In this comprehensive analysis of the personnel, procedures, and interactions of the federal appellate judiciary, Professor Schmidhauser explores the functioning of the Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeal.

POLITICAL THINKING: THE PERENNIAL QUESTIONS, Third Edition, by Glenn Tinder
Paper/212 pages/$4.95/1979
This well known and widely used book engages students in political thinking by posing 31 classic questions, essential to the nature of politics, that have been asked since the days of Socrates.

COLLEGE DIVISION
LITTLE, BROWN AND COMPANY
34 Beacon Street, Boston, Massachusetts 02106

TEACHING

WITH COMPETING IDEAS

POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE EIGHTIES

edited by Robert A. Goldwin

Provocative essays on party reforms since 1968, what the consequences have been, and what the future is likely to be. The authors—some played leading roles in fashioning the reforms—present sharply opposed views. This is a book full of solid information and sustained political controversy.

AUTHORS: Edward C. Banfield • Benjamin Barber • Ken Bode
James W. Ceaser • Donald M. Fraser • Robert Licht
Nelson W. Polsby **$6.25**

BUREAUCRATS, POLICY ANALYSTS, STATESMEN: WHO LEADS?

edited by Robert A. Goldwin

Essays on problems and prospects for leadership in a modern mass democracy. Are bureaucrats and policy analysts indispensable aides in a complex world, or do they ultimately make political leadership impossible? Both views—and many others—are argued forcefully from the vantage points of the academian, policy analyst, journalist, and political appointee in this volume of informative controversy.

AUTHORS: Edward C. Banfield • Werner J. Dannhauser
Michael J. Malbin • Mark H. Moore • Gustave H. Shubert
Laurence H. Silberman • Herbert J. Storing **$6.25**

Robert A. Goldwin, Resident Scholar and Director of Constitutional Studies at AEI, is the editor of many volumes of essays, used widely as introductory texts or supplementary readings in the classroom—among them: **POLITICAL PARTIES, USA • A NATION OF STATES • LEFT, RIGHT, AND CENTER • A NATION OF CITIES • ON CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE.**

Published by the American Enterprise Institute, **POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE EIGHTIES** and **BUREAUCRATS, POLICY ANALYSTS, STATESMEN: WHO LEADS?** will be available in the Spring. To reserve your examination copy of one or both, send your name and address to:

American Enterprise Institute
Department 225 "Examination Copy"
1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

AEI

DORSEY
POLITICAL
SCIENCE
TEXTS

Designed
For Your
Students

A MORE PERFECT UNION: Introduction to American Government

Samuel C. Patterson, University of Iowa, **Roger H. Davidson,** University of California, Santa Barbara, and **Randall B. Ripley,** The Ohio State University

This text provides a solid grounding in American constitutional and political development since colonial times. Central to the text is a presentation of the structure and operation of the major political institutions in American society—the electoral system, political parties, interest groups, the Presidency, the Congress, and the Courts.

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND AMERICAN POLITICS: Voters, Candidates, and Campaigns Since 1952, Revised Edition *(paperbound)*

Herbert B. Asher, The Ohio State University

CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT TODAY: Politics of Reform *(paperbound)*

Charles G. Bell, California State University, Fullerton, and
Charles M. Price, California State University, Chico

PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN POLITICS: Coalition Strategies and Citizen Response *(paperbound)*

John H. Kessel, The Ohio State University

THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS

Wallace Mendelson, University of Texas at Austin

CONGRESS, THE BUREAUCRACY, AND PUBLIC POLICY, Revised Edition *(paperbound)*

Randall B. Ripley and **Grace A. Franklin,** both of The Ohio State University

Examination copies for adoption consideration available on request; please indicate course title and text presently used.

THE DORSEY PRESS, Homewood, Illinois 60430

MULTIPLE DIMENSIONS OF INTERNATIONAL ISSUES


ABC POL SCI
A Bibliography of Contents: Political Science & Government

ABC POL SCI

provides easy access to events, ideas, people

The current periodical coverage of political science and government is easily researched through ABC POL SCI, Bibliography of Contents: Political Science and Government. ABC POL SCI is a rapid access tool that features the tables of contents of more than 300 international journals. The new subject index places the multiple dimensions of international affairs, economics, the law, social sciences, and current affairs at your fingertips. Published six times a year with a cumulative annual index.

ABC POL SCI takes the search out of research.

Write for subscription rates to:

ABC CLIO **Riviera Campus, 2040 A.P.S.**
Box 4397, Santa Barbara CA 93103

ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NATING WORLD OF POLITICS THE FASC
OF POLITICS **THE** FASCINATING WORL
LITICS THE **FASCINATING WORLD OF**
INATING WORLD OF **POLITICS** THE FA

DYNAMICS OF AMERICAN POLITICS, Second Edition
Raymond E. Wolfinger, Martin Shapiro,
both of University of California-Berkeley
Fred L. Greenstein, Princeton University

For introductory courses in American government, this newly revised edition contains added chapters on federalism, civil rights and liberties. Major reorganization of chapters on policymaking, evaluation, intellectual context of politics, public opinion, and interest groups. Simpler, clearer writing style throughout. All statistical material has been updated, and the 1976 and 1978 elections are used in all relevant chapters.
1980 **704 pp. (est.)** **Cloth $15.50**

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, Second Edition
Nicholas Henry, Arizona State University

Extensive revision of a "best-selling" text examines the impact of public administration on substantive issues of public affairs. Deals expressly with **current, critical issues** and approaches the field from the viewpoint of both citizen and bureaucrat. Provides a logical, succinct introduction to organization theory, systems theory, policy evaluation, management science, and ethics in government.
1980 **528 pp.** **Cloth $14.95**

GOVERNING AT THE GRASSROOTS: State and Local Politics
Nicholas Henry, Arizona State University

Unusually **lively** survey and synthesis of the facts, people, and issues of state and local government. Explores, in detail, the dramatic realms of state and local politics, and offers as major themes topics that are either not present or discussed only peripherally in most other texts (e.g. politicians as social-psychological actors, suburban politics, politics of bureaucracies, regional politics, policy as a conflict between social classes). Highly creative, interesting examples and analogies.
1980 **512 pp.** **Cloth $14.95**

TODAY'S ISMS, Eighth Edition
William Evenstein
Revised by **Edwin Fogelman,** University of Minnesota

A new edition of a **leading book in its field** – praised for its clarity and factual accuracy in presenting a comprehensive overview of the major 20th century economic and political systems. Systematically describes and compares the main doctrines of communism, facism, capitalism and socialism, and explores and compares how societies based on these doctrines actually work. Helps to clarify **what is at issue** (in terms of both ideology and alternative ways of life) among the four major systems.
1980 **384 pp. (est.)** **Cloth $10.95**
Paper $ 7.95

Prentice-Hall

RICAN POLITICS **AMERICAN POLITICS**
POLITICS **FOREIGN POLITICS** FOREIGN
EMS COURT SYSTEMS **COURT SYSTEMS**
ARTY SYSTEMS **PARTY SYSTEMS** PARTY S

COURTS & POLITICS: The Federal Judicial System
Howard Ball, Mississippi State University
1980 336 pp. (est.) Paper $8.95

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: Principles and Issues, Second Edition
A. LeRoy Bennett, University of Delaware
1980 544 pp. Cloth $14.95

POLITICAL PARTIES: An Introduction
Robert H. Blank, University of Idaho
1980 432 pp. (est.) Cloth $13.95

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: A Contemporary Introduction
Thomas L. Brewer, Eastern Michigan University
1980 304 pp. (est.) Paper $9.95

INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, Third Edition
William D. Coplin, Syracuse University
1980 368 pp. (est.) Cloth $14.95

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
James Fesler, Yale University
1980 416 pp. (est.) Cloth $15.95

THE PARTY SYSTEM IN AMERICA
William Goodman, (Emeritus) Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville
1980 288 pp. (est.) Paper $7.95

THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF WEST GERMANY, FRANCE, & BRITAIN
Wolfram F. Hanrieder, University of California-Santa Barbara
Graeme P. Auton, Whitman College
1980 336 pp. (est.) Paper $9.95

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: Ideals and Reality
Abraham Holtzman, North Carolina State University
1980 464 pp. (est.) Paper $11.95

POLITICAL PARTIES, INTEREST GROUPS, & PUBLIC POLICY: Group Influence in American Politics
Dennis S. Ippolito and **Thomas G. Walker,** both of Emory University
1980 528 pp. (est.) Cloth $13.95

Prentice-Hall

PRENTICE-HALL **WE** PRENTICE-HALL PRE
PRENTICE-HALL **HAVE IT ALL** PRENTICE-
PRENTICE-HALL **FOR** PRENTICE-HALL PR
PRENTICE-HALL **1980** PRENTICE-HALL PR

CRIME AND JUSTICE IN URBAN AMERICA
Herbert Jacob, Northwestern University
1980 **192 pp. (est.)** **Paper $7.95**

CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
William J. Keefe, University of Pittsburgh
1980 **192 pp. (est.)** **Paper $6.95**

PUBLIC PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT: Contexts and Strategies
Donald E. Klingner, Indiana University
1980 **512 pp. (est.)** **Cloth $16.95**

THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS, Second Edition
Charles E. Lindblom, Yale University
1980 **160 pp. (est.)** **Paper $5.95**

THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF POLITICS, Second Edition
David Roth; Frank L. Wilson, Purdue University
1980 **592 pp. (est.)** **Cloth $16.50**

THE CRAFT OF POLITICAL RESEARCH, Second Edition
W. Phillips Shively, University of Minnesota
1980 **192 pp. (est.)** **Paper $7.95**

THE PRESIDENCY: An Introduction
Robert J. Sickels, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque
1980 **352 pp. (est.)** **Paper $9.95**

CONTEMPORARY CHINESE POLITICS: An Introduction
James C. F. Wang, University of Hawaii at Hilo
1980 **384 pp. (est.)** **Paper $9.95**

For further information, or to order or reserve examination copies, please write:
Robert Jordan, Dept. J-614, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, NJ 07632
For "SUPER-QUICK" service, dial TOLL FREE (800) 526-0485* between 9:00 a.m.-4:30 p.m. EST, Mon.-Fri.
*not applicable in New Jersey, Alaska, Hawaii, or Puerto Rico.

Prentice-Hall

Announcing

the Formation

of

The Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management

THIS ASSOCIATION has been created for the purpose of encouraging excellence in research, teaching, and practice in the field of public policy analysis and management, including decisionmaking and policymaking theory, quantitative and other methods for analyzing public policies and their implementation and management, as well as the application of policy analytic theory and methods to substantive policy problems.

IT IS an individual membership organization, founded by public policy programs at the University of California at Berkeley, Carnegie-Mellon University, the University of Chicago, Columbia University, Duke University, Harvard University, the University of Michigan, the University of Minnesota, the State University of New York at Stony Brook, the University of Pennsylvania, Princeton University, The Rand Graduate Institute, Syracuse University, the University of Texas, and Vanderbilt University; public management programs at Boston University and Yale University; and the Brookings Institution, Mathematica Policy Research, Inc., and The Urban Institute.

THE ASSOCIATION plans to convene an annual Research Conference, to publish a journal of record, and to sponsor other activities designed to foster interaction among those trained in the several disciplines and professions who have a major interest in public policy analysis and management.

THIS ANNOUNCEMENT is intended also to constitute a call for proposals from those researchers wishing to be considered for invitation to present a paper at the 1980 Research Conference, to be held in Boston on October 24th and 25th. Those interested should send their proposals no later than March 1, 1980, to Professor Richard Zeckhauser, 1980 Research Conference Program Chairman. His address is John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138.

RESEARCHERS, PRACTITIONERS, teachers and students who are interested in joining the Association may do so by writing Professor Jared Hazelton, Treasurer of APPAM, Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of Texas, Austin, TX 78712, and attaching a check for 1979-1980 dues ($20.00 for individuals and $10.00 for students). Members automatically receive the Association's Annual Research Volume consisting of selected papers presented at the annual Research Conference. Please note that the annual dues after 1979-1980 are expected to be perhaps as much as double the amount this year, in order to reflect the charge to be made for the journal of record, once it begins publication.

PLEASE NOTE that institutional memberships are also available. Those interested in exploring such affiliation should write Professor Joel L. Fleishman, President, APPAM, Institute of Policy Sciences and Public Affairs, Duke University, Durham, NC 27706.

SETUPS

Supplementary Empirical Teaching Units in Political Science

SETUPS* are Supplementary Empirical Teaching Units in Political Science on topics taught in courses on American Politics, Comparative Politics and World Politics. **SETUPS** introduce students to data analysis and to using computers for political research.

Each SETUPS Includes a Monograph and a Dataset

The monograph is a 5½" x 8½" paperback of approximately 100 pages with:

- A substantive essay on the topic.
- Analytical exercises.
- Instructions about how to do the exercises.
- Suggestions for further readings and exercises.
- A codebook for the dataset.

The dataset is drawn from data collected for one or more recent research studies in political science.

Titles

American Politics

SETUPS for courses in American Government, Political Behavior, Methodology, and Public Policy.

Voting Behavior: The 1976 Election
by Bruce D. Bowen, C. Anthony Broh, Charles L. Prysby.

Political Participation by F. Christopher Arterton, Harlan Hahn.

The Supreme Court in American Politics: Policy Through Law
by John Paul Ryan, C. Neal Tate.

Political Socialization Across the Generations
by Paul Allen Beck, Jere W. Bruner, L. Douglas Dobson.

Representation in the United States Congress: 1973
by Ray A. Geigle and Peter J. Hartjens.

The Dynamics of Political Budgeting: A Public Policy Simulation
by Marvin K. Hoffman.

The Fear of Crime by Wesley G. Skogan and William R. Klecka.

Cross-National and World Politics

Comparative Voting Behavior by Herbert B. Asher, Bradley Richardson.

Comparative Budgeting: Policy and Process
by John Creighton Campbell and John M. Echols.

The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Decision-Making Game by Karen Ann Feste.

Are Political Values Really Changing? by Charles Taylor.

Comparing Political Parties by Robert Harmel with Kenneth Janda.

To Order SETUPS

Order the **SETUPS** monographs from the American Political Science Association through your bookstore. Ask your bookstore to include your name when they place the **SETUPS** order with APSA. When we confirm the bookstore order, we will send you a data specification form if your school does not have the appropriate **SETUPS** dataset already.

SETUPS datasets are prepared and distributed by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. **SETUPS** data can be ordered for use with SPSS, OSIRIS or as card image.

Each **SETUPS** will cost $4.25. Lower prices are arranged for bulk orders.

***SETUPS** were developed originally by faculty in workshops supported by grants from the National Science Foundation to the American Political Science Association and hosted by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. New **SETUPS** are being written by social scientists working at their own institutions.

Guides to Resources for Teaching and Research
for Faculty and Students

Instructional Resource Monographs

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: PUBLICATIONS AND REFERENCES

A Guide to Library Sources in Political Science: American Government by Clement E. Vose

PERSONALIZED INSTRUCTION

PSI and Political Science: Using the Personalized System of Instruction to Teach American Politics
edited by Ralph B. Earle, Jr.

SIMULATIONS AND GAMES

Simple Simulation II
edited by Charles Walcott

INTERACTIVE TEACHING AND TECHNOLOGY

Computer-Assisted Instruction in Political Science
edited by Jonathan Pool

USING CENSUS DATA

U.S. Census Data for Political and Social Research: A Resource Guide

U.S. Census Data for Political and Social Research: A Manual for Students
both by Phyllis G. Carter

COMPUTERS: TECHNOLOGY AND APPLICATIONS

Using Computers
by Jerome M. Clubb and Michael W. Traugott

Order Form

_____ **A Guide to Library Sources in Political Science: American Government** by Clement E. Vose ($4.00 paperback, $6.50 hard cover).

_____ **PSI and Political Science: Using the Personalized System of Instruction to Teach American Politics** edited by Ralph B. Earle, Jr. ($3.50 paperback).

_____ **Simple Simulation II** edited by Charles Walcott ($4.00 paperback).

_____ **Computer-Assisted Instruction in Political Science** edited by Jonathan Pool ($4.00 paperback).

_____ **U.S. Census Data for Political and Social Research: A Resource Guide** by Phyllis G. Carter ($4.00, or $2.50 when accompanied by a note that 10 or more copies will be ordered by student.)

_____ **U.S. Census Data for Political and Social Research: Students Manual** by Phyllis G. Carter ($2.50 paperback).

_____ **Using Computers** by Jerome M. Clubb and Michael W. Traugott ($3.50 paperback).

Name _______________

Address _______________

City/State/Zip _______________

Send form prepaid to:
Educational Affairs
American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Liberty*Press*
Liberty*Classics*



Democracy and Leadership

By Irving Babbitt

A penetrating work of political and moral philosophy, first published in 1924, *Democracy and Leadership* is packed with wisdom. Irving Babbitt was a distinguished professor of French literature at Harvard and a leader of the intellectual movement called American Humanism. This was his only directly political book, and in it Babbitt applies the principles of humanism to the civil social order. He summarizes the principal political philosophies; contrasts Rousseau with Burke; describes true and false liberals; distinguishes between ethical individualism and destructive egoism; and stands up for work and duty. *Democracy and Leadership* joins the broken links between politics and morals—and that accomplishment marks it as a work of genius. With a foreword by Russell Kirk. Hardcover $9.00, Softcover $4.00.

We pay postage, but require prepayment, on orders from individuals. Please allow four to six weeks for delivery. To order this book, or for a copy of our catalog, write:
Liberty*Press*/Liberty*Classics*
7440 North Shadeland, Dept. 440
Indianapolis, Indiana 46250

Liberty*Press*
Liberty*Classics*

The Politicization of Society

Edited by Kenneth S. Templeton, Jr.

"The state has increasingly replaced the church in determining how we should behave," writes Oxford professor R. M. Hartwell in his introduction. "Politics is now religion." Fourteen scholars examine the central problem of modern society—the growth of the state—and its significance for the individual. They are Robert L. Carneiro, Felix Morley, Murray N. Rothbard, William Marina, Robert A. Nisbet, Jacques Ellul, Giovanni Sartori, Michael Oakeshott, Donald M. Dozer, Herbert Butterfield, John A. Lukacs, Jonathan R. T. Hughes, Butler D. Shaffer, and F. A. Hayek. Hardcover $10.00. Paperback $4.50.

We pay postage, but require prepayment, on orders from individuals. Please allow four to six weeks for delivery. To order this book, or for a copy of our catalog, write:
Liberty*Press*/Liberty*Classics*
7440 North Shadeland, Dept. 442
Indianapolis, Indiana 46250